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PREFACE .
The mystery of th
e





property more than any other part o
f
the law student ' s work ; and
most of the solvents of that mystery lie hidden here and there in the
year -books , statutes , and old reports , and locked from the average student
in a dead and barbarous language . This mystery has been a great





the modern texts and readings have been found to empha
size the last application o
f
the rules or the effect o
f
late American
statutes , rather than to expound the original doctrines , without knowl
edge o
f





publications , Professor Digby ' s History of the Law on Real Property
has been found most helpful .
The following pages have been printed from the notes made from
time to time while preparing to conduct exercises in the first course
o
n
real property at th
e
University o
f Michigan , using Blackstone ' s
Commentaries as the text . The design has been to present the great
monuments which mark epochs in the various branches o
f
the subject ,
with only an occasional late example . The prolixity of the originals
has often made imperative the alternative to abridge or omit , and
abridgment has been preferred . The present is a temporary edition ,
made to tr
y
out the serviceability o
f
such a book b
y
use in class , and
trusting to experience to fi
ll
the gaps and prune the exuberance o
f special
topics . In this edition several typographical errors in the first im
pression have been discovered and corrected . The scope of the work has
also been extended b
y
numerous additions throughout , and by inserting
the chapters on uses , trusts , and powers , which di
d
not appear in the
first edition .
JOHN R . Rood .
Dated , Ann Arbor , February 25th , 1910 .
( iii )

TABLE OF CONTENTS .
CHAPTER I .
Tenures - 1-28 .
CHAPTER II .
Estates of Inheritance - 29 - 101.
Classified and Defined - 29 – 31 .
Words Sufficient to Limit a Fee - 31 – 36.
Base Fees - 36 – 39 .
Fee Conditional at the Common Law - 39 -42.
Estates Tail - 42 - 49 .
History of Restraints on Alienation by Limiting the Fee - 49- 101 .
Heir 's Right to Fee Against Alienation by Ancestor - 49 -53.
Alienation Accomplished by Means of Warranty , 53 –54 .
Establishment of Doctrine that Heir Takes by Descent – 54 - 55 .
Alienation Restrained by Creating a Fee Conditional at Com
mon Law – 55 – 56 .
Alienation Restrained by Creating Estate Tail - 56 -62 .
The Rule in Shelley ' s Case - 62 - 92 .
The Rule in Wild ' s Case - 92 – 101 .
CHAPTER III.
Estates of Freehold Not of Inheritance - 101 - 112 .
For Several Lives — 101 - 102 .
Waste by Life Tenant - 103- 109.
Acquiring Adverse Title - 109 – 111 .
Time for Executors of Life Tenant to Remove - 111.
Curtesy Initiate - 111 .
CHAPTER IV .
Estates Less Than Freehold — 112 – 162 .
Estates for Years - 112 – 150 .
Nature of Terms for Years - 113 .
Original Remedies of Ejected Termors — 113 - 115 .
Term Void for Uncertainty - 115 - 119 .
Validity of Oral Lease - 119 - 121.
Tenant or Servant — 121 – 126 .
License or Lease — 126 – 128 .
Farming on Shares — 128 – 132 .
( v )
TABLE OF CONTENTS .
Right to Rent Arrear on Death of Lessor — 133.
Landlord ' s Right of Entry to Inspect During Term - 133 .
Warranty of Safety and Fitness - 133 - 139 .
Right to Emblements -- 139 .
Right to Estovers — 139 - 141.
Apportionment of Rent on Destruction - 141- 143 .
Liability for Waste - 143 - 145 .
Right to Open and Work Mines — 145 - 146 .
Termination of Relation - 146 - 150 .
Tenants at Will - 150 - 154 .
Tenants at Will Defined - 150 – 152 .
Estates at Will , How Determined - 152 - 154 .
Tenancy from Year to Year - 155 - 162 .
CHAPTER V .
Uses and Trusts — 163 - 202 .
Before the Statute of Uses - 27 Henry VIII, c . 10 – 163 - 172 .
Under the Statute of Uses — 27 Henry VIII , c. 10 – 172 – 179 .
What Uses are Executed by the Statute of Uses - 27 Henry VIII , C.
10 — 179 - 186 .
Effect of Consideration - 186 - 202 .
CHAPTER VI.
Powers — 203 - 243 .
CHAPTER VII .
Conditions - 244 - 298 .
In General - 244 -246 .
Term on Condition to Enlarge to a Fee - 246 - 247 .
Condition or Declaration of Use - 247 - 250 .
Rule to Distinguish Condition from Covenant - 250 - 254 .
Conditions and Limitations Distinguished — 254 – 261 .
Impossibility of Performance - 262.
Right to Entry When Not Expressly Reserved — 262 .
Who May Enter for Condition Broken - 262 – 275 .
Division and Waiver of Condition - 275 - 278.
Conditions in Restraint of Alienation - 278 -298 .
CHAPTER VIII .
Future Estates - 299 -408 .
Remainders — 299 – 360 .
To Begin in Future Without Particular Estate —299 – 303.
Acceleration of Remainders — 303 – 304 .
When All to Particular Tenant and So No Remainder - 304 - 305 .
When in Abridgement of Prior Estate or on Condition - 305 - 313 .
Alternative Remainders in Fee — 313 - 319 .
Limited on Remote Possibility - 320 – 324 .
TABLE OF CONTENTS . vii
Sufficient Particular Estate to Support - 324 - 325 .
Destruction of Contingent Remainders by Destruction or Failure
of Particular Estate - 325 – 356 .
What are Contingent - 356 - 360 .
Executory Devises and Springing and Shifting Uses - 360 - 399 .
Without Prior Particular Estate - 360 – 371.
A Fee After a Fee - 372 - 383 .
After Life Estate Out of Term for Years - 383 - 399.
Reversions — 399 –406 .
CHAPTER IX .
The Rule Against Perpetuities - 407 - 447 .

TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES , AND AUTHORS.
115
34







Abel's Case , Y. B . (Maynard ) , 18 36 Hen . 8, Brooke 's New Cases ,
Edw . II, f. 577 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 pl. 282 . . . 179
Abraham v. Twigg , Cro . Eliz . 478 . 46 36 Hen . 8, Brooke's New Cases ,
Adams v . Savage 's Tenants, 2 L . pl. 284 . . . . . . . . . . 186
Raym . 854 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 | Anon , 6 Edw . 6 , Brooke Abr. Feoff
Albany 's Case (Grendon v. Al ments to Uses pl. 30 . . . . . . . . . 372
bany ), 1 Coke 110b - 113a . . . . . . 212
7 Edw . 6. Brooke Abr. Leases
Alexander 's (King ) Case , Coke 66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lit. 27a .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2 Mary , Brooke Abr . Leases 67 . 115
Alfred The Great (Laws of ) , c. 37 49
4 Edw . 6, Brooke 's New Cases,
Allen v. Fogler , 6 Rich . Law 54 . . 381 pl. 406 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alsop v. Crompton , Cro . Eliz . 777 ,
3 Mary, Brooke 's New Cases ,
784 .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 pl. 470 . . . . . .
Amner and Luddington 's Case , 3 19 Hen . 8, Dyer 2b . . .
Leon . 89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Hen . VIII, 1 Dyer 7 . . . . . . . .
Anderson v. Cowan , 125 Iowa 259 . 139 28 Hen . 8, Dyer 18a , pl. 105 . . . . 186
Andrews v. Emmot , 2 Brown C. 28 Hen . VIII , Dyer 25b . . . . . . . .
C. 297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 & 29 Hen . 8, 1 Dyer , 33a . . . . 372
Anon, 1 And . 37, pl. 95 . . . . . . . . . . 31 Hen . 8, Dyer 45a . . .
4 & 5 Phil & Mary, 1 And . 37 , 3 Edw . 6 , Dyer 65b . . . . . . . 287
Cas . 96 . . . . . . . . . . 6 Edw . 6, Dyer 74a . . . . . . . . . . . 384
6 Eliz . 1 And . 42 , pl. 105 . . . . . 2 Eliz . Dyer 177a, pl. 32 . . . . . . . 211
6 Eliz , 1 And . 43, pl. 110 . . . . . . . 14 Eliz . 3, Dyer 314b , pl. 97 . . . . 181
1 And . 122
18 Eliz ., Dyer 349a . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 And. 256, pl. 264 . . . . . . . . . . Cornish Iter , 30 Edw . I . . . . . . .
7 Edw . 4, Brooke Abr . Con Yearbooks (Horwood ) , 21 & 22
science 27 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Edw . I, p. 640 . . . . .
22 Edw . IV , Brooke Abr . Condi 30 Edw . I, Y . B . (Pike ) 30 &
tions 167 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 31 Edw . I, p . 476 . . . . . . . . . . . 141
14 Hen . 8, 4, pl. 5 , Brooke Abr . 31 Edw . I, Horwood 's Y. B . 480 . 103
Feoffments to Uses 10 . ... . . . . 170 33 Edw . III , Liber Assize 33, pl.
30 Hen . 8, Brooke Abr. Feoff 11, p. 201 . . . . . . . . . . 280
ments al Uses 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . 360 Y . B. 40 Edw . 3, 9 . . . . . . . . . . . .
32 Hen . 8, Brooke Abr. " Con Y . B. 4 Edw . IV , 8, pl. 9, Digby's
science" 25 . . . . Hist. R . P . 338 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
33 Hen. 8, Bro . Abr. Chattels , 22 Edw . IV
, 6, pl. 18 . . . . . . . . . .
383 21 Hen . VI, 33 , pl. 21 . . . . . . .
31 Hen . 8, Bro . Abr . Conditions 37 Hen . 6, p. 35b . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 247 9 Hen . 7, 26 , pl. 13 . . . . . . . . . . . .
... 186 384
. 92
181.. . . . .. . . 115
. . . . . 401 55
320
168
23 . . . . . . . . . .. 282
191 ... 207
(ix )
TAELE OF CASES , STATUTES , AND AUTHORS.
. . 325
. . . . .. 123
113
Anon , 10 Hen . VII, 11, pl. 28 . . . . 283 | Bedford ' s ( Earl of ) Case , Moor
11 Hen . VII , 6 , pl. 25 . . . . . . . . . 283 718 . . . . .
11 Hen . VII, 17 , pl. 14 . . . . . . . . 268 Bedingfield v. Onslow , 3 Lev . 209 . 401
13 Henry VII, 22 . . . . . . . 283 Boraston 's Case , 3 Coke 19a . . . . . . 356
14 Hen . VII , pl. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Bowman v. Bradley , 151 Pa . St.
15 Hen . VII, 11, pl. 22 . . . . . . . . 208 351 .. . . . . . . .
4 Jenk . Cent . Case 75 . . . . . . . . . 207 Bracton , Book II, fol. 18b . . . . . . . 299
2 Eliz . 5 Jenk . Cent . Case 70 . . 180 Book II, c. 6, fol. 18 . . . . . . . . . 244
22 Eliz . 6 Jenk . Cent. Case 30 , Book II, c. 9, fol. 27 . . . . . . . . . . 112
p. 244 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Book 4, c. 36 , fol. 220 . . . . . . . . .
17 Hen . 7, Keilwey 41b (2 Bracton 's Laws and Customs of
Cases ) . . . . . . . . 169 England . . . . . . . .
20 Hen . 7, Keilwey 65a . . . . . . . 150 Bracton 's Laws and Customs of
22 Hen , 7, Keilwey 88b 399 | England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Hen . 8, Keilwey , 162b 151 Bradshaw v. Lawson , 4 Term 443 . 12
6 Eliz . Keilwey , p. 206 , pl. 10 . . . 144 Brandies v. Cochrane , 112 U . S.
4 Leon . 21, Cas. 67 . . . . . . . . . 352 . . . . . . . . . . .. 230
4 Leon . 236 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brett v . Rigden , 1 Plowd . Com .
3 Edw . 6 , Moor 8 . . . . 102 340 -346 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
20 Eliz ., Moor 113 . . . . 275 Brian 's Case , Y . B . (Horwood ) 32
24 Eliz ., Moor 177 . . . & 33 Edw . I, p. 278 . . . . . . . . . . . 56
29 Eliz ., Moor 247 . . . . . . . . . . . . | Bristor v. Burr , 120 N . Y . 427 . . . . 126
2 Edw . 2, Selden Soc. Y . B. Vol. Britton , 1 Liber c. 5 , Sec. 2, p. * 93 43
1 Case No . 19, pp . 70 -72 . . . . . 43 1 Liber c. 5, Sec . 15, p. * 96. . . . . 246
4 Edw . II, 4 Selden Soc . Y . B ., 2 Liber , c . 5 , Sec. 1, p. * 93 . . . . . 55
p. 130 . . . · 144 | Bromley , Note by, 2 Mary , Brooke
Anthony Mildman 's Case , 6 Coke Abr . Leases 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
40a .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Brown v. Phillips , 16 R . I. 612 . . . 232
Arbenz v. Exley , 57 W . Va. 580 . . . 158 Buckler v. Harvy , Cro . Eliz . 450 . . 300
Archer 's Case , 1 Coke 66b . . . . . . . . 349 Buffar v. Bradford, 2 Atkyns 220 . 95
Arundel 's (De ) Case , Bracton 's Bullen v. Grant, Cro . Eliz . 148 . . . 400
Note Book , Case 1054 . . . . . . . . . 54 Callard v. Callard , Jenk. Cent. 245 182
Assaby v. Lady Anne Manners , 2 Calvert v. Rice , 91 Ky. 533 . . . . . . . 106
Dyer 235a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 | Carter v. Slocomb , 122 N . Car. 475 238
Astray v. Ballard , 2 Lev . 185 . . . . . Castle v. Dod , 1 Cruise Dig . 455 . . 183
Bainton , petitioner and the Queen , Chamberlain (Lord ) Daybeney v.
Dyer 96a . . . . . . . .
Chichester , 4 Jenk . Cent . Case
. . . . . . . .
94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Bainton v . Ward , 2 Atkin 172 . . . . Charter of Cnut , Digby 's Hist. R .
Baldwin v. Marton , 1 And . 223 . . . 34 P . 59 . . . . . . .. . 32
v . Smith , Cro. Eliz . 437 . . . . . . . of Henry I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Barwick 's Case , 5 Coke 93b . . . . . . of Feoffment of Date 6 Edw . II,
Bath and Wells , Examination by 2 Blackst. Com . (Appendix ) . 33
the Bishop of Calendar Chan of Feoffment of Time of King
cery Vol . I, p. xliii , also in Henry II, Digby's Hist. R . P .
Digby 's Hist. R . P. (5th Ed .) , 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
p . 337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 | Chatard v. O'Donovan , 80 Ind . 20 . 126
Beal v. Shepherd , Cro . Jac . 199 . . 219 Chaworth v . Phillips , Moor 876 . . . 268
TABLE OF CASES , STATUTES , AND AUTHORS. xi
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
........
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Child v. Baylie , Cro . Jac . 459 . . . . 410 , Duke of Norfolk 's Case , 3 Ch . Cas.
Cholmley 's Case , 2 Coke 50 . . . . . . 320 1 -54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Chomley v. Humble , Cro. Eliz . 379 312 Dumpor 's Case , 4 Coke 119b . . . . . 276
Chudleigh 's Case , 1 Coke 120 -140b 327 Dyer and Manwood (Note by ) , 4
Clayton v. Blakey , 8 Term 3 . . . . . 155 Leon , 21, Cas. 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
Clemence v. Steere , 1 R . I. 272. . . 104 | Earl of Bedford 's Case , Moor 718 . 325
Clere' s Case , (Sir Edward ) , 6 Edwards v. Hammond , 3 Lev . 132 360
Coke 17a . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Enrolments, Statute of , 27 Hen .
Clerk v. Day, Cro . Eliz . 313 . . . . . . 74 VIII , c . 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Cout , Charter of, Digby ' s Hist. R . Edward Pells v. William Brown ,
P . 59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cro . Jac . 590 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Cogan v. Cogan , Cro . Eliz . 360 . . . . 311 English Statutes , see Statutes .
Coke Lit . *46a . . 115 Estoft's Case , 1 And . 45 , pl. 114 . . . 34
55a . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 Faber v. Police , 10 S . Car . 376 . . . . 354
2146 – 215b .. . . . . 265 Farington v. Darrel, Y . B. 9 Hen .
216b .. . . . . . . . . 246 VI, 23b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Colthirst v. Bejushin , Plowd . Com . Farrow v. Wooley , 138 Ala . 267 . . . 130
21 to 35 . . . . . . . . . . 305 Fenwike v. Mitford , 1 Leon . 182 . . 400
Commonwealth v. Duffield , 12 Pa . Feoffment , Charter of , of Date 6
St. 277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 . Edw . II, 2 Blackst. Com . (Ap
Cooper v. Franklin , Cro. Jac. 400 . 184 pendix ) . . . . . . . . 33
Corbet 's Case , 1 Coke 83b . . . . . . . . 289 of Time of Henry II, Digby 's
Cotton v. Heath , 1 Roll . Abr. 612 , Hist . R . P . 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
pl. 3 . . . , . . . . 391 Ferguson v. Mason , 60 Wis . 377 . . 369
Countess of Shrewsbury 's Case , 5 First Universalist Society of
Coke 13b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 North Adams V. Borland , 155
Coudert v. Cohn , 118 N . Y. 309 . . . 156 Mass . 171 . .
Coursey v. Davis , 46 Pa . St. 25 . . . . 96 Fitz - James ' s Case , Owen 33 . . . . . . 384
Crawley 's Case , Cro. Eliz . 721 . . . . 183 Flower v. Darby , 1 Term 159 . . . . .
Culbreth v. Smith , 69 Md. 450. . . 394 Foster v. Brown , Moor 758 . . . . . . .
Dale 's ( Utty ) Case , Cro . Eliz . 182 102 Frauds, Statute of, 29 Car . II, c.
Dande v. Annas , Dyer 219a . . . . . . 212 3, Secs . 1 - 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Daybeney (Lord Chamberlain ) v. Fuller v. Fuller , Cro . Eliz . 422 . . . . 303
Chichester , 4 Jenk . Cent ., Case Germin v. Ascot, Moor 364 . . . . . . . 287
.. . . . . . . . 170 |Girland v. Sharpe , Cro . Eliz . 382 . . 180
De Arundel ' s Case , Bracton ' s Note Glanvil ( Tractatus de Legibus et
Book , Case 1054 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Consuetudinibus ) Liber 7, c. 1 . 51
De Donis Conditionalibus ( Stat Gloucester, Statute of, 6 Edw . I,
ute ) Westm . 2, c. 1, 13 Edw . I . 42 c. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Dickins v. Marshall , Cro . Eliz . 330 35 Goodright v. Cornish , 1 Salk . 226 . 324
Digges 's Case , 1 Coke 173 . . . . . . . . 222 d. Hall v. Richardson , 3 Term
Dillon v. Freine, 1 Coke 120 - 140b . 327 462 . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Doe d. Herbert v. Selby , 2 Barn . I v. Pullin , 2 L . Raym . 437 . . . . . . .
& Cres . 926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 Gore v. Gore, 2 P . Wms. 28 . . . . . . 432
Donis (de ) Statute Conditionali . Gorham v. Daniels , 23 Vt. 600 . . . . 367
bus , Westm . 2, c . 1, 13 Edw . I . . 42 Gostwick ' s Case , Cro . Eliz . 163 . . . 287
Dower , How Barred . In Hereford , Graves v . Berdan , 26 N . Y. 498 . . . 142
in Eyre , 20 Edw , I, p . 21 . . . . . . . 111 Green v. Edwards , Cro. Eliz . 216 . . 305
94 .. . .. . . . .
.
104 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
76
xii TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES , AND AUTHORS .
. 33
203
. . . . . . . .
51
278
Grendon v . Albany, 1 Coke 110b - King Alexander's Case , Coke Lit .
113a .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 27a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Grey 's Case , 3 Dyer 274a . . . . . . . . 172 Kitchen v. Pridgen , 3 Jones Law
Grosvenor v. Bowen , 15 R . I. 549 . . 230 49 .. . . . 126
Hall v. Richardson , 3 Term 462 . . 118 Lane v. Lane , 4 Penn . 368 . . . . . . . 239
Hardy V. Galloway , 111 N . Car. Lawrence 's Appeal, 136 Pa . St . 354 443
5.19 .. . . . . . . . 297 Laws of Alfred The Great , c. 37 . . 49
v. Seyer , Cro . Eliz . 414 . . . . . . . . 259 of Henry I, c. 70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Hartopp 's Case, Cro . Eliz . 243 . . . . 69 Layton v. Field , 3 Salk , 222 . . . . . . 155
Harvy v. Oswold , 38 Eliz . Moor Lee v. Vincent, Cro . Eliz . 26 . . . . . . 211
456 .. . . . . . . · 276 Leighton v. Theed , 2 Salk . 413 . . . 153
Harwell v. Lucas, Moor 99 . . . . . . . 372 Le Taverner 's Case , Dyer 56a . . . . 141
Haynsworth v. Pretty , Cro . Eliz . Libbey V. Talford , 48 Me. 316 . . . . 133
833 . . . . . . . . . 259 | Lightbody V. Truelsen , 39 Minn .
Haywood v. Miller , 3 Hill ( N . Y . ) 310 . . . . . . . . . 122
90 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Littleton 's Ten . § 1 . .
Helton v. Brampton , Y . B. (Pike) 88 58 , 59 , 66 . . . . 112
18 & 19 Edw . III, pp . 194 - 206 . . . 45 $ 68 . . . . . . . . 150
Henderson v. Hunter , 59 Pa. St. $ 169
335 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 $ 331 262
Henry 1, Charter of . . . . . . . . . . . . $ $ 346 , 347 . . 262
Henry I (Laws of ) , c . 70 . . . . . . . $ 350 246
Henry III, Magna charta of. . . . . . 3 88 360, 361, 362 , 363, 720 , 721 ,
Henstead 's Case , 5 Coke 10 . . . . . . 152 722 , 723 . .
Herbert v. Selby , 2 Barn . & Cres . Loddington v. Kime, 1 Salk . * 224 . 313
926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 314 Long v. Blackall , 7 Term 100 . . . .
Hills v. Hills , Moor 876 . . . . . . . . . 102 Low v. Elwell , 121 Mass . 309 . . . . . 146
Hinde & Lyon 's Case , 3 Leon 64 . . 362 Magna Charta of King John . . . . . 1
Hoe v. Gerils , Palmer 136 . . . . . . . . 373 Henry III . . . . . . . .
Hogs v. Cross , Cro . Eliz . 254 . . . . . 299 |Manning 's (Matthew ) Case , 8
Holmes v. Coghill , 7 Ves. 499 -508 . 227 Coke 94b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
Hopkins v. Hopkins , Cas. Tem . Marlborough , Statute of , 52 Hen .
Talb . 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 III , c. 23 , § 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Horner v. Chicago , M . & St. P . Marlebridge , Statute of, 52 Hen .
Rv., 38 Wis . 165 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 250 III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Hunt v. Dowman , Cro . Jac . 478 . . 133 Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa . St. 371 108
Hussey 's Case, Moor 789 . . . . . . . . . 183 Mary Portington 's Case , 10 Coke
Ingalls v. Hobbs , 156 Mass . 348 . . 134 35b . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Jackson & Darcyes Case , 3 Leon . Matthew Manning 's Case , 8 Coke
57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 94b .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
John (King ) , Magna charta of. . . 1 Matthews v. Ward 's Lessee , 10
Jones v. Roe , 3 Term 88 . . . . . . . . . 375 Gill & J . 443 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Kellet v. Bishop of London , 3 Merton , Statute of , 20 Hen . III. . . 6
Dyer, 283a , pl. 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 | Messynden v. Pierson , Select Cases
Kelly v. Rummerford , 117 Wis . 620 128 in Chancery No. 117 . . . . . . . . . . 164
Kent's Commentaries , vol. 4, p. Methodist Protestant Church v .
* 197 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Young , 130 N . Car . 8. . . . . . . . . . 402
Kerrains v . People , 60 N . Y . 221 . . 126 Meyer v . Livesley , 45 Ore. 487 . . . . 131
387
TABLE OF CASES , STATUTES, AND AUTHORS . xiii
. . . . . . . 92






Michigan Revised Statutes |Minnesota Statutes
(1838 ) , Pt. 2, t. 1, § 84 . . . . . . . . . 356 $ 26 324
( 1846 ) , c. 62 , 88 14, 15 . . . . . . . . 442 $ 27 . . . . . . . . . 312
$ 16 . . . . . . . . . . . 383 , 442 $ 28
$$ 17, 18 , 19 88 30 , 31 353
20 . . . . . . . . . 399, 443 $ $ 32 , 34 356
$ 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . Revised Laws ( 1905 ) , 88 3203 ,
24 . . . . . . . . . 371, 399 3204 . . . . . . . . . 442
$ 26 . . . 324 3205 . ... .. . . .. 383, 442
$ 27 . . . . . $8 3206 , 3207 , 3208 . . . . . . . . . 442
§ 28 . . . . . $ 3209 . . . . . . . . . .399 , 443
$$ 30, 31 . . . $ 3210
$ 34 . . . $ 3213
C. 64 . . . . . . . $ 3215 324
C. 66, § 31 . . . . . . . $ 3216 312
C. L . ( 1857 ) , $ 2804 . . . . . . . . . § 3217 . . . . . . . 92
C. L . ( 1871) , 8 4301 . . . . . . . . $ 8 3219 , 3220
How . Ann . St. ( 1883 ) , § 5771 . 28 $ $ 3221 , 3223 . . . . . . . . 356
Laws 1881, No. 187 . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
How . Stat., $ 5730 . 35 Mutton 's Case , Dyer 274 . . . . . . . . .
C. L . ( 1897 ) , 88 8796 , 8797 , Mytton v . Lutwich , Cro . Jac . 604 . . 184
8798 , 8799 , 8800 , 8801 . . . . 442 Napper v. Sanders , Hutton 118 . . . 359
§ 8798 383 , 442 Nevil v. Saunders , 1 Vern . 415 . . . . 186
$ 8802 . . . . .. . . .399, 443 Nevil's Case , 7 Coke 33. . . . . . .. . . 39
& 8803 . . . 443 New York Revised Statutes
§ 8806 399 ( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c. 1, t . 2, Art. 1,
$ 8808 . . . 324 8 $ 14, 15 . . .
$ 8809 $ 16 . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 , 442
& 8810 8 $ 17, 18, 19 . . . . . . . . 442
8812 , 8813 . . § 20 . . . . . . . . 399 , 443
$$ 8814 , 8816 . . . . . . . . .
$ 8887 . . . . . . . . 325 , 371, 399
§ 9016 . . . . . . .
§ 9254 . . . . . . . . § 27 . . . .
Mildmay ' s Case , 1 Coke, 1752 - 177b 197 § 28 . . . . .
Mildmay 's Case (Sir Anthony ) , $ $ 30 , 31
6 Coke 40a . . . . . . $8 32 , 34
Miles v. Tracey , 28 Ky. L . Rep . Art . 3, § 93 . . .
621 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 136 ( 1829 ) , pt. 2, c. 1, t. 5 , § 1. . . 35
Milford v. Fenwike, 1 And . 288 . . . 400 Newis et ux . v. Lark and Hunt , 2
Minnesota Statutes Plowd . Com . 403 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
( 1858 ), c. 34, § 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 Norfolk 's Case (Duke of ) , 3 Ch .
( 1866 ) , c. 45, $$ 14, 15 . . . . . . . . . Cas . 1 –54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
$ 16 . . . . . . . . . 383, 442 Note - See " Anon ."
$ 17, 18, 19 . . . . . . . . . . . 442 Note in Y. B . of 20 & 21 Edw . I,
§ 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399, 443 p. 302 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
. . . 443 Oates v. Jackson , 2 Strange 1172 . . 94






















Oswald ( Bishop ) Gift by, Digby 's Sharington v . Strotton , Plowd .
Hist . R . P ., p . 58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Com . 298 - 309 .
Page v. Moulton , 3 Dyer 296a . . . . 181 Shaw v. Barber, Cro . Eliz . $30 . . . . 153
Palmer v. Cook , 159 Ill . 300 . . . . . . 381 Shelley ' s Case , 1 Coke 93b . . . . . . . 70
Parker d . Walker y . Constable , 3 Shrewsbury ' s Case ( Countess of ) ,
Wils . 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 5 Coke 13b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Parry v . Harbert , Dyer 45b . . . . . . 287 Siggins v . McGill , 72 N . J . L . 263 137
Patterson v . Lawrence , 83 Ga . 703 230 Simpson v . Titterell , Cro . Eliz . 242 250
Pay ' s Case , Cro . Eliz . 878 . . . . . . . . 364 Sir Edward ' s Clere ' s Case , 6 Coke
Pells (Edward ) v . William Brown , 17a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Cro . Jac . 590 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 Smith v . Brisson , 90 N . Car . 284 . . 380
Perrin v . Blake , 1 Eng . Rul . Cas .
Somery v . Burmingeham , 4 Selden689 . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pits v . Pelham , 1 Lev . 304 . . . . . . . . Soc . Y . B . 198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Plowden v . Cartwright , 1 Bur . 282 392 Soulle v . Gerrard , Cro . Eliz . 525 . . 373
Plunket v . Holmes , 1 Lev . 11 . . . . . 374 Spark v . Spark , Cro . Eliz . 666 . . . . 75
Pollock & Maitland ' s History of Stanley v . Baker , Moor 220 . . . . . . . 38
5
English Law , Vol . 2 , pp . 310 -311 53
Statutes :
Portington ' s (Mary ) Case , 10 Coke
355 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( For American statutes see the
Powle , v . Veere , Moor 554 . . . . . . . . name o
f
the state . )






West Westminster III , 18 Edw . I ,
minster III , 18 Edw . I , St . 1 . . . 9 St . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Rawson v . Inhabitants o
f
School o
f Marlborough , 52 Hen . III , c .
District No . 5 o
f Uxbridge 89 23 , & 2 Liability for Waste . . 143
Mass . ( 7 Allen ) 125 . . . . . . . . . . . 247 o
f Marlebridge , 52 Henry III . . . 6
Rayman v . Gold , Moor 635 . . . . . . . . 385 o
f
Merton , 20 Hen . III . . . . . . . . 6
Reeve v . Long , 1 Salk . 227 . . . . . . . 352 o
f
Gloucester , 6 Edw . I , c . 5 . . . . .
Religiosis , Statute de Viris , 7 o
f
Westminster I , 3 Edw . I . . . . .
Edw . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 d
e Viris Religiosis , 7 Edw . I . . . 8
Rickman v . Gardener , Dyer 122a . 303 de Donis Conditionalibus , Westm .
Rigge v . Bell , 5 Term 471 . . . . . . . . 155 2 , c . 1 , 13 Edw . I . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Right d . Flower v . Darby , 1 Term o
f
Westminster II , 13 Edw . I . . 10
159 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 o
f Westminster III or Quia
Roe d . Rigge v . Bell , 5 Term 471 . 155 Emptores , 18 Edw . I , S
t
. 1 . . .
Rolt v . Lord Sommerville , 2 Eq . 1 Edw . III , St . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cas . Abr . 759 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 o
f
Uses , 15 Rich . II , c . 5 . . . . . . .
Rosse ' s Case , 5 Coke 13 . . . . . . . . . . 102 Uses , 1 Rich . III , c . 1 , 9 . . . . . . 169
S
t
. Auby ' s Case , Cro . Eliz . 183 . . . 21 Henry . VIII , c . 15 . . . . . . . . . .
Saunders ’ Case , 5 Coke 12 . . . . . . . . 145 o
f
Uses , 27 Henry VIII , C . 10 . . . 172
Savile v . Blacket , 1 P . Wms . 777 . . 225 of Enrolments , 27 Henry VIII ,
Say v . Smith , 1 Plowd . Com . 269 . 116 c . 1
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Scatterwood v . Edge , 1 Salk . 229 . . 430 32 Henry VIII , c . 34 . . . . . . . . . . .
Sceal v . Oxenbridge , Moor 871 . . . . 35 12 Charles II , c . 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Scolastica ' s Case , 2 Plowd . Com . I of Frauds , 29 Car . II , c . 3 , Secs .
403 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 254 1 - 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .






TABLE OF CASES , STATUTES , AND AUTHORS . XV




Stile v . Thomson , Dyer 210a .. . . . 211 /Westminster III, Statute of , 18
Stodden v. Harvey , Cro . Jac . 204 . 111 . Edw . I, St . 1 . . . .
Skyft v. Eyres , Cro. Car . 546 . . . . 302 Whiting v. Ohlert , 52 Mich . 462 . . 120
Taltarum 's Case , Y . B . 12 Edw . Whitlock 's Case , 8 Coke, 69b . . . . . 219
IV , 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 56 Whitlock v. Harding , Moor 873. . . 35
Taverner 's (Le ) Case , Dyer 56a . . 141 Whitman v. Corley , 72 S. Car . 410 202
Taylor v. Vale , Cro . Eliz . 166 . . . . 201 Whitney v . Salter, 36 Minn. 103 . . 109
Temple v. Temple , Cro . Eliz . 791 . . 133 Wild 's Case , 6 Coke 16b . . . . . . . . . . 93
Thellusson v. Woodford , 1 Bos . & Wilkes v. Leuson , Dyer 169a . . . . . 187
Pul. N. R . 357 .. . . 434 | Willion v . Berkley , Plowd . Com .
Tollet v. Tollet , 2 P . Wms. 489 . . . . 225 * 223 – 252 .. . . . .
Thomas v. Howell , 1 Salk . 170 . . . . Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass . 362 . . . 298
Thoreway v. Neel, 4 Selden Soc . | Wisconsin Revised Statutes
Y. B., p. 184 . . . . . . ( 1849) , c. 56, $ $ 14, 15 . . . . . . . . 442
Tyrrel 's Case, 2 Dyer 155a . . . $. 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .383 , 442
Uses , Statute of, 15 Rich . II , c. 5 . 163 $ $ 17, 18 , 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
1 Rich . III , c. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 $ 20 . . . . . . . . . . .399, 443
27 Henry VIII , c. 10. . . . . . . . . . . § 21 . . . . . . . . . . 443
Utty Dale's Case , Cro . Eliz . 182 . . 102 $ 24 399
Cuihthraed of Kent, Digby's Hist . § 26
R. P., p. 56 . . . . . . . . . . $ 27 312
Van Rensselaer V. Ball , 19 N . Y. § 28
.. . 270 $8 30 ,
Van Rensselaer v. Hays , 19 N . Y. $$ 32, 34 . . . . . . . . . 356
68- 99 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 c. 58, § 32. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Vernor v. Coville , 54 Mich . 281 . . . 234 Statutes ( 1898 ) , $$ 2038 , 2039 . . 442
Villers v. Beaumont , 2 Dyer 146a , $ 2040 . . . . . . . . . 383 , 442
146 , 147a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 $ $ 2041 , 2042, 2043 . . . . . . . . . . 442
Vincent v. Crane , 134 Mich . 700 . . . 126 $ 2044 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 , 443
Viris ( de ) Religiosis , Statute of, $ 2045 . . . . 443
7 Edw . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . § 2048 371 , 399
Waddell v. Rattew , 5 Rawle 231 . . $ 2050 324
Wales v. Bowdish , 61 Vt. 23 . . . . . . 230 $ 2051 . . 312
Walker v. Constable , 3 Wils . 25 . . 153 $ 2052
Ward v. Lambert , Cro. Eliz . 394 . . 201 $ $ 2054 , 2055 353
Wardwell v. Bassett , 8 R . I, 302 . . 369 $ $ 2056 , 2058 . . .
Warren v. Lee , Dyer 126b . . . . . . . . $ 2131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Weed v. Woods, 71 N . H . 581 . . . . . 38 Woodliff v. Drury , Cro. Eliz . 439 . 364
Wellock v. Hammond , Cro . Eliz . Wrenford v. Gyles , Cro . Eliz . 643 . 260
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 Wright ex d. Plowden v. Cart
Wells v. Fenton , Cro . Eliz . 826 . . . . 351 wright 1 Burr . 282 . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Westminster I, Statute of, 3 Edw . | Yearbooks , see Anon , etc .
7 Yelland v. Ficlis , Moor 788 . . . . . . 218
Westminster II, Statute of, 13 Yelverton v . Yelverton , Cro . Eliz .
Edw . I . . . . . . . . . 10 401 .. . . . . . . . 363
100 .. . 353
. . . . . . .
. 92
356
204 .. . . . . .





CHARTER OF HENRY I, A . D . 1100 . ( Part omitted .)
If any baron , earl, or other subject of mine , who holds possession from
me, shall die , his heir shall not redeem his land , as was the custom in
my brother 's time, but shall pay a just relief for the same ; and in like
manner , too, the dependents of my barons shall pay a like relief for their
· land to their lords . And if any baron or other subject of mine shall
wish to give his daughter , his sister , his niece , or other female relative,
in marriage , le
t
him ask my permission on the matter ; but I will not
take any o
f
his property for granting my permission nor will I forbid




MAGNA CHARTA OF KING JOHN , signed July 15 , A . D . 1215 .
c . 2 . If any of our earls or barons or any other which hold of us in
chief b




f full age , and owes us relief , he shall have his inheritance by the
old relief ; that is to say , the heir o
r
heirs of an earl , for a whole earl
dom , 1001 . ; the heir or heirs o
f
a baron , for a whole barony , 100 marks ;




one whole knight ' s fee , 100s . at the





C . 3 . But if the heirs o
f any such be within age (his lord shall not
have ward o
f
him , nor o
f




n heir has been in ward ) , when he comes to full age
( that is 21 years ) , he shall have his inheritance without relief and
without fine ; ( so that if such an heir , being within age , be made 8
knight , yet nevertheless his land shall remain in the keeping of his
lord unto the term aforesaid ) . .
The part o
f
c . 3 that is in parentheses was added by the charter o
f
Hen .
III , issued in 1216 .
C . 4 . The keeper of the land , of such an heir being within age , shall
not take o
f
the lands of the heir but reasonable issues , reasonable cus
toms , and reasonable services , and that without destruction and waste
o
f
his men and his goods . And if we commit the custody of any
( 1 )
TENURES .
such land to the sheriff , or to any other which is answerable to us for
the issues of the same land , and he make destruction or waste of those
things that he hath in custody , we will take of him amends and recom
pense therefor , and the land shall be committed to two lawful and
discreet men of that fe
e , which shall answer unto us for the issues o
f
the same land , or unto him whom we will assign . And if we give or
sell to any man the custody o
f any such lands , and he therein do make
destruction or waste , he shall lose the same custody ; and it shall be
assigned to two lawful and discreet men of that fee , who also in like
manner shall be answerable to us as afore is said .






n heir , shall keep u
p
the houses , parks , warrens , ponds , mills , and
other things pertaining to the said land , with the issues o
f
the said land ;
and h
e
shall deliver to the heir , when he comes to his full age , all his
land stored with plows and a
ll
other things , at the least as he received
it . All these things shall be observed in the custodies of archbishoprics ,
bishoprics , abbeys , priories , churches , and dignities vacant , which apper
tain to us , except that such custody shall not be sold .
C . 6 . Heirs shall be married without disparagement , so also that




the heir himself shall be consulted .
“ But these provisions in behalf o
f
the relations were omitted in the char
ter o
f Henry III ; wherein the clause stands merely thus : 'haeredes mari
tantur absque disparagatione ; meaning certainly , by haeredes , heirs female ,
as there are no traces before this to be found o
f
the lord ' s claiming the mar
riage of heirs male , " 2 Bl . Com . * 71 .
c . 7 . A widow , after the death of her husband , incontinent , and
without any difficulty , shall have her marriage , and her inheritance , and
shall give nothing for her dower , her marriage , or her inheritance ,





and she shall tarry in the chief house o
f
her husband by 40 days after
the death o
f
her husband , within which days her dower shall be assigned
her ( if it were not assigned her before , or that the house be a castle ; and
if she depart from the castle , then a competent house shall be pro
vided for her , in which she may honestly dwell , until her dower be to
her assigned a
s
is aforesaid ; and she shall have in the meantime her
reasonable estovers o
f
the common ) ; ſand for her dower shall be
assigned unto her the third part o
f
all the lands o
f
her husband which
were his during coverture , except she were endowed of less at the church
door ] .
The part of c . 7 in parentheses was added by the charter of Hen . III
issued in 1216 ; the part in brackets was added by the charter issued in 1217 .
C . 8 . No widow shall be distrained to give herself in marriage , never
theless she shall find surety that she shall not marry without our license
and assent if she hold o
f
u




c . 9 . Neither we nor our bailiffs will seize any land or rent fo
r any
debt while the chattels o
f










debt ; nor shall the sureties o
f
the debtor be distrained while the
principal debtor is able to pay the debt ; and if the principal debtor fail
in payment o
f
the debt , not having wherewith to discharge it , the sureties
shall answer for the debt , and if they be willing , they shall have the
lands and the rents o
f
the debtor until satisfaction be made to them for
the debt which they had before paid for him , unless the principal debtor
ca
n
show himself acquitted thereof against the said sureties .
C . 12 . Let no escuages nor aids be levied in our kingdom if not b
y




first born son a knight , and to our first born daughter for marriage
once , and for these nothing shall be made but a reasonable aid .
" But this provision was omitted in Henry III ' s charter , and the same
oppressions were continued till the 25 Edward I , when the statute called
confirmatio chartarum was enacted ; which in this respect revived King
John ' s charter , by ordaining that none but the ancient aids should be
taken . ” 2 Bl . Com . 64 . See also charter of Henry III , c . 44 , below .
c . 15 . We will not give leave to anyone for the future to take an aid
o
f h
is own freemen , except for redeeming his own body , and for making
h




that unless it be a reasonable aid .
c . 16 . None shall be distrained to do more service for a knight ' s
fe
e , nor for any other tenement , than what is due from thence .
c . 17 . Common pleas shall not follow our court , but shall be held in
any certain place .









C . 37 . If any do hold of us by fee - farm , or by socage , or burgage ,
and he holds lands of another by knight ' s service , we will not have the
custody o
f
his heir , nor o
f













such fee - farm , or socage , o






the same fee - farm . We will not have the
custody o
f
the heir , or of any land , b
y
occasion o
f any petit sergeanty
that any man holds o
f
u










MAGNA CHARTA , HENRY II
I
(1217 ) .
C . 39 . No freeman from henceforth shall give or sell any more of
h









have the service due him which belongs to the fee .
"Upon which act I have heard great question made whether the feoff
ments made against the statute were voidable or no ; and some have said
that the statute intended not to avoid the feoffments , but implicate to direct
the tenure , viz . , that the tenant should not enfeoff another of parcel to
hold o
f
the chief lord (that is o
f
the next lord ) but to hold of himself , and




prejudice unto him . But this opinion is against the authority of our
books and against said statute o
f Magna Charta . ” Coke Lit . * 43a .
TENURES .
" As against the lord , freedom of allenation ( in favor whereof Bracton
argues with unusual earnestness , f. 45b (below ) , seems very perfect ( from
the cases in Bracton 's Note Book ] , and we look in vain for cases to show
that the restrictive clause in the charter of 1217 had any effect ; we may
well doubt whether the king' s justices thought well of that clause or of
some other clauses of the charter. " Prof. Maitland 's preface to Bracton ' s
Note Book , vol. 1, p. 134 .
" And by this statute the king took benefit to have & fine for his license ,
before which statute no fine for allenation was due to the king ; for it is
adjudged 20 Ass . p. 17 ; 26 Ass . p. 37 ; 20 Edw . 3, Fitz , Abr . Avowry 126 ) that
for an alienation in the time of Hen . II no fine was due ; and it appeareth
in our books, that if an alienation had been made before 20 Hen . III, no
fine was due to the king for alienation . . . . And it is to be observed ,
that no record can be found , that either a license of alienation was sued , or
pardon for alienation was obtained for an alienation without license , at any
time before the 20th year of Hen . III; and it is holden in the 20th Edw . III,
that a license for alienation grew by this statute (20 Ass . pl. 17 , by Skip
with ) . Now in the case of a common person it was the common opinion
that if the tenant had alienated any parcel contrary to the said act , that he
himself was bound by his own act , but that his heir might have avoided it ;
and in the king's case many held the same opinion . • • . But now by
the statutes 1 Edw . III, c. 12 , and 34 Edw . III, c . 15, although the king ' s ten
ant in chief or by grand sergeanty do alien all or any part without license , yet
is there not any forfeiture of the same , but a reasonable fine therefor to be
paid . And note it appeareth by the preamble in 1 Edw . III, that complaint
was made that lands holden of the king in capite , being alienated without
license , was seized as forfeited ." Coke Lit . 43 a & b . A . D . 1620 - 30 .
c . 43 . It shall not be lawful from henceforth to any to give his lands
to any religious house , and to take the same land again to hold of the
same house . Nor shall it be lawful to any house of religion to take the
lands of any , and to lease the same to him of whom they were received
to be holden . If any from henceforth so give his lands to any religious
house , and thereupon be convict , the gift shall be utterly void , and the
land shall accrue to the lord of the fee.
“ But as this prohibition extended only to religious houses bishops and
other sole corporations were not included therein ; and the aggregate eccle
siastical bodies (who Sir Edward Coke observes , in this were to be com
mended , that they ever had of their counsel the best learned men that they
could get ) , found many means to creep out of this statute , by buying the
lands that were bona fide holden of themselves as lords of the fee , and
thereby evading the forfeiture ; or by taking long leases for years , which
first introduced those extensive terms for a thousand years or more , which
are now so frequent in conveyances . " 2 BI. Com . 270 .
For further legislation to avoid this defect see the statute De Viris
Religiosis , post.
c . 44 . Scutage from thence shall be taken as it was accustomed to be
taken in the time of King Henry our grandfather .
BRACTON 'S LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND - A . D. 1256 ? (1240
1267 ) .
Lib . 1, c. 19 , § 2, ff. 46 a & b . Also it is to be seen whether he to








without prejudice to the chief lords ; and it appears 60 ; because if a
donation b
e further made , although the chief lord suffers damage by it ,
nevertheless injury is not done to him , because al
l
damage does not
inflict injury , but on the contrary injury implies damage . Because the
term injury is applied to everything which is done not rightfully , and
upon injury there follows an action to remove the injury and that from
which the injury results ; but where there is damage and no injury an
action does not follow to remove the nuisance from which the damage
results . But some person may say , that from the fact that the donatory
further gives and transfers the thing given to others , that he cannot
d
o this , because the lord through this loses his service , which is not
true , with all due respect and reverence for the chief lords . And it is
generally true that a donatory may give to whom he pleases realty
and land given to himself , unless it be specially provided in the possession
that h
e may not . For when a person has given a tenement he gives
a certain tenement in such a manner , that he is to receive certain cus
toms and a certain service , according as has been said above . And
hence h
e
cannot claim more of right , if he shall have had what is agreed
apon , and so he takes what is h own and goes his way . * * * It
appears , therefore , from the premises , that when a donation by a lord to
his tenant is perfect and free , absolute and not conditional nor servile , no
injury is done to the lord from the fact , that the tenant has further given
it , for injury results from the fact if (he has done so ) against a mode or 8
covenant . If my tenant has made a donation it is asked to whom he has
done an injury ? Not to the lord , for the lord has whatever belongs to
himself , and the tenement charged and burdened , whatever may be said to
whomsoever it may have come . Likewise neither the feoffee , for it matters
not to the chief lord whosoever has his fee , since the tenant is his tenant ,
although through an intermediate tenant . And if he shall say that he has
entered his fee unjustly , I say not so ; because the fee is not his in the
domain , but is his tenant ' s , and the lord has nothing in the fee except a
service ; and so the tenant will have the fe
e
in the domain , and the lord
will have the fee in the service . And if the lord shall prohibit his tenant
to work his pleasure with the tenement , which he holds in domain , the
lord so enters into the tenement of his tenant and causes him a disseisin ,
unless a mode o
r
covenant added to the donation itself induces otherwise ,
since anyone may add in a donation & mode or covenant and a law which




the lord is said to be this , homage
and service and not the tenement in domain , and therefore he who enters
upon the homage and his service does him an injury , and not he who
enters upon the tenement , which his tenant holds in domain , as above
said .
Lib . 2 , c . 35 , f . 81 . In the same way the tie of homage may be dis
solved and extinguished as regards the person o
f
the tenant , and attach
to the person o
f
another , as for instance , where the tenant , when he has
done homage to his lord has altogether relieved himself o
f
his inheritance
and has enfeoffed another to hold o
f
the chief lord , and in that case
TENURES .
the tenant is released from the duty to render homage , and the homage
is extinguished , whether with or against the will of the chief lord , and
the tie attaches to the person of the feoffee , who is bound because o
f
the tenement which he holds , because it is the fee o
f
the chief lord .
THE STATUTE OF MERTON , 20 Hen . II
I
- A . D . 1235 .
C . 6 . O
f
heirs that be led away , and withheld or married b
y
their
parents or by others , with force against our peace , thus it is provided :
That whatsoever layman be convict thereof , that he hath 80
withheld any child , led away , or married , he shall yield to the loser
the value o
f
the marriage ; and for the offense , his body shall be taken
and imprisoned until he has recompensed the loser , if the child be mar
ried ; and further until he has satisfied our lord the king for the tres
pass ; and this must be done of an heir being within the age o
f
fourteen




above , unto his
full age , if he marry without license of his lord to defraud him o
f
the
marriage , and his lord offer him reasonable and convenient marriage ,
without disparagement , then his lord shall hold his land beyond the
term o
f
his age , that is to say , of one and twenty years , so long that
he may receive the double value of the marriage , after the estimation
o
f
lawful men , or after as it has been offered him for said marriage
before without fraud or collusion , and after as it may be proved in the
king ' s court . And as touching lords which marry those that they have







fourteen years , and of such age that
h
e cannot consent to the marriage , then if his friends complain of the
same lord , the lord shall lose the wardship unto the age of the heir , and
all profits that thereof shall be taken shall be converted to the use of
the heir being within age , after the disposition and provision of his
friends , for the shame done to him ; but if he be fourteen years and
above , so that he may consent and does consent to such marriage , no pain
shall follow .
c . 7 . If an heir , of what age soever he be , will not marry at the
request o
f
his lord , he shall not be compelled thereunto ; but when he
comes to full age , he shall give to his lord and pay him as much as
any would have given him for the marriage , before the receipt of his
land , and that whether he will marry himself or not ; for the marriage
o
f
him that is within age of mere right pertains to the lord o
f
the fee .
STATUTE OF MARLEBRIDGE , 52 Henry M - A . D . 1207 .
C . 16 . If any heir after the death of his ancestor be within age , and
his lord have the ward of his lands and tenements , if the lord will not
render unto the heir his land when he comes to his full age , without




mort d 'ancestor , with
the damages that he has sustained b
y
such withholding , since the time
that he was o
f full age . And if an heir at the time of his ancestor ' s
death be o
f full age , and he is heir apparent and known for heir , and
TENURES .
be found in the inheritance , the chief lord shall not put him out, nor
take nor remove anything there , but shall take only simple siezin
therefore for the recognition of his seigniory , that he may be known for
lord . And if the chief lord do put such an heir out of the possession
maliciously , whereby he is driven to purchase a writ of mort d'ancestor
or of cousenage , then he shall recover his damages as in assize of novel
disseizin . Touching heirs which hold of our lord the king in chief ,
this order shall be observed , that our lord the king shall have the first
seizin of their lands , like as he was wont to have before time ; neither
shall the heir , nor any other intrude into the same inheritance , before he
has received it out of the king's hands , as the inheritance was wont
to be taken out of his hands and his ancestors ' in time past ; and this
must be understood of lands and fees which were accustomed to be in
the king 's hands by reason of knight's service , or sergeanty , or right of
patronage.
STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER I, 3 Edw . I - A . D . 1275 .
C. 22 . Of heirs married within age, without the consent of their
guardians , afore that they be past the age of fourteen years , it shall
be done according as it is contained in the statutes of Merton . And
of them that shall be married without the consent of their guardians
after they be past the age of 14 years , the guardian shall have the
double value of their marriage , after the tenor of the same act. More
over, such as have withdrawn their marriage , shall pay the full value
thereof unto their guardian for the trespass , and nevertheless the king
shall have like amends, according to the same act , of him that has so
withdrawn . And of heirs females , after they have accomplished the age
of 14 years , and the lord to whom the marriage belonged will not marry
them , but desirous of the land will keep them unmarried ; it is provided
that the lord shall not have nor keep , by reason of marriage , the lands
of such heirs females , more than two years after the term of the said
14 vears. And if the lord within the said two years do not marry them ,
then shall they have an action to recover their inheritance quit , without
giving anything for their wardship or their marriage . And if they of
malice , or by evil counsel , will not be married by their chief lords where
they shall not be disparaged , then their lords may hold their lands
and inheritance until they have accomplished the age of an heir male ,












C . 36 . For as much as before this time , reasonable aid to make one ' s
son knight , or marry his daughter , was never made certain , nor how
much should b
e
taken , nor at what time , whereby some levied unreason
able a
id , and more often than seemed necessary , whereby the people
were sore grieved ; it is provided that from henceforth o
f





taken but 208 . ; and o
f
201 . land held in socage 20s . , and o
f
more , more , and of less , less ; after the rate . And that none shall levy
such a
id










seven years ; and that
there shall be made mention in the king ' s writ formed on the same ,
when any will demand it . And if it happen that the father , after
he has levied such aid o
f
his tenants , die before he has married his
daughter , the executors of the father shall be bound to the daughter
for so much a
s
the father received for the ai
d ; and if the father ' s goods
b
e
not sufficient , his heir shall be charged therewith to the daughter .
STATUTE DE VIRIS RELIGIOSIS , 7 Edw . I , A . D . 1279 .
The king to his justices o
f
the bench , greeting : Where o
f
late it was
provided that religious men should not enter into the fees o
f any
without license and will o
f
the chief lord of whom such fees be held
immediately , and notwithstanding such religious men have entered as
well into their own fees as into the fees of other men , appropriating and





whereby the services that are due o
f
such fees and which at the beginning
were provided for the defense o
f
the realm , are unlawfully withdrawn ,
and the chief lords d
o
lose their escheats o
f
the same , We therefore to the
profit o
f





our prelates , earls , barons , and other our subjects , being o
f
our council , have provided , made , and ordained , that no person , religious
o
r
other , whatsoever he be , that will buy or sell any lands or tenements ,
o





that will receive by reason o
f any





device will presume to appropriate to himself under pain or forfeiture
o
f
the same , whereby such lands or tenements may any wise come into
mortmain . We have provided also that if any person , religious or other ,
do presume either by craft o
r
device to offend against this statute , it
shall be lawful to us and other chief lords of the fee immediate to
enter into the land so alienated within a year from the time o
f
the alien
ation , and hold it in fee a
s
a
n inheritance . And if the chief lord imme
diate be negligent , and will not enter into such fee within the year ,
then it shall be lawful to the next chief lord immediate of the same fee
to enter into the same land within half a year next following , and to hold
it a
s
aforesaid ; and so every lord immediate may enter into such land if
the next lord be negligent in entering into the same fee , as is afore
said . And if all the chief lords of such fees , being of full age ,
within the four seas , and out o
f prison , be negligent or slack in this
behalf for the space o
f
one whole year , we , immediately after the year
accomplished from the time that such purchases , gifts , o
r appropriations
happen to b
e made , shall take such lands and tenements in our hand ,





our realm , saving to the chief lords o
f
the same fees their
wards and escheats , and other things to them belonging , and the services
for the same due and accustomed . And therefore we command you that
you cause the aforesaid statute to b
e
read before you , and from hence
forth to be kept firmly and observed . Witness myself at Westminster
the 15th day o
f
November , the seventh year of our reign .
TENURES .
" This seemed to be a sufficient security against all alienations in mort .
main : but as these statutes extended only to gifts and conveyances between
the parties , the religious houses now began to set up a fictitious title to the
land which it was intended they should have , and to bring an action to
recover it against the tenant ; who by fraud and collusion , made no defense ,
and thereby judgment was given for the religious house, which then recov
ered the land by sentence of law upon a supposed prior title . And thus
they had the honor of inventing those fictitious adjudications of right which
are since become the great assurance of the kingdom , under the name of
common recoveries . " 2 B1. Com . * 270 - 1.
STATUTE QUIA EMPTORES or Statute of Westminster III , 18 Edw . I,
Statute 1. - A . D . 1290 .
a 1. For as much as purchasers of lands and tenements of the fees
of great men and other lords have many times heretofore entered
into their fees , to the prejudice of the lords , to whom the freeholders
of such great men have sold their lands and tenements to be holden in
fee of their feoffors and not of the chief lords of the fees, whereby the
same chief lords have many times lost their escheats , marriages and
wardships of lands and tenements belonging to their fees , which thing
seems very hard and extreme unto those lords and other great men , and
moreover in this case manifest disheritance , our lord the king in his
parliament at Westminster after Easter the eighteenth year of his reign ,
that is to -wit in the quinzine of St. John Baptiste , at the instance of the
great men of the realm granted , provided , and ordained , that from
henceforth it should be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own
pleasure his lands and tenements or part of them , so that the feoffee
shall hold the same lands or tenements of the chief lord of the same
fee, by such service and customs as his feoffor held before.
C. 2. And if he sell any part of such lands or tenements to any , the
feoffee shall immediately hold it of the chief lord , and shall be forthwith
charged with the services for so much as pertaineth or ought to pertain
to the said chief lord , for the same parcel, according to the quantity of
the land or tenement so sold , and so in this case the same part of the
service shall remain to the lord , to be taken by the hands of the feoffee ,
for the which he ought to be attendant and answerable to the same chief
lord , according to the quantity of the land or tenement sold for the
parcel of the service so due .
c. 3. And it is to be understood that by the said sales or purchases
of lands or tenements or any parcel of them , such lands or tenements
shall in no wise come into mortmain , either in part or in whole , neither
by policy nor craft , contrary to the form of the statute inade thereupon
of late . And it is to -wit that this statute extendeth but only to lands held
in fee simple, and that it extends to the time coming. And it shall begin
to take effect at the feast of St. Andrew the apostle next coming .
NOTE , Yearbooks (Horwood ) , 21 & 22 Edw . I, p . 640.-- A. D . 1294 .
Note that a man may enfeoff another to hold to him and the heirs
of his body begotten , to be holden of him ( the feoffor ) by a certain
10 TENURES .
service by the year ; and in this case there is no need that he be enfeoffed
to hold of the chief lord of the fee ; for the statute 'Quia Emptores Ter
rarum ,” & c., is understood of the case of one enfeoffing another in fee





STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER II , 13 Edw . I – A . D . 1285 .
c . 32 . When religious men and other ecclesiastical persons do im
plead any , and the party impleaded makes default whereby he ought to
lose the lands , forasmuch as the justices have thought hitherto that if
the party impleaded make default b
y
collusion , that where the demandant
by occasion o
f






f gift or alienation , he shall now by reason o
f
the default , and so the
statute [ De Viris Religiosis , above ) is defrauded ; it is ordained b
y
our
lord the king , and granted , that in this case , after default is made it
shall be inquired by the country whether the demandant had right to
the thing demanded o
r
n
o . And if it be found that the demandant
had right in his demand , the judgment shall pass with him and he
shall recover seizin ; and if he hath no right the land shall accrue to the
next lord o
f
the fee , if he demand it within a year from the time o
f
the
inquest taken ; and if he do not demand it within the year , it shall accrue
to the next lord above , if he do demand it within half a year after the
same year ; and so every lord after the next lord shall have the space of
half a year to demand it successively , until it come to the king , to whom
a
t
length , through default o
f
other lords , the land shall accrue . And to
challenge the jurors o
f
the inquest , every of the chief lords o
f
the fees
shall be admitted ; and likewise for the king , they that will shall chal
lenge . And after the judgment given the land , shall remain [ clear ]
in the king ' s hands until it be dereigned b
y
the demandant or some




THOREWAY V . NEEL , in Common Bench , Mich . term , 4 Edw . II , A . D .
1310 – 4 Selden Society Year Books p . 184 .
In a writ o
f entry Alice prayed her age . Willoughby : You ought
not to have your age , for G , your father , enfeoffed you with these same
tenements , so that he did not die siezed . Denom . : We are daughter
and heir of this same G , to whom you can give no other heir ; and so ,
though it was a purchase , she is now found inherited by the death of
John , her brother . BEREFORD [ C . J . ] to Willoughby : Can you show




STATUTE I Edw . II
I , St . 2 – A . D . 1327 .
C . 12 . Whereas divers people of the realm complain themselves to be
grieved , because that lands and tenements which be held o
f
the king
in chief , and aliened without license , have been seized heretofore into
the king ' s hands , and held as forfeit ; the king shall not hold them as
TENURES . 11
forfeit in such case , but will and grant from henceforth , of such lands
and tenements so alienated , there shall be reasonable fine taken in the
chancery , by due process .
" Upon which statute it was settled that one- third of the yearly value
should be paid for a license of alienation ; but if the tenant presumed to
aliene without a license , a full year 's value should be paid .” 2 Bl. Com . * 72 .
STATUTE , 12 CHARLES II, c. 24 . - A . D . 1660 .
An Act for Taking Away the court of Wards and Liveries , and Tenures
in Capite , and by Knight Service , and Purveyance , and for settling & Rey
enue upon his Majesty In lieu thereof.
Whereas it has been found by former experience, that the courts of
wards and liveries , and tenures by knight service , either of the king or
others , by knight service in capite , or socage in capite of the king, and
the consequents upon the same, have been much more burdensome ,
grierous , and prejudicial to the kingdom , than they have been beneficial
to the king ; and whereas since the intermission of the said court, which
hath been from the four and twentieth day of February which was in
the year of our lord one thousand six hundred forty and five , many
persons have b
y
will and otherwise made disposal of their lands held b
y
knight service , whereon divers questions might possibly arise , unless
some seasonable remedy b
e
taken to prevent the same ; Be it therefore
enacted b
y
the king our sovereign lord , with the assent of the lords and





and it is hereby enacted , That the court o
f
wards and liveries , and all
wardships , liveries , primer -seisins , and ousterlemains , values and forfeit
ures o
f marriages , by reason of any tenure of the king ' s majesty , or of
any other b
y knight service , and all mean rates , and al
l
other gifts ,




liveries , primer - seisins , o
r
ousterlemains , be taken away and discharged ,
and are hereby enacted to be taken away and discharged , from the said
twenty - fourth day o
f February one thousand six hundred forty - five ; any
law , statute , custom or usage to the contrary hereof in any wise notwith
standing . And that all fines for alienations , seizures and pardons for
alienations , tenure b
y
homage , and all charges incident o





f wardships , livery , primer -seisin , or ousterlemain , or
tenure b
y knight service , escuage , and also , aid pur file marier , and pur
fair fitz chivaler , al
l
other charges incident thereto , be likewise taken
away and discharged , from the said twenty -fourth day of February one
thousand six hundred forty and five ; any law , statute , custom or usage




y knight service of the king , or of any other person , by knight service
in capite , and b
y
socage in capite o
f
the king , and the fruits and conse
quents thereof , happened or which shall or may hereafter happen or
arise thereupon o
r thereby , be taken away and discharged , any law ,
statute , custom or usage to the contrary hereof in any wise notwithstand




any honours , manors , lands , tenements or here
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ditaments , or any estate of inheritance at common law , held either of the
king or of any other person or persons, bodies politic or corporate , are
hereby enacted to be turned into free and common socage , to all intents
and purposes, from the said twenty - fourth day of February one thousand
six hundred forty - five and shall be so construed , adjudged and deemed
to be from the said twenty - fourth day of February one thousand six
hundred forty five, and forever thereafter turned into free and common
Bocage ; any law , statute custom or usage to the contrary hereof in any
wise notwithstanding . *
BRADSHAW v . LAWSON , in King's Bench , Mich ., 32 Geo . 3. - Nov . 18 ,
1791 - 4 Term . 443 .
Action of debt for 2s. 6d . for not attending plaintiff 's court baron





the manor were ( except the lord ' s
demesne lands ) o
f customary tenure o
f
inheritance , passing b
y customary
deeds and the lord ' s admission . The tenure remains unaltered of several
o
f




feoffment with livery indorsed thereon was made Oct .
2 , 18 Jac . I , whereby the then lord o
f
the manor enfeoffed it for 802 .





8 . 11d . , therein called ancient rent , for all other rents . May 14 , 1
Car . I , another deed reciting this deed covenanted that al
l
holders of the
estate should grind at the lord ' s mill and do suit at his court as formerly ,
and be subject to fines and amercements assessed b
y homage or jury ,
and that for each default 2s . 6d . should be paid . This deed was executed
by C ' s son . Defendant ' s ancestor became possessed of the estate in
1742 , since which time no owner had attended court nor been amerced
except once in 1742 . Case reserved .
LORD KENYON , C . J . - Notwithstanding all the industry that has
been exerted o
n this occasion , I cannot entertain a doubt on the prin
cipal question , which was settled about five centuries ago b
y
a positive
act of parliament , the statute of quia emptores . And the objection to
the plaintiff ' s claim , which arises on this statute , decides the merits of
the cause , and renders it unnecessary to consider the other points that
were made b
y
the plaintiff ' s counsel , which perhaps upon examination
would be found equally destitute o
f
a
ll legal principles . It is stated , as
the foundation o
f
the plaintiff ' s demand , that the relation between these
parties is that o
f
lord and tenant ; as long a
s










manor ; and among others was that o
f attending the lord ' s court . Now
it is stated in the case that the lord of thismanor in the reign o
f
James I ,
by competent deeds o
f
conveyance conveyed the property , of which the
defendant is now seized , to the defendant ' s ancestor , then a customary
tenant o
f







the fee -farm rent ; but if the relation o
f









whicho rd . Ble of the
considered a
s
rent -service , but a rent to be recovered according to the
contract between the parties . After the statute of quia emptores the
lord could not b
y any deed reserve the old services when he conveyed
sway the estate in respect o
f
which those services were due ; for the
tenant must hold o
f





o longer parcel o
f
the manor , nor held o
f
the manor ; neither was
th
e
defendant ' s ancestor any longer a tenant o
f
the manor . Therefore
o
n that point , on which all the plaintiff ' s claim is founded , I am ex









very foundation of his claim totally fails , and that a judgment o
f





ils , and tom ofopinion
tips
MATTHEWS v . WARD ' S LESSEE , In Md . Ct . of App . , Dec . 1839 — 10 GUI
& J . 443 .
Ejectment b
y plaintiff as lessee o
f
Sarah Ward et a
l
. , against Henry
Matthews , for a lo
t
o
f land in the city o
f Annapolis . From judgment fo
r
plaintiff , defendant appeals .





n Oct . 18th , 1817 ,
b
y
indenture in consideration o
f
five dollars , gave , granted , bargained ,




is heirs forever ; and in case the said John Henry Scott should die




Lucy Ward , daughter of said Leonard Scott . The grantors in the deed
died ; John Henry Scott died , intestate , unmarried , and without heirs ;
later Lucy Ward died ; and plaintiff ' s lessors claim as her children and




a patent issued to him on an
escheat warrant taken out b
y




n the death o
f
John Henry Scott without heirs . After the
patent to Matthews , but before this suit was commenced , Price and wife
made a deed , reciting the facts and purpose of the first deed , and grant
in
g , bargaining , selling , conveying , and enfeoffing to plaintiff ' s lessors .
ARCHER , J . - It is contended by the appellant , that the deed from
Scott and wife to Price is a deed o
f
feoffment ; and as such , the legal
title o
f




uses in John Henry Scott
in fe
e ; that the remainder over , as being too remote , was void , and that
upon the death o
f
John Henry Scott without heirs , the property of
course became liable to escheat .
If by the words o
f
the deed and the intention o
f




f feoffment , there would arise no objection to








feoffments , which demanded livery of seisin




enrollment takes the place o
f livery and is equivalent to it . The
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act of 1766 provided for the enrollment of deeds of feoffment, as well
as other deeds , and the act of 1715 declared that livery should not be
necessary where the deed was enrolled . (* 449 ) * * *
If this be a deed of bargain and sale , as we think it is, then the use
was executed in the bargainee, and the limitations to use are merely
trusts in chancery , and the cestui que trusts are seised only of an equi
table estate , and the question has been discussed whether such an estate is
liable in this state to escheat. The case of Burgess v . Wheat, 1 Eden 177 ,
1 Wm . Bl. 123 , may be considered as having settled the English rule on
this subject , though much dissatisfaction ( * 450 ) has at various times
been expressed at the decision. That the death of the cestui que trust ,
without heirs , did not operate as a forfeiture to the lord was founded on
the feudal idea of tenure, the trustee being in esse, and being the legal
seisin of the land,was the tenant possessing capacities to perform the feudal
services ; as against him the king possessed no equity. Judge Tucker , in
3 Leigh 518 , in speaking of Burgess v . Wheat , says , there can be nothing
more unreasonable than this decision of Burgess v . Wheat, if we consider
it in any other light than as a mere question of tenure ; that the trustee
should be permitted upon the death of the beneficial owner without heirs ,
to hold the estate to his own use , is utterly at variance not only with the
principles of equity , which consider him a mere machine , an instrument , a
conduit , * * * but it seems to me at variance with the natural justice
of the case . It is right and proper , that , when the owner of property dies
without giving it away , and without leaving any objects having natural
claim to his bounty , such as heirs or next of kin , his prosperity should
go to the community of which he is a member . The ground upon which
the English rule on this subject can alone be maintained , and upon
which it was established , is on the principle of tenure ; and it becomes
therefore important to inquire , whether the doctrine of that case would
be supported in this state upon the same ground .
The lord proprietary , by the express terms of the charter , held his
lands in free and common socage , and his grantees, or tenants, anterior
to the revolution held by the same tenure . Service of a feudal character ,
or of the nature of feudal services , were attached to his grants ; and the
incidents of fealty , rent, escheat , and fines for alienation or some
of them , were the necessary incidents thereto . At the revolution , when
the people of the state assumed the powers of government , and the right
theretofore existing in the proprietary , these services and incidents were
in effect abolished ; thus the oath of allegiance to the state superseded
the incidents of fealty ; quit rents were abolished , and grants were made
without being subject to fine on the alienation of the grantee ; and
escheats , though they existed , had essentially changed their nature , no
longer being technically founded on the same principles . Instead of
going to the lord of the fe





the tenant without his heirs there was no one
to perform the feudal services ; they reverted to the state as property
without an owner , upon a principle o
f







procured i patenta tih
should hold the derelict property for the benefit o
f
all . After the revo
lution , therefore , lands became allodial , subject to no tenure , nor to any
o
f
the services incident thereto ; and if allodial , the supreme power of
the state would succeed to them as the king would succeed to allodial
property in England b
y
the common law , upon the death of the owner
without next o
f
kin . It was said by Lord Mansfield , in 1 Wm . B
l
. 163 - 4 ,
" In personal estates which are allodial b
y
law , the king is the last heir
where no kin , and the king is as well entitled to that as to any other
personal estate . ” * * * In analogy , therefore , to the admitted condi
tion o
f
allodial property , and in conformity to the reason and justice o
f
the thing , when the owner of real estate dies without heir , the state is
ultimus haeres , and takes the property for the benefit o
f
all . * * *
Here the court discusses the state statutes regulating escheat , and holds
them to apply to equitable interests . ]
If these views be correct , and we think they are , the land held in trust
in this case was liable to escheat . Matthews having taken out an
escheat warrant , and procured a patent thereon , the next inquiry is ,
whether it gave him the legal title ; and it is insisted that it did , in
virtue o
f




terms to uses . It may therefore be doubted whether it applies to modern
trusts , and it is questionable whether it is in force in this state . Cases
coming as it would appear within the terms o
f
the statute , if it applies
e
t all to trusts , have been excluded . Thus it has ( * 455 ) been held , that
this statute does not apply to the trusts o
f
a term . [Goodtitle d . Jones
V . Jones ] , 1 Term 47 . So it has been held , that a feoffment b
y
a cestui
que trust of a term , without the consent of the legal termor , does not
destroy the term . Doe ez dem . Maddock v . Lynes , 3 Barn & Cres . 388 .
The universal practice never to rely on the conveyance o
f
the cestui que
trust for passing the legal title , but to require the conveyance of the trus
tee for that purpose , which practice is admitted to exist , in Cornish , on
Uses , 33 , is very strong to show that the statute o
f
1 Rich , 3 , c . 1 , does not
apply to trusts ; for if it did apply to trusts , then the cestui que trust could
convey the legal title , and the concurrence of the trustee would be wholly
unnecessary . * * * We are therefore of opinion that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover a
t
law , and that the remedy of the defendant is
in equity .
Judgment affirmed .
VAN RENSSELAER v . HAYS , in New York Ct . of App . , Mareh , 1859 .
19 N . Y . 68 - 99 .
Action for rent 16 years arrear under a deed made Feb . 15 , 1796 b
y
plaintiff ' s father and devisor in consideration of 58 . , and the yearly rents
covenants and conditions contained in the deed , which bargained and
sold , released and confirmed , 274 acres to Jacob Dietz (defendant ' s
grantor ) h
is
heirs and assigns , " yielding and paying therefor yearly and
every year ” to the grantor hi
s





bushels of good wheat, four fat fowls , and a day's service with carriage and
horses . The grantee covenanted for himself his heirs and assigns to pay
& c . At the close of the trial the court found these facts , and that the proper
portion of the rent and interest for the portion of the granted premises
held by defendant was $ 485 .07 , for which he directed judgment for
plaintiff . This judgment was affirmed by the general term and defendant
appealed here .
DENIO , J . The defendant 's position is , that the covenant for the pay
ment of the rent is , in law , personal between the grantor and grantee ,
or what is sometimes called in the books a covenant in gross , and ,
consequently , that after the death of the original parties , no action to
recover rent can be maintained in favor of or against any persons ex
cept their respective executors or administrators . As the law contem
plates that the estates of deceased persons shall be speedily settled ,
and in the natural course of things the personal representatives of a
man disappear with the generation to which they belong , the intention
of the parties to the indenture to create a perpetual rent issuing out
of the premises will, if that position can be maintained , be entirely dis
appointed ; and the argument is , in effect , that the law does not permit
arrangements by which [ * 71 ] a rent shall be reserved upon a conveyance
in fee , and that where it is attempted the reservation does not affect
the title to the land , but the conveyance is absolute and unconditional .
The design of the parties to create relations which should survive them ,
and continue to exist in perpetuity by being annexed to the ownership
of the estate of the grantee of the land on the one hand , and of the
rent on the other , is manifest from the language of the instrument .
They were careful to declare that the obligation to pay the rent should
attach to those who should succeed the grantee as his heirs and assigns,
and should run in favor of the heirs and assigns of the grantor ; and
the nature of a perpetually recurring payment requires that there should
be an endless succession of parties to receive and to pay it . We have
a legislative declaration , in an act of 1805 , passed about ten years after
this conveyance , that grants in fee reserving rents had then long been
in use in this state ( Ch . 98 ) ; and the design of the legislature by
that enactment was , not only to render such grants thereafter available
according to their intention , but to resolve , in favor of such transactions ,
the doubts which it is recited had been entertained respecting their
validity. Still, if, by a stubborn principle of law , a burden in the
form of an annual payment cannot be attached to the ownership of land
held in fee simple , or if the right to enforce such payment cannot be
made transferable by the party in whom it is vested , effect must be
given to the rule , though it may have been unknown to the parties
and to the legislature ; unless indeed the interposition of the latter
by the statute which has been mentioned , can lawfully operate retro





that , by the early common law of England , conveyances in al
l
respects like the present would have created the precise rights and
obligations claimed b
y
the plaintiff ; but it is insisted that the act re
specting tenures , called the statute of quia emptores , enacted in the
eighteenth year o
f King Edward I , and which has been adopted in
this country , rendered such transactions no longer possible . The prin
ciples o
f
that statute have , in my opinion , always been the law of this
[ * 72 ] country , as well during its colonial condition as after it became an
independent State . A little attention to the pre -existing state of the
la
w will show that this must necessarily have been so . In the early
vigor o
f
the feudal system , a tenant in fee could not alienate the feud
without the consent o
f
his immediate superior ; but this extreme rigor









y fealty and such services as might be reserved b
y
the act of feoffment . Thus a new tenure was created upon every
alienation ; and thence there arose a series o
f
lords of the same lands ,
the first , called the chief lords , holding immediately of the sovereign :
the next grade holding of them ; and so on , each alienation creating
another lord and another tenant . This practice was considered detri






the tenure , such as escheats , marriages , wardships , and
th
e
like , which , when due from the terre -tenants , accrued to the next





the Great Charter o
f Henry III ( A . D . 1225 ) , which de
clared that no freeman should thenceforth give or sell any more of
h
is land , but so that of the residue o
f
the lands the lord o
f
the fee
might have the service due to him which belonged to the fee . 1 Ruff
head ' s Statutes at Large , 8 . The next important change was the stat
a
te o




lands and tenements (quia emptores terrarum
e
t tenementorum ) , o
f
the fees o
f great men and other lords had many
times entered into their fees to the prejudice o
f





feoffors and not o
f





chief lords many times lost their escheats , et
c
. , “ which thing seemed
very hard and extreme unto these lords and other great men , ” etc . ,
enacted that from henceforth it should be lawful for every freeman
to sell a
t
his own pleasure his lands and tenements , or part of them ,
8





the same fee b
y
such services and customs as his feoffer held
( * 73 ] before . ( Id . 122 . ) The effect o
f
this important enactment was ,
that thenceforth no new tenure o
f
lands which had already been granted
b
y
the sovereign could b
e
created . Every subsequent alienation placed
the feoffee in the same feudal relation which his feoffer before occupied ;
that is , he held of the same superior lord b
y
the same services , and not
o
f his feoffor . The system o
f
tenures then existing was left untouched ,
but the progress o
f




arrested . Our ancestors, in emigrating to this country , brought with
them such parts of the common law and such of the English statutes
as were of a general nature and applicable to their situation 1 Kent , 473 ,
and cases cited in note a to the 5th ed . ; Bogardus v. Trinity Church ,
4 Paige , 178 ; and when the first constitution of this state came to




the common law o






the colonial legislature as together formed
the law o
f





this state , subject , of course , to alteration
b
y
the legislature . Art . 35 . The law as to holding lands and of
transmitting the title thereto from one subject to another must have
been a matter o
f
the first importance in our colonial state ; and there
can be n
o
doubt but that the great body o
f
the English law upon that
subject , so far as it regarded the transactions o
f private individuals ,
immediately became the law o
f
the colony , subject to such changes as
were introduced b
y
colonial legislation . The lands were holden
under grants from the crown , and as the king was not within the




Charles II , ch . 24 abolishing military tenures , must have been that of
free and common socage , was created as between the king and his
grantee . I have elsewhere expressed the opinion that the king might ,
notwithstanding the statute against subinfeudation , grant to his im
mediate tenant the right to alien his land to be holden of himself , and
thus create a manor , where the land was not in tenure prior to the
18th Edward I . The People v . Van Rensselaer , 5 Seld . , 334 . But with
the exception o
f
the tenure arising upon royal grants , [ * 74 ] and such
a
s might be created b
y
the king ' s immediate grantees under express
license from the crown , I am of opinion that the law forbidding the




subinfeudation was always the law
o
f
the colony , and that it was the law o
f
this state , as well before
a
s
after the passage o
f
our act concerning tenures , in 1787 . A con
trary theory would lead to the most absurd conclusions . We should
have to hold that the feudal system , during the whole colonial period ,
and for the first ten years o
f
the state government , existed here in
a condition o
f vigor which had been unknown in England for more
than three centuries before the first settlements of this country . We
should b
e obliged to resolve questions arising upon early conveyances ,
under which many titles are still held , b
y
the law which prevailed in
England during the first two centuries after the Conquest , before the
commencement o
f
the Year Books , and long before Littleton wrote his
Treatise upon Tenures .
The fact that the statute we are considering was re -enacted in this
State in 1787 , has no tendency to show that it had not the force o
f
law prior to that time . Indeed , the contrary inference is nearly irre





Jones and Varick , and enacted by the legisla




English statutes was made in pursuance of an act passed in 1786 . It
recited the constitutional provision which I have mentioned , and that
such of the said statutes “ as had been generally supposed to extend
to the late colony and to this state , were contained in a great num
ber of volumes , and were conceived in a style and language improper
to appear in the statute books of this state . The persons mentioned
were , therefore , authorized to collect and reduce them into proper form ,
in order that such of them as were approved might be enacted into
laws of this state , to the intent that thereafter none of the statutes
of England or Great Britain should be in force here . 1 Jones & Var.,
ch. 35 , 281. The statute of tenures was not , therefore , understood as
introducing a new law , but was the putting into a more [ * 75 ] suitable
form certain enactments which it was conceived had the force of law ·
in the colony , and which the constitution had made a part of the law of
th
e
state . My views upon this question correspond with those expressed
b
y Mr . Justice Platt , in 18 Johnson , 186 . The English crown lawyers
appear never to have doubted but that the statute was the law o
f
the
colonies . Sir John Somers , attorney -general , and afterwards lord
keeper o
f
the great seal in the reign o
f
William III , and who is pro
nounced b
y
Macaulay to have been , in some respects , the greatest man
o
f
his age , together with the solicitor -general , Trevor , gave a written
opinion to the king in council , that al
l
the lands in Virginia were held
immediately o
f
the crown , and that the escheats and tenure accrued
to him and not to the grantors o
f
the lands . The like opinion was
given by Sir Edward Northey , attorney - general to Queen Anne , in
1705 , in respect to lands in New Jersey . He said that the grantees
o
f
the proprietors to whom the Duke o
f
York had assigned his patent ,
held o
f
the queen and not of these proprietors ; and in another opinion ,
b
y
the same law officer , respecting quit - rents in the colony o
f
New
York , he states that no tenure arose upon grants b
y
the Duke of York
before h
e
came to the crown , he being a subject ; but that where the
grant was b
y
the crown there was a tenure , “ the crown not being
within the statute of quia emptores terrarum . " Chalmer ' s Colonial
Opinions , 142 , 144 , 149 .
These opinions assume that the statute prevailed here to the same
extent as in England , and subject to the same exception in favor of
royal grants , upon which a tenure always arises . Judge Ruggles , in
giving the opinion o
f
the court in DePeyster v . Michael , 2 Seld . 467 ,
was led to doubt whether the statute was ever in force in the colonies ,
from finding that several patents , issued b
y
the colonial governors , pur




the patentees . But if the king could , notwithstanding







the opinions in The People v . Van
Rensselaer , and is as I am satisfied is the case , these [ * 76 ] instruments
are quite consistent with the idea that the statute was in force in the
colony o
f
New York . Assuming this to have been so , our own law ,
20 TENURES .
in the particular under consideration , is and has at all times , since
the organization of political society here , been the same as the law of
England .
We are then to ascertain the effect of a conveyance in fee reserving
rent, upon the assumption that the statute of quia emptores applies to
such transactions . In the first place , no reversion , in the sense of the
law of tenures, is created in favor of the grantor ; and as the right
to distrain is incident to the reversion , and without one it cannot exist
of common right, the relation created by this conveyance did not itself
authorize & distress . The fiction of fealty did not exist. The rent in
terms reserved was not a rent-service. Litt ., 88 214 , 215 . It was , how
ever, a valid rent-charge. According to the language of Littleton , " if
& man , by deed indented at this day, maketh a feoffment in fee, and
by the same indenture reserveth to him and to his heirs a certain rent,
and that if the rent be behind it shall be lawful for him and his heirs
to distrain , etc ., such a rent is a rent- charge , because such lands or
tenements are charged with such distress by force of the writing only ,
and not of common right .” Id ., $ $ 217 , 218 . And the law is the same
where the conveyance is by deed of bargain and sale under the statute
of uses . Co . Litt ., 143, b. Mr. Hargrave , in his note to this part of
the Commentaries , expresses the opinion that a proper fee farm rent
cannot be reserved upon a conveyance in fee, since the statute of quia
emptores ; but he concedes that where a conveyance in fee contains &
power to distrain and to re -enter, the rent would be good as a rent
charge. Note 235 to Co. Litt ., 143, b. Blackstone says that upon such
a conveyance the land is liable to distress , not of common right,
but by virtue of the clause in the deed . 2 Bl. Com ., 42 . The case of
Pluck v. Diggs, 2 Dow & Clark 's Parl. Rep ., 180, much relied on by
the defendant , concedes that rent reserved upon a conveyance of the
grantor 's whole estate may be distrained for by virtue of a clause of
distress . That case turned wholly upon a question of [ * 77 ] pleading .
The House of Lords held that the Irish statute, corresponding to the
11 George II, ch . 19, § 22 , allowing a general avowry, did not extend
to a rent -charge, but was limited to cases of rent-service , and that the
defendant ought in that case to have set out his title. It was for this
reason that the judgment in his favor was reversed . Lord Wynford
said , “ it is a dreadful thing to be obliged , for a defect in form , to give
a judgment contrary to the real merits of the case .”
These authorities establish the position that upon the conveyance
under consideration a valid rent was reserved , available to the grantor
by means of the clause of distress . This rent, though not strictly an
estate in the land, Payn v . Beal, 4 Denio , 405, is nevertheless a heredita
ment , and in the absence of a valid alienation by the person in whose
favor it is reserved , it descends to his heirs . Its nature , in respect
to the law of descents, is explained by Lord Coke, who at the same time
points out the distinction between such a rent as we are considering ,








He says that if a man seized of a manor , as heir on the part of his




f parcel , to hold of him b
y
rent and service , albeit they (the
services ] are newly created , yet for that they are parcel o
f
the manor ,
they shall , with the rest o
f
the manor , descend to the heir on the part
o
f
the mother . If a man so seized , that is by inheritance from his
mother , maketh [now ] a feoffment in fee , reserving a rent to him




o . Litt . , 12 , b . The reason is given in a case in Hobart , thus : “ If ,
upon a feoffment o
f
lands which I have on the part of the mother ,
o
r
in borough English (where the youngest son is the heir ] I reserve
a rent to me and to my heirs , it shall g
o





it is not within the custom , but it is a new thing divided from the
land itself . " Counden v . Clerke , 31 , b . The distinction is this : A





was incident to the reversion , and therefore a part o
f
the estate remain




the estate would have done if there had been no
alienation . But where there is no reversion , as in the case o
f
a convey
ance in fee since the statute , the rent reserved is an inheritable estate
newly created , and descends according to the general law of inheritance ,
to the heirs o
f
the person dying seized , with regard to the heritable
quality o
f
the estate , the conveyance of which formed the consideration
o
f
the rent . Preston states the principle thus : “ A rent incident to
the reversion will descend with the reversion as a part thereof ; but a
rent reserved on a grant in fee , or limited b
y way of use in a convey
ance to uses , will be descendible as a new purchase from the person
to whom it is reserved or limited . ” 3 Essay on Abstract of Title , 54 .





the land from the owner o
f
the same ; and , 2dly . A grant
o
f the rent on the part of the grantee . ” Id . , 55 . To the same pur
pose see 3 Cruise , 313 ( N . Y . ed . of 1834 . ) The descendible quality
o
f
these rents was early established in this state in the case of The
Executors o
f
Van Rensselaer v . The Executors of Platner , decided in
the year 1800 . The action was for nine years ' rent to May 1 , 1783 ,




the plaintiffs ' testator to the testator
o
f
the defendants , executed in 1774 ; and it appeared that the testator
o
f
the plaintiffs died on the 22d o
f February , 1783 , seven days before
the last year ' s rent sued for became payable . The plaintiffs , however ,
recovered the rent for the whole period ; and the defendants moved in
arrest o
f judgment , on the ground that the recovery embraced one
year ' s rent which did not belong to them as executors ; and the judg
ment was arrested for that reason . Kent , J . , said , it was clear that
the executor could only g
o
for rent due and payable at the testator ' s
death , " where the rent , as in the present case , goes , on the testator ' s
death , to his heirs . ” 2 John . Ca . , 17 . There can be no pretense that
the court considered the rent to be a rent -service , on the notion that
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the statute of qui emptores had not been enacted in this state when
the deed was executed ; for in the next case in the book , which [ * 79 ]
was an action for subsequent rent on the same conveyance , and was
decided at the same time , it was expressly declared to be “ a fee farm
rent, or rent- charge ." If the annual payments provided for in these
conveyances were merely sums in gross secured by personal covenants ,
the action would have been rightly brought by the executors for the last
year 's rent, though it fell due after the testator 's death . The contract ,
upon that theory , would have been of the same character as a bond
for the payment of moneys by annual installments in perpetuity , in
which case , if we can conceive of such a security , the personal repre
sentatives of the obligees would have been the proper parties to bring
the action , whether the payments sought to be recovered matured before
or after the testator's death . It was only upon the assumption that
the right to the rent reserved was a heritable estate , which , so far as it
had not become payable at his death , descended to the heirs of the
grantor , that the judgment can be sustained . The case was argued by
eminent counsel — the late Ambrose Spencer , and James Emmot - and
appears to have received full consideration ; three of the judges deliver
ing opinions . It may therefore be considered an authoritative prece
dent for the doctrine that rents of the character of these we are con
sidering are heritable estates , descending to the heirs of those in whose
favor they are reserved .
But the plaintiff in this case sues as devisee of the grantor , and
must establish the position that he is entitled , in that character , to
sue upon the covenant. In England , it is perhaps a debatable question
at this day, whether the assignee of the grantor can maintain the ac
tion . In Brewster v . Kidgill , 12 Mod ., 166 , Holt, Ch . J ., said he made
no doubt but that the assignee of the rent should have covenanted
against the grantor , “ because ,” he said , “ it is a covenant annexed to the
thing granted .” It was the case of a rent-charge in fee, granted by
the owner of the lands out of which it issued , with a covenant to pay
it. In Milnes v . Branch , 5 Maule & Sel ., 411 , Lord Ellenborough , Ch .
J ., stated that he was inclined to think that the language of Lord Holt ,
in this respect , was [ * 80 ] extra - judicial ; and putting aside that dictum ,
he said he did not find any authority to warrant the position that such
a covenant ran with the rent. There are several other English cases
bearing more or less directly upon the question , which it is unneces
sary particularly to notice , since they have all been examined by Sir
Edward Sugden , in a late edition of his Treatise , on the Law of Ven
dors and Purchasers . His conclusion is, that there appears to be no
foundation fo
r
shaking Lord Holt ' s opinion . The rent -charge , he says ,
is an incorporeal hereditament , and issues out of the land , and the
land is bound by it . The covenant , therefore , he adds , may well run
with the rent in the hands o
f
a





the realty , altogether distinguishes the case from a
matter merely personal . Vol . 2 , p . 482 , W . Brookfield ed . of 1843 .
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executorsofCh.J.; 32 HenryI did not
The great learning o
f
the author - afterwards as Lord S
t . Leonards ,
Lord Chancellor o
f England - would incline me to adopt his conclu
sion , were it not that we have a precedent the other way in this State .
In The Devisees o
f
Van Rensselaer v . The Executors of Platner , 2 John .
C
a . , 26 , to which I have already briefly alluded , the plaintiffs made
title to the rent under the will of the grantor of the land , and the
defendants were the executors o
f
the grantee , the grantor of the rent
charge . It was held — Lansing , Ch . J . , giving the opinion — that the
action could not be sustained . The statute 32 Henry VIII , chapter 34 ,
which had been re -enacted in this state , it was said did not apply ,
a
s it was limited , as appeared b
y




r years , where there was a reversion ; and , moreover , by the com
mon law , such covenants did not pass to the assignee o
f
the covenantee .
It was intimated that the difficulty might not have existed if the action
had been against the owner o
f
the land charged with the rent , as the
assignee o
f
the original grantee , instead o
f
his executors ; for , as it was
suggested , the common ligament — the estate charged - would have
united them in interest as privies . But I do not see that this would
have helped the plaintiffs . The defendants , as executors o
f
Platner ,
the covenantor , were liable to an action upon his express covenant ,
[ * 81 ] a
t
the suit of any one entitled to prosecute upon it , and if the





so , as it seems to me , against any party chargeable upon
it , whether the covenantor himself , his personal representatives , or
those who represented him a
s privies . The question was not whether
th
e
defendants were liable to be sued on the express covenant , for they
clearly were , whether it ran with the land o
r
not . But the doubt was
whether the plaintiffs so represented the original covenantee as to be
able to sue o
n
the contract made to him ; and this depended on the
question whether the covenant ran with the rent ; and it was held that
it di
d
not . It was probably in consequence of this decision that the
act o
f
1805 was passed ; and assuming that this case was correctly
decided , the present question must turn upon the effect of that statute .
It seems to have been considered that at common law the assignee
o
f
a reversion expectant upon an estate for life o
r years could not
maintain an action upon the covenants o
f
his lessee , though such cove
nants ran with his estate . It is so expressly recited in the preamble
to the statute 32 Henry VIII , already mentioned , though it was not
universallly true . Vyvyan v . Arthur , 1 Barn . & Cress . , 410 ; 2 Sugd . .
468 . During the reign o
f
that sovereign the charters and estates o
f
the monasteries , chantries and other religious houses were , by the
coercion o
f







the statutes made for the suppression of these estab
lishments ; and the lands were , for the most part , granted b
y
him to
individual subjects . The estates being out on terms for life or years ,
there was , upon the assumption o
f




n action could be maintained on the covenants in the lease .
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After the recital of this matter , the statute proceeds to give an action
upon the covenants , not only to the patentees of the king of the estates






“ any other person o
r persons than th
e
king ' s highness , " and their heirs and assigns . A second section gave
the like remedies b
y
the grantees and their assigns [ * 82 ] against the
assignees o
f
the grantors . 2 Stat . at Large , 294 . Although the statute
was made to meet a special occasion , which mainly interested the pur
chasers o
f
the confiscated property o
f
the church , the language which
extended its operation to other grantees o
f
reversions , introduced a
valuable amendment into the law o
f property . When the commis
sioners under our act of 1786 came to report as to the English statutes
suitable to be re -enacted , the act respecting the grantees of reversions
was selected for that purpose , and was re -enacted in 1788 , with certain
changes o
f language - dropping out the reference to the religious
houses , and substituting the people o
f
this state for the crown o
f
England — but retaining the words which adapted it to the case of the
grantees of private persons . 2 Jones & Var . , 184 . It stood in this
form when the conveyance to Dietz was executed in 1796 , and had
not then , as I conceive , any operation upon covenants in conveyances
in fee . The opinion of Sir Edward Sugden , that such covenants as
last mentioned ran with the rent , was not based upon the 32 Henry
VIII , which was admitted to be inapplicable , but upon what was con
sidered the true theory and legal effect o
f
such covenants .
But while Van Rensselaer , the grantor in the indenture under con
sideration , remained the owner o
f
the rents reserved , and no assignee
o
f
those rents had intervened ; the act of 1805 was enacted , b
y
which
it was declared that all the provisions of the act concerning grantees
o
f
reversions , passed in 1788 , and the remedies thereby given , should
be construed to extend as well to leases in fee reserving rents as to
leases for life or years . ( Ch . 98 . ) In the subsequent revision o
f
the
statutes , this amendment has been added as an additional section to the
substance of the act of 1788 . 1 R . L . , 364 , § 3 ; 1 R . S . , 748 , § 25 .
As the Revised Statutes of 1830 contained the enactment in force when
this grantor died , it will be useful to give the precise language of the
23d section o
f
the title referred to . It is as follows : " The grantees
o
f
any demised lands , tenements , rents or other hereditaments , or o
f
the reversion thereof , the assignees of the lessor of any demise , and
the heirs and [ * 83 ] personal representatives of the lessor , grantee or
assignee , shall have the same remedies by entry , action , distress o
r
other
wise , for the non -performance o
f any agreement contained in the lease




other cause of forfeiture a
s
their grantor or lessor had , o
r
might have had if such reversion had remained in such lessor or





the 25th section , to extend as well to grants or leases in fee reserving
rents a
s
to leases for life or for years . Thus it appears that the gran
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tees of demised lands, and the grantees of rents, and the grantees of
the reversion of demised lands, are to have the same remedies which the
grantors or lessors would have been entitled to if no change in their
title had taken place, and that grants in fee with a reservation of rent .
are to be considered as within the provision . Reading the language
in connection , the enactment in terms is , that the grantee of rents
reserved upon grants in fee shall have the same remedy which his
grantor had . Applying the statute to this case , the provision is that
the plaintiff shall be entitled to the same remedy which Stephen Van
Rensselaer , the Patroon , would have had if he were alive and were now
suing . It is added — " if such reversion had remained in such grantor ;"
and it is argued that as Mr. Van Rensselaer never had a reversion
the provision does not apply . But it applies in express terms to reserva
tions of rents upon conveyances in fee , and in such cases I concede that
there can be no reversion ; and it applies equally to rents upon leases,
for life and fo
r
years , where there is a proper reversion . Now , the
qualification which alludes to the reversion may well be taken distribu
tively and be confined to the cases within the provision where a rever
sion existed , reddendo singula singulis . It should be applied , in further
ence o
f
the intention , to the subject -matter to which it appears b
y
the
context most properly to relate . 2 Dwar . on Stat . , 617 . But independ
ently o
f
this answer , the legislature had the right to consider the
interest o
f
a grantor in fe
e reserving rent , as a reversion pro hac vice ,
if it thought proper to do so ; though b
y
the general [ * 84 ] rules o
f
law
It would not be called b
y
that name . The intent to embrace within
the purview o
f
the enactment a rent reserved upon a grant in fee is
plain and certain ; and effect must be given to that intent , though
some o
f
the language should seem to be incongruous .
Two positions were taken a
t
the bar to avoid the effect o
f
this stat
ute upon the case . In the first place , it was assumed that before the
passage of our statute of tenures , a reversion did arise upon a grant of
lands in fee , and that the act of 1805 should be understood as limited
to conveyances executed prior to 1787 , and as having , therefore , no effect
upon the present case . It was in part to furnish an answer to that
suggestion that I have taken pains to show that there was never a
period in this state when conveyances between individuals created a
tenure , except in the special cases of a grant from the crown of a
power to erect a manor . But without reference to that principle , I
a
m unable to find anything in the statute which countenances the
distinction contended for . The act of 1805 , which first brought grants
in fee reserving rents within the remedies o
f
the 3
2 Henry VIII , chapter
3
4 , recited , as the motive for the enactment , that such grants had long
been in use in this state . The argument supposes that it was intended
to give effect to such only as had been executed in colonial times and
during the first eleven years o
f
the state government . If such were
the intention , it is inconceivable that some idea of the kind was not
expressed . The language used certainly conveys the understanding that
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such transactions had been in use up to the time when the legislature
was speaking . I am of opinion that the legislature considered such
conveyances lawful contracts , and intended to render them effectual in
the hands of those to whom they should be transferred equally as when
they belonged to the original parties to whom the rents were reserved ,
without regard to the time when the grants were made .
The other answer given to the statute is, that these grants in fee
were within the protection of the provision of the Constitution of the
United States which forbids the state [ * 85 ] governments to pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts . But this statute has no
such effect . The parties bound to pay these rents were liable , inde
pendently of the statute , to an action at the suit of the grantor of the
conveyances and of his heirs in perpetuity . Upon the failure of heirs ,
the state would take them as an escheat. If it be admitted that they
were not assignable before the statute , so as to give the assignee an
action in his own name, they were, like other choses in action arising
upon contract , assignable in equity ; and if the statute had not been
passed , the assignee could have prosecuted in the name of the grantor
or his heirs for the benefit of the equitable owner . In making them
assignable at law and giving the assignee an action in his own name,
the legislature acted only upon the remedy , which al
l
the cases agree
it was competent for it to do . The same thing in effect was done by
the Code o
f
Procedure in abolishing the distinction between legal and
equitable remedies , and requiring all actions to be brought in the name
o
f
the real party in interest . ( S $ 69 , 111 . )




covenant to recover rents
o
f
the kind in question , b
y parties claiming by devise or assignment
from the party in whose favor the rent was reserved . Watts v . Coffin ,
1
1 John . , 495 , A . D . 1814 , was an action for rent reserved upon a
conveyance o
f








several mesne conveyances , against the assignee of the grantee ,
and a verdict , subject to the opinion o
f
the court , was sustained . Van
Rensselaer v . Bradley , 3 Denio , 135 , A . D . 1846 , was a like action for





grantor , against an assignee o
f
the grantee ; and the plaintiff prevailed .
Van Rensselaer v Jones , 5 Denio , 449 , A . D . 1848 , was another case o
f
precisely the same character , where the plaintiff had judgment .
Ejectment is a remedy given b
y
statute for the recovery o
f
rent .
Stat . 4 Geo . II , ch . 28 , § 2 ; 2 Jones & Var . , Laws of N . Y . , 238 , § 23 ;
1 K . & R . 134 , § 23 ; 1 R . L . , 1813 , 440 , § 23 ; 2 R . S . 505 , § 30 .
The statutes prescribe that it may be brought in cases between landlord
and tenant , where there is [ * 86 ] rent in arrear for which no distress can
b
e
found , and the landlord has a subsisting right to re - enter . When we
consider that , at common law , conditions subsequent could only be re
served for the benefit o
f
the grantor and his heirs , and that a stranger
could not take advantage of a breach of them ( 4 Kent ' s Com . . 127 ;
Litt . , § 347 and Coke ' s Com . thereon ; Nicholl v . The N . Y . and Erie
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R . R . Co ., 2 Kern . 121) , and that the only change which this principle
has undergone was that wrought by the act of 1805 and it
s subsequent




bas conveyed in fee , reserving rent with a clause of re - entry , has bus
tained ejectment for non -payment o
f
that rent , are in point to show
the construction which has been given to that act upon the point under
consideration . Such cases have frequently occurred in this state and
many have been reported . In the following cases the action was prose
cuted by the devisee or grantee o
f





the statute , and yet no objection to the plaintiff ' s
title was made . In two of the cases the plaintiff prevailed , and in the
others h
e
was defeated upon grounds not material here . Jackson v .
Collins , 11 John . 1 , A . D . 1814 ; Van Rensselaer v . Jewett , 5 Denio . 121 ;
The same v . Hayes , id . ,477 ; The same v . Snyder , in the Court of Appeals ,
3 Kern , 299 .
We have come to the conclusion that the covenant o
f
Dietz was one
upon which the plaintiff , as the devisee of Van Rensselaer , has a right
to sue any one upon whom that covenant was binding . We do not de
termine whether this would or would not have been so a
t
the common
law , but we place the decision upon the effect of the act o
f
1805 , which ,
in our opinion , precisely meets the case . * * *
It is argued b
y
the defendant ' s counsel that a reversion in the grantor
is essential to enable an obligation to pay rent to attach to any one
except the party originally bound to pay it , o
r
to enure to the benefit
o
f any one deriving title from the party in whose favor it was reserved ;
and the want o
f
a reversion in Van Rensselaer is the circumstance which
is [ * 99 ] supposed to create the difficulty under which the plaintiff labors .
But there are several cases in hostility to this doctrine . In McMurphy
1 . Minot , 4 N . H . 251 , the plaintiff , tenant for life , demised the
premises to the owner of the reversion , reserving an annual rent , which
the latter covenanted to pay , and afterwards conveyed the premises
to another , under whom the defendant entered . The action was cove
nant for rent in arrear , and it was urged that the lessee , being seised
o
f
the whole estate in fee simple , his covenant to pay the rent could
not b
e
enforced against his grantee ; but it was held that a reversion
in the plaintiff was not essential , and the plaintiff had judgment . It
is settled , b
y
a series o
f adjudications in England and in this country ,
that if one possessed of a term for years demise it , reserving rent , and
afterwards assign the rent , the assignee may maintain debt fə
r
the
rent against lessee . Allen V . Bryan , 5 Barn & Cress . , 512 ; De
marest v . Willard , 8 Cow . , 206 ; Willard v . Tillman , 2 Hill , 274 ; Childs
F . Clark , 3 Barb . Ch . 52 ; Kendall v . Carland , 5 Cush . , 74 .
The result o
f
the examination which we have given to this case is ,
that these covenants are available in favor of the plaintiff ; and that the
defendant , as the owner under Dietz of a portion o
f
the land granted ,
is liable in this action for a breach of them : and we , therefore , affirm
the judgment o
f



























JOHNSON , Ch. J ., COMSTOCK , GRAY and GROVER , Js ., concurred ;
SELDON and STRONG , Js., delivered opinions in favor of affirming the
judgment upon grounds differing , in some respects , from those adopted
by the court ; ALLEN , J ., being interested in the question , took no part
in the decision .
Judgment affirmed .
Accord : Wright v. Hardy (1899 ), 76 Miss. 544 , 24 So . 698 , sustaining a
bill for rent by a grantee of part of the reversion against the lessee ' s grantee .
MICHIGAN STATUTE , R . S . 1846 c. 66 , § 31 ; O. L . 1857 , 8 2804 ; C. L . 1871 ,
8 4301 ; How Ann . St. 1883 ; 8 5771 ; O. L . 1897 ; 8 9254 .
Every person in possession of land, out of which any rent is due,
whether it was originally demised in fee, or for any other estate of free
bold , or for any term of years , shall be liable for the amount or proportion
of rent due from the land in his possession , although it be only a part of
what was originally demised .
CHAPTER II .
ESTATES OF INHERITANCE .
Classified and Defined .









service . ich is
word , alt
Liber ii , c . 6 , fo . 17 . [ Classification of Fees . ] There is another
division o
f
donations , for instance , one is simple and absolute , another
is conditional , another is modified , made to one person or to several
successively .
[Fee Simple . ] It may be termed simple and absolute , when there is
n
o condition or mode attached to it , for it may be said to be given
simply whatever is given with nothing added to . As if it should be said ,
I give to such a person so much land in such a vill for his homage and
service , to have and to hold to such a one , and to his heirs , of me and
o
fmy heirs , rendering thence annually , himself and his heirs to me and
m
y
heirs , so much for such terms , for al
l
service and secular custom
and demand ( so that the thing may be certain which is given , and the
services certain , and the customs which are due to the lord , although
th
e
other things are uncertain , which are tacitly remitted ) , and I and
my heirs shall warrant , acquit , and defend forever so -and - so aforesaid
and his heirs , against all persons , through the aforesaid service . And




the donation , and
his heirs after him by reason o
f
their succession , and the heir acquires
nothing from the gift made to his ancestor , because he is not enfeoffed
with the donatory . And b
y
the expression , to so -and - so and his heirs
(the word heirs being taken in a wide sense ) all heirs are contained as
well near as remote , as well present as future ; but nevertheless one o
f
them , or several who are equivalent to one , and the nearer are preferred
to the more remote , as will be explained hereafter on the subject of
successions .
(Modified Fees - Heirs and Assigns . ] Likewise , he may increase the
donations and make , as it were , heirs , although in truth they are not
heirs . As if he should say in the donation , to have and to hold to such
a
n one and his heirs , or to him to whom he shall wish to give or assign
the land , and I and my heirs will warrant to the same 80 - and - 80 and his
heirs , or to him to whom he shall wish to give or assign that land , and
to their heirs , against all persons . In which case , if the donatory has
( 29 )
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given or assigned that land , if the donatory and his heirs fail , the donor
and his heirs will begin to take the place of the donatory and his heirs ,
and the donatories will take the place of heirs as far as regards the
warranty to be made to the assigns and his heirs , through the clause con
tained in the deed of the first donor ; which would not be the case unless
mention had been made of assigns in the first donation . But as long
88 the first donatory or his heirs survive , they are themselves bound to
the warranty and not the first donor.
[ Same- Restricted to Special Heirs - Fee Conditional at Common
Law . ] Likewise, as heirs may be enlarged in number , as has been afore
said , so they may be narrowed in number by the mode of the donation ,
whereby all the heirs are not called generally to the succession . For a
mode sets law to the donation , and a mode is to be upheld against the
common right and against the general ] law , for a mode and an agree
ment must prevail against the generalſ law . As if it should be said :
I give to so -and -so that land , with its appurtenances , in N , to have
and to hold to him and to his heirs , whom he shall have procreated from
himself or his espoused wife . Or thus : I give to so -and -so and so -and -so
his wife ( or with 80-and -so my daughter & c. ) to have and to hold to
himself and to his heirs , issuing or procreated or to be procreated , of
the flesh of such wife ( or daughter ) ; in which case , if ( since certain
heirs are expressed in the donation ) it can be seen that the descent is
only made to their common heirs according to the mode appointed in
the donation , al
l
other his heirs being excluded altogether from the
succession , because the donor so willed . Whence if heirs of this kind are
procreated , they only are called to the inheritance ; and if a person 80
enfeoffed has further enfeoffed some person , he holds the enfeoffment ;
and his [ the first feoffee ' s ] heirs are held to the warranty since they
can claim nothing except from the succession and the descent o
f parents ;
although it appears to some that they were themselves enfeoffed at the
same time with their parents , which is not true . But if he shall have
no heirs , that land shall revert to the donor , through a tacit condition ,
even if there be no mention made in the donation that it should return ,
o
r if express mention has been made in the donation . And so it will
happen , if there have been at some time heirs and they have failed .
But in the first case , where there has been no heir , the thing given to
the donatory will always be a free tenement and not a fee . Likewise ,
in the second case , until heirs have begun to exist , it is a free tenement ;
but when they have begun to exist , the free tenement begins to be a fee ;
and when they have ceased to exist it ceases to be a fee , and again begins
to be a free tenement . And so there will never be an exaction of dower
unless there be a
n
absolute donation , since there is no mention of an
express reservation .
It is to be noted , that a donor may well impose at the beginning from
the commencement o
f
his donation , a law upon the donation , and o
f
his
own will may exonerate the thing given for the advantage o
f
the dona
tory , and contrary to the law of the land ; provided this be not done to
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the prejudice of others, who are not at a
ll
concerned with their contract .
As if a person has given land for a less service than that b
y
which he
held it from his lord and his feoffor ; provided that he can warrant his
act a
s regards his own service , so that no prejudice shall b
e worked to
the chief lord , as respects the service due to him .
Liber iv , c . 28 , fo . 207 . [ Mere Freehold . ] Now it is to be observed
that a freehold tenement is that which a man holds to himself and his
heirs in fee and in inheritance , o
r
in fee alone , to him and his heirs .




indefinite period without any fixed limit o
f time , as for instance until
such a thing happens o
r
does not happen ; as if it b
e
said " I give to such
a one until I provide for him . ” But a tenement cannot b
e
called a free
hold which one holds for a certain number of years , months , or days ,
though it be for a term of a hundred years , which exceeds the lives
o
f
men . Further , a tenement cannot be called a freehold which a man
holds a
t
the will of the lord and b
y
favor , which may be revoked in
season o
r out of season , as when a man holds from year to year or from
day to day .
Liber ii , c . 5 , fo . 13 . And it should be known that a gift is made
in many ways , sometimes for instance in fe
e , sometimes for life , some
times in fee farm , sometimes for a term of life or years . But if it be
made in any manner for life , the donee has a
t
once a freehold , so that
if he be ejected he can recover by the assize of novel disseizin ; and he to
whom the land was thus given can give it to another in fee , o
r
for life
if he desires , but the gift is liable to revocation . But if he who has
held for life makes a gift of the land which he holds for life to anyone
in such words as the following , " I give and grant to such a one whatever
right I have in such land , " although the donor has a freehold , he does
not create a freehold in favor of the donee , because when I say " I give
you my right that means " I give such and such land for the life of
me the donor , " and there is no question about the life of the donee ;
and therefore although the donor has a freehold , nevertheless b
y
these
words he cannot create a freehold in favor o
f
the donee , because if he
had said " I give you such land in demesne or in fee , ” this would be
& wrongful act and not the exercise of a right . His right was to give
that which he had , that is to say , to give the land for his life , that
is for the life of the donor and not for the life of the donee , for the
latter would be wrongful and not right , and under a grant for the
donor ' s life the donee cannot acquire a freehold .
Words Sufficient to Limit a Fee .
GIFT OF LANDS TO A CHURCH BY UUIHTRAED OF KENT - A . D . 700
o
r
715 – from Codex Diplomaticus , i p . 54 , no . xlvii , and Digby ' s History
o
f Real Property 56 .
In the name o
f
our Lord Jesus Christ . I Uuihtraed , king of the Kents , pro
riding for myself in the future , have determined to give something to him
who gave all things to me ; and with this design , it has seemed best to me
32 ESTATES OF INHERITANCE .
to bestow upon the church of the Blessed Mary Mother of God which is
located in the place called Liminga , the land of four plowmen , which is
called Pleghelmestun , with all pertaining to that same land , next to the
well known boundaries , etc ., * * . also a part of that same land I
bestow likewise upon the Blessed Mary , Mother of God , to be held for ever ,
the name of which is Rumingseta , for the feeding of 300 sheep , at the south
indeed of the river which is called Liminaea ; but the boundaries of this
land we do not fix for this reason because they are determined on all sides
by the dwellers . This my gift I wish to be assured forever , so that neither
I nor my heirs may presume to diminish it in any respect . But if an attempt
shall have been made otherwise by any other person whomsoever let him know
that he transgresses under penalty of the anathema. For the confirmation
of this , on account of my ignorance of letters , I have made the sign of the
holy cross and asked suitable witnesses to sign it, that is Berhtwald the arch
bishop , venerable man
+ I Berthwald when asked consented and subscribed .
+ The sign of the hand of Uuithraed the king .
+ The sign of the hand of Aethilburgh the queen .
( Other signatures follow in the same form . )
GIFT BY OSWALD BISHOP OF WORCESTER - A . D . 963 — Codex Diplo
maticus p. 399 , no . dix , Digby' s History of Real Property 58 .
I Oswald adjudged president by the anointing of Christ in the 963 year
of the incarnation of the Lord , with the consent of Edgar king of England ,
Aelfer earl of the Mercians , and likewise the ecclesiastical family of
Wiogorn , have granted a certain bit of land , to -wit, one hide in a place
inhabited by farmers which is called also by the name of Heortford , to a
certain servant of mine by name Aethelnod in perpetual inheritance ,
and after the end of his life it must be left free to two heirs only , and when
these are dead it must be restored to the church of God in camp Wiogorna .
( Then follow the boundaries . ) This document was written with these
witnesses attesting whose names are signed lower down .
[ Then follow the names . ]
CHARTER OF CNUT - A . D. 1033 — Codex Diplomaticus 0, p. 180, No .
1318 ; Digby' s History of the Law of Real Property 59 .
Our Lord and Master , Jesus Christ , reigning forever , since under his
sway the fortune of passing time seems greatly disturbed and confused for
the future , and since all visible and desirable adornments of this world
pass away daily from those who love them , therefore , those who are happy
and wise hasten eagerly to purchase with these fleeting riches of time the
joys of the heavenly country that are eternal and will remain permanently
[and ] therefore, I , Cnut king of the Angli , and guide and director of the
peoples living about , confirm as an inheritance a certain portion of my
estate , vii mansas of land in that region to which the inhabitants have given
the name Hortun , to my faithful attendant whom his acquaintances and
kinsmen are accustomed to call Bovis , that he may well enjoy and forever
possess as long as God through his wonderful mercy shall have desired to
grant him life and breath , and then indeed he may leave it to one suc
ceeding himself , to whom so ever he pleases , as heir by right of clergy , or ,
as we have above said , for an eternal inheritance . Let this our gift there
fore remain unalterably free , pleasing with all those things which are
properly known to belong to this same place , as well in great as in small
things , in plains , pastures , meadows , woods , brooks, and water - courses , that
common labor being excepted which is plainly imposed upon all, to -wit ,
the building of roads , bridges, and castles . But if it shall happen at any
time that any man present any more ancient book , contrary to the privileges
of this book , let it be counted as naught . But if anyone at the instigation
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of the foul demon shall have wished to break this decree of ours let him
be separated from the fellowship of the holy church of God , and let him be
tortured forever in the flames of Hell , along with Judas the betrayer of
Christ , unless beforehand he shall have repented with due expiation because
he has offended , contrary to our decree . This present sheet of parchment
was in truth written in the year 1033 of the incarnation of our Lord , but
in the first year of the indiction . By these boundaries the above mentioned
land is enclosed . [ The boundaries follow in Anglo - Saxon . )
This document is corroborated by the testimony of those witnesses whose ,
names are seen here in letters .
+ I Cnut, master of the scepter of this island , have confirmed this letter
of our decree , attesting it with the mark of the blessed cross .
+ I Aethelnoth , archbishop of Dorover , have attested and subscribed .
+ I Aelfric , the archbishop , have corroborated .
+ I Brihtwold , bishop , have confirmed .
+ I Aelfwine , bishop , [ & c . ] .
CHARTER OF FEOFFMENT OF TIME OF KING HENRY II ( A . D . 1154
1189 ) - Madox Formulare Anglicanum , Digby's Iistory of Real Prop
erty 61 .
Richard de Luci, to all his men and friends, French and English , for the
present and future, of all England , Greeting : Know ye that I have given
and granted to Radulphus Briton the land of Chiggeville with all things
pertaining to the same, to him and his heirs , to hold of me and my heirs
in fee and inheritance through service of one knight . Wherefore I desire
and strongly enjoin that this same Radulphus and his heirs hold this land
well in peace , quiet, liberty , and honor , in bush and plain , in meadow and
pasture , in waters , in ways and foot - paths , and in all other things which
pertain to that land . Witnesses [ & c . ) .
CHARTER OF FEOFFMENT of date 6 Edw . II , A . D . 1313 . - Appendix
to book 2 Blackstone's Commentaries .
Know all present and future , that I, William , son of William de Segenho ,
have given and granted and by this my present charter have confirmed
to John son of the late John de Saleford , for a sum of money which he
has paid into my hands , an acre of my arable land lying in the plain of
Saleford next to the land of one Richard de la Mere ; To have and to hold
all of the aforesaid acre of land with all its appurtenances, to the afore
said John and his heirs and assigns , of the chief lords of the fee , ren
dering and performing yearly to the same chief lords the services there
from due and accustomed ; and I, the said William , and my heirs and my
assigns , will forever warrant all the said acre of land with all its appur
tenances , to the said John de Saleford and his heirs and assigns , against
all men . In witness whereof I have affixed my seal to this present charter .
Before these witnesses : Nigel de Saleford , John de Seybroke , Ralph clerk
of Saleford , John the miller of the same ville , and others . Given at Sale
ford the Friday before the feast of Saint Margaret , in the sixth year of the
reign of King Edward , son of King Edward .
Memorandum , that on the day and year within written full and quiet
seizin of the within specified acre with appurtenances was given and deliv
ered by the within William de Segneho to the within named John de Sale
ford , in their proper persons , following the tenor and effect of the within
written charter, in the presence of Nigel de Saleford , John de Seybroke , and
others .
LITTLETON 'S TENURES , § 1. (Littleton died in A . D. 1482.)
Tenant in fee simple is he who has lands or tenements to hold to him
and h
is heirs forever ; and it is called in Latin feodum simplex , fo
r
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feodum is the same that inheritance is, and simplex is as much as to say,
lawful or pure. And so feodum simplex signifies a lawful or pure in
heritance . For if a man would purchase lands or tenements in fee sim
ple , it behooves him to have these words in his purchase : To have and
to hold to him and to his heirs ; for these words his heirs make the estate
of inheritance . For if a man purchase lands by these words : To have
and to hold to him forever , or by these words : To have and to hold to
him and his assigns forever - in these two cases he has but an estate for
term of life , for that there lack these words his heirs , which words only
make an estate of inheritance in all feoffments and grants .
ANON ., 32 Hen . 8 , A . D . 1541 - Brooke Abr . t. " Conscience ” 25.
If a man purchase land , and the vendor execute the estate to the
vendee , habendum to him forever without the word heirs where the
intent of the bargain is to pass a fe
e
-simple , and the vendor on request
refuses to make another assurance , there lies a writ o
f subpoena on the
liberal principles of the English law ; and it was conceded b
y
AUDLEY ,
chancellor , clearly , in the time of Henry 8 , that if a man sold his land
before the statute o
f
uses this would change a use o
f
the fee -simple ; and
the same is the law o
f
vendors by indenture under the statute 27 Hen .
8 [ c . 10 of uses ] without the word heirs ; which note well .
ANON , in K . B , 4 Edw . 6 . - A . D . 1550 - Brooke ' s New Cases p
l
. 406 , Marsh ' s





the king ' s bench , if a man devise his land to W . N .
paying 101 . to the executors , and dies , the devisee has a fe
e simple , by
reason of the payment , without the words , heirs or in perpetuity , and this
shall be supposed the intention o
f
the devisor . The same is the law if &
man sell his land to W . N . for 201 . , this shall be intended a sale in fee
simple without the words heirs , for conscience & c . , and it is just and
right , which is a ground in every law .
ESTOFT ' S CASE , in O . B . , Hllary , 10 Ellz . , A . D . 1568 - 1 And . 45 , p
l
. 114 .
Between Estoft and others , it was adjudged that if land was given to
& man and wife and a third person in fee , and the third person releases
to the man all the right he has in the land without these words to him
and his heirs , the man has a fe
e
-simple without words o
f enlargement .
BALDWIN V . MARTON , Paschae , 31 Eliz . , in Common Pleas . - A . D . 1589
1 And . 223 , Abridged .
Trespass for breaking close , on not guilty , and special verdict . Earl
W . , by indenture made a grant of land to Agnes and Anthony Baldwin
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( now plaintiff ) " and to the heirs of the said Anthony from the date , & c.,
to the end of 99 years , and from 99 years to 99 years , till such time as
300 years be spent and expired ,” reserving rent one penny yearly , cove
nanted to be paid , and with covenant to renew the lease at the end of
the 300 years , and without impeachment of said earl or his heirs . After
many arguments and citing many cases similar, it was held to be a lease
fo
r
years only and not a fee o
r
freehold .
DICKINS v . MARSHALL , in Queen ' s Bench , Trinity , 36 Eliz . - A . D . 1505 .
Cro . Eliz . , 330 .
Toby devised land and goods , after his debts and legacies paid , to R .
and M . , his children , equally to be divided between them .
The court resolved that an estate for life only passed ; for although the
devise o
f
land and goods are coupled together , and it be a devise forever
o
f
the goods ; yet for the land , there being no words to pass the inherit
ance , only an estate for life passes . And although it was objected that
the devise o
f
the land is after his debts and legacies paid , so this is
limited after he has made an end o
f disposing o
f anything ; and though
it was to his children , of which his heir was one , so that he intended to
give as much to one as to the other ; yet the court held , that only an
estate for life passed . POPHAM , C . J . , said he doubted if any land did
pass , in case he had a term for years in any lands , so that the devise o
f
land shall be supplied .
WHITLOCK V . HARDING , A . D . 1614 ? - Moor 873 .
One devised his lands for 99 years , and after , b
y
these words : " I give
Agnes , my daughter , all my lands o
f
inheritance , if the law will per
mit . ” It was adjudged that Agnes should have the fee simple of the
land before devised for the 99 years , without the words to her heirs ,
The words refer to the land and not to the estate in strict construction ;
but from the whole the intent appears to pass the inheritance , for the
estate for life after the 99 years would be o
f
small value , and it cannot
b
e so understood .
SCEAL v . OXENBRIDGE , in Common Bench , Trinity 12 Jac . I , A . D . 1615 .
- Moor 871 .
In waste the plaintiff made title b
y
a certain feoffment to another to
the use o
f
the plaintiff and his heirs , and omitted that he enfeoffed the




precedents the writ was adjudged
good .
MICHIGAN LAWS of 1881 , No . 187 . How Stat . g 5730 , Comp . Laws , 1897 ,
$ 9016 .
It shall not be necessary to use the words " heirs and assigns of the
grantee ” to create in the grantee an estate o
f
inheritance , and if it be
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the intention of the grantor to convey any lesser estate , it shall be so
expressed in the deed .
To same effect New York , R . S. 1829. Part II, C. I, Title V , $ 1.
Base Fees .
KING ALEXANDER ' S CASE , 1272 - 1307 - Hargrave 's note o to Coke Lt














King Henry III gave the manor of Penreth and Sourby to Alexander
King o
f
Scots and his heirs kings o
f
Scotland ; and Alexander , having
daughters o
f
which one was married to the Earl o
f
Hunt , died not having
any heir king of Scotland ; and for this reason King Edward I recovered
seisin , and the coheirs of Alexander were excluded . Lib . Parl . E I , 134 ,
308 .
FIRST UNIVERSALIST SOCIETY OF NORTH ADAMS v . BORLAND , in
Sup . Judicial Ct . of Mass . , Jan . 6 , 1892 — 155 Mass . 171 , 29 Atl . 524 , 15
L . R . A . 231 .
Bill in equity to enforce a contract to purchase land of plaintiff . De
cree fo
r plaintiff . Defendant appeals .
ALLEN , J . The limitation over , which is contained in the deed of
Clark to the plaintiff in 1854 , is void for remoteness . Wells v . Heath ,
1
0 Gray , 17 , 25 , 26 . Brattle Square Church v . Grant , 3 Gray , 142 , 152 .
The fact that the grantor designated himself as one of the persons
amongst many others to take under this limitation , does not have the
effect to make the limitation valid . He was to take with the rest , and
stand upon the same footing with them .
Where there is an invalid limitation over , the general rule is that
the preceding estate is to stand , unaffected by the void limitation .
The estate becomes vested in the first taker , according to the terms in
which it was granted or devised . Brattle Square Church v . Grant , 3
Gray , 142 , 156 , 157 . Sears V . Russell , 8 Gray , 86 , 100 . Fosdick v .
Fosdick , 6 Allen , 41 , 43 . Lovering v . Worthington , 106 Mass . 86 , 88 .
Lewis on Perpetuity , 657 . There may be instances in which a void
limitation might be referred to for the purpose o
f giving a construction
to the language used in making the prior gift , provided any aid could be
gained thereby . In the present case , we do not see that any such aid can be
gained . The estate given to the first taker does not depend a
t
all upon
the validity or invalidity of the limitation over , and the construction
o
f
the language used is not aided b
y
a reference thereto .
The grant to the plaintiff was to have and to hold , etc . , " so long a
s





s assigns be devoted to the uses ,
interests , and support of those doctrines o
f
the Christian religion , ” as




specified . " And when said real estate shall by said society or its 93
signs be diverted from the uses , interests , and support aforesaid to any
other interests , uses , or purposes than as aforesaid , then the title of
said society o
r
its assigns in the same shall forever cease , and be forever
rested in the following named persons , " et
c
. These words do not grant
a
n absolute fee , nor an estate on condition , but an estate which is to
continue till the happening o
f
a certain event , and then to cease . That
erent may happen a
t a y time , o
r
it may never happen . Because the
estate may last forever , it is a fee . Because it may end on the
happening o
f
the event , it is what is usually called a determinable o
r
qualified fee . The grant was not upon a condition subsequent , and
n
o
re - entry would be necessary ; but b
y
the terms of the grant the
estate was to continue so long a
s
the real estate should be devoted to the
specified uses , and when it should no longer be so devoted , then the
estate would cease and determine by its own limitation . Numerous
illustrations o
f
words proper to create such qualified or determinable
fees are to be found in the books , one of which , as old as Walsingham ' s
Case , 2 Plowd . 557 , is " as long as the church o
f
S
t . Paul shall stand . ”
Brattle Square Church v . Grant , 3 Gray , 142 , 147 ; Easterbrooks v .
Tillinghast , 5 Gray , 17 ; Ashley v . Warner , 11 Gray , 43 ; Attorneys
General v . Merrimack Manuf . Co . , 14 Gray , 586 , 612 ; Fifty Associates
v . Howland , 11 Met . 99 , 102 ; Owen v . Field , 102 Mass . 90 , 105 ; 1
Washb . Real Prop . ( 30 . ) 79 ; 2 Washb . Real Prop . ( 3d ed . ) 20 , 21 ;
4 Kent Com . 126 , 127 , 132 , note ; 2 Crabb , Real Prop . $ $ 2135 , 2136 ,
2 Flint . Real Prop . 230 , 232 ; Shep . Touchst . 121 , 125 .
A question o
r
doubt , however , has arisen , though not urged b
y
counsel
in this case , whether after all there is now any such estate as a qualified
o
r determinable fee , o
r
whether this form o
f
estate was done away with
b
y
the statute Quia Emptores . See Gray , Rule against Perpetuities ,
$ $ 31 -40 , where the question is discussed and authorities are cited .
We have considered this question , and whatever may be the true solution
o
f it in England , where the doctrine of tenure still has some significance ,
we think the existence o
f
such an estate as a qualified o
r determinable




courts and text writers . Jamaica Pond Aqueduct
V . Chandler , 9 Allen , 159 , 168 ; Leonard v . Burr , 18 N . Y . 96 ; Gil
lespie v . Broas , 23 Barb . 370 ; State v . Brown , 27 N . J . L . ( 3 Dutch . )
1
3 ; Henderson v . Hunter , 59 Penn . St . 335 ; Wiggins Ferry Co . v . Ohio
& Mississippi Railway , 94 Ill . 83 , 93 ; 1 Washb . Real Prop . ( 3d ed . ) 76
7
8 ; 4 Kent Com . 9 , 10 , 129 ; See also , of English works in addition to ci
tations above , Shep . Touchst . 101 ; 2 B
l
. Com . 109 , 154 , 155 ; 1 Cruise
Dig . tit . 1 , $ $ 72 - 76 ; 2 Flint . Real Prop . 13
6
-138 ; 1 Prest . Est . 431 ,
441 ; Challis , Real Prop . 197 -208 .
Since the estate o
f
the plaintiff may determine , and since there
is no valid limitation over , it follows that there is a possibility of re
verter in the original grantor , Clark . This is similar to , though not
quite identical with , the possibility o
f
reverter which remains in the
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grantor of land upon à condition subsequent. The exact nature and
incidents of this right need not now be discussed , but it represents what
ever is not conveyed by the deed , and it is the possibility
that the land may revert to the grantor or his heirs when
the granted estate determines. Challis , Real Prop . 31, 63 -65 ,
153, 174 , 198 , 200 , 212 ; 1 Prest. Est . 431, 471 ; Newis v . Lark ,
2 Plowd . 403 , 413 ; [post - ] Shep . Touchst . 120 ; 2 Washb . Real Prop .
( 3d ed .) 20 , 579 ; 4 Kent Com . 10 ; Smith v . Harrington , 4 Allen ,
566 , 567 ; Attorney General v. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 14 Gray, 586 ,
612 ; Brattle Square Church v . Grant, 3 Gray , 142 , 147 -150 ; Owen
v . Field , 102 Mass . 90 , 105 , 106 ; Gillespie v . Broas , 23 Barb . 370 ; Gray ,
Rule against Perpetuities , $ $ 33 , 34 , 39 , and cases cited .
Clark 's possibility of reverter is not invalid for remoteness . It has
been expressly held by this court , that such possibility of reverter upon
breach of a condition subsequent is not within the rule against perpet
uities . Tobey v . Moore , 130 Mass. 448 ; French v . Old South Society ,
106 Mass . 479. If there is any distinction in this respect between such
possibility of reverter and that which arises upon the determination of
a qualified fee, it would seem to be in favor of the latter. But they
should be governed by the same rule . If one is not held void for remote
ness , the other should not be. The very many cases cited in Gray , Rule
against Perpetuities , $$ 305 - 312 , Show conclusively that the general
understanding of courts and of the profession in America has been
that the rule as to remoteness does not apply ; though the learned
author thinks this view erroneous in principle .
We have no occasion to consider whether the possibility of reverter
would or would not pass to an assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency ,
because the plaintiff expressly waived any right it might have under
the second deed from Clark , and we have not , therefore , felt at liberty
to consider the second deed , and have been confined to the construction
and effect of the first deed . See Rice v . Boston & Worcester Railroad ,
12 Allen , 141. This being so , the plaintiff 's title must be deemed im
perfect, and the entry must be.
Bill dismissed .
WEED v. WOODS, in New Hampshire Sup . Ct., Dec . 4, 1902 – 71 N . H . 581 ,
53 Atl. 1024 .
Trespass quare clausum for entry by defendant into the chapel enclos
ure and removing fences , sheds, & c., claiming under a deed by which
plaintiff conveyed to defendant her farm with the reservation stated in the
opinion . Case transferred from Superior Court .
BINGHAM , J . A construction of the clause in the deed , " reserving ,
however, the building situated on the last described premises , known as
the chapel, together with th
e right to the land on which such building
stands , said building to remain so long as the association owning the
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same may want it necessitates a determination of the extent of territory
in which the plaintiff retained a property interest and the nature of that
interest. * * *
It matters not whether this clause is technically a reservation or an
exception ; such a classification lends no aid to it
s interpretation . The
estate retained b
y
the plaintiff in the lot is a fe
e , not because as a matter
o
f
law it “ is an exception and not a reservation , " but because the clause ,
“ understood in the ordinary and popular sense of it
s
terms , ” reserves
a
n estate which may be of perpetual continuance . Cole v . Lake Co . ,
5
4
N . H . 242 , 277 , 278 ; Smith v . Furbish , 68 N . H . 123 , 141 - 5 , 44 Atl .
398 , 47 L . R . A . 226 ; 1 Wash . R . P . (6th ed . ) , s . 162 . It is not an estate
for the life of the plaintiff , for the particular limitation agreed upon
b
y
the parties might happen either before or after her decease , or it
might never happen . For the same reasons , it is not an estate for
years o
r for any shorter period . It is an estate in fee , determinable
upon the association ceasing to want it for chapel purposes . It is
not " an absolute fee , nor an estate on condition , but an estate which
is to continue till the happening of a certain event , and then to cease .
That event may happen at any time , or it may never happen . Because
the estate may last forever , it is a fee . Because it may end on the
happening o
f
the event , it is what is usually called a determinable o
r
qualified fee . ” First Universalist Society v . Boland , 155 Mass . 171 ,
174 ; 15 L . R . A . 231 , note ; 1 Wash . R . P . , s . 167 . By such a con
struction , the intention of the parties will be carried out and effect
given to this clause o
f
the deed . So long as this estate continues , and
the plaintiff and her successors in title retain the possession , they will
have all the rights in respect to it which they would have if they were









the Common Law .
NEVI ' S CASE , before all the judges of England , Mich . , 2 Jac . I . - A . D .
1605 – 7 Coke 33 .




the king , was propounded
to a
ll
the judges . Anno 21 Ric . II , Ralph Nevil , Lord of Raby , was by
letters patent under the great seal created Earl o
f
Westmoreland , to him
and the heirs males o
f his body ; which Ralph , b
y Margaret Stafford his
first wife , had issue Ralph , Earl of Westmoreland , to whom Charles ,
late Earl o
f











f Gaunt , Duke of Lancaster , had issue George , Lord Latimer
(for a
ll his elder brothers were dead without issue male ) from whom
was lineally descended Edward Nevil , who now is the nearest issue male
to the said donee ; and afterwards Charles , Earl of Westmoreland , was
attained b
y outlawry and b
y parliament , of high treason , and died
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without issue male ; and now the said Edward Nevil claimed to be Earl
of Westmoreland .
And in this case three questions were moved to all the judges of Eng
land : 1. If the said limitation of the said dignity to the said Ralph
and the heirs males of his body be within the statute De donis condi
tionalibus, or a fee -simple conditional at the common law . 2. Admit
ting that it was an estate -tail within the said statute, if by the attainder of
treason the estate - tail was forfeited by a condition in law tacite annexed
to the state of the dignity . 3. If the estate of the dignity was for
feited by the act of 26 Hen . VIII , c. 13 , or that the said Edward Nevil
as heir male of the body of the first donee ought to be Earl of Westmore
land .
And these three points were argued and debated at Sergeant's Inn in
Fleet street by the king's attorney and by the counsel of the said Edward
Nevil . And as to the first it was objected that the said dignity was not
within the said statute de donis , & c., for diverse causes : ( 1 ) Because it
was a great dignity , derived from the king as the fountain of all dignity ,
and therefore it is not within the said act, which speaks only of tenement
quae multotens dantur sub conditione , viz : cum aliquis terr ' suam dat
alicui viro & c. ; so this dignity cannot be included within the words tene
ments or land . ( 2 ) The statute saith in omnibus praedicť casibus post
prolem suscitatam hujusmodi feofaffati habuerunt potestatem alienandi ,
& c . But this dignity was adherent in the blood of the donee , and could
not be alienated or granted , neither after nor before issue ; and therefore
such cases of dignities were out of the mischief , the words and the intent
of the makers of the act de donis , & c. And the opinion in Manxel's Case
in 2 Plow . Com . 1- 15 , the grant of a thing which does not concern land
or tenements , which is personal , is not within the statute , de donis , & c.
* * *
As to the second point it was resolved that although this dignity be
within the statute de donis conditionalibus , yet by the attainder of
treason , if the statute 26 Hen . VIII ( c. 13 ) had not been made , this
dignity had been forfeited by force of a condition in law tacite annexed
to the estate of the dignity . * * *
As to the third point it was resolved by all the justices that if it had
not been forfeited by the common law , that by the statute of 26 Hen .
VIII , c . 13 , the said Charles had forfeited the dignity . * * *
At the common law before the statute de donis conditionalibus , if land
had been given to one and the heirs males of his body , in that case , as
well the donor as the donee had a possibility — the donor of a reverter
if the donee died without issue male , and the donee to have power to alien
if he had issue male . For if the donee had issue a son , now to some
intent the condition was performed , for post prolem suscitatam he had
potestatem alienandi ; and the reason thereof was because he having a
fee -simple and having issue , his issue could not avoid the alienation ,
because he claimed fee -simple , whereof his father might bar him . And
although the donee and his issue also after such alienation died without































estate in him , could not recover the land against the




issue the condition was performed to this
intent , scil . to make an alienation . But in the same case at the common
law , if the donee had issue a son and died , yet the son had not an abso
lute fee -simple in him , but only the same power which his father had ,
scil . to alien ; and if such issue died without issue , and without any
alienation made , the land should revert to the donor , as Brian held , 12





the donee is not within the form o
f
the gift , the




the donee , which limita
tion o
f
heirs males of the body doth exclude al
l
collateral heirs to inherit .
But the policy of the law w s to give power after issue to alien for two
causes : 1 , t the estate o
f
a purchaser should not be avoided b
y
a
remote possibility , scil . if the donee and his issue also should die without
issue ; 2 , if he having a fee -simple should not have power after issue to
alien it would be in a manner a perpetuity and a restraint of alienation
forever , which the common law for many causes will not suffer . And
in 4 Hen . III , [ Fitz . Abr . ] Formedon 64 , it is adjudged , that where
lands are given in frank -marriage , and the donees had issue and died ,
and afterwards the issue died without issue , that his collateral heir
should not inherit , for the donor recovered the lands in a formedon in
the rererter ; l and in the said case if the donee had issue two sons and
died , and the elder son had issue a daughter and died without issue male ,
the younger son should inherit a fee -simple per formam doni a
t
the
common law . So if lands were given to one and to his heirs females of
h
is body , and he had issue a son and a daughter and died , the daughter
should inherit an estate in fee - simple per formam doni . And mark well
the statute de donis , & c . , doth not create an estate tail but of such
estate a
s was fee - simple conditional and descendible in such form a
t
the
common law , as now b
y
the statute the land shall descend ; and the only
mischief was that the donee after issue had power to alien in disinherison
o
f




ct that although the donee had issue , yet he had not an absolute fee ,
so that the collateral heir o
f





praeterea cum deficiente exitu d
e hujusmodi feoffatis ,
tenementum si
c
datum ad donatorem vel ad ejus haeredem reverti debuit
per formam in carta d
e
dono expressam , licet exitus , si quis fuerit obisset ,
per factum e
t
feoffamentum ipsoram , quibus tenementum sic fuit datum
sub conditione , erclusi fuerunt hucusque de reversione , & c . ; b
y
which
it appears that if the heir in tail dies without issue , and without any
The case here referred to seems to be Case No . 61 of Bracton ' s Note




the donor (deceased )
against an Intruder after the death without issue of the son of the donees
in frank -marriage ; and the suit failed because sons of the older deceased
brother of the plaintiff had the better right . That the land would revert
is merely inferred .
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alienation male , that the land shall revert , and by consequence shall not
descend to the collateral heir ; 30 Edw . I, [Fitz . Abr . ] Formedon 65
post — ) . If the donee in tail had aliened before the statute and after
wards had issue , and then the issue had died without issue , the land
should revert : for he had not power to alien at the time of the aliena
tion , but such alienation should bar the issue as it is adjudged in 19 Edw .
II , [ Fitz . Abr . ] Formedon 61 , because he claimed fee-simple . N . B.
These rules yet hold place in case of a grant of an annuity to one and
the hefrs males of his body , and al
l
other inheritances which are not




STATUTE DE DONIS CONDITIONALIBUS , Westm . 2 , c . 1 , 13 Edw . I .
A . D . 1285 .
First , concerning lands that many times are given upon condition ,
that is , to wit , where any giveth his land to any man and his wife ,
and to the heirs begotten of the bodies o
f
the same man and his wife ,
with such condition expressed that if the same man and his wife die
without heir o
f
their bodies between them begotten , the land so
given shall revert to the giver or his heir ; in case also where one giveth
lands in free marriage , which gift hath a condition annexed , though
it be not expressed in the deed of gift , which is this , that if the husband
and wife die without heir of their bodies begotten , the land so given
shall revert to the giver o
r
his heir ; in case also where one giveth land
to another and the heirs o
f
h
is body issuing , it seemed very hard and
yet seemeth to the givers and their heirs , that their will being expressed
in the gift was not heretofore nor yet is observed . In all the cases afore
said after issue begotten and born between them , to whom the lands were
given under such condition , heretofore such feoffees had power to aliene
the land so given , and to disinherit their issue o
f
the land , contrary to the
minds of the givers , and contrary to the form expressed in the gift .
And further , when the issue of such feoffee is failing , the land so









them , to whom land was so given upon condition , the
donors have heretofore been barred o
f
their reversion of the same tene
ments which was directly repugnant to the form o
f
the gift : wherefore
our lord the king , perceiving how necessary and expedient it should
b
e
to provide remedy in the aforesaid cases , hath ordained , that the
will o
f
the giver according to the form in the deed o
f gift manifestly
expressed shall be from henceforth observed , so that they to whom the
land was given under such condition shall have no power to aliene the
land so given , but that it shall remain unto the issue o
f
them to whom
it was given after their death , or shall revert unto the giver or his
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heirs if issue fail , either by reason that there is no issue at all, or if
any issue be, it fail by death , the heir of such issue failing. Neither
shall the second husband of any such woman from henceforth have any
thing in the land so given upon condition after the death of his wife ,
by the law of England , nor the issue of the second husband and wife
shall succeed in the inheritance , but immediately after the death of the
husband and wife, to whom the land was so given , it shall come to their
issue or return unto the giver or his heir as before is said . And for
asmuch as in a new case new remedy must be provided , this manner
of writ shall be granted to the party that will purchase it. * * * The
writ whereby the giver shall recover when issue faileth is common enough
in the chancery . And it is to wit that this statute shall hold place
touching alienation of land contrary to the form of gift hereafter to
be made, and shall not extend to gifts made before . And if a fine be
levied hereafter upon such lands it shall be void in the law , neither
shall the heirs or such as the reversion belongeth unto , though they be
of full age, within England , and out of prison , need to make their
claim .
BRITTON , 1 Liber c . 5, Sec. 2, p. * 93 . - A . D . 1275 — 1300 .
If any one purchase to himself and his wife and their issue begotten
in lawful matrimony ; by such a purchase the purchasers have only &
freehold for their two lives, and the fee accrues their issue if there be
any already born ; and if not , then the fee remains in the person of the
donor until they have issue .
Some have thought that this was written after the statute de donis was
passed but before it was understood .
ANON ., in the Common Pleas, 2 Edw . 2, A . D. 1308 - 9 - Selden Soc. Year .
books , Vol. 1 ( 1 & 2 Edw . 2) , case No . 19, pp . 70 -72 , also noted in Fitzher
bert ' s Abr. t. Resceit 147 .
This case is a writ of dower . The tenant has made default after
default . Now here comes A and says that the tenements were given to
his father and the heirs of his body begotten , and that he ( A ) is the
eldest son and heir apparent ; and he prays to be received to defend
his right.
BEREFORD , C . J .* Heir yo
u
cannot be during your father ' s life , for
you cannot know which o
f you will be the survivor . And I put the case
that lands are given to a man in fee -tail , and he to whom the gift is
" tailed ” engenders a daughter , and is afterwards impleaded , and the
•Whether Bereford was chief justice when this case was decided does not appear
from the report , but I take it that he was from the fact that he alone speaks for the
court . He became chief justice March 15th , 1309 .
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daughter comes and prays to be received to defend her right and she
is received , and then pending the plea he engenders a son , and then the
daughter makes default , and the son comes into court and prays to be
received : — How can he be received , and how could the right jump across
to the male when she has been received as heir ? And it is certain that
the daughter cannot be heir so long as there is a male ; thence it follows
[ in the present case ] while his ancestor is living he cannot be heir.
Toudeby ( sergeant arguing for A ] . These tenements were given to
[his father ) and the issue of his body , and he is issue and is the eldest .
Herle (sergeant for the plaintiff. ] You will never make out that he is
" heir ;" and if you leave out this word heir , then he will not be within
the statute [Westm . II , c . 3 ] , for the statute says the heirs shall be
admitted .
Toudeby . These tenements are given to [ the father ) and to the heirs
of his body engendered , so that the father is only tenant for his life, and
for ( a mere ] freehold , and the right dwells in the person of the issue .
Passeley (also for the plaintiff ]. I will show that that is not so ; for
the father by himself can vouch to warranty in the right, and the war
rantor in the right can join battle and the grand assize , and if he ( the
father thus ] loses, he ( the son ] never shall have recovery of the same
land .
Toudeby . If no issue issues he to whom the reversion belongs shall be
received , and (what is more ) so shall a remainderman who is a total
stranger . Why not then the issue , who is more privy ?
BEREFORD , C . J . If the tenements were given to the father and mother
and the heirs of their two bodies begotten , and the one of them died and
the survivor was impleaded , in that case peradventure the issue should
be received , for in that case one can know for certain that an heir there
cannot be other than one who is begotten of their two bodies .
Toudeby . There may be just the same uncertainty in the one case that
there is in the other, for albeit ( in the case that you put ] one of the two
donees is dead , it may be that he has issue three or four sons , and we
cannot say which of them will be the heir .
Passeley. If the father desired to pray aid of the son he should not be
received , and no more shall the issue [be received in this case ).
Toudeby . We have seen before now that a linen -draper of London
purchased tenements to himself and his wife and to the heirs of their two
bodies begotten ; and ( the husband and wife ) were impleaded and made
default ; and, because there was no issue , he to whom the reversion
belonged came and prayed to be received ; and pending the plea a son
was born , who was brought into the bench before you in a cradle and
prayed to be received and was received ; and yet the father and mother
were in full life, as they are to this day . Wherefore we pray to be
received .




HELTON v. BRAMPTON , in Common Bench , Mich . term , 18 Edw . 11,
A . D . 1344 . - Yearbooks (Pike) 18 & 19 Edw . III, p . 194 - 206 ; also reported










, eassise for damag
John , son o
f
William de Holton , brought an assise o
f
novel disseisin
against two men and their wives and others in the county of Westmore
land . The men and their wives pleaded in bar on the ground that one
John De Helton , grandfather o
f
the wives , had two sons , John the elder ,
and Thomas , the younger . John , the ancestor , & c . , gave the tene
ments to his younger son , Thomas , in fee simple . After the death o
f
Thomas , who died seised , Thomas entered as son and heir and died
without issue of his body , and after his death the wives , with their
husbands , entered as sisters and heirs . John , the plaintiff , as cousin ,
abated , claiming as heir . We ousted him ; judgment whether the assize ,
& c . To this the plaintiff said that the gift was made to Thomas [ John )
and the heirs male of his body , and inasmuch as Thomas , the son o
f
Thomas [ John ] , died without heir male o
f
his body , he entered , as heir
o
f
the donor , upon his reversion . And he prayed the assise for da ages .
The tenants not denying the gift in tail as above , d manded judgment
inasmuch a
s
the plaintiff admitted the issue in tail to have been seised ,
and so the li itation was brought to an end , and the wish of the donor




this gift confessed b
y
the plaintiff ; and ( said the tenants ) we
demand judgment whether there ought to be an assise . And thereupon




• • R . Thorpe . Anyone who is a female is a stranger to such
& form o
f gift ; and this is not like Multon ' s Case , on which judgment
was given in parliament , and in which the sisters had the inheritance ,
because in that case the gift was to him and his heirs male , so that his
collateral heirs as well as the lineal heirs had the capacity o
f inheriting ,
wherefore on such a gift he had a fee simple . Not so in the case before
u
s , in which the reversion of the fee simple was saved b
y
the gift .
HILLARY ( J . ) : Then will you say that in this case in which you are ,
the daughters , if he had any , would not have the inheritance ?
B . Thorpe : It is certain that they would not . * * * STONORE
( C . J . ] : It is necessary to look at the statute which states the case
o
f
entail , and this particular case is not among any o
f
the cases expressly
mentioned by the statute , and therefore it is at common law and conse
quently a fee simple . Seton : Certainly , Sir , we rely greatly on that on
our side . Sadelyngstanes : We understand that in case o
f
such a gift the
issue had a
t
the common law , an inheritance in fee simple , for it is certain
that they could have aliened ; and although alienation is restrained b
y
stat
1 The two sons were , according to the record . William the elder , and
John the younger . 2 John , according to the record . 3 John ' s son Thomas ,
according to the record .
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ute , the estate , when it is continued , remains as it was at common law ,
that is to say , one of fee simple . Maubray : This limitation by which
the gift is made to a man and the heirs male of his body is more re
stricted , and does not give inheritance so largely as if the gift were made
to one and the heirs of his body ; in which case the twentieth in descent
would have only a fee tail , and in default of issue the land would be
revertible , & c . ; and all the more in this case.
WILLOUGHBY [ J . ] ( to the plaintiff ) : It will be necessary to take the
assise , because another tenant has , in the same assise , pleaded to the
assise with respect to a part of the land ; therefore as to this sue an
assise in respect to the damages , and as to the rest sue an assise also .
And so note that female issue will not inherit by such a gift, even though
the issue male was seised .
ABRAHAM v. TWIGG , in B . R ., Trinity , 38 Eliz . - A . D . 1597 . - Cro . Ellz .
478 , Moor 424. Abridged from Croke .
Avowry fo
r
rent . On demurrer . Peter , seised in fee , made a feoff
ment to the use o
f
himself and the heirs o
f
his body , and in default o
f
such issue to Gabriel and his heirs males , and in default o
f
such issue ,
to the right heirs of Peter . Peter died without issue ; Gabriel entered ,
devised the rent out o
f
the land to the avowant , and died having issue .
It was argued that Gabriel had an estate tail , though it was not limited
to the heirs o




use , which is to be
expounded according to the intent , and as wills , citing 9 Edw . 3 , “ Tail ”
2
1 ; 5 Hen . 6 , p
l
. 6 .
All the Justices ( Popham , C . J . , absent ) held that it was an estate
in fe
e




use , it differs not from
other gifts by deed , and shall not have any other construction . And it
cannot be an estate tail , because there is not any body from whom this
heir male should come . And so it is in a case b
y
devise , as appears
9 Hen . 6 , p
l
. 25 . Wherefore it was adjudged for avowant .
WILLION V . BERKLEY , in Common Bench , Trinity , 4 Ellz . - A . D . 1562









[Ejectione Firmae . It appears b
y
the record that Henry Willion sues
Henry Lord Berkley and Richard Knight , for ejecting him from seven
acres o
f
wood in Weston , and declares that Henry Cook , being seised in
fee o
f
the land , May 5th , in the 4 & 5 years o
f
Phil . & Mary , demised




which plaintiff was pos
sessed , and the next day , May 6th , o
f
said year , defendants ejected him .
Defendants plead in bar , that long before the time of the supposed eject
ment , one Wm . Berkley was seised in fee of the manor of Weston , of
which the land in dispute is a part ; and being so seised , levied a fine in
the king ' s court 5 Hen . 7 , A . D . 1490 , by which the land was limited to
said Wm . Berkley and the heirs of his body , remainder to King Henry 7 ,
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Dand the heirs males of his body , remainder to the right heirs of said Wm .that afterwards said William died without issue, after whose deathKing Henry ï entered in his said manor in his estate tail male , and
died leaving issue his son , King Henry 8 , who entered and was seised
in the same estate and died leaving issue his son , King Edward 6 , who
entered and was seised likewise in tail male and died without issue male ;
and then the late King Henry y being dead without issue male , these
defendants lawfully entered in their remainder as heirs of said William
Berkley , on whom said Henry Cook entered and made the said lease
to the plaintiff , on whom defendants rightfully re-entered ; and so they
demand judgment . Plaintiff rejoined confessing the matter alleged in
the plea , and alleging an act of parliament , 35 Hen . 8 , and alleging
that by birth of issue to King Henry 7 the land became his in fe
e
-simple .
Defendants demurred . Many points were argued that are not given in
this abridgment , which the curious reader will find reported at large
b
y Mr . Plowden . One point made was that the replication does not
state that there was office found on the death o
f
Wm . Berkley , without
which King Henry 7 could not lawfully enter . ]
ANTHONY BROWN [ J . ] said , if land is leased to the king for his
life , upon condition that if the lessor dies his heirs shall enter , and the
lessor dies ; there his heir shall not enter without office finding the death ,
and without ouster le main sued . But if it was upon condition that if
the king , who is lessee , dies , the lessor shall enter ; there if the king dies ,
the lessor shall enter without office , o
r
ouster le main sued . For in the
first case the condition is merely a condition , which abbreviates the
estate , but in the other case the condition is joined to the limitation of the
estate , and the condition and the limitation tend to one end , and the
condition does not abridge the limitation a
s it does in the other case .





upon the lessor before entry . So in our case , when King Edward 6
died without heir male , the freehold was cast upon the Lord Berkley ,
and his entry was lawful without office or ouster le main ; and the bar
reciting that he entered is good enough in this point . Which was agreed
b
y
the whole court . Also admitting that an office was necessary here ,
yet the defendants , b
y
their plea in bar , have amended the fault which
they have excepted to . For they themselves , in conveying their title to
them have shown that the marquis died without issue , and that King
Henry q entered . * * *
[Counsel for the plaintiff argued at length that a grant to the king and
the heirs male o
f
his body is not a fee - tail , but a fee conditional a
t
com
mon law , and the statute de donis conditionalibus does not extend to
him ; which the defendant ' s counsel denied . The judges took time to
consider , and later in Trinity 4 Eliz . argued upon the matter as follows ] :
WESTON , justice . It seems to me that the plaintiff shall recover .
* * By the common law before the statute de donis conditionalibus ,
48 ESTATES OF INHERITANCE .
there were two estates of inheritance , the one a fee-simple absolute , as
where a man had lands to him and his heirs generally , and the other &
fee - simple conditional , as where a man had lands given to him and to
his heirs of his body , which estate to him and to his heirs of his body
was greater than an estate for life , for the word heirs makes it greater
than for life , so that if he had aliened before issue the donor should not
have entered for a forfeiture , as the lessor shall do upon the feoffment of
tenant for life. * * * It seems to me that the estate shall be
adjudged a fee- simple conditional in the king , and that the remainder
shall be void , and that the king shall not be bound by the statute de donis
conditionalibus . For inasmuch as all justice, tranquility , and repose are
derived from the king, as the fountain thereof, the law shows him special
favor in a
ll
his business [ * 243 ] as being the cause and origin thereof .
* * * If the king , should be restrained he would be in a worse condi
tion than any other ; for every one else may suffer a common recovery ,
and so make the most o
f
the land and bar their issues , but no recovery
can b
e
had against the king , for no praecipe lies against him . *
ANTHONY BROWN , justice : I am of opinion to the contrary . * * *
The person of the king is not to be respected in gifts of land , but the
quality o
f
the estate is to be considered ; and the person o
f
the king
shall not rule the estate in the land . * * * When [ * 248 ) the statute
ordained that the will of the donor should be observed , from thence it
followed consequently that the donee was restrained from alienating
lawfully the fee -simple , and from doing other acts which a tenant in
fee -simple might do . And when he was thereby restrained from doing
lawfully those acts which attended the fee -simple estate , and from
meddling with the fee -simple ; from thence they took it to be the intent
both o
f
the legislature and of the donor , that he should not have a fee
simple ; for it would have been an idle intent to have adjudged the fee
simple in him , when he could not lawfully do anything with it . And
therefore upon this reason they took it that the fee -simple was left in the
donor , and yet that the estate o
f
the donee was an estate o
f
inheritance ,
because the heirs o
f
his body should inherit it ; but this inheritance
could not be a fee -simple , for then there would be two fee - simples of the
same land ; but they took it to be a baser estate of inheritance , and gave
it the name of an estate tail , which is an estate of inheritance certainly
limited . So that upon good reason , in order to perform the will o
f
the
donor and of the legislature also , they took it b
y
the perview that the
estate was divided , and that the donee had an estate tail and the donor




f remainder , and that he could not do before the statute ; for
then the donee had a fee - simple , and one fee -simple cannot depend upon
another . For in 3 Edw . 3 a man levied a fine sur conusance de droit
come ceo que il ad de son done , and he could not make a remainder over
upon such fine , because the gift shall be as a fe
e
simple . [ See H . 42 Ed .
3 , 5b , per Finchd . , Brooke Abr . t . Estates 65 in fine . ) But now that the
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the act instructed the
expositors o
f
it to divide the estate , and continual use ever since has con
firmed the exposition . Wherefore the estate is divided b
y
the intent of
the act without precise words , as fully and perfectly as if the act had
expressly divided it ; for that which is done b
y
the intent of the act ,
without precise words , is equivalent to that which is done b
y
precise
words . So that now the estate is restrained and abridged and altered
b
y
the act ; and therefore when the king took the estate , he took it
restrained and abridged , and he could not take it otherwise . * *
And , si
r , if the king would say that the estate was not divided a
t
common
law , and that as to him it shall be at this day as it was at the common
law , whereby he would have a fee - simple , and [ * 249 ] the remainder
would b
e void ; b
y
this , I say , he destroys his own estate for the estate
tail precedes his remainder , and if it should be a fee -simple conditional ,
then the remainder o
f
the king would be void , for a remainder cannot
b
e limited upon a fee - simple precedent . And if the king would say that
his remainder is a fee -simple , he cannot say otherwise but that the estate




t one same time , and both estates are b
y
the donor limited to be in
tail . And the king cannot say that the one is in tail and the other in
fe
e , for thereby he affirms and disaffirms at the same time . * * *
He is bound by the statute a
s well as another ; and as proof that it has
been so taken before , the case of P . 4 Hen . 6 ( 19 p
l
. 6 ; Fitz . Abr . t . Gard
5
0 ; Brooke Abr . 52 Tenures 21 ) has been well cited ; where the tenant ,
who held o
f
the king in capite b
y knight ' s service , made a gift in tail ,
and the donee died , his issue within age , and it was there adjudged that
the king should not have the ward , but the donor should have it ; for
the estate is divided , and the reversion is in the donor , and the donee
held of him . * * *
DYER , chief justice : As to the matter in law , I am of the same
opinion . * *
Afterwards on the quinzaine o
f
S




Queen Elizabeth , the justices at the prayer o
f
the Lord Berkley ,
who had often prayed their judgment after their arguments , gave judg
ment fo
r
him against the plaintiff .
HISTORY OF RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION BY LIMITING THE FEE .
Heir ' s Right to Fee Simple Against Allenation b
y
Ancestor .
LAWS OF ALFRED THE GREAT , C . 37 . - A . D . 871 – 901 .
S
i quis terram haereditariam habeat , cam ron vedat a cognitis haeredi
bus suis , si illi viro prohibitum sit qui eam ab initio acquisivit , u
t
eta
facere nequeat . If any have hereditary land he may not sell it from
h
is kindred heirs if he who acquired it in the beginning provided that it
should b
e impossible to d
o
so .
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Laws of Alfred the Great ( ci
r
. A . D . 890 ) c . 41 . The man who has
bocland , and which his kindred left him , then ordain we that he must
not give it from his maeg -burg , if there be writing or witness that it
was forbidden b
y
those men who at first acquired it , and b
y
those who
gave it to him , that he should do so ; and then let that be declared in the
presence o
f the king and o
f
the bishop before his kinsmen .
"We may argue , if we will , that this is an attempt to impose upon the
alienable book - land some of those fetters which have all along compressed
the less alienable folk - land or 'family - land ' : the forma donationis is to be
observed , and restrictive forms are not unknown . Nevertheless , here , about
the year 900 , we see the current of legislation moving , at least for the
moment , in favor of the expectant heirs . Either a new law is made for
their benefit , or a new sanctity and precision is given to an old law . "
2 Pollock & Maitland 251 .
" We must admit that most o
f
our evidence relates to book - land , and
we have often argued that in all likelihood book - land is an exotic and
superficial institution , floating , as it were , on the surface of English law .
Of what went on below the surface among those men who had no books
we can learn very little . But what we see happening among the great folk
is not unimportant , and it is this : the Anglo - Saxon theng who holds book
land does not profess to have his heirs consent when he gives part of that
land to a church ; his successor , the Norman baron , will rarely execute a
charter o
f feoffment which does not express the consent of one heir or
many heirs . Our record is miserably imperfect ; but as it stands , it tends
to prove that among the rich and noble there was a period when the rights
of the expectant heir were not waxing but waning . In the end , as we shall
see hereafter , the heir succeeds in expelling the testamentary or quasi
testamentary gift of lands from the common law . We have not been argu
ing for any conclusion save this , that in the present state of our knowledge
we should be rash were we to accept ‘family ownership , ' or in other words ,
a strong form o
f 'birthright , ' as an institution which once prevailed among
the English in England . " 2 Pollock & Maitland 252 .
" The suggestion therefore may be admissible that at least in some cases
'family ownership , ' or the semblance of it , may really be , not the origin ,
but the outcome of intestate succession . We have but to ask for a time
when testamentary dispositions are unknown and land is rarely sold or
given away . In such a time a law of intestate succession will take deep root
in men ' s thoughts and habits . The son will know that if he lives long
enough he will succeed his father ; the father will know that in the ordi
nary course of events his land will pass from him to his sons . What else
should happen to it ? He does not want to sell it , for there is no one to
buy it ; and whither could he go and what could he do if he sold his land ?
Perhaps the very idea of a sale of land has not yet been conceived . In
course o
f time , as wealth is amassed , there are purchasers for land ; also
there are bishops and priests desirous o
f acquiring land by gift and willing
to offer spiritual benefits in return . Then the struggle begins , and law
must decide whether the claims of the expectant heirs can be defeated .
In the past those claims have been protected not so much by law as by
economic conditions . There is no need of a law to prohibit men from
doing what they do not want to do ; and they have not wanted to sell or
give away their lands . But now there must be law . The form that the law
will take will be determined by the relative strength of various conflicting
forces . " 2 Pollock & Maitland 247 .
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LAWS OF HENRY I, c. 70. - A . D. 1100 .
Si bockland habeat, quam ei parentes dederint , non mittat eam extra
cognationem suam . If one has bookland which the parents gave to him
he shall not alienate it from his kindred .
GLANVIL ( Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus* ) Liber 7, c. 1. - A . D .
1180 ?
[ By Livery ). Every free -man possessed of land may give a certain
part of it with his daughter , or with any other woman in marriage -hood ,
whether he has any heir or not ; or whether his heir , supposing he has
one , consent to such a disposition or not ; nay , though the heir expressly
dissent from , and forbid it. Every one may also give a certain part of his
freehold estate to any person he chooses, in remuneration for his services ,
or to a religious establishment in free -alms ; that, if seisin follow up the
donation , the land shall perpetually remain to the person to whom it is
given and his heirs , if the terms of the gift go to that extent . But, if
such a donation should not be followed up by seisin , nothing can , after
the death of the donor , be claimed with effect in virtue of it contrary to





the realm , rather as a naked promise , than a real promise or
donation .
[By Will . ] It is thus , generally speaking , lawful for a man , in his
lifetime , freely to dispose of the reasonable part of his land in such
manner a
s he may feel inclined , yet the same permission is not allowed
to anyone on his death -bed ; because the distribution o
f
the inheritance
would , probably , be then highly imprudent , were such an indulgence
conceded to men , who , in the glow of sudden impulse , not unfrequently
lose both their memory and reason . Hence , it is to be presumed , that if
8 man laboring under a mortal disease , should then for the first time set
about making a disposition of his land , a thing never thought o
f by him
in the hour o
f





deliberation . But yet a gift of this description , if
made to any one b
y
the last will , shall be valid , if done with the consent
o
f
the heir , and confirmed b
y
his acquiescence in it .
[Distinction of Purchased from Inherited Land . ] If he possesses
inheritable land only h
e may , as we have already observed , give a certain
portion o
f
it to any stranger at his pleasure . But if he has many sons
born in wedlock , he cannot , correctly speaking , without the consent o
f
his heir , give any part of his inheritance to a younger son , because if this
were permitted , it would then frequently happen that the eldest son
would b
e disinherited , owing to the greater affection which parents often
feel toward their younger children . But it may be asked whether a man
having a son and heir , can give any part of his inheritance to his
illegitimate son ? If he can , it follows , that the condition of the illegiti
mate son would , in this respect , be preferable to that o
f
the younger son
*Written about A . D . 1180 , when the author was Chief Justicar o
f Eng .
land . This is one of the first treatises on English Common Law .
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born in wedlock ; and yet the law is so . But if a person desirous of
making a donation of part of his lands possess only such as he has pur
chased , he may then make such gift ; provided it does not extend to the
whole of his purchased lands , because he cannot disinherit his son and
heir. Yet, if he has not any heir , male or female, of his own body, he
may, indeed , consult his own inclination in making an absolute gift,
either of part or of the whole of his purchased lands. And if the
person to whom the gift be made obtain seisin of it during the life of
the donor , it is not in the power of any more remote heir to invalidate
such gift. Thus a man may give in his lifetime the whole of his pur
chased land. But he cannot make anyone an heir of it, neither a college ,
nor any particular individual, it being an established rule of law , that
God alone, and not man , can make an heir . If, however , a man possess
both inheritable and purchased lands , it is then unquestionably true,
that he may absolutely give any part or the whole of the latter to such
persons as he pleases ; and of his inheritance , he may notwithstanding
dispose, according to what we have already observed , provided such
disposition be a reasonable one. It should be observed , that if a man
having lands in free socage , has many sons , who are al
l
in equal propor
tions to be admitted to the inheritance , then it is unquestionably true ,
that their father cannot give a greater part of his inheritable land , or of
his purchased if he possess no inheritable , to any one o
f
the sons , than
the reasonable part which would fall to such son o
f
the whole inheritance .
But the father can in his lifetime give to either of his sons such part only
o
f








" In the thirteenth century the tenant in fee simple has a perfect right
to disappoint his expectant heirs by conveying away the whole of his land
by act inter vivos . Our law is grasping the maxim Nemo est heres viventis .
Glanvill wrote just in time , though only just in time , to describe the older
state of things . ” 2 Pollock & Maitland 306 .
"Glanvill , however , is far from defining an exact rule for every possible
case ; he nowhere tells us in terms of arithmetic what is that reasonable
portion which the father may freely give away . We can see , however ,
that one main restraint has been the deeply rooted sentiment that a father
ought not to give one of his sons a preference over the others ; they are
equals and should be treated as equals . In the case of partable socage
land this sentiment governs ; but the introduction of primogeniture has
raised a new problem . When Glanvill is writing the court is endeavoring
to put the eldest son in the advantageous position that is occupied by each
of the sokeman ' s expectant heirs ; without his consent he should not be
deprived by any gift made to his brothers of that which was to come to
him upon his father ' s death . But under the new law what was to have
come to him at his father ' s death was the whole of his father ' s land . Are
we then to secure all this for him , and that too in the name of a rule
which has heretofore made for equality among sons ? If so , then we come
to the paradox , that it is better to be a bastard than a legitimate younger
son . This could not long be tolerated . Free alienation without the heir ' s
consent will come in the wake of primogeniture . These two characteristics ,
which distinguish our English law from her nearest of kin , the French
customs , are closely connected . The charters of the twelfth century afford
numerous examples o
f expectant heirs joining in the gifts of their ancestors .
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Occasionally the giver may explain that he has not obtained his heir ' s
concurrence , because he is disposing not of heritage but of conquest .
• • Well worthy of notice are the cases , not very uncommon , in which
little children are made to approve their father 's pious gifts ; worthy of no
uice , because an attempt seems made to bind them by receipt of a quid pro
quo . At Abingdon the monks , fearing that the heir might afterwards dis
pute the donation , gave him twelve pence and a handsome leather belt .
At Ramsey two infantes receive five shillings apiece , an infantulus a shil
ling , and a baby held in its mother ' s arms twenty pence . . . . In some
of the charters the heirs are put before us not merely as assenting to , but
as joining in the gift ; it is a gift by a man and his heirs ; in other cases the
heirs are named among the witnesses of the deed . What ceremony was
observed on these occasions we cannot tell .” 2 Pollock & Maitland 307 ,
308 , 309 .
Allenation Accomplished by Means of Warranty .
POLLOCK & MAITLAND ' S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW , vol. 2, pp .
310 -311 .
The object of the restraint [on alienation in time past [before
Hen . II ] has not been solely , perhaps not mainly , the retention of land
" in the family ” ; it has secured an equal division of land among sons,
or as equal a division as the impartibility of the knight 's fee would per
mit . It became useless , inappropriate , unbearable, when the eldest son
was to have the whole inheritance . No great harm would be done to the
feudal lords , at all events to the king, by abolishing it. They had ,
or they meant to have , some control over the alienations made by their
tenants , more control than they could have had under a law which par
titioned the inheritance . The material cause of the great change we may
find in such considerations as these ; but it must have been effected by
some machinery of legal reasoning , and we may suspect that the engine
which did the work was one that was often to show it
s potency in after
centuries — “ the rebutting effect of a warranty . ” Alan alienates land
to William ; Alan declares that he and his heirs will warrant that land
to William and his heirs . Alan being dead , Baldwin , who is his son
and heir , brings suit against William , urging that Alan was not the
owner o
f
the land , but that it really belonged to Alan ' s wife and Bald
win ' s mother , or urging that Alan was a mere tenant for life , and that
Baldwin was the remainderman . William meets the claim thus : “ See
here the charter of Alan your father , whose heir you are . He undertook
that h
e and his heirs would warrant this land to me and mine . If a
stranger impleaded me you would be the very person whom I would
vouch to warrant me . With what face then can you claim the land ? ”
Baldwin is rebutted from the claim by his ancestor ' s warranty . It is
a curious and troublesome doctrine , which hereafter will give rise to
many a nice distinction . A man is debarred , rebutted , from claiming
land because the burden of a warranty given by one o
f
his ancestors
has fallen upon him . In later days , already when Bracton was writing ,
this doctrine no longer came into play when a tenant in fee simple had
alienated his land ; for in such a case the heir had no right to the land ,
n
o
claim which must be rebutted . It only came into play when the
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alienator and warrantor had been doing something that he had no busi
ness to do, when a husband had been alienating his wife 's land , or
a tenant for life had made a feoffment in fee . But we may suspect that
this doctrine performed its first exploit when it enabled the tenant in
fee simple to disappoint his expectant heirs by giving a warranty which
would rebut and cancel their claims upon the alienated land .
SOMERY V. BURMINGEHAM , In Common Bench , Mich . term 4 Edw . II
A . D . 1310 - Selden Society Year Books 198 .
One John brought his writ of debt against C and demanded 201.
" which he owed him .” The writ ran : “ Command C that justly , etc .,
he render to J 201. which he owes.' Hedon asked what he had for the
debt . They produced a dees which said that H , father of C, granted
for himself and his heirs to be bound to John in 201 . Hedon : We pray
judgment of the variance between writ and specialty , for the writ sup
poses that we ourselves are party to the contract ; [ and ] the specialty
says that our father , whose heir we are , was party to the contract ,
whereas he might have had a good writ saying “ Command C , son and
heir," etc. Denon : Is this your ancestor 's deed ? IIedon : We have no
need to confess or deny, for we are abating this writ. STANTON [ J . ] :
What you say would be right in a plea of land or a writ of warranty of a
charter. But in this personal action the writ and specialty are sufficiently
accordant. (And afterwards he answered over .)
Establishment of Doctrine That Heir Takes by Descent .
WILLIAM DEARUNDEL ' S CASE , Pleas at Westminster , Hilary Term , 9 Hen .
III. - A . D. 1225 — Bracton 's Note Book , Case 1054 .
Radulfus , son of Roger, demanded of William de Arundel five and
& half acres of land with appurtenances at Trelley , three acres with
appurtenances in Treberned , two acres with appurtenances in Tredeiset,
and one acre with appurtenances in Hendr, as his right, of which Roger,
his father , was seised as of right in fee and demesne in the time of Henry ,
king, & c., and which right of Roger to this land descended to said
Radulfus as his son and heir . And William came and defended his
right ; and said that this Roger , plaintiff 's father , rendered all this land
with appurtenances as his sole and peaceable inheritance to William , the
defendant 's father , and in the court of our lord the king quit -claimed
for himself and his heirs in perpetuity to said William and his heirs ;
and he produced the charter of Roger which witnessed it. And Radulfus
came and acknowledged his father 's charter and said quit -claim ; but he
demanded judgment whether his father could give all the land which he
held by knight service reserving no service to himself or his heirs . And
because Radulfus acknowledged his father 's charter and the charter
proved that Roger , his father , rendered this land and quit - claimed it for
himself and his heirs it is held that William go hereof discharged and
that Radulfus be in mercy .
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" Several points may be made clear by this book , but the exact extent of
the tenant ' s power of alienation does not come out very plainly . It should
be remembered the whole learning and even the very conception of 'estates'
belongs to a later time; Bracton had not the word 'estate , ' nor any equiva
lent for it . Also it should be remembered that but a short time back the
man who held land to him and his heirs could by no means always disap
point his heir apparent. " Maitland ' s introduction to Bracton 's Note Book ,
pp . 133 - 4
Note that in writing his treatise later — 1250 -67 ? _ Bracton lays down the
law in accord with this case as unquestioned . See ante .
" Unfortunately when in 1194 the rolls of the king ' s court begin their
tale, it is too late for them to tell us much about this matter . However , in
1200 Elyas Croc gave the king 30 marks and a palfrey to have a judgment of
the court as to whether a gift made by his father Matthew was valid .
Matthew had given to his own younger brother , the uncle of Elyas , a
knight ' s fee which , so Elyas asserted , was the head of the honor and barony .
Whether Elyas got a judgment or no we cannot say ; but the case looks like
an extreme case ; the father had been giving away the ancestral mansion .
So late as 1225 a son vainly tries to get back a tenement which his father
has alienated , and plaintively asks whether his father could give away all
the land that he held in military tenure without retaining any service for
himself and his heirs ; but it is unavailing . Bracton knows nothing of
or rather, having Glanvill' s book before him , deliberately ignores — the old
restraint; it is too obsolete to be worth a word . The phrase 'and his heirs '
in a charter of feoffment gives nothing to an heir apparent. " 2 Pollock &
Maitland 309 .
BRITTON , Liber II , c. 5 , Sec. 1, p . * 93. - A . D . 1275 — 1300 .
Notwithstanding heirs are named in a purchase , yet no purchase
thereby accrues to the heirs . And it must be understood that where any
one purchases to himself and his heirs , he purchases to himself and his
heirs near and remote , and to have and to hold from heir to heir , as well
to those begotten as to those which are to be begotten .
Alienation Restrained by Creating a Fee Conditional At Common Law .
ANON , Cornish Iter, 30 Edw . 1. - A . D. 1302 : -- FitzHerbert Abr . Formedon
65 , 1 Gray 's Cases on Property p . 412 .
Formedon in reverter because the donee died without issue .
Asseby : The donee alienated before the statute ( 13 Edw . I. c. 1)
and had issue . Heyham : He had no issue when he made the alienation .
Asseby : It may be that he had no issue when he alienated but that he
had issue afterwards , and then is the alienation good . Heyham : No.
Asseby : He had had issue. PER CURIAM : It is nothing to the point
that he had had issue alive when he alienated ; for there might have been
issue and the issue might have died ; by that alienation the plaintiff will
not be barred . Asseby : He had issue alive when he made alienation . And
the others said the contrary .
The following cases at the same term , if not different reports of the same
case , seem to be to the same effect : Kilcart v. Hevys, 30 & 31 Ed . I . p .
196 ; Waryn de Traneryon v . Thomas de Traneryon , 30 & 31 Edw . I. p .
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BRIAN ' S CASE , Trinity term , 32 Edw . 1. - A . D . 1304 . - Year -books (Hor
wood ) 32 & 33 Edw . I, p . 278 . Abridged .
Formedon because the donee had died without issue . Touthby ( for
the defendant ] : Robert ( the donee , to him and the heirs of his body )
had issue, and alienated before the statute of Westm . 2, c. 1 ) , ready , & c.
Friskney ( for the demandant ) : The statute states " that such feoffees
had power to alienate after issue begotten ,” and we will aver that Robert
had not any issue at the time of or before the alienation , ready , & c .
* * * Malberthorp [ also for defendant ] : Our case is at the common
law ; so it seems that it is sufficient for us to say that he had issue and
alienated , & c . HENGHAM [ J . ] : They say that at the time when Robert
alienated he had no issue ; and this they offer to aver ; Do you accept the
averment or not ? * * * [Holding the previous answer insufficient .]
Land was given to a man and woman and the heirs of their bodies and
thereafter they had issue and later the wife died , the statute de donis was
passed , he married again and died , and the second wife was endowed of this
land . Year -books (Pike ) 33 & 35 Edw . III, p . 286 .
Alienation Restrained by Creating Estate Tail .
NOTE In Yearbook of 20 & 21 Edw . 1, p. 302 . - A . D . 1292 .
One Adam purchased a tenement, to hold to him and the heirs of his
body begotten , and afterwards took a wife with a good estate , and begot
& son . Adam aliened the land so purchased , in despite of the form , & c . ;
and afterwards he and his wife died ; then came the son and brought a
writ of formedon against the tenant, and the tenant vouched him to war
ranty by virtue of his father 's deed , and the son said that it was not due
course of law to vouch the demandant . And so in this case the voucher
was of no avail . But can the objection in this case avail against the
father 's deed ? I say no , because the alienation was made against the
form of the gift, unless he has something by descent ex parti patris .
TALTARUM 'S CASE , Mich . Term , 12 Edw . IV . - A . D . 1473 - Year - Books
12 Edw . IV , 19 .
In a writ of entry on the statute of 5 Rich . II, (c. 8 ) 'Ubi ingressus
non datur per legem , & c., sued against one J . Smith , the defendant said
that the plaintiff ought not to have his action , for before the alleged
entry one T . B . was seised of the tenements in fee, and gave them to
one W . Smith to have and to hold to him and to the heirs of his body
begotten , by force of which he was seised , & c ., and had issue one Richard
and died so seised , and the tenements descended to Richard , and he
entered and was seised , and had issue the said J . Smith , and died seised ,
and the tenements descended to the said J . ; and the plaintiff claiming
by color of a deed of feoffment, before the gift , & c ., entered , on whose
possession the said J ., as son and heir of the said R . at the time of the






forc , and the ata issue the
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action . To which the plaintiff said , true it is that T . B . gave the tene
ments as above , & c . ; but he said that the said W . had issue one Humphrey
an older ( son ) and the said Richard , the younger , and died , after whose
death H . entered and was seised by the form of the gift, & c., and being
so seised , one T . Taltarum sued a writ of right against said Humphrey ,
returnable , & c . ; on which day the parties appeared , and said Taltarum
counted on his possession , and the said H . made defense , and vouched to
warranty one R . King, who was ready and entered into the warranty ,
and joined issue on the mere right ; and the said Taltarum imparled
(with him ) and then returned into court ) and the tenant by the war
ranty did not return but in contempt of court made default , by which
the demandant had final judgment against said H ., and he over against
the tenant by the warranty ; by force of which said Taltarum entered and
was seised , & c . ; and then said H . died without heirs of his body , & c. ;
and later Taltarum enfeoffed the present plaintiff , & c ., whereby he was
seised when the defendant entered , &c . To which the defendant said , true
it is that the said W . had issue Humphrey the elder and R . the younger ,
and died ; and that after his death the tenements descended to Hum
phrey as son and heir , and he entered and was seised as son and heir by
the form of the gift , & c. ; but he said that the aforesaid Humphrey
before the writ purchased ( in Taltarum 's suit) enfeoffed the said tene
ments to one Tergos in fee , who before said writ purchased gave the
tenements back to said H . and one Jane his wife to have and hold to
them and to the heirs of their bodies begotten , remainder to the right
heirs of said H . in fee , & c., by force of which they were seised , & c . ; and
later Jane died , after whose death H . was sole seised of said tenements
as tenant in tail after possibility , & c. ; and while he was so seised said
Taltarum sued his writ of right, and recovered against said H . in manner
and form as he had alleged ; the which H ., continually after the said judg
ment during his life was seised of said tenements by force of the gift to
him and his wife , and died without issue ; after whose death said Richard
as brother and heir of said H ., of the body of W . begotten , entered and
was seised by force of the gift made to W ., and died seised , and it
descended to said J . Smith , and he entered and was seised by force of the
gift, & c . ; without this that the said T . Taltarum , after the said recovery
in the life of the said H . entered on the said tenements as he had alleged ;
and without this that the said H . had any other estate in the said
tenements at the day of the purchase of the writ of right or afterwards ,
except that by force of the gift to him and his wife , & c . ; and without
this that the said Taltarum was seized of the said tenements as of fee
and of right at the time of the king, as he had alleged ; and so the said
recovery was false and feigned in law . * * *
In place of the long and confusing argument given in the original, the
following synopsis of the decision is given from Challis on Real Property
* 250 : “ It would appear , so fa
r
a
s the rambling obscurity of the report
allows anything to appear , that in the present case the question a
t
issue
was whether a person claiming under the original entail , which had been
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discontinued by Humphery Smith 's ( * 251) feoffment to Tergos was
barred by this recovery . And it appears to have been held that he was
not barred , upon the ground that Humphery Smith (who was really
seised under the tortuous seisin acquired by his own feoffment to Tergos )
had not been seised by force of the original entail , which was now sought
to be barred , at the time when the recovery was suffered . From this the
inference is deduced , that if Humphery Smith had been so seised by force
of the original entail , the recovery would have been a good bar to the
issue in tail claiming thereunder . And this inference being acted upon
in practice, was subsequently recognized by the courts , and became the
foundation of common recoveries ."
ANON ., before al
l




t Sergeant ' s Inn , a great question was agitated ,
which was this : Tenant in tail levied a fine of his land with proclama
tions , and the five years passed during his life -time , and [ * 3a ] after





ENGLEFIELD , SHELLY and CoNINGSBY , thought that the issue shall not
b
e barred ; for the statute 4 Hen . 7 , c . 24 , is , that such fine shall be
final , and shall conclude as well privies as strangers to it , saving
to a
ll persons and their heirs (other than such a
s
shall b
e parties to the
fine ) their right interest , & c . , which they had on the day of engrossing
the fine , so as they bring their action or enter lawfully within five years
after the engrossing ; saving also to al
l
other persons such right , title ,
and interest in the said tenements a
s
should first grow , remain , descend ,
o
r
come to them after the fine engrossed , o




any estate - tail , o
r
other cause and matter made before the fine
levied ; so b
y
this last saving , & c . , the issue in tail is aided , for he is the
first to whom the right descends after the fine engrossed . * * *
FITZJAMES , BRUNDEL , FITZHERBERT , BROOKE , and MOORE , to the
contrary , for the intent of those who made the statute was (as appears by
the words o
f
the said statute ) that such fine , & c . , should be a final end ;
and besides that such fine , & c . , shall conclude as well privies as strangers .




the statute was , not that
such as claim b
y
the same title that his ancestor , who levied the fine ,
had , shall be aided , & c . , for such issue in tail is privy to the fine levied
by his ancestor , through whom he shall make his descent , although he
b
e not party to the fine , and all privies are concluded b
y
such fine ; and
so such issue in tail shall be barred by a fine by his ancestor , & c . And
in this case it was agreed b
y
all the judges , that if he who is a stranger
to the fine , to whom a remainder in tail , o
r
other title , first accrues after
the fine , do not put in his claim within five years after , & c . , his issue
is barred b
y
that fine forever . Which note
T
o
settle the doubt raised by this divided opinion , and to confirm the
opinion of the majority in this case ( see Hargrave ' s note 1 to Coke Lit .
121a ) , it was enacted in 1540 , by the Statute of Fines of 32 Hen . VIII , c .
3
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" That all and singular fines, as well heretofore levied as hereafter to be
levied before the said justices with proclamations according to the said stat
ute [ 4 Hen . 7, c. 24 ) , by any person or persons of full age of one and twenty
years , of any manors , lands , tenements , or hereditaments , before the time
of the said fine levied in any wise entailed to the person or persons so
levying the same fine , or to any the ancestor or ancestors of the same per
son or persons in possession , reversion , remainder , or in use , shall be imme
diately after the same fine levied , engrossed , and proclamations made ,
adjudged , accepted , deemed , and taken , to all intents and purposes , a
sufficient bar and discharge forever , against the said person and persons
and their heirs claiming the same lands , tenements , and hereditaments ,
or any parcel thereof, only by force of any such entail , and against all
other persons claiming the same or any parcel thereof only to their use ,
or to the use of any manner of heir of the bodies of them ; any ambiguity ,
doubt , or contrariosity of opinion , risen or grown upon the said statute , to
the contrary notwithstanding . "
JACKSON & DARCYES CASE , in Common Bench , Mich . 16 Eliz . -- A . D.
1574 . 3 Leon . 57.
In a writ of partition facienda between Jackson and Darcy , the case
was : tenant in tail, remainder to the king , levied a fine, had issue , and
died ; in that case, it was adjudged that the issue was barred , and yet the
remainder which was in the king was not discontinued ; for by that fine,
an estate in fe
e
-simple determinable upon th
e
estate ta
il , did pass unto
the conusee .
MARY PORTINGTON ' S CASE , in O . B . , Trinity , 11 James 1 , A . D . 1614 –
Abridged from 10 Coke 35 b .
Speaking o
f
this case in the preface to the report , Lord Coke said : “ Then have
I published in Mary Portington ' s case , for the general good both of the prince and
country . the honorable funeral of fond and new - found perpetuities — a monsterous
brood carved out of mere invention , and never known to the ancient sages of the law .
I say monsterous , for that the naturalist saith , quod monstra generantur propter
corruptionem alicujus principii ; and yet I say honorable , for these vermin have crept
into many honorable families . At whose solemn funeral I was present , accompa
the dead to the grave of oblivion , but mourned not , for that the commonwealth
rejoiced , that fettered free -holds and inheritances were set at liberty , and many and
manifold inconveniences to the head and all the members of the commonwealth thereby
avoided . "
[ Trespass b
y Mary Portington against Robert Rogers and Thomas
Barley for breaking a close and house in York County . Defendants




the land devised it in writing to Elizabeth , his youngest daughter , in
tail , when she should be 18 ; that the testator died when she was five
years old , and when she was of age and seized under the devise she
married defendant Rogers , & c . Plaintiff replied that the testator had
issue ,Mary , the plaintiff , his eldest daughter , Helen , his second , and said
Elizabeth , and that for want of issue o
f
said Elizabeth , the same will
limited the remainder to said Mary in tail , remainder to Helen in tail ,
with divers remainders over in tail ; “ Provided always , that if my said
daughters or any o
f
them * * * jointly or severally , b
y
themselves
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or together with any other person or persons, willingly , apparently , and
advisedly conclude and agree to ” any act to alienate the land or bar
or destroy the entails , such person shall immediately lose and forfeit
and be utterly barred and excluded from every estate , remainder , and
benefit that she or they might claim by virtue of the will , immediately
from such act as if she or they were dead without heirs ; and that said
Elizabeth and Robert had bargained for and suffered a recovery ; where
fore the plaintiff entered for the said forfeiture , as in her remainder .
Upon which the defendant demurred . This Plea was entered , Mich .
7 James , in the common bench , and had depended fourteen terms and
been argued at the bar more than half as many times ; and now it was
argued by the judges, and at last unanimously resolved by the whole
court that judgment should be given against the plaintiff . ]
On the Plaintiff 's Part divers objections or rather declamations were
made : 1. That from the time of the making of the act of 13 Edw .
1, c . 1, de Donis Conditionalibus, till Taltarum 's Case , 12 Edw . 4, 19,
there was no opinion that a recovery against the tenant in tail with
voucher over would bind the estate tail on the pretense of a feigned
recompence ; but 12 E . 4 it was newly invented , and never before that
time imagined by any of the sages of the law , in so many generations
and ages incurred after the said act. 2. Although the donor cannot
restrain the common recovery after it is suffered and executed (because
then the reversion or remainder is barred , & c . ) yet (as it was agreed
on the other side ) he may restrain the conclusion and agreement to
Buffer , and so prevent the bar by the recovery , and preserve his remainder
or reversion . 3. Such recoveries are by divers acts of parliament
marked and branded with the blemish of fiction and falsity , as in 34
H . 8, c. 20 , they are styled feigned and untrue recoveries ; and so in
11 I . 7 , c . 20 ; 32 H . 8 , c . 31 ; 14 Eliz. c. 8, & c. And therefore it
stands with law and reason to provide for the preservation of reversions
and remainders against such feigned , false , and covinous recoveries .
4 . That this opinion that a common recovery cannot be restrained by
condition or limitation was new and of late invention , and never heard
of before , Sir Anthony Mildmay 's Case , 6 Coke 40a (post - ). For it
was admitted to be restrained in the Case of the Earl of Arundel ( 17
Eliz .) , Dyer 242 , 243 ; where the said earl in the time of Queen Mary
gave the manor of Haselber Bryan , in the county of Dorset , by indenture ,
to Thomas ( late Earl of Northumberland ) and to the heirs males of his
body, upon condition that if said earl or the heirs male of his body
issuing (among others ) shall suffer any to recover against them , or
shall discontinue ; and in the argument of Scholastica 's Case (12 Eliz . )
Plow . Com . 403 [post - ] the said point of restraint of a common
recovery was never moved.
And therefore it was thought to stand with the honor and gravity
of the court, that this point had been so often argued at the bar ; and
therefore , tow the sergeants said that it was ripe for judgment after
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such mature deliberation . And in this case all the said objections were
confuted , and thereby the point in judgment confirmed .
As to the first, two questions were moved and resolved : 1, that judg
ment given against a tenant in tail with voucher and recompenee in
value , would bind the estate tail , notwithstanding the said act of 13
Edw . 1, c . 1, be the recovery upon good title or not ; 2, that the judgment
given in such case for the tenant in tail to have in value, would bind the
estate tail , although no recompense be had .
And therefore as to the first of these questions : It appears
by our books, that the opinion that a recovery against tenant in tail
with voucher would bar an estate tail , and was not restrained by the
statute de Donis Conditionalibus was not newly invented in 12 E .
4, but often affirmed for law by the most knowing of the law that ever
were ; for Sir Wm . Thirning in the time of Hen . 4 , C . J . of the Com . Pl.,
enno 12 Hen . 4 , 13 b , saith that the most learned of the law that ever
were , were in the reign of Edward 3, which also were near the making
of the statute . Let us see then how the law was held in their days on this
point . By 15 Ed . 3, Brief 324 , by recovery in value by the tenant in tail
the estate tail is barred , and he shall have a formedon of the land so
recovered in value. And therewith agrees 42 Ed. 3, 53 ; for there it is
held that in some case a man shall have a writ of formedon of land which
was never given - as if tenements in tail be lost , and the tenant in tail
recover other land in value , the issue shall have a formedon of the land
recovered in value, and yet that land was not given . In Octavian
Lombard ' s Case , 44 Edw . 3, 21, 22 , tenant in tail grants a rent charge
to one in consideration that the grantee having right to the land in tail
releases to him , it shall bind the issue in tail . In Jeffery Bencher 's
Case , 48 Edw . 3, 11 b , a recovery in value by tenant in tail shall bind
the tail , and a formedon lies of the land recovered in value ; and there
with agree 1 Ed . 4 , 5 ; 5 Ed. 4, 2b . And that also appears by the like
cases : For if a tenant in tail aliens with warranty , and leaves assets to
descend it is a bar to the issue , by reason of the warranty and assets
descended ; but neither the warranty without the assets , nor the warranty
and assets without judgment in a formedon shall bar the estate tail *
* * ; and therewith agree Temp. Ed. 1, tit. Garr . 89 ; 34 Ed. 1, tit Gart .
8
8 ; 11 Ed . 2 , ti
t
. Garr . 83 ; Hen . Sommer ' s Case , 4 Ed . 3 , 24 ; 3 Ed . 4 ,
1
4 ; 40 Ed . 3 , 9 ; 14 Hen . 4 , 39a ; 24 Hen . 8 , Br . Tail 33 ; 4 Mary , Dyer
139 . And in the case of a common recovery there is a judgment against
the tenant in tail , and another judgment against the vouchee to have in
value ; and therefore these resolutions and opinions o
f
law produced the
judgment in T 'altarum ' s Case , 12 Ed . 4 , which was not of any new inven




times after the said act until 12 Ed . 4 ; and the judges of the law
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times after the said act, gave judgment that in such case the estate tail
should be barred . * * *
As to the second objection , it is absurd to say , that the recovery
itself cannot be prohibited by any condition or limitation and yet that
the conclusion and agreement to suffer a recovery shall be prohibited ;
and such condition to prohibit a conclusion or agreement savors of a
new device or invention ; for till now of late , none ever heard of any
condition or limitation to prohibit goings about, nor any conclusion or
agreement, but they are altogether unknown to the law . And therefore
the said act of Westm . 2 [ c. 1 ], reciting the said mischief , saith : per
factum tamen et feoffamentum eorum quibus tenementum fuit datum
sub conditione exclusi fuerunt, & c . So that the makers of the said act
ought to be taxed with great ignorance , and that the act was not neces
sary , if the going about or conclusion to alien might have been prohib
ited ; for then when a man had made a gift to one and the heirs of his
body , he might have added the condition that if the donee in tail at the
common law after the donation had gone about or concluded to alien ,
that then the donor should re -enter, and so have preserved his possibility
of reverter . * * *
As to the third objection and aspersion of a scandal upon common
recoveries , which is one of the main pillars which supports the estates
and inheritances of the kingdom , it was answered that there was never
anything by the wisdom of man so well devised , or so surely established
upon law and reason , which the wit and craft of those who are subtle
and wicked has not abused . * * * In the great case betwixt T . Ver
non and Sir . Ed . Herbert , which was argued by learned counsel before
the lords in parliament , there Hoord , an utter barrister of counsel with
Vernon , who was barred by a common recovery , rashly and with great ill
will inveighed against common recoveries , not knowing the reason and
foundation o
f
them ; who was with great gravity and some sharpness re
proved by Sir James Dyer , then chief justice o
f
the common pleas ; who
said h




the law , who durst speak




itances , and founded upon great reason and authority ; sed non omnis
capit hoc verbum . And as to Scholastica ' s Case , I respect much the
reporter , and attribute due honor and reverence to the judges who argued
in the case ; but amicus Plato , amicus Socrates , sed magis amica veritas ;
for the resolution in the said case is founded upon two authorities in law
(one 29 Assize p
l
. 17 , and the other in Fitzh . Nat . Brev . 201 , c . ) , which
authorities being duly considered do not warrant the collection or con
clusion which is made upon them arguendo in the said case , but to say
the truth the contrary . * * *
The Rule in Shelley ' s Case .
ABEL ' S CASE in Common Pleas , Mich . term , 18 Edw . II . - A . D . 13254
Year -books (Maynard ) 18 Edw . II , f . 577 . Abridged .
John Abel , having two sons , Walter and John , purchased the manor
THE RULE IN SHELLEY 'S CASE . 63
of Fortysgray in Kent ; to hold to himself and Matilda his wife , and
Walter Abel , his eldest son , and to the heirs of the body of Walter be
gotten ; and , if Walter died without heir of his body , the manor should re
main to the right heirs of John the father . Matilda , the wife , died ; and
Walter , the son , also died without heir of his body . John , the father, be
came bound in a statute merchant to pay £100 to B . at a day certain ; and
died , leaving his younger son John his heir. After the day of payment
was elapsed the creditor sued out a writ to the sheriff of Kent, to extend
and deliver to him all the lands which John Abel the father had , on the
day of acknowledging the statute . The sheriff returns , that he had deliv
ered to other creditors upon recognizances all the lands which John Abel
had in fee , except the manor of Fortysgray , in which he had only an estate
for term of life . Upon this return it was argued , that John the father
had only the freehold for term of life , the fee simple being limited to his
heirs , who therefore took by purchase and not by descent . But the court
held the contrary ; for which this reason (among others) is given by
Stonor , J . vi
z
. , because otherwise the fee and the right after the death of
Walter , the eldest son , would have been in nobody . And therefore Bere









Grandfather , father , and son ; and land held of the king in capite b
y
knight -service was given to the grandfather for life , remainder to the
father for life , remainder to the son for life , remainder to the right heirs
o
f
the grandfather , father , and son . The grandfather died , and the ques
tion was whether the father should sue livery ; and the opinion of the




son had the fe
e
-simple b
y survivorship and not b
y
descent .
BRETT V . RIGDEN , in Common Bench , Trinity term , 10 Eliz . - A . D . 1568
1 Plowd . Com . 340 - 346 .
[ Abridged statement o
f
facts . Replevin b
y
Thomas Brett against
John Rigden , for three cows taken Dec . 5 , 6 Eliz . , in Linnets and Col
nets a
t Kingsnoth in Kent . Defendant pleaded that Giles Brett , being
seized in fee o
f
1
0 acres called Clatches -farm , in Kingsnoth , held b
y
fealty only , made his will in writing June 15 , 1556 , by which he devised




elsewhere in Kent ; and afterwards H . Clerk ,
being seized in fee o
f
1
2 acres in Kingsnoth , held by fealty only , made
feoffment o
f it to said Giles Brett and his heirs ; and afterwards said
Henry Brett had issue Thomas Brett and afterwards died , April 19 ,
1559 , in the lifetime o
f
said Giles Brett ; who afterwards said in the
presence o
f
said Thomas and others that said Thomas should be heir
to said Giles , and should have the lands which said Henry would have
had b
y
said will had he survived said Giles ; and afterwards said Giles ,
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being still seized of all said lands, died , without issue , Oct. 1, 1561 ;
and afterwards said Thomas entered on said lands by authority of said
will and said saying of said Giles , and being so seized , demised the said
lands to the defendant herein for term of two years, Oct . 1, 1562 ; by
virtue of which the defendant entered , and being so possessed , found
the said cows on the said lands eating the grass and doing damage ,
wherefore he took the cattle , and justly , & c. Upon this the plaintiff
demurred ; and three points were argued : 1, whether the will included
the 12 acres purchased by the devisor after he made his will ; 2, whether
Thomas could take by virtue of the devise to Henry and his heirs, he
being heir of Henry ; 3, whether the devisor 's saying that Thomas should
be his heir and have the lands availed Thomas. Loveless for the plaint
if
f . Manwood for the defendant . ]
As to the first point , Manwood held , that b
y
the words in the devise
o
f all his lands and tenements , as well the 12 acres as the 10 acres should
pass . For , he said , it is to be presumed that no subject o
f
this realm
is misconusant of the law whereby he is governed . For ignorance o
f
the law excuses none , and for as much as in indifferent matters , every
one shall b
e presumed to know the law according to his duty , from
thence it follows that in a last will , it shall be presumed that every man
is conusant o
f that which the law has ordained touching the same , viz . ,




effect until the death o
f
the testator , a
t
which time only




the testator the will is consum
ate , and that which is written in his lifetime is of no force , but the
precedent death alone makes the will effectual . The words of the will
therefore are to be considered , and here we ought to put such construc
tion upon them a
s
the precedent death o
f
the testator permits and





his will is subsequent , which ought to be made in such
manner a
s if the words had been spoken at the last instant of his life ,
and a
s
if the testator himself had expressed in what manner they should
be construed after his death . And then when he gave to another all
his lands and tenements and well knew that the word all must receive
some construction and exposition after his death , it shall be taken for
“ all that he had a
t
the last instant o
f
his life , " a
t
which time his death
commenced ; for before this last instant the will does not take effect ,
nor shall the words be adjudged to be spoken , and it shall be presumed
that he knew the law to be so . And so it shall be taken that he gave all
his lands and tenements which he had at the time when his life ended
and his death commenced ; and it shall be presumed that his intent was
such , forasmuch as he shall not be deemed misconusant of the time when
the law adjudges wills to take effect . So that the testator shall not
be intended misconusant o
f
the law in this point , and neither the date
o
f
the will nor the time o
f
its being written is to be considered , inas
much as that time is not material nor gives essence to the will . And
therefore if a man makes his will the 1st day of May , and thereby gives
to another the manor o
f
Dale in fee -simple , and the 10th day of May
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one of the tenancies escheats to the manor , and the 20th day of May
the devisor dies, now the devisee shall have the tenancy escheated , fo
r
the will takes effect at the time o
f
his death , a
t
which time it was parcel
o
f
the manor ; and yet if we should only regard the date of the will ,
and expound it according to that time , and not according to the time
o
f the death , the tenancy escheated should not pass , for then the devisor
had no estate in it ; but the date is not to be considered . For if a feme
sole makes her will the 1st day of May and gives land thereby , and after
wards , the 10th day o
f May , she takes husband , who dies the 20th day
o
f May , and afterwards the woman dies the 30th day o
f May , the
devise is good ; and yet if it should be considered according to the time
o
f
the date , the will would be countermanded b
y
the espousals ; but it
is not so , for it does not take effect until her death , at which time she
was discovert , as she was at the time of making the will , and the inter
marriage shall not countermand that which was o
f
n
o effect in her life






his lands and tenements n
o exception was intended . So
that the latitude of the devisor ' s intent appears from the latitude of the
words . For if a man makes his will the 1st day of May , and thereby
h
e
devises to another all his plate , and he buys more plate the 10th
day o







his death , for the largeness o
f
the
words declares his intent to be that they shall be taken beneficially for
the devisee . So here the devise of all hi
s
lands and tenements implies a
large and benevolent intent towards the devisee , and therefore as well
the 1
2 acres a
s the 10 acres shall pass to the devisee . And he said many
other things to enforce this point .
But Loveless and all the JUSTICES argued to the contrary . For the
making o
f
a testament consists o
f
three parts , as do all other human
acts which are done with discretion , viz . , inception , progression , and
consummation . Inception is the writing o
f
the testament , and this is
the first part ; progression is the publication o
f
it , in which it commences ,
and this is the second part ; the death o
f
the testator is the consumma
tion o
f
the will , and this is the third part , which being done , the act
has its perfection . But there is one same thing annexed to each o
f
these parts , and that is the intent of the party ; for every one who does
any act with discretion has an intent in the inception o
f
it , for no man
begins a thing but to some end o
r purpose . And in the progression
and consummation o
f
it the same intent also subsists , so that one same
intent runs through all the parts , and continues in the doing of them .
Then when Giles Brett wrote his will , and thereby gave al
l
his lands
and tenements , and at that time he had no more than 10 acres , what
was his intent therein ? Certainly no other but that the devisee should
hare those 10 acres ; and when he afterwards purchased 12 acres more ,
it could not possibly be his intent that those should pass , for there is
nothing in the will that intimates such intent , and it is to be presumed






the time when the will
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was written and published . So that he could not have any intent to give
that which he had not, nor was there any presumption that he would
afterwards have them . And therefore in the commencement of the
will there does not appear to be any kind of intent that the 12 acres
should pass, and when he published that which was written as his will ,
and that too before the purchase of the 12 acres, this publication carries
with it the same intent which the testator had in the commencement
of the will, and therefore it is as void of any intent to pass the 12 acres
as the commencement was, and when he died , whereby the will became
consummate , that consummation was agreeable and consonant to the
first intent . For if the commencement of the will should have one
intent, and the consummation of it another, then would it be consum
mate in that which was never intended at the beginning , which is inco
herent and incongruous in itself , and by no means agreeable with acts
of discretion , and therefore it shall not be so taken here . For which
reason the intent of the testator , which subsisted in the making of
the will, and in the publication of it , and in its consummation , excludes
the devisee from having the 12 acres . And Loveless said that testa
mentum est testatio mentis , and of these two words it is compounded ; but
here there does not appear any evidence of his mind (which is no other
than his intent ) that the 12 acres should pass. And to prove that the
commencement is to be regarded in wills , he put this case , viz ., if a
feme covert makes her will and thereby gives land devisable by the com
mon law , and publishes her will, and afterwards her husband dies , and
after that she dies , the devise shall be void , because the consummation
is founded upon the first parts , viz ., the making and publishing , which
are void , and yet at the time of her death she was discovert , but the
death cannot give effect to the will , unless the commencement be good .
So it is if an infant makes a will and publishes it and dies at full age ,
it is of no effect , causa qua supra . Wherefore , the commencement and
intent is to be respected in all acts . * * * But if after the purchase
of the 12 acres he had newly published the will , there perhaps it would
have been otherwise, for by the new publication it shall be taken to be
his intent that all which the words contain at the time of the publication
should pass , and the words contain that the devisee should have a
ll
that
the devisor then had . But he said if a man devises land in certain , as
the manor o
f
Dale , or Whiteacre , and has nothing in it at the time of
making the will , and afterwards he purchases it , there it shall pass
to the devisee : for it shall be taken that it was his intent to purchase it ,
and if it should not pass , the will would be void to all intents . But
in our case when the devisor had 10 acres and he gave al
l
his lands , the
words a
ll
his lands are satisfied in the passing o
f
the 10 acres , and so they
shall take effect ; and a
s
to the other 12 acres , there are no words which
show his intent to extend them , as there are when the thing is particu
larly named , as the manor o
f
Dale , or Whiteacre ; so that there is a plain





2 [ c . 1 ] and 34 Hen . VIII [ c . 5 ) it was intended that
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the devisor should be seized of the lands devised at the time of making
the will, for the words are, that every person having or that after the
act shall have any lands or tenements , & c ., shall have full and free lib
erty to devise them by his testament, & c. ; wherefore , inasmuch as the
devisor had not the 12 acres at the time of making the will , it is out
of the words of the act. And he and all the other justices were of
opinion that the 12 acres should not pass .
As to the second point Manwood said , that although Henry, the de
visee, died in the life of the devisor, yet the devise should not be void ,
but should vest in the heir of the devisee , who was included in the
devise ; for when the devise was to Henry and to his heirs , it was the
will of the devisor that the heir should have it. But perhaps it may be
objected that it was his intent that the heir should not have it imme
diately but mediately , viz ., by descent. Possibly he did intend that the
heir should have it mediately , nevertheless his intent was that he should
have it some way or other , and if he cannot have it immediately he shall
not have it at all ; and to say so , would be more contrarient to the will
of the devisor than to say that he should have it immediately , for the
one way he should not have it at all, and the other way he should have
it , but not in the same form . And in wills the intent or effect is more
to be regarded than the form ; for the effect is , that the heir shall have
it , and the form of the limitation is that he shall have it by descent . And
sooner than the form and effect shall perish altogether, the effect shall
take place , and the form shall perish , which is more agreeable to the
will of the devisor and to sound reason . As if a man devises land to
A for life, the remainder in tail to B and A dies in the life of the de
visor, B shall take it in tail, and yet the words and intent of the devisor
were that B should not take the land in possession immediately , but
should have the remainder in tail therein , and that A should have the
possession ; but inasmuch as by the act of God he cannot take it in that
manner, he shall take it as he may , vi
z
. , the possession immediately in
tail , so that the effect shall be fulfilled although the form is not . So if
one devises land to the wife of J . S . , J . S . dies , she takes to husband J .
D . , and afterwards the devisor dies , she shall take the land , and yet she is
not the wife o
f
J . S . when the devisor dies , nor shall she take it as his
wife , but the intent was that she who was the wife o
f




f making the will should have it ; so that the effect shall be performed ,
although the formal part is not strictly adhered to . And if a man
devises land to Alexander Nowel , Dean o
f
Paul ' s and to the chapter
there and to their successors , and Alexander Nowel dies , and a new dean
is made , and afterwards the devisor dies , the land shall vest in the new
dean and chapter , and yet it does not vest according to the words , but
according to the intent ; for the chief intent was to convey it to the
dean and chapter and to their successors forever , and the single person
o
f Alexander Nowel was not the principal cause , though perhaps it was
one o
f
the causes . So here , the effect o
f
the gift was , that the land
should continue in the heirs of Henry Brett forever , and not in him









only , for he could not have the land longer than for his life . And there




the gift , yet the continuance
o
f
the land from heir to heir forever is the principal cause and intent
o
f
the devise . And if a man make feoffment upon condition to enfeoff
two in fee a
t
such a time , and before the time one of them dies , the
feoffment ought to be made to the survivor only and to his heirs , because
o
f
the intent which appears in the condition . And if a man ' s intent
in a condition shall be so much pursued where the words cannot be
performed , a fortiori in a will the intent shall be observed where the
words cannot . And in 21 Rich . II , Fitz . Abr . Devise 27 , land was de





. Andrew in Holborn , and after the death of the tenants for life
the parson o
f
the church sued an ex gravi querela , and it was pleaded
in judgment that the remainder did not take effect because the church
was not persona capax , and upon this it was demurred , and adjudged
that the devise was good and that the parson should have execution ,
and yet the parson was not named in the devise , but he was compre
hended in it . So is the heir here , for which causes it seemed to him
that the land should vest in the heir , And o
f
this opinion also was
WALSH , justice , as to this point .
But Loveless , sergeant , and all the other JUSTICES argued to the con
trary . For it is a principle in the law that in a
ll gifts , whether they be
by devise o
r
otherwise , there ought to be a donee in esse who has power
and capacity to take the thing given at the time when it ought to vest .
For if there be none such in rerum natura when the thing ought to vest ,
the gift shall be void . And here the thing ought not to vest in the de
visee until the death o
f
the devisor , a
t
which time the devisee was dead ,
and so not in rerum natura . And as to the heirs being named in the gift ,
viz . , to Henry Brett and to his heirs , for which reason it is alleged that
they shall be contained and included in the intent o
f
the devisor , they
said that the heirs are not named there to take immediately but only
to express the quantity o
f
estate which Henry should have . For the
devisor could not properly make an estate o
f
fee simple in the devisee
without mentioning his heirs . So that heirs are there named only to
make a fee simple in Henry and in none other , and not to the intent
to make any other than Henry take an estate b
y
them ; and they are
there put to make the devisee able as well to alien the land to another
a
s
to suffer it to descend to his heir ; for the descent to the heirs is but
a thing subsequent to the estate o
f
fee simple vested first in Henry
Brett the devisee , and a thing at the pleasure o
f
the devisee . And it is .
by no means a just conclusion that because the land should have d
e
scended to the heir o
f Henry if it had first vested in Henry , that there
fore the heir o
f Henry shall take it immediately , inasmuch as his father
died in the life of the devisor . For b
y
the same way o
f reasoning it
might be said that if Henry had died without heir , the lord should have
had the land b
y
escheat , and that the wife o
f Henry should have the
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in Henry ; and every other conclusion might be made a cause to vest
the land in others , as well as the descent to vest the land in the heir .
And by the same reason also it might be said that if a man devises a
lease or goods to J . S., who dies, and afterwards the devisor dies, the
executors of J. S . shall have them , which most certainly is not law ,
for they shall not have them . So that al
l
these things which would
follow by conclusion if the estate had first vested are not good causes
to make things vest in others than in them only to whom they are lim
ited . For which reason al
l
the justices except Walsh were o
f opinion
that the land should not vest in Thomas Brett the son .
And as to the third point , al
l
the justices unanimously argued and
agreed , that the devisor ' s saying to Thomas Brett the son , that he should
b
e his heir , and should have all the lands and tenements which said
Henry should have had b
y
his last will if he had survived the devisor
was o
f
no effect in law , and that no regard ought to be given to it inas
much a




[ c . 1 ] and 34 Henry VIII ( c . 5 ] gave liberty and authority to every
one to devise his lands by his last will in writing . In which case all
that can make the devise effectual ought to be in writing . And if the
rest which is in writing is not sufficient to make the land pass without
the words spoken to Thomas the son , then it follows that the substantial
matter which should make the land pass is not written but rests in words
only , and is not within the statute ; for no will is within the statute but
that which is in writing , which is as much as to say that al
l
that is
effectual and to the purpose must be in writing , without seeking aid of
words not written . And herein all the justices agreed .
Wherefore , inasmuch as Thomas Brett the plaintiff has sued a replevin
o
f his cattle taken and the defendant has not shown a good right o
r
title
in himself to take them , because he has not shown a good right or title
in Thomas Brett the son , who was his lessor and who is a stranger to
Thomas Brett the plaintiff ( for if the title o
f
his lessor is not good , the
title o
f himself , being lessee , cannot be good ) , and inasmuch as his title
is bad and insufficient for the reasons above shown , the justices awarded
the same Trinity term in which they now argued , that the plaintiff
should recover his damages . [ The judgment for the plaintiff follows . ]
HARTOPP ' S CASE , in Court of Wards , Trinity , 33 Eliz . — A . D . 1592 - Cro .
Eliz . 243 .
Elizabeth devised lands to several to use o
f
Thomas , her brother , and
the heirs male of his body , and in default of such issue , to the heirs female
o
f
his body , remainders over . Thomas died before the testatrix , leaving
a daughter and his wife enceinte with a son born before the testatrix died .
Should the son , daughter , or neither have the land ?
Upon argument it was ruled by WRAY and ANDERSON , Chief Justices ,
KINGSMILL and MORRIS , Surveyor and Attorney of the court of wards ,
that neither o
f
them should have the land ; for it being devised to the use
o
f
Thomas , and he dying before the devisor , this cannot vest in the heir ,
for it never vested in the ancestor ; for the word "heirs " is not to give the
immediate estate , but by way of limitation ; and if this shall vest in the heir
it shall vest in him as a purchaser , which was not the intent of the devisor ,
and so it shall be void .
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SHELLEY ' S CASE , in B . R ., Trinity , 23 Eliz . - A . D . 1581 . 1 Coke 93b , 1
Anderson 69 , Moor 136 , 3 Dyer 373 , Abridged from 1 Coke 93b .
Nicholas Wolfe brought ejectione firmae of land in Sussex against
Henry Shelley , declaring on a lease to him by Richard Shelley . Plea
not guilty. It was found by special verdict that Edward Shelley and
Joan , his wife , being seised of the land in question , in special tail , to
them and the heirs of their two bodies , Joan died , leaving by him two
sons, Richard , the younger , under whom the plaintiff claims , and Henry ,
defendant 's father, who died before defendant was born . After Henry 's
(Sr.) death Edward convenanted by indenture to suffer a recovery
to his own use for life , then to the use of one Carill and others for 24
years , then to the use of the heirs male of the body of said Edward ,
with remainder in tail over . Said Edward died while the land was in
possession of a tenant for years , and later on the same day the said
recovery passed with a voucher over , and , immediately after judgment
given habere facias seisinam was awarded and ten days later the recovery
was executed . Edward died Oct. 9t
h , A . D . 1553 , and Henry , the defend
ant , was not born till Dec . 4th following . After the death of said
Edward said Richard entered and leased to the plaintiff , on whom
defendant entered and ejected him .
The principal questions in the case were four : 1 , whether execution
may b
e
sued against the issue in tail if the tenant in tail suffers a com
mon recovery with voucher over and dies before execution ; 2 , whether the
reversion is in the recoverer presently by the judgment before execution
sued when a recovery is suffered while a tenant for years is in possession ;
3 , whether the entry b
y Henry was lawful under the facts o
f
this case ,
and this was the great doubt in the case ; and , 4 , whether Richard may
take as a purchaser in this case , for a
s much as the elder brother





the time of the execution o
f
the recovery .
Anderson , queen ' s sergeant , and Gaudy and Fenner , sergeants , for the
plaintiff , argued , that , this use originally vested in Richard Shelley , and
never vested in Edward Shelley ; and therefore it vested in Richard b
y
purchase , for that which originally vests in the heir and was never in
the ancestor always vests in the heir b
y
purchase . That the use never





the recoverers , which could not arise during his life , for it was not
executed during his life . This case is like the case in 5 Edw . 4 , 6a ,





6 R . 2 , a son is afterwards born , he shall never
devest it , fo
r
it vested in the daughter b
y
purchase ; so in the case agreed
in 9 Hen . 7 , 25a , if a lease be made to one for life , the remainder to the
right heirs of J . S . , if J . S . dies leaving a daughter , his wife with child
with a son , the daughter claims it by purchase , and therefore the son
born afterwards shall never devest it . But they relied principally upon
the case in 9 Hen . 7 , 25a , that if a condition descends to a daughter ,
and she enters for the condition broken , the son born afterwards shall
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never enter upon her , and yet there she is in by descent and has the
condition and right of entry as heir, which is a stronger case than ours.
It was further argued that the manner of the limitation of the use
ought to be observed in this case , for it is to the heirs male of the body
of Edward and the heirs male of the body of said heirs male . If heirs
male of the body of Edward should be words of limitation , then the
subsequent words would be void , for words of limitation cannot be added
to words of limitation , but to words of purchase ; and such construction
is always to be made of a deed that all the words , if possible , agreeable
to reason and conformable to law , may take effect according to the intent
of the parties . If a man makes a feoffment in fee to the use of himself
for life , and after his decease to the use of his heirs , the fee simple is
executed ; but if the limitation be to the use of himself for life, and after
his decease to the use of his heirs and their heirs female of their bodies ,
his heirs in this case are words of purchase and not of limitation , for
then the subsequent words would be void .
Therefore they concluded that no use could arise till execution sued ,
and then it vested in Richard as purchaser before defendant was born
as heir of the elder son ; and admitting the recovery had been executed
the use first settled in Richard as a mere purchaser .
Popham , solicitor general , Cowper and Coke , for the defendant. Ex
ecution could not be sued against the issue in tail. He who vouches shall
never have execution against the vouchee before execution sued against
him ; so that the judgment to recover over in value is notmaterial , as this
case is, unless execution may be sued against the issue , which cannot be
in this case . For he who is in of an estate in possession by title para
mount to a recovery shall not be bound by the same recovery ; and the
issue in tail in our case is in of an estate in possession which he had para
mount the recovery , and therefore he shall not be bound.
For as much as the land was in lease for years , the recovery was exe
cuted by operation of law without execution ; in which there is a differ
ence between lands in possession and lands in lease for years . Because
the recoverer cannot sue execution , the law will adjudge him in execution
presently . Those things which lie in grant pass to the conusee immedi
ately by a fine levied ; and so in case o
f
a common recovery . If the




law , then the estate tail to his
heirs male o
f
his body was in Edward Shelley , and consequently the entry
o
f
the defendant was without doubt lawful .
But if execution may be sued against issue in tail , and if the recov




law in the life o
f
Edward , still the
entry o
f
the defendant was lawful . 1 . If everything be performed with
out laches that the parties could perform , they shall not be prejudiced b
y
those things which the act o
f
God made inevitable . 2 . Where the heir
takes anything which should have vested in the ancestor , then although
it first vests in the heir and never in the ancestor , yet the heir shall take
it in the nature and course of a descent . In the case here the use might
have vested in Edward , and if it had vested in him Richard would have
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taken it by descent, and therefore he ought to take this use in the nature
and course of a descent. Otherwise it is when the remainder is limited
to the right heirs of J . S . & c., for there it begins in the son by name
of purchase , and never could have vested in the brother , as the book ,
9 Hen . 7, 25a , cited on the other side is agreed . So it is in the case of
ravishment , 5 Edw . 4 , 6a , which was cited on the other side.
What is it that governs and directs the use raised after the execution
was had ? The answer is , the indentures . And what is their direction ?
That Edward shall have it, and after his death the heirs male of his
body. But the indentures direct that the heirs male of the body shall
take it by limitation of estate and not by name of purchase , and there
fore Richard ought to have it as heir by limitation of estate and not by
name of purchase ; so the entry by the afterborn son of his elder brother
was lawful.
Admitting the remainder had been limited to the right heirs of the
body of Edward , yet Richard could not have it ; for he must have both
qualities , male and right heir , but the daughter of his elder brother was
right heir , so he could not take by purchase . And so is the opinion of
Ellerker , J ., expressly in 9 Hen . 6 , 24a , if a man makes a lease for life,
remainder to the right heirs female of the body of J . S ., who has issue
a son and daughter and dies ; in this case the daughter shall not take the
remainder , for she is not right heir female .
As to the objection that the limitation was to the heirs male of the
body of Edward and the heirs male of the body of the heirs male , and
80 the heirs male of the body of Edward should be purchasers ; the
defendant 's counsel answered , that it is a rule of law , that , when the
ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold , and in
the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited , either mediately or
immediately , to his heirs , in fee or in tail , that always in such cases,
“ the heirs ” are words of limitation of the estate , and not words of pur
chase . And that appears in 40 Edw . 3, 9a and b, in the Provost of
Beverley 's Case ; in 38 Edw . 3, 31 b ; 24 Edw . 3, 36 b ; 27 Edw . 3, 87 a ;
and in divers other books. So inasmuch as in this case Edward Shelley
took an estate of freehold , and after an estate is limited to his heirs
male of his body, the heirs male of his body must of necessity take by
descent and cannot be purchasers . Otherwise it is where an estate for
years is limited to the ancestor, remainder to another for life, remainder
to the right heirs of the lessee for years ; there his heirs are purchasers .
If the right heirs male should have by purchase to them and their heirs
male , a violence would be done to the words and meaning of the party ,
for then a
ll
the other male issue of the body of Edward would be ex
cluded to take anything b
y




Lastly if Richard should not take in nature and course o
f
descent
he cannot take at all ; for when an estate is made to a man , and after
in the same deed , to limit the quality o
f
the estate , another limitation
is made to his heirs , or to the heirs o
f
his body ; in a
ll
these cases
THE RULE IN SHELLEY ' S CASE .
his heirs or the heirs of his body shall never take as purchasers . In
this case the words " heirs male of the body of Edward Shelley ” were
words of limitation ; and therefore his heir male cannot take as a
purchaser . This proposition is proved by the reason of the book in 40
Assize pl. 19, and by the case put by Littleton § 128 , that if a man
grant a reversion of a seigniory by deed to J . S . and his heirs, and the
grantee dies before attornment , attornment to his heirs is void , for if
it should be good the heir would take by purchase under words of limita
tion in the grant . On the same reason Brett v . Ridgden , Plow . Com .
342 , is a stronger case than this ; for a man devised lands to a man
and his heirs , and the man died before the devisor , and it was adjudged
that the heir should not take by the devise , for in that case the word
" heirs " is not named as a word of purchase , but only to limit the estate
which the devisee should have . So in our case the words heirs male of
the body of Edward Shelley are only to give him an estate tail , and not
to make any other a purchaser ; and therefore Richard cannot claim the
land by purchase .
After the case had been argued , openly and at large, by counsel on
both sides, on three several days, in the queen ’s bench , the queen hear
ing of it ( for such was the rareness and difficulty of the case , being
of importance , that it was generally known ) , of her gracious disposition ,
to prevent long , tedious, and chargeable suits between parties so near
in blood , which would be the ruin of both , being gentlemen of good
and ancient family , directed her gracious letters to Sir Thomas Bromley ,
lord chancellor of England , who was of great and profound knowledge
in the law , thereby requiring him to assemble all the justices of Eng
land before him , and upon conference had between them touching the
questions , to give their resolutions and judgments thereof. And there
upon the lord chancellor , in Easter term , 23 Eliz ., called before him
at his house , called York -house , Sir Christopher Wray , lord chief justice
of England , and al
l
his companions justices o
f
the queen ’ s bench ; Sir




common pleas , and all
his companions justices o
f
the same court ; Sir Roger Manwood , chief
baron o
f
the exchequer , and the barons of the exchequer ; before whom
the questions aforesaid were moved and shortly argued b
y
Fenner ser
jeant for the plaintiff , and by one on the defendant ' s part .
[Opinion o
f
the Judges . ] A
t
this time the lord chancellor was o
f
opinion for the defendant , and openly declared his opinion before al
l
the
justices , that the third question of law was for the defendant , and
therefore the defendant ' s entry upon his uncle was lawful . But the
questions were not resolved at that time , the justices desiring time to
consider . Eight o
r
nine days after in the same term , all the said jus
tices and barons met together in Serjeants ' Inn in Fleet street , for the
resolution o
f
the case , and there it was argued b
y
them shortly ; after
which arguments the justices a
t
that time conferred amongst them
selves , and took further time to consider till the trinity term follow
in
g
. Accordingly at the beginning of trinity term , after great study
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and consideration , al
l
the justices and barons met again in Serjeants '
Inn in Fleet street ; a
t
which time , upon conference amongst themselves ,
all the justices o
f England , the lord chief baron and the barons of the
exchequer , except one o
f
the puisne justices o
f
the common pleas , agreed
that the defendant ' s entry upon the said Richard the uncle was lawful .
Four or five days after their last meeting , one o
f
the defendant ' s coun
sel came to the bar in the queen ' s bench , and moved the justices to
know their resolution in the case , for their resolution was not before
known to the defendant nor his counsel . WRAY , C . J . answered , that
they were resolved , and asked plaintiff ' s counsel if they could say any
more , who answered that they had said as much as they could ; and like
wise asked defendant ' s counsel if they had any new matter to say for
defendant , who said : "No . " And then the chief justice gave judg
ment that the plaintiff take nothing b
y
his bill . Because counsel on
both sides were desirous to know on which o
f
the points their resolu
tion di
d depend , the chief justice openly declared , that as to the first
point the greater part o
f
the justices and barons held that execution
might be sued against the issue in tail , because the right of the estate
tail was bound b
y
the judgment against the tenant in tail , and the
judgment over to have in value . As to the second point , they were all
agreed , that the reversion was not in the recoverers immediately b
y
the
judgment . But he said that al
l
the justices of England and barons o
f




the common pleas , were
agreed a
s
to the third point , vi
z
: that the uncle was in in course and
nature o
f
descent , although he should not have his age , nor be in ward :
( 1 ) because the original act , the recovery , out of which the uses and
estates had their essence , was had in the life of Edward , to which the
execution after had retrospect ; ( 2 ) because the use and possession might
have vested in Edward , if execution had been sued in his life ; ( 3 ) be
cause the recoverers b
y
their entry , nor the sheriff b
y doing the execu
tion , could not make whom they pleased inherit ; and ( 4 ) because the











limitation and not o




that the recovery was good enough , notwithstanding the death
o






his report of this case , Judge Anderson bays Judgment was given for
Henry , and agreed that he should have the land ; but the reason was not published by
the court . Then he adds a note , saying that Coke has now made report in print of
this case with arguments and the agreements of the chancellor and judges , but noth
ing of this was said in the court nor in the report of the judges .
CLERK V . DAY , in B . R . , Hilary , 36 Eliz . - A . D . 1593 . - Cro . Eliz . 313 .
The case on special verdict was , Joan Marsh devised land to Rose ,
her daughter , for life ; and , “ If she marry after my death , and have
heir o
f
her body then lawfully begotten , I will that the heir after my
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daughter 's death shall have the land , and to the heirs of their body be
gotten ; and if my daughter di
e
without issue of her body begotten ,
then Philip shall have it to him and his heirs . " Joan died . Rose mar
ried Silly and had issue . The question was , if Rose had an estate tail
o
r
for life only ?




the judges that a devise to one and the
heir o
f
his body , is an estate tail , and shall g
o
to all the heirs of her
body ; for heir is nomen collectivum , and one can have but one heir
a
t
a time , and this shall go from heir to heir . GAWDY and FENNER ,
JJ . , held that Rose had but an estate for life , for so it is limited by
express words that she shall have for life ; and then her heir shall take
a
s
a purchaser , and it shall not execute in Rose . POPHAM , C . J . , contra ,
for the estate is limited to the ancestor , and after limited to the heir ,
and shall execute in the ancestor ; especially , the words being , " if she
hath any heir , " and therefore intended that any heir should have it . Et
adjournat .
No judgment was entered on the roll , yet Moor (593 ) says the opinion of
the court was given . Hale cites it as such a case in King v . Melling , 1 Ven .
214 , 225 . The true name o
f
this case is Cheat v . Day . See 2 Stra . 804 .
SPARK v . SPARK , begun in C . B . , Mich . 40 & 41 Eliz . - - A . D . 1599 . Croo .
Eliz . 666 .
Ejectione Firmae . Upon special verdict the case was , Nicholas Spark
seised in fee , b
y
indenture let it to William Spark for 80 years , if he
live so long , the remainder after his decease to the executors or assigns
o
f
said William Spark for 40 years . William Spark died intestate ,
his wife (now plaintiff ) took letters o
f
administration , and entered ,
claiming the term . The lessor (now defendant ) ousted her . The sole
question was whether this remainder for 40 years vested in William
Spark , o
r
failed because he had not made any executor .
All the Justices delivered their opinions severally , that this term
vested in William , and that the plaintiff should have it as administratrix
to him , and it should be assets in her hands ; for the intention o
f
the
lessor appears , that the executors or assigns o
f




the word " assigns ” it is intended that William may dispose and
make a
n assignment thereof ; and therefore it vested in him , and shall
g
o
to his executors or administrators as assigns in law , and as a thing
which came to them from their testator , and not as a perquisite b
y
themselves . WALMSLEY , J . , said it never yet was questioned b
y
any ,
that if these two terms had been in one clause , but that they should
hare vested in William as if it had been habendum for 80 years , if he
lived so long , and for 40 years after his decease to his executors . But
it is here demised to William for 80 years , if he live so long , remainder
to his executors for 40 years ; yet notwithstanding it is a
ll
one , and the
executor shall have it as executor , and it shall be assets in his hands ,
it being in the testator to dispose o
f
. And it was afterwards adjudged
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accordingly . In this case WALMSLEY , J ., said , the difference betwixt
this case and Cranmer ' s Case , 14 Eliz ., Dyer 309 , Moore 100 , is be
cause it is there limited by way of use , and by the party himself, so
he shows his own intent that it should not vest in himself , but in his
executors . But here the limitation is by a stranger , wherein there is
not any intention appears , but that it should vest in the lessee him
self. And by this difference all the books are reconciled .
GOODRIGHT V. PULLIN , in King 's Bench , Mich ., 13 Geo . I . - A . D . 1727
2 Strange 729 , 2 L . Raym . 437 .
Special verdict in ejectment on this devise : “ I, Nicholas Lisle , give and
bequeath unto my wife al
l
that my messuage or tenement called Hatters
field , to hold for the term of her natural life , and after her decease , then
to my kinsman Nicholas Lisle , for and during the term o
f
his natural





Nicholas lawfully to be begotten and his heirs forever ; but in case the
said Nicholas die without such heir male , then I give and bequeath the
said premises unto my kinsman Edward Lisle , for and during his natural
life , and after his decease to the heirs males o
f
his body lawfully be
gotten and his heirs forever , " and for default of such heir male , remainder
over . Edward Lisle , the lessor o
f
the plaintiff claims as heir male to
Edward Lisle the remainder man in the will , supposing this to be only
a
n
estate for life to Nicholas , and that therefore a recovery suffered b
y
him and Mary (the widow ) could not bar the remainders . The defend
ant claims a
s
heir in fee to Nicholas .
Bootle , for the plaintiff , argued , that it appeared plainly to be the in
tention o
f
the devisor , that Nicholas should take an estate for life only ;
for the premises are expressly limited to him for life ; and if the testator
had intended him an estate tail , why is this restriction ?
RAYMOND , C . J . It will be a difficult thing to make this an estate for
life ; and the case of King v . Melling , ( 1 Vent . 225 , 2 Lev . 58 ) answers
all the objections as to the limitation to Nicholas for life . The word
issue is a proper word o
f purchase , but the word heirs is always a word o
f
limitation ; and the word heirs being used in this case , the words after
his decease are o
f
n
o force . The words heirs and heirs male are nomina
collectiva , and include all the heirs o
f
the devisee , and in Archer ' s Case
it was the word next which confined it to one particular person , for with
out that word , it would have been a limitation , and not a purchase . The
word his is the word which makes the difficulty in this case ; but I think
that it may very properly be referred to Nicholas himself . Suppose
Nicholas had had several sons ; if the eldest had been made a purchaser
by this will , the other sons could not have taken ; and there must be
stronger words than these to control the words heirs male and make them
words of purchase . I therefore think this clearly to be an estate tail in
Nicholas . FORTESCUE , REYNOLDS , and PROBYN , JJ . , of the same opin
ion ; and judgment was given for the defendant b
y
the whole court .
THE RULE IN SHELLEY ' S CASE . 77
PERRIN V. BLAKE , in the English Court of Exchequer Chamber . - A . D .
1771 . - Hargrave ' s Law Tracts 489 , 10 English Ruling Cases 689.
This is a feigned action of trespass brought in the Court of King's
Bench by Perrin and Vaughan , as surviving trustees for Sarah , the
widow of John Williams , against Hannah Blake , for forcibly entering a
plantation in Jamica , with videlicet to lay the action in Middlesex . De
fendant pleaded not guilty as to the force and claimed title under the will
mentioned below . Plaintiffs replied setting up the will at length and
alleging a common recovery suffered by John Williams as tenant in tail
under the will and a subsequent conveyance by him to the plaintiffs . To
this defendant demurred . From a judgment for defendant in the Court
of King 's Bench (See 4 Burrow 2579 , 1 Wm . Blackstone 672 ) , plaintiffs
bring the case here by writ of error . Reversed .
This action was brought at the suggestion of the committee of the
King 's Privy Council to obtain an adjudication by the courts of West
minster Hall upon the point arising on the will mentioned below in
volved in an appeal before the Privy Council from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals of the Island of Jamaica affirming a judgment of the
Supreme Court of Judicature at St. Jago , Jamaica , in favor of defendant
in an action of ejectment by the plaintiffs herein against the defendant
herein . The committee advised that this course be pursued because Lord
Mansfield , who was the only law lord then attending the Council , pre
ferred that a question of so much importance on the land titles of all
England should not be decided by his sole opinion .
The facts involved in the ejectment suit were these : William Will .




a plantation in that island ,
and having one son and three daughters , duly executed his will bearing
date March 13 , 1722 . On February 4 , 1723 , the testator died , leaving
issue John Williams his only son and heir , and the three daughters
named in the will . His wife died March 1 , 1723 . In February , 1743 ,
John came o
f age ; and conceiving himself to be seised in fee tail under
the will o
f
his father , he immediately made such conveyance of the de
vised plantation in Jamaica as b
y
the law o
f that island is equivalent to
8 common recovery here . In March following John Williams executed
& settlement in pursuance o
f marriage articles made whilst he was under
age : and b
y
this settlement the plantation entailed b
y
his father ' s will
was conveyed to trustees and their heirs to the uses following : namely , to
the use o
f
John Williams for life ; remainder to the use of trustees , dur
ing his life , to preserve contingent remainders ; remainder to the use and
intent that Sarah , his wife , if she survived him , might receive out of the
premises , during he
r
life , a clear yearly rent charge of £1000 , British
money , payable at the Royal Exchange , London , quarterly , with powers
o
f
distress and entry ; and subject to this rent - charge to the use of John
Sharpe , William Perrin and Thomas Vaughan , their executors , admin
istrators , and assigns for 400 years , for securing the rent - charge ; re
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his wife, successively in tail male ; remainder to John Williams in fee .
Dec. 31, 1744 , John Williams died without issue, leaving Sarah his
widow , and his two sisters , Bonella , the wife of Norwood Wilter , and
Hannah , the wife of Benjamin Blake , his co -heirs , Anna , the other sister ,
having died unmarried in his lifetime. In 1745 , immediately after the
death of John Williams , the husbands of his two surviving sisters and
co -heirs in their right entered into the plantation so devised and settled
and became seised . The wife of Wilter died , leaving William Wilter her
son and heir ; and Benjamin Blake also died , leaving the said Hannah
his widow . Both William Wilter and Hannah Blake controverted the
validity of the jointure of £1000 a year to Mrs . Williams the widow , on
the ground, that her deceased husband John Williams was a mere ten
ant for life under the will of his father , and therefore could not bar the
entail thereby created . Perrin and Vaughan , ( the surviving trustees of
the term of 400 years ) , brought the action of ejectment mentioned above,
to try this point.
The feigned case was several times argued before the Court of Ex
chequer Chamber and lastly in May 1771. After several months the
judges of the Exchequer Chamber disposed of the case , each delivering a
separate opinion as follows : For reversal : Lord Chief Justice Parker ,
Mr. Baron Adams , Mr. Baron Perrott and the Justices Nares , Black
stone and Gould . For affirmance : Lord Chief Justice De Grey . The
following opinion of Mr . Justice Blackstone , according to Mr. Hargrave ,
is generally accepted as expressing the reason of the decision in the Ex
chequer Chamber :
BLACKSTONE , J . Upon the fullest consideration which I have been able
to give to this case , I am of opinion , that the judgment of the Court
of King 's Bench is erroneous and ought to be reversed .
I conceive that the great and fundamental maxim , upon which the
construction of every devise must depend , is “ that the intention of the
testator shall be fully and punctually observed , so far as the same is con
sistent with the established rule of law ; and no further .” — If it did not
go so far, it would be an infringement of that liberty of disposing
of a man 's own property , which is the most powerful incentive to honest
industry , and is , therefore, essential to a free and commercial country .
If it went farther , every man would make a law for himself ; the metes
and boundaries of property would be vague and indeterminate , which
must end in its total insecurity .
But there is , I will acknowledge , a distinction to be made , though too
often confounded or forgotten , in what is meant by those rules of law ,
which must co -operate with the intention of the testator, in order to effec
tuate his devise . Some of these rules are of an essential, permanent, and
substantial kind ; and may justly be considered as the indelible landmarks
of property , irrevocably established by the well -weighted policy of the
law , which have stood the test of ages , and which cannot be exceeded or
transgressed by any intention of the testator , be it ever so clear and
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f alienating his estate , b
y
the several modes adapted to
their respective interests ; that no disposition shall be allowed , which
in it
s consequence tends to a perpetuity ; that lands shall descend




the daughters or sisters in
partnership . These , and a multitude of other fundamental rules o
f prop
erty in this kingdom , are founded on the great principles of public con
venience o






a testator , however , fully or emphatically expressed .
A condition not to alienate is void , when annexed to a devise in fee , or
in tail : an executory devise which tends to a perpetuity , b
y
depending on
so distant a contingency a
s
the general failure of issue , is totally null
from the beginning ; and no man would be suffered to direct , that his






female . But there are also certain other rules of a more
arbitrary , technical , and artificial kind , which are not so sacred as these ,






these are only rules o
f interpretation or evidence , to ascertain
the intention o
f parties , by annexing particular ideas of property to
particular modes o




these technical modes o
f expression , it is evidence prima facie , that he





words . Thus , if a man devises his land , being freehold ,
to another generally , without specifying the duration o
f
his estate , the
devisee shall be only tenant for life : if he devises in like maner a chattel
interest , the devisee shall have the real property : a devise to a man and
his heirs shall give him the full and absolute dominion ; to a man and the
heirs o
f
his body , shall give him a more limited inheritance . Lastly ,
there are some rules , which are not to be reckoned among the great fun
damental principles o
f judicial policy , but are mere maxims o
f positive
law deduced b
y legal reasoning from some or other of these great fun




is own right heirs , b
y
the name of heirs , as a purchase ; o
r , to bring it
home to the case now before the court , that a devise o
f
lands to a man
for his life , and afterwards in any part of the same will a devise of the
same land to the heirs of his body , shall constitute an estate tail in the
first devisee for life .
But some of these rules , of the second and third class , are rules o
f
a
more flexible nature than those o
f
the preceding kind , and admit o
fmany




e clearly and manifestly contrary to the legal import o
f
the
words , which he has thus hastily and unadvisedly made use of , the tech
nical rule o
f
law shall give way to this plain intention o
f
the testator .




least , if not longer . It is
said b
y
the judges in 9 Hen . VI . fol . 21 , that a devise is marvelous in its
operations ; and many instances are given , where it may countervail the
ordinary rules of law . The like doctrine is to be met with in every re
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porter since ; and is the same that obtained in equity for the construc
tion of uses before the statute . In the case of uses ( says Lord Bacon of
Uses, 308 , 8vo . edit . ) , the chancellor will consult with the rules of law ,
where the intention of the parties does not specially appear. But then ,
this intention of the testator, which is to ride over and control the legal
operation of his own words , must be “manifest and certain and not ob
scure or doubtful,” as was resolved by all the judges of England in
Wild 's Case , 6 Coke 16 (post - ). Or, according to the emphatical words
of Lord Hobart 33 , “ the intent must not be conjectural , but by declara
tion plain .” Which words of Lord Hobart , as they are adopted and con
strued by Lord Hardwicke in Garth v . Baldwyne , 2 Ves . Sen . 646 , must
mean , " plain expression or necessary implication of his intent . But if
that intent be uncertain , if it be in æquilibrio , or even in suspense or
doubt , then (he afterwards adds ) the legal operation of the words must
take effect .” And most certainly his lordship has laid down and ex
plained the rule with that sagacity and caution , which so eminently dis
tinguished his decisions . For as, on the one hand, it would be very un
reasonable to control the plain intent of a testator by technical rules ,
which were principally contrived to ascertain it ; so , on the other hand ,
where the intent is obscure or even doubtful, and liable to a variety of
conjectures , it is the best and the safest way to adhere to these criterions ,
which the wisdom of the law has established for ages together , for the
certainty and quiet of property . Every testator , when he uses the legal
idiom , shall be supposed to use it in it
s legal meaning , unless he very
plainly declares that he means to use it otherwise . And if the contrary
doctrine should prevail ; if courts either of law or equity ( in both of
which the rules of interpretation must be always the same ) , if these or
either o
f




tures upon wills , instead of attending to the grammatical o
r legal
construction , the consequence must be endless litigation . Every
title to an estate , that depends upon a will , must be brought into
Westminster Hall ; for if once we depart from the established rules
o
f interpretation , without a moral certainty that the meaning of the




f justice . For how can a client or purchaser
b
e
assured that the conjectures o
f
the most able counsel , o
r
the most
experienced conveyancer , will be in al
l
points the same as the con
jectures o
f
the judges or the chancellor ? A civilian o
f
some emi
nence , Mantica , has written a learned treatise on their law , which he
heater ias entitled , de conjecturis ultimarum voluntatum ; but I hope nevernthe has written arimarned treatise on their
to see such a title in the law o
f England . For , should such a doctrine
ever prevail in this country , it were better that the statute o
f
wills
should be totally repealed than b
e made the instrument o
f introducing
a vague discretionary law , formed upon the occasion from the cir
cumstances o
f every case ; to which no precedent can be applied , and
from which n
o rule can be deducted .
The principles being thus cleared , upon which I have endeavored
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to found my present opinion , I shall now proceed to state what is the
legal and technical import of the words made use of in this devise ;
and will then consider whether there is any plain and manifest inten
tion of the testator , to be gathered from any part of his will, which
may control and overrule the legal operation of the words , and at
the same time be consistent with the fundamental and immutable rules
of law .
The words which are material to be considered, in the event that
has happened (when stript of all embarrassment from the contin
gency, which never arose , of the birth of a posthumous son ) are the
following : — " Item , and it is my intent and meaning , that none of
my children should sell and dispose of my estate fo
r
longer time
than his life ; and to that intent I give , devise , and bequeath all the
rest and residue o
f my estate to my son John Williams for and during
the term o
f
his natural life ; the remainder to my brother - in -law
Isaac Gale and his heirs , for and during the natural life o
f my said son
John Williams ; the remainder to the heirs of the body of my said son
John Williams , lawfully begotten or to be begotten ; the re
mainder to my daughters for and during the term of their natural
lives , equally to be divided between them ; the remainder to my
said brother - in -law Isaac Gale and his heirs during the natural lives
o
f my said daughters respectively ; the remainder to the heirs of the
bodies o
f my said daughters , equally to be divided between them .
And I do declare it to be my will and pleasure , that the share or
part of any of my said daughters , that shall happen to die , shall im
mediately vest in the heirs o
f
her body in manner aforsaid . ”
It is necessary to take notice , that Isaac Gale died in the lifetime
o
f
the testator , whereby the remainder limited to him and his heirs
for the life of John Williams became , in point o
f
law , a lapsed devise .




the testator , stood thus :
" T
o John Williams for the term o
f
his natural life ; the remainder
to the heirs of his body , " without any interposing estate . The legal con
sequence o
f which is , that if this be an estate tail in John Williams ,
it is a
n
estate tail in possession , by immediately uniting with the
life -estate ; and not an estate tail in remainder , as in the cases o
f
Duncomb v . Duncomb ( 3 Levinz , 437 ) , and Coulson v . Coulson ( 2




the interposing estate ,
which subsisted in both these cases . And indeed , were it otherwise ,
the plaintiff ' s replication could not be supported upon this general
demurrer ; fo
r
therein he pleads , that "by virtue of the said will ,
John Williams entered into the close in question , and became seised
thereof in his demesne a
s o
f
fee tail , to wit , to him and to the heirs
o
f his body issuing . " How far the interposition of this estate to Isaac
Gale and his heirs , though it never took effect , is an evidence o
f
the
testator ' s intention , will afterwards come to be considered . At present
the only question is , what estate is by these words devised to John
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Williams , according to the general rule of law , uncontrolled by other
considerations ? And I apprehend there is no doubt, but that the
words , in their legal construction , convey an estate tail to John Williams.
For the rule of law , as laid down in Shelley 's Case , 1 Coke 104 ,
Tante ] and recognized in Co . Litt . 22 , 319 , 376 , is, that , " where
the ancestor takes an estate of freehold , with a remainder , either
mediate or immediate , to his heirs , or the heirs of his body, the word
'heirs ' is a word of limitation of the estate and not of purchase ;" that
is , in other words , that such remainder vests in the ancestor himself, and
the heir (when he takes ) shall take by descent from him , and not as a
purchaser . This rule , though too plain and positive to be openly ques
tioned , or denied has yet been obliquely reflected on ; and insinuations
have been thrown out, that it is a strict and a narrow rule , - founded
upon feodal principles , which have long ago ceased ;- - that in Shelley 's
Case it is only laid down arguendo by the counsel , and not by the court ;
— and that too in the case of a deed and not of a will . It will not there
fore be foreign to the present question , to make a short inquiry into the
reason , the antiquity , and the extent of the rule .
Were it strictly true, that the origin of this rule was merely feodal,
and calculated solely to give the lord his profits of tenure ( either ward
ship or relief ) upon the descent of the heir from the ancestor, of which
the lord might be defrauded if the heir was to take by purchase , of which
(by the way ) I have never met with a single trace in any feodal writer ;
still it would not shake the authority of the rule , or make us wish for an
opportunity to evade it. There is hardly an ancient rule of real prop
erty , but what has in it more or less of a feodal tincture . The common
law maxims of descent , the conveyance by livery of seisin , the whole doc
trine of copyholds, and a hundred other instances that might be given ,
are plainly the offspring of the feodal system ; but, whatever their paren
tage was, they are now adopted by the common law of England , incor
porated into it
s body , and so interwoven with its policy ; that no court
o
f justice in this kingdom has either the power or ( I trust ) the inclina
tion to disturb them . The benefit of clergy took its origin from prin
ciples o
f
popery ; but is there a man breathing that would therefore
now wish to abolish it ? The law o
f
real property in this country , wher
ever it
s
materials were gathered , is now formed into a fine artificial sys
tem , full of unseen connections and nice dependencies ; and he that breaks
one link o
f
the chain , endangers the dissolution of the whole .
But it is by no means clear , that this rule took its rise merely from
feodal principles . I am rather inclined to believe , that it was first estab
lished to prevent the inheritance from being in abeyance . For , though it
has been the doctrine o
f
modern times , in order to effectuate executory
devises , that ,where a limitation o
f
the inheritance depends in contingency ,
an interim estate may descend to the heir until the contingency happens ,
yet it is manifest to any one the least conversant in our ancient books ,
that during the pendency o
f
a contingent remainder in fee o
r
in tail , the
inheritance was formerly always (and in some case is to this day ) held to
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be in abeyance , or in nubibus , as they then expressed it . Thus, if a gift
be made to one for life , remainder to the right heirs of J . S ., then living,
the fee simple is in suspense or * abeyance during the life of J . S. Bro .
t. Done . 6 . And so is Co . Litt . 342 b . But this state of abeyance was
always odious in the law ; and therefore the whole freehold or frank - tene
ment could not be in abeyance , except in the single case of the death of
a parson , or other corporation sole . Dyer 71 ; Hob. 338. For in that
interval there could be no seisin of the land, no tenant to a præcipe, no




services . And this is one principal reason , why a particular es
tate for years is not allowed to support a contingent remainder ; that
the freehold may not be in abeyance : as is laid down in Hob . 153 .
But when the first or particular estate was a freehold , there in some





a contingent remainder ; but this very sparingly and with
great reluctance . For , during such abeyance o
f
the inheritance , many
operations of law were totally suspended . The particular tenant was
rendered dispunishable for waste ; for the writ o
f
waste can only be
brought by him who is entitled to the inheritance . The title , if
attacked , could not be completely defended ; for there was no one in
being , o
f
whom the tenant o
f
the freehold could pray in aid to support
his right . The mere right itself , if subsisting in a stranger , could not
b
e
recovered in this interval ; for , upon a writ o
f right patent , a lessee
for life cannot join the mise upon the mere right . 1 Roll . Abr . 686 .
For these among other reasons , the law was extremely cautious of ad
mitting the inheritance to be in abeyance , unless in very particular
cases ; as is laid down b
y
Hobart and Doddridge , 2 Roll . Rep . 502 ,
506 , Hob . 338 . Indeed , where the particular estate was made to A .
for life , with remainder to the right heirs of B . then living , there till
the death o
f
B . the inheritance was necessarily in abeyance ; for B .
the ancestor was entitled to nothing . But , where the ancestor had
already an estate o
f
freehold limited to him , the law , ( to prevent such
abeyance ) adjudged that a subsequent remainder to his heirs (who ,
during his life , are uncertain ) was a remainder vested in the ancestor
himself , and that his heirs shall claim b
y
descent from him . For , as
Hankford , J . , says in 11 Hen . IV . 74 : " If land be given to a man for
term o
f his life , the remainder in tail , and for default o
f
issue the
remainder to the right heir o
f




the possession which the first tenant hath . ”
And though in this case it was argued at the bar , that the fee was
in nubibus , or in suspense , yet this was strongly denied both by
him and b
y
Hill , another of the Judges . And , indeed , if we consider
it attentively , the whole of this rule amounts to no more than what
happens every day in the creation o
f
a
n estate in fee o
r
in tail , by
a gift to A . and to his heirs forever , or to A . and to the heirs o
f
his
body begotten . The first words ( to A . ) create an estate for life : the
latter ( to his heirs , or the heirs of hi
s
body ) create a remainder in
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fee or in tail ; which the law , to prevent an abeyance , refers to and
vests in the ancestor himself ; who is thus tenant for life , with an im
mediate remainder in fee or in tail ; and then , by the conjunction of
the two estates , or the merger of the less in the greater , he becomes
tenant in fee or tenant in tail in possession . Hence therefore I am
induced to think , that one principal foundation of this rule was to
obviate the mischief of two frequently putting the inheritance in sus
pense or abeyance .
Another foundation might be , and was probably, laid in a principle
diametrically opposite to the genius of the feodal institutions ; namely ,
a desire to facilitate the alienation of land , and to throw it into the
track of commerce , one generation sooner , by vesting the inheritance
in the ancestor , than if he continued tenant for life , and the heir was
declared a purchaser. Therefore , where an estate was limited to the
ancestor for life , and afterwards (mediately or immediately ) to his
heirs , who are uncertain till the time of his death ; the law considered
the ancestor as the first and principal object of the donor 's bounty ; and
therefore permitted him (who , as it is said , Co . Litt. 22, beareth in his
body all his heirs , and who had the only visible and notorious freehold
in the land ) to sell it , devise it where the custom would permit , or
charge it with his debts and incumbrances. And however narrow and
illiberal the original establishment of this rule , or the adhering to it
in later times, many have been represented in argument , I own myself
of opinion , that those constructions of law , which tend to facilitate the
sale and circulation of property in a free and commercial country , and
which make it more liable to the debts of the visible owner, who derives
& greater credit from that ownership ; such constructions , I say, are
founded upon principles of public policy altogether as open and as
enlarged as those which favor the accumulation of estates in private
families , by fettering inheritances till the full age of posterity now
unborn , and which may not be born for half a century .
Then as to the antiquity of the rule in question , it hath been said ,
that in Shelley 's Case , it is only urged by the counsel for the de
fendant in their argument , and not relied on by the court. But the
determination of the court is grounded on this rule , as well in
Shelley 's Case , as in the Case of the Earl of Bedford , Moor. 720 , where
the same rule is likewise argued from by the counsel as a known and
undeniable maxim . And Lord Coke in his Commentary on Littleton
( the great result of al
l
his experience ) has often adapted and relied
upon it ; and has cited , in his margin , to support it , a long list o
f
authorities from the Year Books ; chiefly those o
f
Edward the Third .
I have looked into al
l
these , and into some besides ; and shall only say
that they d
o
most explicitly warrant the doctrine extracted from them
b
y
that great and learned judge .




f any that have occurred to me upon a diligent search . In
this the question before the court was , whether an estate thus circum









stanced (that is , settled on a man for life , and after an immediate
remainder in tail , to the right heirs o
f
the t nant for life ) was , on
failure of the remainder in tail , liable to the debts of the tenant for
life ; and it was determined to be liable , upon the ground of its being
a fee simple vested in the ancestor ; and therefore vested in him , in
order to prevent the inheritance from being in abeyance . This , I
believe , is the very first case in our books , wherein this principle was
established . It is in the Year Book of Edward II . published by Ser
jeant Maynard , M . 18 Edw . II . fol . 577 . [Abels Case ante 48 , stating
it in full ] * * * The rule of law , deducible from hence , is well and
emphatically collected b
y





. 109 , who refers ( I presume ) to this case (although it was not then
in print ) when he says , that it was resolved in M . 18 Edw . II . “ that if
a man give land to B . for term o
f
life , remainder to C . in tail , remainder
to the right heirs o
f
B . in fee , this remainder in fee vests in B . as
much a
s if the remainder was limited to B . and his right heirs in fee ;
and the right heir of B . shall have this b
y
descent and not as purchaser . "
And from al
l
these authorities I infer , that the rule in question is
å rule o
f
the highest antiquity ; not merely grounded on any narrow
feodal principle , but applied , in the first instance we know o
f , to the
liberal and conscientious purpose o





charging it with the debts o
f
the ancestor .
However , it hath been urged , that though the rule must be allowed
with respect to estates created b
y
deed ; yet it doth not follow , that it
also extend to devises : and so the master of the rolls is said to have
declared ( in the case o





case , where lands being devised to A . for life , remainder to the
heirs o
f
the body , this ( in case of a will ) had been construed an estate
tail in A . ” But either the reporter has misapprehended hi
s
honor ' s
meaning or else he had surely forgotten the cases o
f Whiting v . Wilkins ,
1 Bulstr . 219 , Rundle v . Healy , Cart 170 , and Broughton v . Langley ,
Lutw . 814 , wherein that point is resolved in terminis . It will therefore
b
e sufficient to observe upon this head , that the rule in Co . Litt . 22 ,
319 , is laid down in general terms , “ where and wheresoever the an
cestor taketh an estate for life , & c . , " and in Co . Litt . 376 , and also in
Shelley ' s Case , and in Moor . 720 , Earl of Bedford ' s Case , it is extended
to all conveyances . And devises of land (which differ totally from
testaments o
f
chattels ) are held in all our books , and particularly in
Widnham v . Chetwynd , 1 Burr . 429 , to be a species of conveyance ; and





such a devise .
But , however strongly this rule may be founded in antiquity , and
supported b
y
reason and authority , I have in the outset conceded , that
when it is applied to devises , it may give way to the plain and manifest
intent o
f
the devisor ; provided , that intent be consistent with the
great and immutable principles o
f
our legal policy ; and provided it
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be so fully expressed in the testator's will, or else may be collected from
thence by such cogent and demonstrative arguments , as to leave no
doubt in any reasonable mind , whether it was his intent or no . Which
leads me to the last consideration . Whether there is any such plain
and manifest intent of the devisor, expressed in or to be collected from
any part of this devise , as may control the legal operation of the words ,
and at the same time be consistent with the fundamental rules of law ?
And I am of opinion , that there is no such plain intent .
In order to decide this question clearly , it is necessary to state it
accurately . And first, let us see what the question is not . The question
is not, whether the testator intended that his son John should have
& power of alienation . If that was all , the dispute would be soon at
an end ; for his intention is most clearly expressed (and it is the only
clear intent I can find ) that the son should not have such a power. And ,
if a conveyance were now to be directed of this estate by a court of
equity , it would probably be in strict settlement , according to the case
of Lennard v . Earl of Sussex , 2 Vern . 526 . But that and all similar
cases (of directing a conveyance by a court of equity ) must be laid out
of the present question ; for we are now in the case of a legal estate ,
executed either one way or the other, and not of an executory trust .
And if the testator has in fact devised an estate to John , with which such
a restriction of alienation is incompatible by the fundamental rules of
law , the restriction is null and void . Again : the question is not, whether
the testator intended that his son John should have only an estate for life .
I believe there never was an instance, when an estate for life was ex
pressly devised to the first taker, that the devisor intended he should
have anything more . But if he afterwards gives an estate to the heirs
of the tenant for life , or to the heirs of his body , it is the consequence
or operation of law that in this case supervenes his intention ( as Lord
Hale expresses it , 1 Ventr . 225 , 379 ) , and vests a remainder in the an
cestor : which remainder , if it be immediate , merges hi
s
estate for life , and





some interposing estate , then it vests the inheritance in the tenant
for life , as a future interest , to take effect in possession when the in
terposition is determined . And therefore it has been frequently ad
judged , that though an estate be devised to a man for life only , or for
life et non aliter or with any other restrictive expressions ; yet , if there be
afterwards added apt and proper words to create an estate o
f
inheritance
in his heirs or the heirs of his body , the extensive force of the latter
words shall overbalance the strictness of the former , and make him
tenant in tail o
r
in fee . These therefore are not the true questions in
the present case .
But I apprehend the true question o
f
intent will turn , not upon the
quantity of estate intended to be given to John the ancestor ; but upon
the nature of the estate intended to be given to the heirs of his body .
That the ancestor was intended to take an estate for life , is certain :
that his heirs were intended to take after him , is equally certain : but




















how those heirs were intended to take , whether as descendants , or as
purchasers , is the question . If the testator intended they should take
a
s purchasers , then John the ancestor remained only tenant for life . If
h
e meant they should take b
y
descent , or had formed no intention about
the matter , then , by operation and consequence of law , the inheritance
first vested in the ancestor . The true question therefore is , — Whether





John Williams shall take an estate by purchase , entirely
detached from and unconnected with the estate o
f
their ancestors ? o
r ,
in other words , Whether he meant to put an express negative on the
general rule o
f
law which vests in the person of the ancestor (when
tenant of the freehold ) an estate that is given to the heirs o
f
his body ?
But , in order to say this , we must suppose , that the testator was ap
prised o
f this rule , and meant an exception to it ; o
f
which there is no
evidence whatsoever . And here lies the great difficulty , which the
defendant in error must encounter . It is not incumbent on the plaintiff
to show , b
y any express evidence , that this testator meant to adhere to
the rule o
f
law ; for that is always supposed till the contrary is clearly
proved : but it is incumbent on the defendant to show , b
y plain and
manifest indications , that the testator intended to deviate from the gen
eral rule ; for that is never supposed , till made out , not by conjecture but
b
y strong and conclusive evidence .
Let us therefore see what evidence has been usually required to
demonstrate such a devious intention , and what the evidence is that is re
lied o
n
in the present case . I am far from maintaining , that b
y
a devise
to a man ' s heirs or the heirs of his body , they shall never take as pur
chasers in any case . But I have never observed it to be allowed , ex
cepting in one o
f
these four situations ; not one o
f
which will apply to
the present case .
1 . Where no estate at al
l
, or (which is the same thing in the idea
o
f
our ancient law ) where no estate of freehold is devised to the ancestor .
Here the heirs cannot take b
y
descent , because the ancestor never had
in him any descendible estate . And this must always be the case ,




the devise , as in the known
case o
f
John de Mandeville ( C
o . Litt . 26 ) , the heir then taking a
vested estate b
y





estate devised to him ; only that then the estate o
f
the heir is contingent , because nemo est haeres viventis . And , if the
ancestor has only the devise o
f
a chattel interest , with a subsequent






ll . For , if between the term of the ancestor and the estate of his
heirs , there is no vested freehold remainder , the heirs can only take b
y
way o
f executory devise ; which , ex vi termini , implies an estate not ex
ecuted in the ancestor . Or , if there be any such vested estate of free
hold , interposed between the ancestor ' s term and the contingent re
mainder to his heirs , that contingent remainder is supported entirely
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by the interposed estate , and does not derive its being or any degree of
assistance from the chattel estate o
f
the ancestor .
2 . The next case is , where no estate of inheritance is devised to the
heirs ; a
s
in the case o
f White v . Collins , Com . 289 (cited by the counsel
for the defendant ) . There the devise was to Frank Mildmay for life ,
with a power o
f jointuring , and after his death (and jointure , if any be )
to the heir male o
f
his body lawfully begotten , during the term of his
natural life ; remainder over . Common sense will here tell us , that
when no estate of inheritance is devised to the heir male o
f
the body ,





3 . The third case is , where some words of explanation are annered
b
y
the devisor himself to the word heirs , in the will ; whereby he dis
covers a consciousness , distrust , or apprehension that he may have used
the word improperly , and not in its legal meaning ; and therefore he in
a manner retracts it , he corrects the inaccuracy of his own phrase , and
tells every reader o
f his will how he would have it understood . Thus ,
in Burchel v . Durdant , ( 2 Ventr . 311 , Carth . 51 ) , the devise was , “ in
trust for Robert Durdant for life , and after his decease to the heirs
male o
f his body , now living . ” As if the testator had said , “ I do not
mean a perpetual succession in the male line o
f
Robert Durdant , which
perhaps may b
e




his body ; but I mean b
y
that expression only such o
f
his sons as are a
t present born and known
to me . ” And accordingly the court held that George Durdant , the
son o
f
Robert , and living when the will was made , should take the
estate as a purchaser . So in Lisle v . Gray ( 2 Lev . 223 ) , the words
were , “ to Edward for life remainder to his first , second , third and fourth
sons in tail male ; and so to al
l
and every other the heirs male o
f
the
body of Edward . ” Which words " and so ” (together with the manifest
reason o
f
the thing ) plainly showed that the " other heirs male of the
body ” in the subsequent clause of the will , were to be understood just
8
0 a
s the " first , second , third and fourth sons ” were to be understood in
the preceding . And in Lowe v . Davis (Lord Raym . 1561 ) , when the
testator had first devised , in a loose unguarded manner , to “ his son
Benjamin and his heirs lawfully to be begotten , ” he immediately recol
lects himself and adds , b
y
way o
f explanation , “ that is to say , to his






the said Benjamin , & c . ” This devise to
the heirs , thus explained was held to be by way of purchase . So in the
case o
f
Doe on demise o
f Long v . Laming , (Burr . 1100 ) , the devise
was o
f gravelkind lands , “ to Anne Cornish and the heirs of her body be
gotten , as well female as male , to take as tenants in common . ” Now ,





is expressly declared b
y
the statute De Prærog . Regis , 17 Edw .
II . c . 16 ) , nor can heirs , as such , be tenants in common but coparceners ,
it is clear , that by the words heirs of the body ( thus explained by the
words female as well as male , and to take as tenants in common ) , the
devisor could only mean to describe the children o
f Anne Cornish .
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4 . The last case , wherein heirs of the body have been held to be
words of purchase , is where the testator hath superadded fresh limita
tions , and grafted other words of inheritance upon the heirs to whom
he gives the estate : whereby it appears , that those heirs were meant by
the testator to be the root of a new inheritance , the stock of a new des
cent ; and were not considered merely as branches derived from their
own progenitor . Where the heir is thus himself made an ancestor , it
is plain , that the denomination of heir of the body was merely de
scriptive of the person intended to take , and means no more than “ such
son or daughter of the tenant for life , as shall also be heir of his body ."
The cases of Lisle v . Gray , and Lowe v . Davis and Long v . Laming,
fall under this head as well as the other ; these having also words of
limitation superadded to the word heirs , as well as the explanatory
words I before took notice of. Thus too in Cheek v . Day (which , as
Lord Raymond observes , Fitzg . 24 , Fortesc . 77 is the true name of the
case usually called Clerk v . Day ) , the devise , as there cited from the
roll , was " to my daughter Rose for life, and if she marry after my
death , and have any heirs lawfully begotten , I will that her heir shall
have the lands after my daughter 's death , and the heirs of such heir ."
So likewise Archer 's Case , 1 Coke , 66 , is “ to the right and next heir .”
of Robert Archer ( the tenant for life ) , and to the heirs of his body
lawfully begotten for ever.” And the case of Backhouse v . Wells, 2
Wms. 476 , is " from and after the decease of the tenant for life to the
issue male of his body, and to the heir male of such issue male .”
All the cases therefore that have hitherto occurred , from the statute
of wills to the present time ( a period above two centuries ) — all the
cases, I say , in which heirs of the body have been construed to be words
of purchase , are reducible to these four heads : either where no estate
of freehold is given to the ancestor ; or where no estate of inheritance is
given to the heir ; or where other explanatory words are immediately sub
joined to the former ; or, lastly , where a new inheritance is grafted on the
heirs of the body , — none of which is the present case . We have therefore
no authority from precedents to warrant such a construction as is now
contended for . I do not however say , that this construction can never
be made under other circumstances than those which I have now men
tioned , but only that at present I am not aware of any other circum
stances that can warrant the same construction . At the same time I
allow , that the same construction may and ought to be made , whenever
the intent of the testator is equally clear and manifest .
What then is the evidence of this intention in the present case ? It
may be resolved into two particulars : 1 . The testator's previous declared
intention , “ that none of his children should sell or dispose of his
estate fo
r
longer term than his own life , ” together with his consequent
disposition “ to that intent ; " and , 2 , The interposed estate o
f
Isaac
Gale , and his heirs , during the life of the testator ' s son . For , as to
what was mentioned a
t
the bar , of hi
s
making the daughters and the
heirs o
f












90 ESTATES OF INHERITANCE .
each daughter immediately upon her death to vest in the heirs of her
body ; — that is plainly done to prevent the inconvenience of survivorship
among the daughters ; which must otherwise have been the consequence ,
according to the rules laid down , Co. Litt . 25 b , that “ where there is
a gift to two women , and the heirs of their bodies , they have a joint
estate for life, and several inheritances .”
Nor indeed do I think much stress can be laid on the second par
ticular , the interposed estate of Isaac Gale , and his heirs. For had
that been expressly created to preserve contingent remainders , the
case of Coulson v. Coulson ( 2 Atk . 250 ) , is an express authority , that
this will not make the heir of the body a purchaser . Much has been said ,
and much has been insinuated at the bar to discredit that case . But I
hold it to have been determined upon sound legal principles . For the
misapprehension of a testator, in thinking the remainders were con
tingent when they were not so , cannot alter the rule of law . But were
it otherwise, had the case of Coulson v . Coulson been decided upon
dubious grounds , I should tremble at the consequence of shaking its
authority , after it has now been established for thirty years , and half
the titles in the kingdom are b
y
this time built upon its doctrine . But
there is no occasion , upon the present question , to disturb the case o
f
Coulson v . Coulson , by either affirming or denying it . For , in the de
vise to Isaac Gale and hi
s
heirs , there is no such purpose avowed as the
preserving contingent remainders : it is only to be conjectured and
guessed a
t . The purpose o
f
the testator might be ( as in the case o
f
Duncomb v . Duncomb ) , to prevent dower in the wife of his son , or
tenancy by the curtesy in his daughters ' husbands : - especially as he had ,
by another clause in his will , destroyed the joint - tenancy of his daughters ,
which would otherwise (according to 2 Roll . Abr . 90 ) , have prevented the
curtesy o
f
their husbands . And where it is possible there may be more
intents than one , the selecting o
f
the true intent is a
t
best but probability
and guess -work ; and does not amount to that declaration plain , which




If this be so , we are driven back to the introductory words as the
only evidence o
f
this intent : and then the result o
f
the whole matter is ,
that the testator , having declared his intent , that his son shall not alien
his land , he to that extent gives his son an estate to which the law
has annexed the power o
f alienation : an estate to himself for life , with
remainder to the heirs of his body . Now , what is a court o
f justice
to conclude from hence ? Not , that a tenant in tail , thus circumstanced ,




alienation ; this is contrary to funda
mental principles . Not , that the devisee shall take a different estate
from what the legal signification of the words imports ; this , without




construction . But ,
plainly and simply this : that the testator has mistaken the law , and
imagined that a tenant for life , with first an interposed estate , and then a
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remainder to the heirs of his body, could not sell or dispose of this in
terest .
My Lord Chief Baron on the argument put a question to the counsel
fo
r
the defendant , to which no satisfactory answer was or could be
given . Suppose , after the like declaration o
f
his intent , the testator
had devised the premises to his son and his heirs for ever : Would that
have made the son tenant for life only , and his heirs take as purchasers ?
Most clearly not . This case is the same in kind , and differs only in
species . The words now used are as apt legal words to create an estate
tail , as those an estate in fee . And as I conceive , that when a testator
has devised a vested estate , his creation of a trust to preserve contingent
remainders will not turn it into a casual executory interest ; so also I
think , that when he has ( though ignorantly ) devised an estate that is
alienable , no previous or concomitant intent to prevent his devisee from
alienating shall alter the nature o
f
that devise .
Will it be said , that when the testator ' s intent is manifest , the law will
supply the proper means to carry it into execution , though he may have
used improper ones ? This would be turning every devise into an ex
ecutory trust , and would be arming every court of law with more than
the jurisdiction of a court o
f equity ; a power to frame a conveyance
for the testator , instead o
f construing that which he has already framed .
Will it then be said , that because the means marked out b
y
the testator
will not answer the end proposed , therefore he intended to use other
means and not those which he has marked out ? This consequence , I
apprehend , will not follow b
y any rules of law or logic . For then it must
b
e supposed , that every man , who has so in view a particular end , knows
also and is sure to employ the most effectual means to carry it into ex
ecution ; which is paying too great a compliment to human wisdom . Let
u
s
see how this argument will stand in form . The testator intended to
use those which were the most effectual means to prevent his son from
selling his estate ; that the son ' s heir should take by purchase was the
most effectual means : therefore the testator intended that the heir should
take b
y purchase . Here the first proposition will not be granted , that
h
e intended to use those which were the most effectual means ; for this
intent implies his knowledge o
f







evidence . Or , put it otherwise ; the testator in
tended to use what he thought the most effectual means : but he thought
the heir ' s taking by purchase was the most effectual ; therefore he in
tended that the heir should take b
y purchase . Here the second pro
position can never be proved ; that the testator thought any such thing .
The true consequence I conceive to be this : that because the means
marked out b
y
the testator are not adequate to the end proposed , there
fore he was mistaken in their efficacy .
If a man proposes to qualify a son to si
t
in the House o
f
Commons ,
and to that intent devises to him an annuity o
f
£300 per annum for
9
9 years , if he so long lives ; we cannot argue from this declared intent
o
f
the testator , that this term of years shall be construed to be a free
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hold estate for life, because otherwise it would not answer the intent.
We should rather conclude , that the testator was ignorant of the dis
tinction between the two estates , and had unfortunately chosen that
which was unfit for his purpose .
The case of Popham v. Bam field ( as the two parts of it are reported
in 1 Vern . 79, 1 Wms. 54 ) , was in this respect stronger than the present.
One Rogers had devised a large estate to the testator's ( Popham 's ) son , on
condition that his father would also settle two - thirds of his estate on the
son and his heirs male . Now , though the testator was under a strong
obligation , by this condition , to give an estate to his son and his heirs
male ; though he recited in his codicil that he had devised the lands to
his son and heirs male of his body ; which were indisputable evidences of
his intention to give his son an estate in tail male ; yet , having in his
will by express words made his son only tenant for life, with remainder
to his first and other sons, in tail , the lord keeper , assisted by the two
chief justices, the master of the rolls, and Mr. Justice Powell , al
l
agreed that the estate must remain in strict settlement . And , if an
intention o
f
the testator ( so manifestly and directly proved ) was not in
that case sufficient to make the words " first and other sons ” be construed
" heirs male o
f
the body , " much less in the present instance shall it turn
the words "heirs of the body ” into " first and other sons . ”
Upon the whole , I conclude , that though it does appear , that the
testator intended to restrain his son from disposing of his estate for any
longer term than his life , and to that intent contrived the present d
e
vise ; yet , it does not appear by any evidence at all , much less b
y
dec
laration plain , that in order to effectuate this purpose he meant that
the heirs of the body o
f
his son should take by purchase and not b
y
descent , or even that he knew the difference .
The consequence is , that b
y
the legal operation o
f
the words , which are
not in my opinon controlled b
y
any manifest intent to the contrary ,
the heir could only take b
y
descent , and of course John Williams , the
son , was tenant in tail o
f
the premises , and duly authorized to suffer
the recovery , that has been pleaded ; and therefore I am o
f opinion that





N . Y . , Mich . , & c . “ When a remainder shall be limited to the
heir or heirs of the body of a person to whom a life estate in the same prem
ises shall be given , the persons who , on the termination of the life estate ,
shall be the heirs , or heirs of the body , of such tenant for life , shall be en
titled to take as purchasers , by virtue of the remainder so limited to them . "
C . L . (1897 ) 8810 ; Minn . S
t
. ( 1866 ) , c . 45 , § 28 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , § 3217 ;
N . Y . R . S . (1828 ) , pt . 2 , c . 1 , t . 2 , Art . 1 , § 28 ; Mich . R . S . ( 1846 ) , c . 62 ,
$ 2
8 ; Wis . R . S . ( 1849 ) , c . 56 , § 28 , St . ( 1898 ) , § 2052 .
Rule in Wild ' s Case .
ANON . , in Common Bench , Hilary , 6 Eliz . - A . D . 1564 — 1 And . 43 , p
l
. 110 .
One devised his land to William his son fo
r
term o
f life , and after
his decease to the men - children o
f
his body , and if the said William die
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without any man - child of his body then the land should remain over ,
& c . The testator died , William died without any issue male of his body ;
and on this the question was what estate he had . The justices held
that he had an estate to him and the heirs male of his body .
WILD ' S CASE , in B . R ., Hilary , 41 Eliz . - A . D . 1599 – 6 Coke 16b , Moor
397 , Golsb . 139 , 1 Vent. 225 , 2 Lev . 58 . From Coke .
Ejectione Firmae between Richardson and Yardly, and on not guilty
pleaded the jury gave a special verdict to this effect . Land was devised
to A for life , remainder to B and the heirs of his body, the remainder to
Rowland Wild and his wife, and after their decease to their children ,
Rowland and his wife then having issue a son and daughter ; and after
wards the devisor died , and after his decease , A died , B died without
issue , Rowland and his wife died , and the son had issue a daughter
and died . If this daughter should have the land or not was the ques
tion : and it consisted only upon the construction what estate Rowland
Wild and his wife had , viz . if they had an estate tail , or an estate for
life with remainder to their children for life . The case for difficulty
was argued before all the judges of England , and it was resolved , that


















In the construction of the will the judges first considered the judg
ment o
f
the common law , if the conveyance had been made b
y
the de
visor in his life , and second the reason and cause that the judgment shall
not be according to the rule o
f
law . And it was resolved without ques
tion , that at the common law they had but an estate for life , the re
mainder to their children for life . Then what shall be the reason and
cause to give them an estate tail b
y
construction in this case ? It will
b
e
answered , the intent o
f
the testator . But it was resolved , that such
intent ought to be manifest and certain , and not obscure and doubtful ;
for at the common law lands were not devisable , but only b
y
custom ,
and that in ancient cities and boroughs , of houses and small things ,
* * * for the ancient common law di
d
favor him whom the common
law made heir , because he was to si
t
in the seat o
f
his ancestor , and to
serve the king and commonwealth . * * * And therefore this dif
ference was resolved for good law , that if A devises his lands to B and
to his children o
r
issue , and he hath not any issue a
t
the time of the
devise , that the same is an estate tail ; fo
r
the intent of the devisor is
manifest and certain that his children o
r
issue should take , and as im
mediate devisees they cannot take , because they are not in rerum natura ,
and by way o
f
remainder they cannot take , for that was not his intent ,









for every child or issue ought to be of the body , and therewith agrees 8
case in Trinity 4 Eliz . ( above ? ] where one devised land to husband and
wife and to the men -children o
f
their bodies begotten , and it did not
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appear in the case that they had any issue male at the time of the devise ,
and therefore it was adjudged that they had an estate tail to them and
their heirs male of their bodies .
But if a man devises land to A and his children or issue , and they
then have issue of their bodies, there his express intent may take effect ,
according to the rule of the common law , and no manifest and certain
intent appears in the will to the contrary . And therefore in such case,
they shall have but a joint estate for life .
But it was resolved that if a man as in the case at bar, devises land
to husband and wife , and after their decease to their children , or the
remainder to their children ; in such case , although they have not any
child at the time, yet every child which they shall ever have after , may
take by way of remainder , according to the rule of law ; for his intent ap
pears that their children should not take immediately , but after the de
cease of Rowland and his wife .
The rules declared in this case are generally known in the law as the Rule
in Wild ' s Case . This doctrine is now applicable to both deeds and wills ,
by virtue of statutes found in many states declaring that the word heirs
shall not be necessary to pass a fee by deed , or that every grantor shall be
presumed to intend to pass all the estate he has unless a different intention
is expressed in the deed .
The statutes enacted in all of the states, declaring that the devisee shall
take as large an estate as the testator could give at the time of his death un
less a different intent appears , result in a modification of the rules in this
case to the extent that the children will take in fee if they take as pur
chasers .
OATES V. JACKSON , in King's Bench , Mich . 16 Geo . II . - A . D . 1743 - 2
Strange 1172 .
Upon a case made at the assises , it was stated , that Ralph Clay being
seised in fee of an estate called Wolf 's Park , devised it in these words ,
“ As to Wolf Park I give it to my wife Annabella for her life , and after
her death to my daughter Isabella Addibell and her children on her
body begotten or to be begotten by William Addibell her husband , and
their heirs for ever.” That the wife is dead , and Isabella at the
time of making the will had one daughter Elizabeth , and afterwards
two sons and one daughter , who are all dead without issue : that
Elizabeth had issue the lessor of the plaintiff : that Isabella survived
William Addibell and married Jackson , by whom she had a son the
present defendant , who entered on her death .
The question was, what estate passed to Isabella and her children by
William Addibell : the plaintiff insisting , that Isabella was only tenant
for life , and the children of that marriage had the reversion in fee : the
defendant insisting , that Isabella was jointly seised in fee with the chil
dren , and having survived them all, and left him her son and heir , he
is entitled .
And after several arguments the Chief Justice delivered the resolu
tion of the court : that Isabella took as joint- tenant. It being stated , that
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at the time of making the will she had a child , which has been con
strued to be equal to children : 2 Vern . 106 . Coke Lit. 9. is express, that
to A . et liberies suis and their heirs , is a joint fee to al
l
. And it is
no objection , that b
y
this means the several estates may commence at
different times . Coke Lit . 188 ; Pollerfen 373 ; Moore 220 .
As Isabella therefore survived al
l
the children she had b
y
William
Addibell , the whole fee vested in her , and descended to her son the
defendant . Who had judgment accordingly .
BUFFAR V . BRADFORD , in English High Court of Chancery , Nov . 27 ,
1741 - 2 Atkyns 220 .
Bill to have personal estate secured and the deeds and writings , in
volved in a will providing among other things : " I give the use of the
whole to my sister Mary Bradford , for her support and maintenance
during the time she shall remain a widow , sans waste , so as the same
b
e divided on her marriage ; two eights to herself , two other parts to
her daughter my niece Ann , and the remaining four parts to my niece
Buffar , and the children born o
f
her body . ”
LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE : The question is what estate the
testator ' s niece Buffar and her children take . She had no child at the
time the will was made , but the plaintiff was born afterwards in the
life -time of the testator ; the mother of the plaintiff died in the testator ' s
life - time . It is insisted on the part of the defendant Mary Bradford ,
who had the estate for life , and who is likewise the heir at law , that it
is a lasped devise , for that the plaintiff ' s mother took an estate -tail ,
and her children are words of limitation and not of purchase where the
devisee had none a
t
the time the devise was made ; and therefore , as
the plaintiff ' s mother died before the testator , no estate vested in her ,
and consequently it is a lapsed legacy ; and for an authority her counsel
relied on Wild ' s Case , 6 Coke 17 [ ante – ) . On the other hand it
must be admitted that children in its natural import is a word o
f
purchase and not o
f
limitation , unless it is to comply with the in
tention of a testator , where the words cannot take effect in any other way .
But suppose that a devise was to A and after his death to his children ,
here it is a word o
f purchase .
It has been admitted very candidly by the counsel that as to the
personal estate the children , though born after the making of the will ,
must take equally with the mother as joint - tenants ; for where a man
gives personal estate to A and his children , to construe the word
children to be a word o
f
limitation and not o
f purchase would be a
strained and remote construction , and would defeat the children entirely ,
and the first taker would have all . Vide Cook v . Cook , 2 Vern . 545 ;
and Forth v . Chapman , adjudged on the same words in Lord Maccles
field ' s time , 2 P . Wms . 663 .
It is the time of possession in the present case which takes it out of
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the reasoning in Wild 's Case ; for here Mrs. Buffar and her children are
to have four eights , and to take at the same time as joint-tenants . The
will in this case confines it to such children as should be born in the
life- time of the testator, and therefore is not liable to the objection
made by the defendant 's counsel , that the remainder must divide and
split as in common marriage settlements where there is an estate tail
to daughters and one is born in the life -time of the father and another
after his death . See Stevens v. Stevens, Cas. Temp . Talb . 228 .
The plaintiff being born in the life time of the testator , would have
taken with his mother as a joint - tenant if she had lived ; and as she
is dead , he shall take the whole by way of remainder . * * *
COURSEY v. DAVIS, in Pa . Sup . Ct., 1863 — 46 Pa . St. 25 , 84 Am . Dec. 519 .
Scire Facias to revive a judgment recovered by Wm . Davis and Mildred
Ann Davis for damages , $ 512 . 10 for breach by defendants of their con
tract to buy from plaintiffs the land mentioned in the opinion . The
defense was that plaintiffs ' title was not a fee . Judgment below was fo
r





READ , J . The rule in Wild ' s Case , 6 Coke , 16 b , by which where lands
are devised to a person and his children , and he has no child at the time
o
f
the devise , the parent takes an estate - tail , has no application to the
present case , in which there was a child or children of the mother living ,
a
t
the time of the execution of the deed . The word " children ” is not
therefore a word of limitation , but o
f purchase , and the question is ,
What is the estate taken b
y
the mother and children respectively ?
The deed was executed on the 23rd o
f
October , 1843 , and was a con
veyance by Peter Mowen and wife to Mildred Ann Davis , a married
woman , b
y
whom the consideration o
f eight hundred dollars is said to
have been paid . In the premises it is stated to be " unto the said Mildred
Ann Davis and her children exclusively , and their heirs and assigns , "
and the habendum , although not strictly formal , is “ unto the said Mildred
Ann Davis and her children exclusively , and their heirs and assigns
forever , to them and their only proper use , benefit , and behoof , and to
and for no other use , intent , meaning , or purpose whatsoever . ” The
warranty is special , and is “ to and with the said Mildred Ann Davis and
her children , and their heirs and assigns .
At the execution of the deed , Mrs . Davis had an illegitimate child born
before her marriage , and a legitimate child by her present husband , Will
iam Davis , b
y
whom she has since had four children who are now living .
The illegitimate child has released to it
s




the conveyance is dead .
In construing this deed , it is necessary to collate the authorities , both
in England and in this state , in order to ascertain the legal as well as the
natural meaning o
f
the words used to describe the estate of the mother
and of the children . In Jeffrey V . Honywood , 4 Madd . 398 , Vice
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Chancellor Leach held that a devise to the testator's daughter , a married
woman , and to al
l




her body lawfully begotten , and unto his , her , and their heirs
o
r assigns forever , as tenants in common , and not as joint tenants , gave
a life estate to the mother and a remainder in fee to the children . The
mother died in the lifetime o
f
the testator , leaving ten children , and it is
probable that some o
f
the children were living at the date o
f
the will ,
although it is not so expressly stated .




f the rolls for the opinion of the court of king ' s bench , the devise , which
was o
f
land , was in these words : “ My will likewise is , that at the decease
o
f my son - in -law , John Broadhurst , the same , the whole legacy to him ,
shall g
o
to my grandson William Broadhurst , and to his children lawfully
begotten , forever , but in default o
f
such issue , a
t
his decease , to my
grandson Alexander Bridoak , natural son o
f my daughter , Rebecca
Bridoak , him , his heirs and assigns forever . ” Until the testator ' s death ,
William Broadhurst had not been , nor was married . The court , Lord
Tenterden and Justices Parke and Taunton , certified that William
Broadhurst took an estate -tail , but assigned no reasons for their opinion .
Mr . Jarman says ( 2 Jarman on Wills , 371 ) : “ The case of Jeffrey v .
Honywood , 4 Madd . 398 , seems to be inconsistent with , and must there
fore be considered a
s
overruled b
y , the case o
f
Broadhurst v . Morris , 2
Barn . & Adol . 1 . ” And in Webb v . Byng , 2 Kay & J . 673 , Wood , V . C . ,
said : “ The contention was , that the devise was to the mother for life ,with
remainder to her children , as joint tenants in fee . The only authority
for such a construction is the case of Jeffrey v . Honywood , 4 Madd . 398 ,
and even that has been overruled b
y
Broadhurst v .Morris , 2 Barn . & Adol .
1 . Independently , however , of that consideration , what I chiefly rely
upon is this : that the Quendon Hall estate , — the subject o
f
this devise , - -




which the testatrix intends by her will , to per
petuate the name o
f
Cranmer ; and if I were to hold that devise to have
been a devise to Mary Ann Byng for life , with remainder to her children
a
s joint tenants in fee , the estate would be divisible into eight separate
estates , and as the parties who are to take the property are also to take the
name and arms , the result would be to found as many small families ,
all bearing the name and arms o
f





one and indivisible , and to be enjoyed in its entirety . In
rejecting such a construction in favor o
f
one which will treat the word
children ' as a word of limitation , and not of purchase , I do not depart
from the spirit o
f
the rule in Wild ' s Case , 6 Coke , 16 b , - - the real rule in
that case being that it is lawful , as Lord Hardwicke puts it , to construe
the word 'children ' as a word of limitation when the will necessitates
such a construction . This is a case of that description , and as the only
means o
f keeping the property which the testatrix has described as her
Quendon Hall estates in one mass , which is clearly the general intention
o
f
the will . I am compelled to hold that in this will the word 'children '
is a word of limitation , and that the devise created is an estate - tail . ” In
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addition to the name and arms, there were various chattels , as a striking
watch and her diamond ear - rings, and pins devised as heir -looms with her
estate , and the vice -chancellor commences his opinion with this sentence :
“ However bold the decision may appear, I must hold this devise of the
Quendon Hall estates to be estate - tail.”
Upon appeal , the lords justices ( 26 L . J ., N . S ., 107 ) , considered the
construction of the devise to be one of great difficulty Lord Justice
Knight Bruce said : “ The inclination of his opinion was , that notwith
standing the fact of Mrs . Byng having to the knowledge of the testatrix ,
when she made her will , several children , that lady was made by the
devise , tenant in tail of the Quendon Hall estate . The vice-chancellor
had adopted that view , and his lordship could not give his voice for vary
ing that decision , as he was not pursuaded that the effect of the devise
was to make Mrs . Byng tenant for life , or joint tenant with her children .”
Lord Justice Turner said : " As to the other point, the devise of the Quen
don Hall estate , he had rarely seen a will more difficult to interpret . Two
things are , however , clear : that Mrs . Byng was the principal object of the
bounty of the testatrix , and that she intended the Quendon Hall estate to
be a family estate , with which the name of Cranmer was to be perpetuated .
The first appeared from the whole will , and the other from the gift of the
heirlooms , and the name and arms clause . Both these circumstances led
to the conclusion that the children were . to take through Mrs. Byng ,
not with her or after her.” No observations, according to this report , were
made by the lord justices upon either of the cases of Jeffrey v . Honywood ,
4 Madd . 398 , or Broadhurst v . Morris , 2 Barn . & Adol. 1. Upon appeal
to the House of Lords , the decision of the lords justices was affirmed , and
is reported under the name of Byng v . Byng , 31 L . J . Ch . 470. Lord
Chancellor Westbury placed his opinion upon the peculiar terms of the
will, and the evident intention of the testatrix , whilst lords Cranworth
and Kingsdown , taking similar grounds, certainly expressed opinions
hostile to the construction of the words we have been considering as giving
a life estate to the mother with remainder to the children , and in favor of
a joint tenancy , between the mother and children , without saying whether
after -born children were to be included or not .
It is clear that Webb v . Byng, 2 Kay & J . 673 , was decided upon the
intention of the testatrix , which required the devise to be held to create
an estate - tail , and it in no manner conflicts with the case of Jeffrey v .
Honywood , 4 Madd . 398 ; nor does Broadhurst v . Morris , 2 Barn . & Adol.
1 , which was a case where the father was not married until after the death
of the testator . In arguing this case , Cowling said : “ If the devise
stopped at the words 'lawfully begotten forever ,' the case would be gov
erned by the rule in Wild 's Case , 6 Coke, 16 b , viz . , that where lands are




the devise , the parent takes an estate -tail ; " and so little was it supposed
to interfere with Jeffrey v . Honywood , supra , that it was neither cited nor
referred to b
y
either Mr . Cowling or Mr . Preston , both gentlemen of great
learning and research . In Bowen v . Scowcroft , 2 Younge & C . 640 , Mr .
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Campbell , in argument ( p . 656 ) , said : “ There is a total distinction
between this and Wild ' s Case , 6 Coke , 16 b . In that case the devise was to
A and his children ; in the present , the words are, 'to the children and
their heirs'. This distinction was taken in Ives v. Legge [ cited in 1
Fearne on Remedies, 377 ] ; and the principle was acted upon in Jeffrey
v . Honywood , 4 Madd . 398 .” Baron Alderson ( p . 661) adopted this con
struction , and said : " Lastly , as to Lucy Bowen 's share. It was con
tended as to this that she took an estate -tail, having no children at the
time of the testator 's death . But I think this is not so , and that it is
distinguishable from Wild ' s Case , 6 Coke , 16 b , on the same grounds as
were taken by Sir John Leach , in Jeffrey v . Honywood , 4 Madd . 398 .
Indeed , on this point of the case , Jeffrey v . Honywood seems precisely in
point.”
After some doubt and hesitation , it has been determined in England
that Wild 's Case , 6 Co . 16 b , does not apply to personalty . In Audsley
V. Horn , 28 L . J ., N . S. c. 293, the master of the rolls decided that a
bequest of leasehold premises to A and her children (after a prior life
estate ) , gave a life estate to A , with remainder to her children , although
she had no children at the death of the testator, or of the tenant for life ,
and this decision , upon appeal , was affirmed by the lord -chancellor : 29
L . J ., N . S . c . 201 .
In Haskins v . Tate , 25 Pa . St. 249 , this court held , the present chief
justice delivering the opinion , that a devise by a testator in these words :
“ I further will that the plantation I bought of my son Robert , lying
near Hill's mill , shall be equally divided amongst my son Robert 's chil
dren , he and them enjoying the benefits of it whilst he lives,” gave
Robert a life estate , with remainder to all the children born before or
after the death of the testator . The court did not determine whether
Robert took a life estate in the whole or not , but they decided that the
period of division was the death of Robert , and that the limitation to his
children was to a class , - the time of distribution defining the members
that were to constitute the class . In Gernet v . Lynn , 31 Pa . St. 94,
where a testator devised land to his son J ., to hold the same to him during
his natural life, and after his decease to his children lawfully begotten ,
share and share alike , it was held that J . took an estate for life with a
vested remainder in fee to his children in being at the death of the testa
tor, which opened to let in after -born children . At the date of the will ,
the son had four children , and afterwards , four other children , some of
whom were born after the death of the testator. The children , therefore,
took as a class . In Brink v . Michael , 31 Id . 165 , my brother , Woodward ,
for sufficient reasons on the face of the case , confined the word " children ”
to the then living children of William Brink by his first wife , he being
& widower living on the farm conveyed by the deed , with his children .
He said : “ The natural love and affection which constituted the consider
ation of the deed , and maintenance , and education , which were among the
objects it aimed to promote, had reference , and in the nature of things
must have had exclusive reference , to the children then in being ; they
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were before the grandfather 's eyes , and were more manifestly the objects
of his bounty .”
In White v. Williamson , 2 Grant Cas. 249 , there was a declaration of
trust for the use of Mary M . Weaver and her children , and a subsequent
declaration of trust by Benjamin F . Weaver , to whom the premises had
been afterwards conveyed , that he held the same in trust for Mary M .
Weaver and her children , and their heirs . The question , as stated by my
brother Strong , was , What interest did Mrs . Weaver take under the
original declaration of trust ? “ Was it a life estate with remainder to her
children , or was it a tenancy in common with them ?”
The court adopted the first view , and held that the gift to the children
was as a class , and not individually. This is the natural construction ,
and is now the established rule as to personal property ; and we have
seen that such has been the view taken as to real estate in two leading
cases in England which have never been distinctly overruled . In this
state , the only case cited for a contrary doctrine is Shirlock v . Shirlock ,
5 Pa . St. 367, where the mother and all her children were living at the
date of the conveyance . The court below held that they were tenants in
common , and the mother taking one eleventh , her husband , the defendant
below , on her death , became tenant by the curtesy of her share . The
defendant , the husband , took a writ of error , on the ground that his
wife's estate was a tenancy in tail of the premises conveyed . In a per
curiam opinion , the court say : “ There is no error in the record of which
the defendant below can avail himself ; " and here the case really termi
nated , for if not an estate - tail, which it clearly was not, then the decision
below was the most favorable for him ; for if his wife 's interest was only
a life estate , then he had no claim whatever to any part of the premises.
The rest of the opinion is extrajudicial, but sustains the view taken by
the court below . The subsequent cases , however , have sustained what
appears to be the true construction , and with the light afforded by them ,
we proceed to examine the case before us.
The words used are, " unto the said Mildred Ann Davis , and her chil
dren exclusively , and their heirs and assigns." By giving the mother
a life estate , and regarding her children as a class, we provide not only
for those in existence at the date of the conveyance , but for those , also ,
a married woman might reasonably expect to have , and the period of
distribution would be the termination of the life estate by her death .
This would give effect to the word “ exclusively ,” for upon the construc
tion adopted by the court below , her husband would have a curtesy
estate , if he survived his wife , in the whole or a part of the premises.
Any other construction would cut off the subsequently born children ,
which we do not feel disposed to do, unless compelled by a settled rule of
law , which we do not find to be the case . Adopting , therefore , this
benign construction of this conveyance , the judgment is reversed , and
judgment entered for the defendant for costs upon the case stated .
A life estate to the grantee first named and remainder to his children born
and to be born was held to be created by a deed in these words : “ This
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March 21 day 1885 : This indenture made and entered into between Eli Hall
and Polly Hall of the first part and Joseph Hall and his children of the
second part. . . Know all men that I Eli Hall and Polly Hall of the
first part hath this day bargained and sold unto Joseph Hall of the second
part a certain tract • We the party of the first part doth bargain
sell and convey the above named tract of land and will warrant and defend
the title of the same from us and our heirs and assigns and from all other
unto the said Joseph Hall and his children forever ,” & c. Hall y . Wright
(1905 ) , 121 Ky. 16 , 27 Ky . L . R . 1185 , 87 S . W . 1129 , reviewing the Kentucky
decisions.
A devise of land in trust for testator 's daughter “and all her children if
she shall have any " was held to give the daughter a fee , she having no
children at testator ' s death . Silliman v . Whitaker ( 1896 ) , 119 N . C . 89 , 25
S. W . 742 , reviewing several decisions .
The stepmother and her children were held to take jointly under a devise
of the residue “ to my first husband 's stepmother and her children ,” Gordon
v . Jackson ( 1899 ) , 58 N . J . Eq. 166 , 43 Atl . 98 .
" I leave to my dear wife and our sweet little children all that I possess , "
made them joint - tenants . Fitzpatrick v . Fitzpatrick ( 1902 ) , 100 Va . 552 , 42
S. E . 306 .
It was held that the daughter took a life estate with remainder in fee to
the children in the following devise to her " in trust for her sole use and
benefit , and of her children and their children thereafter . But in the event
that my daughter should die and leave no children as heirs to the within
mentioned property, then it is my will and desire that all of said property
shall go to my brother. " Schaefer v. Schaefer ( 1892 ) , 141 Ill. 337 , 31
N . E . 136 .
The statute having abolished estates - tail , a fee simple was given by a
devise “ to said W . and his heirs being his own children ." Moore v. Gary




ESTATES OF FREEHOLD NOT OF INHERITANCE .
For Several Lives .
ANONYMOUS , in Common Pleas , Trinity Term , 3 Edw . 6 . - A . D . 1550 .
Moor 8 .
Land was leased to I . S . , habendum to him for life and for the lives
Jane his wife and William his son . HALES , J . It seems that he shall
have an estate for his own life , and that the limitation for the lives o
f
the others is void , and that there was no right to the occupant in the
case . BROWN , J . , agreed that there was no right o
f occupant , but he ·
held that this inured b
y way of remainder , the one after the other .
MONTAGUE , C . J . , held that they should have an estate for the lives of
all , and that the occupant had right .
UTTY DALE ' S CASE , in Common Pleas , 32 Eliz . - A . D . 1591 , Cro . Eliz . 183 .
A lease was made to J . S . " to have and to hold to him and his assigns
for his own life , and for the life of A and B . ” J . S . died . Is his estate
determined , because one cannot have a greater estate o
f
freehold than
his own life ?
ANDERSON , C . J . , and the court held clearly that it is a good limita
tion , and he has an estate for all their three lives ; for although he him
self cannot have an estate but for his own life , yet he may have it to
grant to another , and the habendum for their three lives is a good limit
ation , and by his death the estate is not determined , but occupanti con
ceditur .
HILLS v . HILLS , Moor 876 . Jac . I . - A . D . 1605 - 15 ?
A man made a lease for years rendering rent during his life and the
life o
f
his wife . This is during the life of the longest liver of them . So
adjudged .
ROSSE ' S CASE , In King ' s Bench , Mich . , 41 & 42 Eliz . - A . D . 16005
1
3 , Moor 398 , 399 , Gold . 157 , Cro . Eliz . 491 .
Coke
Ejectione firmae between Peter Rosse and Aldwick . A lease is made
to A and his assigns , habendum to him during his own life and the
lives o
f
B and C . If this limitation during the lives of B and C was
( 102 )
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void or not was the question . It was adjudged that the limitation was
good . It was objected that when a man has two estates in him , the
greater shall drown the less, and that an estate for his own life is higher
than for the life of another ; and therefore an estate for his own
life and for lives of others cannot stand together. It was answered and
resolved , that in the case at bar the lessee had but one estate , which has
limitation during his own life and the lives of two others, and he had
but one freehold ; and therefore there cannot be any drowning of
estates in the case , but he had an estate of freehold to continue during
these three lives and the survivor of them .
Waste by Life Tenant.
ANON , in the Common Pleas . - A . D . 1303 , Mich ., 31 Edw . 1, Horwood's
Year Books 480 .
In a writ of waste of a mill , if the defendant say that the post and
other timbers were carried away by an inundation , and can aver it, he
shall not answer for the waste . per BEREFORD .
ROLT v. LORD SOMMERVILLE , in English High Court of Chancery , Trin
ity Term . - A . D . 1737 — 2 Eq . Cas. Abr . 759 .
A very considerable real estate was limited to Mrs . Rolt (who after
wards married the defendant the Lord Somerville ) for life, without im
peachment for waste , remainder to the plaintiff Rolt for life, without
impeachment for waste, with several remainders over . The defendant the
Lord Somerville , to make the most of this estate during the life of his
wife , pulled down several houses and out-buildings upon the estate , and
sold the same, and took up lead water pipes that were laid for the con
veyance of water to the capital messuage and disposed thereof ; and he
also cut down several groves of trees that were planted for the shelter
and ornament of the capital messuage. Upon this a bill was brought by
the plaintiff to compel the defendant to account for the money raised
by the particulars before mentioned , and to put the estate in the same
plight and condition that it was before . To this the defendant demurred ,
and thereby insisted that this waste was committed by tenant for life
without impeachment for waste , and therefore he was not liable to be
called to account for what he had done , either in law or in equity ; and it
he was , yet the plaintiff could not call him to account , because he was not
a remainder man of the inheritance .
LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE : – Though an action of waste will not
lie a
t
law for what is done to houses or plantations for ornament or con
venience b
y
tenant for life without impeachment for waste , yet this court
hath set up a superior equity , and will restrain the doing such things on
the estate . In Lord Barnard ' s Case the court restrained him and ordered
the estate to b
e put in the same condition . In Si
r
Blundel Charleton ' s
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the park ; but Lord Chancellor King reversed
that , and extended it only to trees that had been planted in rows . My
only doubt is a
s
to the trees that have been cut down , for if this bill had
been brought before such trees had been cut down as were for the orna
ment and shelter of the estate , this court would have interposed . But
here the mischief is done , and it is impossible to restore it to the same
condition a
s
to the plantations , and therefore it can lie in satisfaction
only ; and I cannot say the plaintiff is entitled to a satisfaction for the
timber which is a damage to the inheritance ; yet as to the pulling down
o
f
the houses and buildings and laying the lead pipes , they may be re
stored , or put in as good condition again . In the case o
f my Lord Ber
nard there were directions for an issue at law to charge his assets with
the value o
f
the damages , he not having performed the decree in his
life - time .
The demurrer was allowed as to satisfaction on account o
f
the timber ,
but overruled as to the rest .


























t is a wished
in
Action of waste . The defendant was devisee o
f
a life estate in the
premises under the will of W . C . Steere . The plaintiff , who was also
executor o
f
the will , claimed under a conveyance from a devisee of the
reversion . The facts sufficiently appear from the charge of the court .
By Court , GREENE , C . J . This is an unusual form of action in our
courts ; but it is an action well known to the law , and established in
our state b
y
statute nearly two centuries ago . And it is a i e pro
vision ; for unless there were some such remedy provided , the owner
o
f





the t ant for life . Although very stringent , causing
a forfeiture o
f
the estate wasted , it was designed to promote good hus
bandry , and should be fairly and reasonably enforced . You are , there
fore , to entertain no prejudices on account of the nature o
f
the suit ,
nor on account of the relations of the parties . They should stand be
fore you divested o





you is , Has waste been committed in any or all the
ways in which it has been charged ? I will go over the charges separately .
The defendant is charged with having converted meadow land into
pasture land . In England this would be waste . But we are not to apply
the English law too strictly . Our lands are , in many respects , cultivated
differently from land in England ; and this difference is to be taken
into account . Here it is necessary to show that the change is detri
mental to the inheritance , and contrary to the ordinary course of good
husbandry . If in this case the change injured the farm , or was such
a change as n
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ti
t
. 3 , c . 11 , sec . 18 ; 3 Dane ' s Abr . , c . 78 , art . 5 ; Harrow School v .
Alderton , 2 Bos . & Pul . 86 .
It is said that the pastures have been permitted to become overgrown
with brush . In England that would be waste , but you would not ex
pect so high a state of cultivation in Burrillville as in England , or as
in the vicinity o
f
a populous city . There must be such neglect in
cutting the brush as a man o
f ordinary prudence would not permit ;
and if there was in this case such neglect , it is waste .
Another item is the cutting and selling off the farm fifteen cords
o
f
wood . The tenant for life has a right to cut only so much wood
a
s is necessary for fuel and repairs . Therefore to cut wood and sell
it off the farm is waste , beyond a doubt . The defense set up is that the
plaintiff assented to it . If he has assented , either before or after the
cutting , he has no right to claim a forfeiture of the estate on that ac
count . You will consider in connection with this point the relations
sustained b
y
the parties . This estate was charged with the comfortable
support o
f
the defendant . As owner o
f
the reversion , the plaintiff is
bound to provide for her ; and as executor , the will obliges him to sell
the estate for her maintenance if necessary . Now if the sale of the
wood went for the support and so relieved the estate o
f
the charge for
her support , this is a fact for you to consider in connection with other
facts bearing upon the question o
f
his assent .
Another charge is cutting hoop -poles . Hoop -poles are timber trees
in the earlier stages o
f
their growth . This would be waste , unless it
is the ordinary mode o
f managing the farm . It may be as usual for
tenants to cut hoop - poles , when o
f
the proper size , a
s
to harvest the
potatoes or fruit ; and it would be wrong to make that waste which would
not be waste in an ordinary tenant for a term o
f years : Greenl . Cruise ,
tit . 3 , c . 11 , sec . 5 , and note ; 4 Kent ' s Com . 76 , 77 .
Then there is a charge not only for not repairing the house , but also
for tearing it down . Now , in regard to the question o
f repairs , if the
life tenant receives a house in such a state as not to be reparable , or so
dilapidated that the expense o
f repairing would be beyond the value
o
f the house , he is not bound to repair , and may leave it to it
s
natural
destruction . But if the house is such that repairs would make it
tenantable , he is bound to make them . But in regard to the charge
o
f tearing the house down , the fact that it was not tenantable is no
excuse . Whatever may have been its value the reversioner had a right
to it . If he consented to the demolition , that indeed alters the case ;
and you are to look to all the circumstances o
f
the transaction and the
parties for the evidence of the consent . If the house was torn down
after she left the premises , and neither b
y
her direction nor permis
sion , she is responsible : Greenl . Cruise , tit . 3 , c . 11 , secs . 21 , 30 ;
4 Kent ' s Com . 77 ; Fay v . Brewer , 3 Pick . 203 .
She is charged with removing the crib . The defense is that it did
not belong to the inheritance , that it was placed by the life tenant




















is not waste . She is charged with tearing down the barn . This is an
important part o
f
the farm . The defense set u
p
is that it was so old
and unstable that she feared it would fall upon her cow . If there was
any such danger she had a right to tear it down , unless its dilapidated
condition resulted from her neglect to repair . There are also charges
o
f tearing boards from t e buildings and destroying the fences , which
if proved amount to waste .
You will perceive that there are various portions claimed to be
wasted . Waste in any particular place forfeits the place , as waste in
the woods forfeits the woods , in the meadow forfeits the meadow . A
destruction o
f
the dwelling -house forfeits the whole place . You are
to find the place forfeited where the waste was committed . And , in
addition , you are also to assess the damages for the place wasted , over
and above the value o
f
the place .
Verdict for the plaintiff , in that there has been waste of hoop -poles
in the pasture , with damages in the sum of twenty -five dollars .
CALVERT V . RICE , in Ky . Sup . Ct . , May 12 , 1891 . - 91 Ky . 633 , 16 S . W .
351 , 34 Am . St . Rep . 240 .
PRYOR , J . This is a controversy between the appellants who are
the life tenants , and the appellees , who own the inheritance , and are
entitled to the possession when the tenancy expires . It is a petition
in equity , with an injunction to stay waste . W . H . Duvall owned at
his death a tract o
f




n the Maysville and Mt . Sterling Turnpike , in the county of Mason .
A
t
his death seventy -five acres o
f
this tract including the dwelling , was a
l
lotted to his widow as her dower . She subsequently married the ap
pellant , Jesse Calvert , who has been cutting the timber on the dower
land , and converting it into rails for the use of the dower tract . The
first husband , Duvall , left one child surviving him , who married the
appellee , Rice , and they instituted this action , asking that the appel
lants be enjoined from cutting any trees on the dower and from com
mitting waste .
The testimony is conflicting a
s
to the number o
f
trees cut and used
o
n the premises b
y
the appellants in repairing the buildings and the
fencing . The appellant admits the cutting about fifteen trees , and the
appellees say that h
e cut at least twenty . The main contention arises
from the scarcity o
f
timber on the entire farm , it appearing that al
l







the dower land , and some o
f
that timber is in the yard . It
appears that only one tree was cut that was standing in the yeard , and
that seems to have been decayed , and in such close proximity to the
dwelling as subjected it to danger if the tree should fall .
If this case is to be determined upon the idea that there is not a
sufficiency o
f
timber on the dower to keep in repair the entire tract ,
then the injunction ought to g
o , for it is evident that there is not more
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t he should byaprudentmäe per
than a sufficiency of timber to keep up and continue in permanent re
pair the dower tract . The scarcity of timber , however , does not prevent
it
s
use by the life tenant in repairing the buildings and fencing on the
premises . It only requires that he should be the more careful in its
use , and only cut so much as would be sed b a prudent man when in
possession and the owner o
f
the fee , and necessary to keep th premises
in repair . It is the duty of the life tenant not to permit the premises
to g
o
to destruction for the want o
f repairs , and particularly when there
is timber on the place from which the repairs may be made . It is
better for those in remainder that the life tenant should keep the prem
ises in repair , so that when the term expires the owner of the fee re
ceives it in good condition , than to be compelled to receive it as a





the tenant for life to take reasonable estovers
from the estate , but not to such an extent as to work an injury to the
inheritance ; and what is meant b
y
this injury is , that the tenant shall
not make an unreasonable use of this right . The right to timber for
firewood and repairing buildings is an incident to every life estate to
b
e
used for such purposes when on the land . The tenant has no right
to cut and use rail timber for firewood when there is other timber that
might be used for that purpose , o
r
to even cut and use young and grow
ing timber that would not make more than four or five rails to the cut





the tenant , as is said in the text -books
and reported cases , “ is to give the tenant necessary fuel that he may
remain on the premises , and sufficient timber to keep the fences and
buildings in repair ” : 2 Bla . Com . ; Padelford v . Padelford , r Pick .
152 ; Miles v . Miles , 32 N . H . 147 ; 64 Am . Dec . 362 .
Why is it not to the advantage of the remainder -man that the prem
ises should b
e kept in repair ? It is not required or expected of the
tenant that he shall expend his money in buying plank o
r
lumber to
improve fences and keep the premises in repair , so that the timber
may pass from him to the inheritance untouched , although it
s judicious
use may lessen the value of the estate . The owner of the fe
e
would
use this timber if without means to purchase other material , and so
would any prudent farmer . He would not cut the timber in the yard
left for ornamental purposes , nor could the tenant , without being guilty
o
f waste ; but ordinary woodland can be used in a prudent manner for
the use of the premises , and that use or the right to use the
timber not having been abused b
y
the tenant , we see no reason for an
injunction , the effect of which would be to enrich the inheritance at
the expense o
f
the life tenant .
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MARSHALL v. MELLON , in Pa . Sup . Ct ., Jan . 4, 1897 — 179 Pa . St. 371 , 86
Atl. 201, 57 Am . St. Rep . 601 , 35 L . R . A . 816 .
Assumpsit fo
r
rent due on an o
il




GREEN , J . In Stoughton ' s Appeal , 88 Pa . St . 198 , we said : “ Oil ,
however , is a mineral , and , being a mineral , is part o
f
the realty :
Funk v . Haldeman , 53 Pa . S
t
. 229 . In this it is like coal or any other




. 312 , we said of petroleum , “ It is a mineral substance ob
tained from the earth b
y
a process o
f mining , and lands from which
it is obtained may with propriety be called mining lands . ” In West
moreland Nat . Gas Co . v . De Witt , 130 Pa . St . 235 , we said : "Gas ,
it is true , is a mineral , but it is a mineral with peculiar attributes . "
In Blakely v . Marshall , 174 Pa . St . 425 , a lease for oi
l
and gas pur
poses was made b
y
lessors who were tenants for life and also as trustee
for those in remainder . The leased premises proved to be productive . A
question arose upon a case stated a
s
to the interests respectively o
f
the life
tenants and those in remainder . The life tenants claimed the whole o
f
the
oil , and for those in remainder the same claim wasmade . The court below




due to the lessors , and to invest
the proceeds , and pay the interest annually realized therefrom to the life
tenants during their joint lives and the life of the survivor , and , at the
death o
f
the latter , to pay the principal to the remaindermen . This court
sustained the court below and said : “ As was said in Stoughton ' s Appeal ,
8
8 Pa . S
t
. 198 , and other cases in the same line , oi
l
in place is a mineral ,
and , being a mineral , is part of the realty . An oil lease investing the
lessee with the right to remove all the o
il
in place in the premises , in
consideration o
f
his giving the lessors a certain per centum thereof ,
is , in legal effect , a sale of a portion o
f
the land , and the proceeds rep
resents the respective interests o
f
the lessors in the premises . If there
b
e life tenants and remaindermen , the former are entitled to the en
joyment o
f
the fund ( interest thereon ) during life , and at the death of
the survivor the corpus of the fund should go to the remaindermen . ”
This distribution was made because all the interests concurred in
making the lease , and it was to the manifest interest of all that the oil
should b
e
taken from the land lest it should be drawn
away b
y
other wellson adjacent premises . In that respect ,
o
f
course , there is a difference between o
il
and gas , and solid
minerals , but in respect of the interests of life tenants , as contrasted
with those in remainder , there was no departure from the common -law
rule that tenants for life only may not open new mines o
r
take minerals
from the premises , except in case of mines opened by the former owner .
This was recognized in Westmoreland Coal Co ' s Appeal , 85 Pa . St .
344 , where we held that while the life tenant ' s right to work previously
opened mines was undoubted , there was no right in a life tenant of sev
eral tracts to open a new mine on one of the tracts upon which no
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previous opening had taken place . Mercer , J., said , in the opinion :
" Neither tract is appendant or appurtenant to the other. If she had
& life estate in the distant tract only , the fallacy of claiming a right
to remove the coal therefrom would be most manifest . The unanswer
able reason would be that the mine on that tract had never been opened .”
We see no difference between the present case and those cited , so far
as this question is concerned . The plaintiff was but a tenant for life
of the premises in question . There had never been any oil or gas op
erations commenced on the land before her estate for life accrued .
She had no right therefore , to operate for oil or gas herself ,
and she could not give such a right to any lessee from her. Neither
the original lessee nor the defendants , his assignees , ever held any such
right. They would have been trespassers if they had undertaken to
exercise such a right . The lease was " for the sole and only purpose




, or gas , ” and “ to have and
to hold the said premises for the said purpose only . " All the terms
and conditions o
f
the lease relate to that purpose alone , and no right
to the use o
f the surface for any other purpose is conferred . It is
manifest , therefore , that as no interest whatever was acquired under
the lease , the lessees are under no obligation to pay for a right or
privilege which they never obtained , or in damages for not performing
a
n illegal covenant therein . We think the judgment entered b
y
the
court below was entirely right .
It seems to us , however , in view of the peculiar character of oil and
gas a
s being fugacious in their nature , and liable to be diverted b
y
operations upon other adjoining or near - b
y
lands , in order to preserve
the interests o
f
both life tenants and remaindermen , it would be well
for the legislature to make such enactments a
s





lands to secure to themselves the benefits of such minerals
a
s
these . As it is now , the law is not efficacious to that end .
Judgment affirmed .
T
o the same effect see Swayne v . Lone Acre Oil Co . ( 1905 ) , 98 Tex . 597 ,
8
6
S . W . 740 ; Keon v . Bartlett ( 1895 ) , 41 W . Va . 559 , 23 S . E . 664 , 56 Am .
S
t
. Rep . 884 , 31 L . R . A . 128 .
Acquiring Adverse Title .
WHITNEY V . SALTER , in Minn . Sup . Ct . , Nov . 22 , 1886 - 36 Minn . 103 , 30
N . W . 755 , 1 Am . St . Rep . 656 .
Ejectment by the administrator of Ann Salter ; who died possessed of
a term for 100 years subject to a mortgage for $555 and a mechanic ' s lien
for $ 884 , and left a will b
y
which she devised the term to the defendant
William Salter , her husband , for life . After her death the liens were
foreclosed and the purchasers at the sale conveyed their interests to de
fendant William . The court directed a verdict for defendant , and plaint
if
f appeals from an order denying a motion for a new trial .
B
y
the Court , MITCHELL , J . The established doctrine is , that a tenant
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for life in possession , in the purchase o
f
a
n encumbrance upon , or an
adverse title to , the estate , will be regarded as having made the pur
chase for the joint benefit of himself and the reversioner or remainder
man . The law will not permit him to hold it for his own exclusive benefit ,
if the reversioner or remainderman will contribute his share o
f
the
sum paid . If the life tenant in such case pays more than his propor
tionate share , he simply becomes a creditor of the estate for that
amount : 1 Washburn on Real Property , 96 ; Daviess v . Myers , 13
B . Mon . . It is also the settled doctrine , that if a life tenant of a
renewable leasehold estate the lease , the law will not permit
him to d
o
so , for his own exclusive use , but will ake him a trustee
for the reversioner o
r
remainderman . And this is so even although he
was not required to renew : Bissett on Estates for Life , [ 26 Law Lib . ]
248 . The renewed lease in such a case is subject to the same equities
a
s
the original . Thus far we agree i the appellant . But this is not
the whole law applicable to the facts o
f
this case . Salter , the life tenant ,
was under no obligation to pay of
f
o
r buy up these outstanding claims .
against the estate . The will under which he held the life estate imposed
n
o
such duty upon him . Neither did the law : 1 Washburn on Real
Property , 96 .
Whether in this case the life tenant should contribute towards the
amount paid to remove these encumbrances is not here important . Un
doubtedly , the general rule in regard to the apportionment o
f
the con
tribution towards paying off encumbrances between the life tenant and
the remainderman is , that the life tenant shall contribute in proportion
to the benefit he derives from the liquidation o
f
the debt : Story ' s Eq .
Jur . , sec . 487 ; 1 Washburn on Real Property , 96 , 97 .
In view o
f
the fact that this life estate was given to Salter " in lieu
o
f all estate , right , title , or interesť ” he might otherwise have in the
estate o
f
his wife , the testatrix , there may be some question whether
he would be bound to contribute anything towards taking up these
outstanding claims against the estate : See Brooks v . Harwood , 8 Pick .
497 . But as the point is not really before us , we neither decide nor
consider it . It is , however , certain , in any event , that Salter became a
creditor o
f
the estate for the amount he paid out , less his proportionate
share , if any . To that extent he would be subrogated to the rights of
the parties from whom h
e bought , and would be entitled to hold the
property until the other parties interested paid their share . He and
those claiming under him would occupy a position analogous to a
mortgage in possession after condition broken , who cannot
b
e ejected until al
l
sums due on the mortgage have been paid .
Order affirmed .
That the life tenant cannot acquire and use an adverse title against the
remainderman : De Freese v . Lake ( 1896 ) , 109 Mich . 415 , 67 N . W . 505 , 63
Am . St . Rep . 584 , 32 L . R . A . 744 , tax - title ; Boynton v . Veldman ( 1902 ) , 131
Mich . 555 ; 91 N . W . 1022 ; Stewart v . Matheny ( 1888 ) , 66 Miss . 21 , 5 So . 387 ,
1
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S. W . 375 , 58 Am . St . Rep . 564 ; Weaver v. Wible ( 1855 ) , 25 Pa. St. 270 , 64
Am . Dec . 696 .
Numerous decisions to the effect that possession by or under a life tenant
cannot be set up as adverse to the remainderman or reversioner are collected
in 19 L . R . A . 839 , in a note to Gindrat v . Western Ry . of A ., 96 Ala . 162,
11 So . 372 . See also King v. Rhew , post .
Time for Executors of Life Tenant to Remove .
STODDEN V. HARVEY , in King 's Bench , Trinity, 5 Jac. 1. - A . D . 1608
Cro . Jac. 204 .
Trespass . Upon demurrer the case was , lessee for life of a house and
pasture land dies , his executors suffer his cattle to go there for six days
after his death , and then remove them , and in trespass justify for that
time, averring that in that time of six days they could not procure any
other land or place to put in the cattle ; whereupon it was demurred .
And whether that were a convenient time to remove them was the ques
tion . The court seemed to incline that six days is but a convenient time
to remove the cattle ; and the law allows a convenient time for their re
moving , especially it being averred that they had not any other place to
remove them . See 18 Edw . 4 ; 22 Edw . 4 , p
l
. 27 . But for a fault in the
plea * * * it was adjudged for the plaintiff .
Curtesy Initiate .
ANON . , in Common Bench , Hilary , 28 Hen . VIII . - A . D . 1537 - 1 And . O . P .
3
5
(Case 88 ) , Dyer 25b , Bendloes 21 .
If a man espouse a woman and have issue , which issue is born in life
and baptised , and the issue dies not yet heard to cry ; or if the issue is
born in life and not baptised nor heard to cry ; yet the husband shall be
tenant b
y









DowerHow Barred . In Hereford , in Eyre , 20 Edw . 1 , A . D . 1292 , p . 21 .
If a woman covert make quit -claim of her dower for her whole life it
is worth nothing . Otherwise , if she is single .
CHAPTER IV .
ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD .
ESTATES FOR YEARS .
Nature of Terms for Years .
BRACTON , book II , c. 9, fo
l
. 27 . — 1256 ? (1240 -1267 ) .
If ,moreover , a gift be made for a term of years , though o
f
exceeding
length longer than the life of man - nevertheless this will not give the
donee a freehold , since a term o
f years is fixed and certain , and the limit
of life is uncertain , and because , although nothing is more certain than
death , nothing is more uncertain than the time of death . Moreover , if
land be granted to a person for a term of years , the grantor may dur
ing the same term grant the same land to another o
r
to the same person
in fee ; thus , if he enfeoffs the lessee , changing one kind o
f
possession for
another . If , however , he enfeoffs another , both kinds of possession will
continue , because the term and feoffment of the same land may well
coexist , since in that case there are different sorts o
f rights ; the owner
ship o
f
the fee and the freehold belong to the feoffee , while the lessee
can claim nothing for himself except the usufruct , that is to say , he may
freely and without hinderance on the part o
f
the feoffee take the pro
duce . Further one may give to another land to hold at will , or so long
a
s
he pleases , from term to term , or from year to year , in which case
the donee has no freehold , for the lord of the fee may reclaim land thus
granted as from one holding b
y
mere grace and favor .
LITTLETON ' S TENURES . (Littleton died in 1482 . )
§ 5
8 . Tenant for term o
f years is where a man lets lands o
r
tene
ments to another for a term o
f
certain years , after the number o
f years




f the lease , then is he tenant for term o
f
years . * *
§ 5




without deed , there need be no livery of seisin made to the lessee , but he
may enter when h
e will b
y
force of the lease . * * *
§ 6
6 . Also , if a man lets land to another for term of years , although
the lessor die before the lessee enters into the tenements , yet he may enter
into the same tenements after the death o
f the lessor , because the lessee ,
by force o
f
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ing to the form of the lease. But if a man makes a deed of feoffment to
another , and a letter of attorney to one to deliver to him seisin by force
of the same deed ; yet if livery of seisin be not executed in the life of
him who made the deed , this avails nothing . * * *
Original Remedies of Ejected Termors .
BRACTON , Book 4, c. 36 , fol. 220 . - A . D. 1256 ? ( 1240 - 1267 ) .
I must now speak of the case of a person being ejected from the use
and occupation of any tenement which he holds for a term of years before
the expiration of his term . For in one and the same tenement one man
may have a freehold and another use and occupation . The usual remedy
open to such lessees, when they are ejected before the expiration of their
term is by action of covenant. But inasmuch as this action is not avail
able except as between lessor and lessee , and third persons could not be
bound by the covenant, and even as between lessor and lessee it was an
insufficient and inconvenient mode of determining the matter , by the
advice of the Curia Regis a remedy was provided which the farmer could
avail himself of as against any person whatsoever who should turn him
out of possession . This was by means of the following writ : 'The king ,
to the sheriff greeting . Command A that he duly and without delay do
restore to B so much land with the appurtenances in such a township ,
from which the said A who demised the land to B ' (had wrongfully
ejected him , & c . ) , Or thus : “ If A gives proper security, summon B to
show cause why he ejects and keeps ejected A from so much land with
the appurtenances which C demised to A for a term which is not yet
passed , and within the said term the said C sold the said land to B , by
reason of which sale the said B afterwards ejected A from the said land
as he saith ;' & c . And if such a writ is available against a stranger on
account of a sale to him , much more is it available against the lord him
self who demised to and without reason ejected the lessee, than against a
stranger who had no sort of excuse if at the time of the sale made to
him his vendor ejected the farmer , or if on any other ground any one
other than the original lessor has ejected the lessee. In that case the
writ speaks of ' the land which C of N demised for a term which has not
yet expired , within which term the aforesaid A or C wrongfully ejected
B from the said land as he alleges ;' & c . * * * No one can eject a
farmer from his farm any more than he can eject a tenant from his free
hold . Hence if it be the lessor who ejects the farmer le
t
him restore the
possession with damages for such a right o
f
restitution does not differ
much from the case o
f
disseisin . But if the ejector be some person other
than the lessor , if he have done the wrong b
y





the lessor , both o
f
them are liable to judgment , one because
h
e
did the act , and the other because he authorized it . But if the act
was done against the will of the lord , then the wrongdoer is liable both
to the lord o
f
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I have mentioned , to the lord of the fee by the assize of novel disseisin ,
80 that the one may recover the term with damages , and the other his
freehold without damages . Further if the lord of the fee gives to anyone
a tenement to hold in demesne which has been granted to another for a
term of years , he may well grant to him the seisin without prejudice to the
term of the farmer. For the lord may confer upon the grantee the seisin
which he vacates so far as relates to himself and those claiming under
him , and he can cause the farmer to attorn to the grantee and to render
to him services , provided always that the feoffee may not enter into the
occupation of the land itself , nor take any part of its produce , and in
particular may not hinder the farmer in his enjoyment , nor eject him .
STATUTE , 21 HENRY VIII , c . 15 . - A . D , 1529 .
Fermers shall enjoy their leases against recoveries b
y
feigned titles , & c .
Where afore this time divers persons have made leases o
f
their manors ,
lands , tenements , and other hereditaments , sometime b
y
their indentures ,





them great fines for the incomes o
f
the same leases ; and after the
same leasors , their heirs , o
r assigns ,have caused and suffered recoveries
to b
e
had against them in the court o
f our sovereign lord the king ,
and in other lords courts , upon feigned and untrue titles , b
y
craft or
covin to put the same termers from their said terms ; and after such





judgments , have entered into the same manors , lands , tenements , and
other hereditaments so to ferm letten , and thereof have expulsed the
said fermers , contrary to their said leases , covenants , and agreements ; and
because it was doubted to some persons , whether the said termers might
falsify such recoveries , or not :
2 . Be it therefore enacted , * * * that all such termers shall and
may falsify , for his term only , such recoveries , as well heretofore had
a
s
hereafter to be had , in such wise and form as a tenant of a freehold
shall and may do by the course o
f
the common law , where such tenant
o
f
freehold was neither privy nor party to the same recovery .
3 . And that the same termers , their executors and assigns , notwith
standing such recoveries so had , shall retain , hold , and enjoy their said
terms , according to their said leases , against a
ll
such recoverees , their
heirs and assigns , as they should o
r might have done against the said
lessors , if such recovery had not been had he suffered ; and that the said
recoverers , their heirs , and assigns , after such recovery so had , shall have





f debt , for the rents and services reserved upon the
same leases , being due after the same recoveries ; and also like actions
against them for waste done , after the same recoveries so had ; in like
manner and form as the said leasors should or might have had , if the
same recoveries had never been had . * *
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COKE LIT. * 460 - A . D. 1620 - 30 .
When Littleton wrote , if a man had made a lease for years by writing ,
and he that had the freehold had suffered himself to be impleaded in a
real action by collusion to bar the lessee of his term , and made default ,
& c ., the statute of Gloucester gave the lessee for years some remedy by
way of receipt, and a trial whether the demandant did move the plea
by good right or collusion ; and if it were found by collusion , then the
termor should enjoy his term , and the execution of the judgment should
stay until after the term ended . But this statute extendeth not to five
cases : 1. If the lease were without writing ; for the words of this
act are so that the termor may have recovery by writ of covenant. 2. It
extendeth not but to a recovery by default . 3. The termor could not be
relieved by this statute unless he knew of the recovery and were received ,
& c. 4 . By the better opinion of books it extendeth not to tenants by
statute merchant , statute staple , or elegit . 5 . Not to guardian . But
now the statute of 21 Hen . 8 doth give remedy in all the said cases sav
ing the case of the guardian , and giveth them power to falsify all
manner of recoveries had against the tenants of the freehold upon feigned
and untrue titles . Now the statute saith that it was a doubt before
the statute whether a termor for years might falsify or no ; but yet it
seemeth by the better opinion of books in so great variety , that he, hav
ing but a chattel, was not able by the common law to falsify a covenous
recovery of the freehold , because he could not have the thing that was
recovered .
Term Void for Uncertainty.
ANON , in Common Bench , 7 Edw . 6. — A . D . 1553. — Brooke Abr . t. Leases, 66 .
A man possessed of a lease for a term of 40 years granted to J . N . as
many of these years as should be arrear at the time of his death . This
grant was held void by HALES and a
ll
the other justices , because of the
uncertainty ; for this is not like where a man leased land for the term
o
f his life and four years more ; this is certain that his executors shall
have it for four years after his death . But in the other case the grantor













w ere is ce
r
NOTE , by BROMLEY and the other justices , 2 Mary . - A . D . 1555 - Brooke
Abr . t . Leases 67 .
If I lease land to W . N . habendum until it should pay 10
0
1 and
without livery this is merely a tenancy at will for the uncertainty , but if
livery is made the lessee thereby shall have it for life on condition to
cease when he has made the 100 l . And in Easter term 3 Mary , this
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ANON ., in chancery . A . D . 1583 ? - 1 And . 122 .
W . Kingswell , possessed of a lease for years , gave it in these words :
" I give my lease of and in ” & c ., “ after my decease to my son Swithin
and his wife .” The question was if this manner of grant was void or
not ; and this in the chancery , was referred by the chancellor to the
CHIEF JUSTICES of the king 's bench and common pleas to consider ; who
thought that the assignment or grant of the lease was void , and cannot
take effect according to the words of it ; for to make a lease so com
mence or end, as one had a lease in possession , may not be , and it is no
more than to grant so much of his term as shall be to come after the
death of the father ; which is entirely void , for this that there is no
knowing what thing in this case passes, and this for the uncertainty ;
and to hold that these words, after the death , & c ., shall be void and on
this to say that it is an assignment or gift of his term , viz ., the residue,
is against reason ; for this is not the intent of the grantor . And of
this opinion also were MEAD and PERYAM , JJ.
SAY V. SMITH , in Common Pleas, Easter term , 6 Ellz . - A . D . 1564 - 1
Plowd . Com . 269. Abridged .
[Replevin by William Say against John Smith and Thomas Fuller, for
taking nine cows . The defendants justified the taking as bailiffs of
Edmond Smith in whose freehold of 20 acres the cows were doing
damage . Say rejoined that said Edmond had the freehold by devise
in writing of William Norton , who in his lifetime, viz , 4 Hen . 8, leased
the same to John Kirton , whose executor assigned said lease and term
to Say , which lease produced in court demised the land to the lessee
and his assigns for the term of ten years reserving to the lessor and his
heirs and assigns a yearly rent of 4 l. 16 s. 8 d., and a rent of 10 ,000
tiles, or their value in money payable at the end of said term ; and
further by said lease it was agreed and granted that , if at the end of
said term and every succeeding term , the rent should be duly paid ,
said lessee , his heirs and assigns, should have a perpetual demise , farm ,
and grant of the premises from ten years to ten years on like rent con
tinually and ensuing out of the memory of man . It was further alleged
that the rent had been duly paid , and that by virtue of the lease and as
signment the plaintiff was lawfully possessed of the premises, and being
80 possessed, the defendants wrongfully entered and took the cows.
To this the defendants demurred . ]
[OPINION .] I heard the arguments of al
l
the justices except WALSH ,
the latter end o
f
whose argument I only heard ; but they al
l
argued
to one effect , and agreed that the title of the plaintiff was not good ,
and that the defendants should have a return . * * * Then as to the
principal matter , every contract sufficient to make a lease for years ought
to have certainty in three limitations , viz . in the commencement o
f
the
term , in the continuance of it , and in the end of it . So that all these
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ought to be known at the commencement of the lease, and words in a
lease which don 't make this appear are but babble, as BROWN said . And
these three are in effect but one matter , showing the certainty of the
time for which the lessee shall have the land , and if any of these fail
it is not a good lease , for then there wants certainty . * * Sa So here
the first term of ten years is good without question , but the term after
wards for other ten years is limited to commence after the per
formance of a condition , so that until the condition is performed
the term cannot commence . And then if the condition ought first to be
performed , it is first to be considered whether or no it is possible to be
performed , and if it is now performed . And Brown said that it is not
possible to be performed , because the words of it are , that he shall
hare the lease if he pay the tiles or the value of them in money at the
end of every ten years from thence next following . So that every ten
years which shall next follow ought to precede the payment , and the pay





them , for the payment ought to be at the end of
every ten years . * * * So that until all ten years are passed the end
o
f every ten years next following the date of the said indenture is not
passed ; and all ten years are not passed until the end of the world .
Wherefore the end o
f
the world ought to come before the payment , and
the payment ought to come before the lease , and so the lease shall never
commence . * * *
Then a
s







although it should be here admitted that there is a certainty of the com
mencement o
f







the term may be known , for it is appointed that upon the
payment the lessee shall have a perpetual demise from te
n
years to
ten years , which is as much as a demise for 20 years , and which words
would have made a good lease fo
r
2
0 years if he had stopped there , but
he has coupled them with other words which make the whole uncertain ,
viz . that the demise shall be perpetual , and from ten years to ten years
continually and out o
f
the memory of man , which words , perpetually ,
continually , and out of memory , don ' t contain any certain term , but time
without a term . * * *
From the above cases it will be seen that if it had not been for the fact
that the form of the conveyance was insufficient to pass a freehold the titles
o
f
the lessees would have been sustained as creating estates for life , in which
the uncertainty of duration is a common element . Therefore , since livery is
no longer necessary to pass a freehold , and the word heirs is made unneces
sary to pass a fee by deed , the questions discussed in these cases will now
seldom arise . They might arise on a contest between the heir and the ad
ministrator as to whether it was a freehold or a chattel real . But that un
certainty as to the term would not now avoid the contract and estate is
shown by the following cases : Reed v . Lewis ( 1881 ) , 74 Ind . 433 , 39 Am .
Rep . 88 ; School Dist . No . 6 v . Everett ( 1883 ) , 52 Mich . 314 , 17 N . W . 926 ;
D 'Arcy v . Martyn ( 1886 ) , 63 Mich . 602 , 30 N . W . 194 ; Horner v . Leeds
( 1855 ) , 25 N . J . L . 106 ; Lemington v . Stevens ( 1875 ) , 48 Vt . 38 .
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" Said Crow hereby agrees to lease unto said Meinhart the following plece
of ground [describing it ] for the purpose of carrying on the business of a
creamery thereon , and for the term of so long as said creamery is carried
on as said business , for the sum or rent of one dollar for said lease in full ,"
was held not to create a term nor any interest in the land , but a mere
license ; and therefore an attachment of the interest of the licensee as a
leasehold was not sustained . Melhop v . Meinhart ( 1886 ) , 70 Iowa, 685 .
28 N . W . 545 . To the same effect see also : Western Transp . Co. v . Lan
sing , 49 N . Y . 499 .
ST . AUBY 'S CASE , in the Exchequer , Easter , 31 Ellz . - A . D. 1590 .- Oro .
Eliz . 183 .
Earl of Arundel being possessed of a term for years in lands , grants
a rent to St. Auby for his life, issuing out of said lands , and dies. This
is found by office , and the land now being in the queen 's hands, Drew
prays an allowance of this rent, the term yet having continuance for
divers years. Popham , Att . Gen ., moved that it was void to charge the
land , for he cannot have a frank -tenement out of a chattel , and if he has
not a frank -tenement according to the word of the grant , he can have no
other estate , for it is not granted for any time certain .
MANWOOD , Chief Baron . — Although this cannot be a grant to make
a freehold , yet it shall be a grant as it may be , vi
z
. , a grant for so many
years a
s
the term endures , if he live so long ; for it is not a frank -tene
ment in law , but a chattel . To this opinion were GENT and CLERK , Bar
ons , inclined , but said they would advise .
ACCORD : Butt ' s Case ( in common pleas , 1600 ) , 7 Coke ( part 2 ) 23 .
For the later history of this question see the cases on executory devises
post
GOODRIGHT d . HALL v . RICHARDSON , in King ' s Bench , Mich . , 30 Geo .
III - A . D . 1790 — 3 Term 462 .
In ejectment for a messuage and lands it was found b
y
special verdict
that Oct . 28 , 1785 , Wm . Child leased to James Moss ( from whom de
fendant got title ) the premises in question “ a
t
the yearly rent of 10 l . ,
payable half yearly , for and during the full end and term of 3 , 6 , or 9
years from the feast day o
f St . Thomas next ensuing * * * which
shall be determinable in the years 1788 , 1791 , 1794 ” and the tenant cov
enanted to repair during the term o
r
terms . Plaintiff ' s lessor , claiming
b
y








LORD KENYON , C . J . There is no doubt o
f
what LORD MANSFIELD ' S
opinion would have been in Ferguson v . Cornish , 2 Burr . 1034 , as to
the validity of the lease beyond the first seven years . In these cases
the intention o
f
the parties ought to prevail , if it be not contrary to
law . It is true that there must be a certainty in the lease as to the
commencement and duration o
f





the time ; for if in the fluxion of time a day will
arrive which will make it certain , that is sufficient . As if a lease be




1 years after three lives in being ; though it is uncertain
a
t
first when that term will commence , because those lives are in being ,
yet when they die it is reduced to a certainty ; and id certum est quod
certum reddi potest ; and such terms are frequently created for raising
portions for younger children . Now in this case it is impossible to form
any doubt respecting the intention of these parties . It was intended
that this lease should take effect for three years at all events , and that




the parties to put an end to
it at that time , or at the end o
f
six years , giving reasonable notice to
the other . It is like a lease for a year , and so from year to year ; where ,
if the lessee wishes to determine it at the end o
f
the year , he must
give reasonable notice to the other party . And though here either
o
f
the parties might have determined the lease at the expiration o
f
the
first three years , yet when the time elapsed , at which notice ought to
have been given for that purpose , the lease could not be determined
till the end o
f
the next three years . Consequently the lessor of the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover .
ASHHURST , J . All that is required is either that the term should
be certain in itself , or reducible to a certainty . Now that is the case
here ; for it is for three , six , or nine years , as the case may happen ;
the parties having agreed that it should be determinable in the years
1788 , 1791 , 1794 . It is therefore a lease for three years certain , or
for six or nine years unless the parties determine it sooner .
BUTLER , J . This is a lease for nine years , determinable by either of the
parties a
t
the end of the first three or si
x
years ; for it is stated in the
case that it is determinable in the years 1788 , 1791 , 1794 . But if it




these periods , the party first giving
reasonable notice , it was to continue for the nine years .
GROSE , J . O
f











f Oral Lease .
STATUTE OF FRAUDS , 29 Car . II . c . 3 , Secs . 1 - 3 . - A . D . 1676 .
For prevention o
f many fraudulent practices which are commonly e
n
deavored to be upheld b
y perjury and subornation o
f perjury be it en
acted b
y
the kings most excellent majesty b
y
and with the advice and
consent o
f
the lords spiritual and temporal and the commons in this





from and after the four and twentieth day o
f June which shall be in
the year o
f
our Lord one thousand six hundred seventy and seven . All











f any messuages , manors , lands , tenements or
hereditaments made or created b
y
livery and seisin only o
r by parole
and not put in writing and signed b
y




their agents thereunto lawfully authorized b
y writing , shall






will only and shall not
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either in law or equity be deemed or taken to have any other or greater
force or effect . Any consideration for making any such parole leases or
estates or any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding .
SEC . 2 . Except nevertheless all leases not exceeding the term of
three years from the making thereof whereupon the rent reserved to the
landlord during such term shall amount unto two- third parts at the least
of the full improved value of the thing demised .
SEC. 3 . And moreover that no leases, estates or interests either of
freehold or terms of years or any uncertain interest not being copyhold
or customary interest of in to or out of any messuages , manors , lands,
tenements or hereditaments shall at any time after said four and twen
tieth day of June be assigned , granted , or surrendered , unless it be by
deed or note in writing signed by the party so assigning , granting , or
surrendering the same or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by
writing or by act and operation of law .
WHITING v. OHLERT, in Mich . Sup . Ct. 1884 - 52 Mich . 462 , 18 N . W . 219 ,










Assumpsit . Plaintiff brings error from judgment for defendant .
CAMPBELL , J . This was an action by a tenant against his landlord
for disturbance in his enjoyment . The main dispute was concerning
the validity o
f
the lease . The testimony tended to show an agreement
b
y parol in April for a year ' s tenancy from the beginning of May . The
court below held that an agreement b
y
parol for a full term o
f
a year ,
to begin in the future , was void under the Statute of Frauds . That
statute provides that all contracts for the leasing for more than one
year o
f
lands shall be void unless in writing . Comp L . ( 1871 ] § 4694
[How . S
t
. § 81 . ] The only other provision supposed to be involved is




terms is not to be
performed within one year must be in writing . Comp . L . § 4698 .
The distinction between an agreement for a lease and the lease itself
was pointed out in Tillman v . Fuller 12 Mich . 113 . It is very well settled
that a lease may b
e
made to take effect in future , and that the estate
does not begin with the contract , but with the future period . Young v .
Dake 5 N . Y . 463 ; Trull v . Granger 8 N . Y . 115 ; Wood v . Hubbell
1
0
N . Y . 479 . It is held in New York , under a statute corresponding
to ours , that an agreement by parol for a future term not exceeding
one year is valid , and not within the statute . Young v . Dake 5 N . Y
463 . That case is well considered , and is , we think , à fair construction
o
f
the statute , which ought not to be given a strained meaning . The
same doctrine has been adhered to in that state , and is re -affirmed em
phatically in Becar v . Flues 64 N . Y . 518 , where a tenant was held
liable for the agreed rent , who had never gone into possession , and had
declined to do so .
Concurring , as we do , in this view o
f
the law , we think the court
below erred in it
s ruling , and should have allowed a recovery o
f
damages
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for the injury done plaintiff . We note further in the record that the
right of possession seems to have been determined in plaintiff 's favor
in proceedings before a commissioner , and we cannot understand why
on any theory his recovery , to some extent at least , was questionable.
But as tenant for a year he was of course entitled to larger damages .
Judgment reversed .
Accord : Sears v. Smith , 3 Colo . 277 ; Steininger v. Williams , 63 Ga . 475 ;
Huffman v . Starks, 31 Ind . 474 , Gregory , J ., dissenting ; Sobey v . Brisbee , 20
Iowa , 105 ; Paulton v. Kreiser ( 1904 ) , 18 S. Dak . 487 , 101 N . W . 46 .
The weight of authority is against this case . Bain v. McDonald , 111 Ala .
272 , 20 So . 77 ; Wickson V. Monarch Cycle Mfg . Co . (1900 ) , 128 Cal. 156 ,
60 Pac . 764 , 79 Am . St . Rep . 36 , and cases there cited . Wheeler v . Franken
thal, 78 Ill. 124 ; Wolf v . Dozer , 22 Kan . 436 ; Mathews v. Carlton ( 1905 ) ,
189 Mass. 285 , 75 N . E . 637 ; Jellett v. Rhode , 43 Minn . 167, 45 N . W . 13 , 7
L . R . A . 671 ; Johnson v. Albertson , 51 Minn . 335 , 53 N . W . 642; Whiting v .
Pittsburgh Opera , 88 Pa. St. 100 , " from the making thereof."
Tenant or Servant .
HAYWOOD v. MILLER, in N . Y . Sup . Ct., May 1842 — 3 Hill 90 .
Miller sued Haywood in trespass for ejecting his goods from a dwell
ing house on Haywood 's lower farm , which plaintiff occupied under an
agreement that he would labor on the farm for a year and that his wife
would do the house-keeping ; for all of which Haywood agreed to pay
him $ 160 . Haywood asked Miller to work on the upper farm , which
Miller refused to do , whereupon Haywood discharged him , gave him
notice to leave , and finally entered and put out his furniture . From
judgment for $ 200 for plaintiff, Haywood brings error .
PER CURIAM . The contract was not in the nature of a lease . Whether
the lower farm was intended as the place of labor or not, the relation
between these parties was merely that of master and servant. True ,
it is assumed by the contract that the defendant below should furnish
a house ; and so does every master agree to furnish a house , or house
room , which is the same thing , for his domestic servants . It does not
follow that , when he becomes dissatisfied and gives his servant warning
to depart , and the latter refuses , that the master may not turn the
servant away and remove his goods. To be sure , the master does this
under the peril of paying damages for a breach of the contract with
his servant, if he cannot show good grounds for dismissing him . But
he is not a trespasser , whether he have good cause or not . Here the
labor was to be on a salary of so much for the year . Suppose the plaint
if
f
below had refused to work and held over the year ; could the de
fendant have distrained for rent , or sued for use and occupation ? Or
could the plaintiff have had ejectment for the ouster within the year ?
Clearly neither ; and that shows there was no more a tenancy created ,
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than there would be under any other retainer for a year 's service . The
mistake lies in the form of action - in bringing trespass , and not as
sumpsit . The judgment must be reversed .
Judgment reversed .
LIGHTBODY v. TRUELSEN et al., in Minn Sup. Ct., Nov . 2 , 1888 – 39 Minn .
310, 40 N . W . 67.
The plaintiff claiming to be tenant of some boarding houses , sues the
defendant sheriff and under- sheriff for wrongfully ejecting him .




s quarry , built these houses , and the plaintiff went into
possession under a contract with the company , b
y
which he agreed to
furnish the house and board and lodge all the men sent him b
y
the com
pany for $ 4 . 50 per week , to be paid him b
y
the company and b
y
it de
ducted from the men ' s wages , the company also deducting from the board
money $60 per month for the rent of the houses . The plaintiff agreed
to give personal and constant supervision to the house and not to be
absent without the consent o
f
the company ' s superintendent . The su
perintendent becoming dissatisfied , ordered plaintiff to leave and re
move his goods . This being refused , he had the defendants remove them .
The court below gave plaintiff judgment for $ 1 ,000 damages and the
defendants appeal .
MITCHELL , J . * * * If plaintiff was merely the servant of the Com
pany , employed to manage the boarding -houses for them , there could be
very little doubt but that his use or occupancy of the buildings was also as
servant , and not as tenant , being merely accessory to the more convenient
performance o
f
his duties as servant . If the use or occupancy be as
servant , the law is well settled that the master does not part with the
possession , the servant ' s possession being the master ' s . If the serv
ant is discharged , he must , on request , quit the premises ; and , if he
refuses to g
o , the master may eject him , and for that purpose use
such force a
s
is reasonably necessary . The master ' s right in this re
spect does not depend upon the question whether the servant is right
fully or wrongfully discharged , but exists in the one case as well as the





f employment , which would be the servant ' s only remedy .
But the question here is , was plaintiff the servant of the company a
t
all , or was he their tenant ? A tenant may be defined to be one who
has possession of the premises of another in subordination to that
other ' s title , and with his consent . No particular form of words is
necessary to create a tenancy . Any words that show an intention of
the lessor to divest himself o
f
the possession , and confer it upon
another , but of course in subordination to his own title , is sufficient .
While , of course , the existence o
f
certain things is necessary to con
stitute a lease , there is no artificial rule b
y
which the contract is to
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be construed . It is largely a question of the intention of the parties ,
to be collected from the whole agreement. It seems to us that the
agreement in the present case all looks to a leasing of these boarding
houses to plaintiff , and not to an employment of him as agent to
manage them for the company. Every provision of the contract con
templates his occupancy as landlord or proprietor . There is nothing
to indicate that his possession of the buildings was not to be exclu
sive ; on the contrary , the nature of the business, and the manner in
which it was to be run , necessarily imply that it was to be exclusive .
He was to run the business , not for the benefit of the company , but
for himself ; the profits, if any, being his , and the losses, if any, he
would have to stand . He took his chances on the number of boarders
he would get ; the company did not obligate themselves to furnish
any particular number . He furnished the houses and provided the
supplies at his own expense , just as any boarding -house keeper would
do, if running the business as principal, and not as agent for another .
What was paid him was for boarding the men , and not as compensa
tion for services as agent. Moreover , he had to pay a fixed rent for
the use of the buildings, the amount of which was not at all depend
ent upon the number of boarders the company furnished . It was to
be the same whether they furnished one or one hundred . The man
ner in which the board -bills of the men or the rent for the buildings
were paid is unimportant . That was a mere question of convenience .
The fact that plaintiff was obligated to board the company's men ,
and that he was to give his time to the supervision of the boarding
houses, is not at all inconsistent with the idea of a lease . In short,
the whole contract , in our judgment , shows an intention , not to em
plov plaintiff 's services as agent , but to lease the buildings to him ,
with just such covenants and conditions as to the manner of their
use and the mode of conducting the business as would naturally be
incorporated into a lease, in view of the relation the buildings bore
to the company's business . * * *
Judgment affirmed .
BOWMAN V. BRADLEY , in Pa . Sup . Ct., Oct. 3, 1892 – 151 Pa . St. 351, 24
Atl. 1062 , 17 L . R . A . 213 .
Action in trespass . From judgment for plaintiff , defendant appeals .
WILLIAMS , J . The question on which this case turns is one of consid
erable practical importance , and in this state it seems to be an open one .
The learned trial judge finding no precedent in our own reports to guide
him turned to the English courts , and followed what he believed to be
the rule held by them . He stated at the same time that the question
was one that could " only be settled by a decision of the supreme
court.” The facts on which the question arises are mainly undisputed .
They show that Bradley owned a farm in Dauphin county containing
124 ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD .
about twenty -nine acres . About four or five acres of this were occupied
by a mill and pond operated by the owner . To care for the balance
and the stock upon it he hired Bowman and his family . The farm
work and the care of the cattle were to be looked after by Bowman . His
wife was to milk the cows . His son was to deliver the milk each
morning to Bradley in the city of Harrisburg . For this labor Bowman
was to receive one dollar per day and the use of a house upon the
premises to be occupied by himself and family . The only fact in dispute
was the duration of the contract . The plaintiff alleged it was to
continue for one year . The defendant asserted that it was terminable
at his pleasure. He says that he told Bowman “ I will try you , and on
your terms , and if you don 't suit me I will discharge you and expect you
to leave the premises on sight.” Which was the true version was a ques
tion of fact for the jury . If they found with the defendant that was
an end of the plaintiff 's case unless by some arbitrary rule of law the em
ployee was turned into a tenant for years. On the other hand if they
found the contract was for one year the plaintiff was entitled to re
cover unless the defendant could show a sufficient reason for terminat
ing it sooner . The first question therefore that presented itself on
the trial was over the nature and extent of Bowman 's right to the house
from which he was ousted by the defendant . Was that right an in
cident of the hiring and dependent on the continuance of the relation
of employer and employee , or had it an independent separate existence ,
so that he was to be treated as a tenant for years with a right to remain in
possession for one whole year whether he remained in the employment of
the owner or not ?
This was a question of law . The terms of the contract , so far as
the parties differed , it was the duty of the jury to determine ; but the
terms being fixed , their legal import was for the court to declare . This
should be determined upon a consideration of the nature and purpose
of the contract , and the character of the business to which it relates ;
and analogies furnished by cases arising under the poor laws in Eng
land or in this country , while they may be helpful in some respects ,
ought not to be controlling . The subject of this contract was labor .
Labor was what Bradley needed and undertook to pay for . It was what
Bowman offered to furnish him at an agreed price . The labor was to
be performed upon the land in it
s
cultivation , in the care o
f
the cows ,
and the delivery o
f
the milk . As Bowman was not a cropper , or tenant




the land and the cows , and the implements
o
f
farm labor , was the possession o
f
his employer . The barn was used to
stable the cattle and store their feed . The house was a convenient place
for the residence o
f
the laborer . The house , the barn , the land , the cattle ,
the farming tools were turned over into the custody o
f
the man who had
been hired to care for the property ; but he had no hostile possession , no
independent right to possession . His possession was that of the owner
whom h
e represented , and for whom he labored for hire .
This is not denied a
s
to the farm , the barn , the stock , or the tools ,
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but an attempt is made to distinguish between the house and everything
else that came into the possession of the employee in pursuance of the con
tract of hiring . There is no solid ground on which such a distinction
can rest . If the possession of the house be regarded as an incident
of the hiring , the incident must fall with the principal. If it be re
garded as part of the compensation for labor stipulated for, then the
right to the compensation ceased when the labor was discontinued .
Bowman had the same right to insist on the payment of the cash part
of his wages as on that part which provided his family a place to
live. His right under the contract of hiring was like that of the porter
to the possession of the porter 's lodge ; like that of the coachman to his
apartments over the stable ; like that of the teacher to the rooms he or she
may have occupied in the school buildings ; like that of the domestic
servants to the rooms in which they lodge in the house of their employers.
In a
ll
these cases and others that might be enumerated the occupancy
o
f
the room or house is incidental to the employment . The employee
has no distinct right of possession , fo
r
his possession is that o
f
the
employer , and it cannot survive the hiring to which it is incidental ,
o
r
under which it is part of the contract price for the services per
formed . So in this case , if the contract was simply a contract for labor
a
t
one dollar per day and a house to live in , the plaintiff held the house
b
y
the same title and for the same purpose that he did the land o
r
the
cattle in the care o
f
which his labor was to be performed . When his
contract ended , his rights in the premises were extinguished , and it
was his duty to give way to his successor . The jury might have found
the disputed term of the contract in the plaintiff ' s favor and that the
contract was made in express words for one year . In this case the de
fendant would be called upon to explain his conduct in discharging the
plaintiff before the time for which he was hired had expired ; and the
jury would have to determine whether his conduct was a violation o
f




the reasons assigned . But
the plaintiff ' s declaration is not drawn upon this basis . It does not
allege a violation of contract but a trespass . It asserts that the plaint
if
f was " in the lawful and peaceful possesion o
f
a certain dwelling
house , messuage and tract o
f land , " and that the defendant “ with a
high hand entered upon said close * * * and forcibly threw out
o
f
said dwelling the furniture and property o
f
said plaintiff and exposed
the same to the weather and broke and injured the same . ” The damages
alleged are for injury to the furniture , and money paid to secure an
other house fo
r
himself and family . The case seems to have been begun ,
and tried , b
y
the plaintiff on the theory that his right to the possession
o
f
the house was superior to his right to remain in the defendant ' s
service ; and that while his employer might dismiss him from the one
a
t any time , he could not oust him from the other until the expiration
o
f




tract for labor at a fixed price per day and a house to live in . It can
only b
e supported b
y proof of a contract for one year ' s occupancy of the
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house. Both parties agree that the contract in this case was one of
hiring . There is no pretense of a separate lease for the house . The
compensation for its use was in the labor to be performed on the prem
ises. When the labor ceased on the nineteenth of July , the plaintiff
ceased to pay for his occupancy . By ceasing to labor without remon
strance or objection he must be held to acquiesce in the defendant 's
right to terminate the contract for labor. If that contract was right
fully terminated then the plaintiff's right to the house was at an end
and he could be lawfully put out of possession .
These views sustain the first and second assignments of error. The
fifth assignment is also sustained . It is not necessary that occupation
of a house , or apartments , should be a necessary incident to the service
to be performed in order that the right to continue in possession should
end with the service . It is enough if such occupation is convenient for
the purposes of the service and was obtained by reason of the contract
of hiring .
For the reasons thus given the judgment in this case is reversed .
Farm Hand in Cottage . - A tenant under a lease containing a condition
not to sublet , employed a man to work on the farm , and gave him posses
sion of a house on it. The court held this was not a subletting within the
terms of the lease , and no forfeiture , because the man let into the house was
there as servant and not as tenant. Vincent v . Crane , (1903 ) , 134 Mich . 700 ,
97 N . W . 34 , citing Kerrains v. People , and Chatard v . O 'Donovan , below .
A Mill Hand hired for the year at thirteen shillings per day was furnished
a cottage near the mill for his family , so he could be near his work , paying
no rent. The employer discharged him , and in an attempt to remove him
and his goods from the house was resisted . This is a prosecution of the
servant for assault with intent to kill . The case turned on whether the
defendant was tenant, in which case he could use all force necessary to pro
tect his house from unlawful intrusion : or whet
In which case he could make no resistance except to avoid bodily harm to
himself or family not avoidable by retreat. The court held he was a mere
servant. Kerrains v. People ( 1875 ) , 60 N . Y . 221, 19 Am . Rep . 158, Finch
Cas. 713 .
A Methodist Parson was removed from the parsonage by the trustees of
the church , leased to the church ladies guild and occupied by the parson
without rent . In a suit by him in trespass for the removal, the court held
that defendants were liable , because he was tenant, not servant - certainly
not their servant because not employed by them but sent by the conference .
Bristor v. Burr (1890 ) , 120 N . Y. 427 , 24 N . E . 937 ; 8 L . R . A . 710 .
A Roman Catholic Priest was removed from office by the bishop in charge
of the diocese , who owned the parsonage in fee in trust for the congrega
tion ; and was given notice to quit , which was too short if he was tenant at
will . In an action to recover possession , the court held that he was servant
and not tenant, and so entitled to no notice to quit . Chatard v. O 'Donovan
( 1881 ) , 80 Ind . 20 , 41 Am . Rep . 782 .
License or Lease .
KITCHEN V. PRIDGEN , in N . Car. Sup . Ct., Dec ., 1855 – 3 Jones Law 49 ,
64 Am . Dec . 593 .
Trespass quare clausum fregit . Plaintiff claimed possession under one
Herring , and alleged that he had occupied a house on the land for sev
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eral months where he lived , had a cook , and employed several men
cutting wood , and that he was in possession of the land . A witness
testified that he saw plaintiff pay Herring $ 7, and heard him say :
" You can go on and cut as long as you choose , paying 25 cents per cord .”
The jury were charged that plaintiff was a tenant from year to year
and entitled to notice to quit , and in absence of evidence of such notice ,
plaintiff was entitled to recover . Verdict and judgment for plaintiff .
Defendant appealed .
BY COURT, BATTLE , J . A tenancy from year to year is a species of
term for years , from which , however , it is distinguished , inasmuch
as the duration of the term is not limited . It is distinguished from
& tenancy at will, inasmuch as it is raised only by construction of
law as a substitute for an estate at will ; therefore , although prima facie
all leases for uncertain terms create a tenancy at will , courts of law
have for a long time construed such leases to constitute a tenancy from
year to year , especially where an annual rent is reserved . Thus, where
land was leased to A . for a year, and so from year to year , as long
as both parties should agree ; so , a general parol demise at an annual
rent ; so , where the occupier , under an agreement for a lease at a certain
rent , pays the rent ; so , where a tenant for life, under a limited power
of leasing , granted a lease exceeding his power , but the remainderman
accepted the rent ; so , a tenant who holds over after his term has ex
pired , and the lessor accepts rent ; so , a parol demise for a longer term
than three years, which is void by the statute of frauds : 2 Crabbe on
Real Estate , 416 , 417 ; 55 Law Lib . 265 , 266 . All these are cases where
the law will , by implication , raise a tenancy from year to year ; and it
will be seen that in them all there is a reference to an annual occupa
tion of the premises , and a corresponding payment of rent. The mode
of determining this tenancy by a notice to quit is what properly dis
tinguishes it from an estate at will ; for , although this latter estate
cannot, as a rule , be determined without a demand of possession , yet
this is for the most part all that is necessary , though there are cases
still occurring where the estate is so strictly at will that even a de
mand of possession is not required : 2 Crabbe on Real Estate, 418 . A
tenancy from year to year can be put an end to only by either party 's
giving a regular notice to quit, which must be given half a year pre
vious to the expiration of the current year of tenancy , so as to expire
at the period of the year at which the tenancy was commenced : Id .
423 . Tenancies from year to year do not determine by the death of
the tenant, but devolve on his personal representative , who must have
half a year's notice to quit : 1 Cru . Dig ., tit. Estate at Will, 285 ; Doe
v . Porter , 3 Term 13 .
Such being a tenancy from year to year , we shall look in vain for
anything in the testimony set out in the bill of exceptions which shows,
or has a tendency to show , that it existed in the present case . Neither
of the plaintiff 's witnesses says a word about a lease, an annual occu
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pation , or the payment of an annual rent. One of them does indeed
state that Herring , who then owned the land , and from whom the de
fendant soon afterwards purchased it, complained that the plaintiff
had not paid him “ the rent which he had agreed to pay ;" but this we
soon afterwards learn was not for the occupation of the land , but for
wood for which Herring had permitted him to cut at twenty - five cents
per cord ; and then , upon his paying seven dollars , Herring told him
he might cut as long as he chose upon the same terms. This agree
ment certainly did not constitute a lease for a year , or a tenancy from
year to year , even of the trees which were to be cut into wood . No
particular time is mentioned at which it had commenced , or was to com
mence . There was no reference to a year , or a number of years , for its
continuance , o
r
for the payment o
f
a
n annual rent . It did not seem
to b
e contemplated that the plaintiff should be compelled to continue
the business until he had given half a year ' s notice of his intention to
quit ; and we can hardly think that he had such an interest a
s
would ,
upon his death , have devolved on his executor or administrator . In
the absence of these qualities , the agreement between Herring and the





the defendant did not alter the nature o
f
the transaction . At most , it was but a tenancy at will of the trees ,
and such portion o
f
the land as was necessary to enable him to cut them ;
and it may well be doubted whether it was anything more than " a
mere personal contract , not attaching to the land , o
r passing , or in
tending to pass , any estate in it , but resting entirely in contract : " See
Mhoon v . Drizzle , 3 Dev . L . 414 . It is sufficient for us to say that it
was not a case o
f
tenancy from year to year ; which puts an end to the
action , without reference to any other question . The judgment must
b
e
reversed and a venire d
e novo awarded .
Judgment reversed .
Farming on Shares .
KELLY v . RUMMERFORD , in Wis . Sup . Ct . , May 8 , 1903 – 117 Wis . 620 , 94
N . W . 649 , 98 Am . St . Rep . 951 .
Replevin for half o
f crop o
f potatoes raised b
y
defendant on plaintiff ' s
land . Defendant a
t
the time o
f digging notified the plaintiff o
f
his in
tention to divide the crop in the field , and accordingly left half in a pile
in the field and took half away as his own , for which this suit is
brought . Plaintiff objected to the right o
f
the defendant to divide
the crop , but not to the manner of division . Defendant had judgment
for the return o
f
the property or it
s
value ( $ 30 ) and costs . Plaintiff
appeals .
CASSODAY , C . J . It is sometimes difficult to determine whether
a person who works the land o
f
another on shares is a tenant in com
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mon of the crop with the owner of the land or a mere cropper . Much
depends upon the wording of the contract between the parties . Lan
yon v. Woodward , 55 Wis . 652, 13 N . W . 863 ; Carrier V. Atwood ,
63 Wis . 301 , 24 N . W . 82 ; Wood v. Noack , 84 Wis . 398 , 54 N . W .
785 ; Rowlands v. Voechting (Wis .) 91 N . W . 990 ; Warner v . Abbey ,
112 Mass . 355 . In the case at bar there is practically no dispute as to
the facts . The plaintiff furnished the land and the seed . The de
fendant was to plow the ground , plant and care for and harvest the
potatoes, and have one -half of what should be raised . After plowing
the ground and planting the potatoes , the defendant moved away. Fin
ally , his son - in -law came, and went over the potatoes with a cultivator
one way and partly over them the other way . But the potatoes be
came badly damaged for want of care, and finally the plaintiff got
another man to care for the potatoes , and agreed to give him a share
of the crop for doing so . The defendant testified to the effect that
the plaintiff was to furnish the land and the seed , and that he was to
cultivate the ground and have half of the crop , provided he stay there ;
and , if he did not stay, and no one else would buy, then the plaintiff
would buy his share of the potatoes . The trial court manifestly held
that the parties were tenants in common of the crop . If such was the
relation of the parties , then the decision may be justified . Section
4257 , Rev . St. 1898 ; Foley v . The S. L . Co ., 94 Wis . 329 , 68 N . W . 994 ;
Sullivan v. Sherry , 111 Wis . 476 , 87 N . W . 471 , 87 Am . St. Rep . 890 ;
Orcott v. Moore , 134 Mass. 48 , 45 Am . Rep . 278 . If, on the other
hand , the defendant was a mere cropper , then the decision was wrong.
The general rule is that : “ The legal possession of the land , as well as
the title to the entire crop , is in the owner of the soil. The possession
of the cropper being merely that of a servant , and incident to his right
and duty of entering the close for the purpose of planting , cultivating ,
and gathering the crop , it is not the legal possession of premises which
usually gives the possessor the title to the produce . He has no property
in his share of the crop until the division which is made by the owner
of the land .” 8 Am . & Eng . Ency . Law (2d Ed. ) 324 , 325 . It is there
said that : “ The term “ cropper is applied to a person hired by the
landowner to cultivate the land , receiving for his compensation a portion
of the crop raised .” Id . So it was said in an early case in Pennsylvania
that : " If one hires a man to work his farm , and gives him a share of
the produce , he is a cropper. He has no interest in the land , but re
ceives his share as the price of his labor. The possession is still in
the owner of the land , who alone can maintain trespass ." Fry v . Jones ,
2 Rawle , 12 . In a later case in the same state it was held that an
" agreement to farm land on shares is a contract of service , and not of
lease , and a person doing the farming is a mere cropper , and not a
tenant, and has no interest in the land.” To the same effect , Steele v .
Frick , 56 Pa. 172 ; Adams v . McKesson 's Ex 'x , 53 Pa. 81 , 91 Am .
Dec. 183. Thus it has been held in North Carolina that: “ Where a
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the cropper cannot convey a legal title to his share of the crop to a third
person before an actual division and appropriation .” McNeely v. Hart ,
32 N . C . 63, 51 Am . Dec . 377 . To the same effect , Brazier v. Ansley , 33
N . C . 12 , 51 Am . Dec. 408 ; Harrison v. Ricks, 71 N . C . 11. In this last
case it is said that : “ A cropper has no estate in the land . That remains
in the landlord . Consequently , although he has , in some sense , the pos
session of the crop , it is only the possession of a servant , and is in law
that of the landlord . The landlord must divide of
f
to the cropper his
share . In short , he is a laborer receiving pay in a share of the crop . "
That is referred to approvingly in Strain v . Gardner , 61 Wis . 184 , 21
N . W . 35 . Perhaps it would have been more proper to have used the
word " landowner " instead o
f
" landlord . ” We must hold that the de
fendant was a mere cropper , and that the plaintiff remained all the
time the legal owner o
f
the whole crop , and hence was entitled to re
cover in replevin .
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed , and the cause is re
manded , with direction to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff in .
accordance with this opinion .
FARROW v . WOOLEY , in Ala . Sup . Ct . , Feb . 12 , 1903 . - 138 Ala . 267 , 30
So . 384 .
This is an action b
y
Wooley & Jordan o
f
two counts , one in tres
pass for taking , the other in trover for converting , two bales o
f
cotton ;
which was grown b
y
Pratt on Tillman ' s land under an agreement b
y
which Tillman furnished the stock and land and Pratt the labor , the
crop to b
e divided equally . Pratt gave Wooley & Jordan a mortgage on
the crop in February , and delivered these two bales to them in the fall
to apply on the mortgage . Tillman took the cotton from their premises
and delivered it to defendant , Farrow , who gave him credit on account
for it , knowing all the circumstances . The justice ' s judgment for plaint
iffs was affirmed in the circuit court , and the defendant appeals .
DOWDELL , J . The undisputed evidence showed that no force or violence
was used in taking the cotton , and that the legal title to the cotton was
in Tillman , from whom the defendant purchased it . The defendant was
entitled to the affirmative charge as requested and the court erred in its
refusal . Jordan v . Lindsay , 132 Ala . 567 , 31 So . 484 ; Code 1896 .
$ 2712 . The cases of Collier v . Faulk , 69 Ala . 58 ; and Adams v . State ,
87 Ala . 89 , 6 So . 270 , and the other cases following the Collier - Faulk
decision , in addition to those mentioned in Jordan V . Lindsay , supra ,
must b
e overruled .
Reversed and remanded .
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MEYER V. LIVESLEY , in Ore . Sup. Ct., Nov . 28 , 1904. - 45 Ore . 487, 78
Pae . 670 , 106 Am . St. Rep . 667 .
BEAN , J . This is a suit to restrain the defendants from trespassing
upon or interfering with the plaintiff 's possession of a hop -yard . On March
7, 1900 , I. M . Simpson , being the owner of a certain tract of land in
Polk county , upon which the hop -yard in question was situated , leased the
yard , with the improvements thereon , consisting of dry kiln , hop poles ,
etc ., to the defendants , for the years 1900 to 1904 , inclusive . On October
25 , 1902 , the defendants sublet the yard , together with the hop kilns,
baler and farming implements mentioned in the lease from Simpson to
them to W . D . Huston , agreeing to furnish Huston one of the dwelling
houses on the Simpson place , or to remodel another building thereon ,
and the use of Simpson 's horses in the cultivation of the hops at a certain
stipulated rate per day, in consideration of which Huston agreed to pay
them , as rental , one- fourth of the “ average quality ” of the hops produced
on the land during the years of 1903 and 1904 . On January 11 , 1904 ,
Huston assigned to the plaintiff all his right and interest in and to the
lease or contract between himself and the defendants . This assignment
was not recorded , and on January 23, 1904 , the defendants , without
knowledge or notice thereof, entered into a new lease with Huston for the
current year , taking from him a mortgage on his interest in the crop
to be grown during that year to secure a balance due for advances made
the previous year. It was stipulated in the new lease that, in case of a
violation of any of its terms by Huston , the defendants should have the
right to re-enter and take possession of the hop-yard , to complete the
cultivation of the crop , and harvest and sell it, paying over the surplus ,
if any, to Huston . In March , 1904 , the defendants attempted to enter
and take possession of the hop -yard , on account of a violation of the
provisions of the lease or agreement between them and Huston , when
this suit was brought by the plaintiff to enjoin them from doing so .
The only question we deem it necessary to consider is whether the
lease from the defendants to Huston , made in October , 1902 , was assign
able by Huston without the consent of the defendants . The plaintiff
claims title under such an assignment , but, unless Huston had authority
to assign the lease to him , he has no standing in court, and the other
questions become immaterial .
As a general rule, the power of assignment is incident to the estate of
a lessee of real property , unless it is restrained by the terms of the lease :




d . , sec . 402 . But a lease o
f
land upon shares , including the use
o
f buildings , farm implements , stock and other personal property is
regarded a
s
a personal contract , and not assignable without the consent
o
f
the lessor , because the amount to be received b
y
the lessor , and the
care o
f
the property depend upon the character , industry and skill o
f
the lessee : Taylor on Landlord and Tenant , 9t
h
e
d . , secs . 24 , 24a ; Ran
dall v . Chubb , 46 Mich . 311 , 41 Am . Rep . 165 , 9 N . W . 429 ; Lewis v . .
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Sheldon , 103 Mich . 102, 61 N . W . 269. Randall v . Chubb is much
in point. Chubb leased certain premises to Stoddard upon shares for
the term of three years with the privilege of five . Stoddard was to do all
the work , find all the seed , and deliver to the lessor one-third of the
crop . The farm was to be cropped in a certain specified way , and , as in
the case at bar , the lessee was to have the use of certain property belong
ing to the lessor . The court held that the lease was not assignable, and
that an attempt to assign it worked a forfeiture of the estate of the lessee ,
and the lessor could take immediate steps to recover possession . “ The very
nature and character of the lease or agreement,” says Mr. Chief Justice
Marston, " shows that it was a personal one to the defendant , and could
not be assigned by him to a third party without the consent of his lessor .
The rent or share which the latter would receive must depend very much
upon the character of the lessee , and the latter could not place a party
in possession of the premises who might not be a good husbandman , and
who might not be able to carry on the farm operations in a good , careful
and proper manner . Under such a lease the landlord has a right to choose
his tenant, and he may be willing to lease upon shares to one man , and
yet be wholly unwilling to let another have possession upon any terms.
So, with reference to the use of hi
s
farm implements , one might be a
careful , prudent man , who would take good care o
f
them , while another ,
more reckless , would not b
y
the owner be permitted to use them upon any
terms . ” The same principle was reaffirmed in Lewis v . Sheldon , 103
Mich . 102 , 61 N . W . 269 .
The cases of Dworak v . Graves , 16 Neb . 706 , 2
1
N . W . 440 , and Yates
V . Kinney , 19 Neb . 275 , 27 N . W . 132 , are not in fact in conflict with this
doctrine . They involve the right o
f
a lessee o
f property on shares to sell
o
r mortgage his interest in the crop after it has been grown without
the consent o
f




r interest under the lease to another before the crop is raised .
The terms of the lease from the defendants to Huston bring it directly
within the doctrine o
f
the Michigan cases . The lease included not only
the hop -yard , the successful cultivation of which necessarily depended
upon the industry and skill o
f
the lessee , but also the use of certain build
ings , farm implements , and personal property the care of which likewise
depended upon the character o
f
the lessee . In addition to this , the lease
is indefinite a
s
to its terms . It does not contain any stipulation as to the
manner in which the hops shall be cultivated , cared for , harvested , or
prepared for the market - provisions usual in leases of real property .
Its nature and terms would seem to indicate that it was made by the
defendants in reliance upon the ability , character , and skill of Huston .
From the character o
f
the agreement and the subject -matter thereof ,
we are led to conclude that it was a personal contract , which Huston
could not assign or transfer so as to substitute another in his place a
s
lessee without the consent o
f
the defendants .
These views result in the reversal of the decree and the dismissal of
the bill , and it is so ordered .
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Right to Rent Arrear on Death of Lessor .
TEMPLE V. TEMPLE , in Common Bench , 42 & 43 , Eliz . - A . D . 1601 . - Cro .
Eliz . 791 .
Debt. A rent was granted to baron and feme for their lives , the rent
was arrear ; the baron dies ; another rent was arrear ; the feme dies in
testate ; and her administrator brings debt for the arrearages due in the
life of the baron and after.
The Court resolved that it well lay, because the arrearages survived
to the feme as well as the rent itself. * * *
Landlord's Right to Enter and Inspect Daring - Term .
HUNT . DOWMAN , In King 's Bench , Trinity , Jac. 1. - A . D . 1618 Cro .
Jac . 478 .
Action on the case ; whereas the defendant , being lessee for years , the
reversion in fee to the plaintiff (and shows how ) , the plaintiff coming
to the house to see if any waste was committed therein , or any defect
in the reparations , that the defendant disturbed him , and would not
Buffer him to enter and view the waste , by reason whereof he is without
remedy to punish the same; and after verdict for the plaintiff upon not
guilty pleaded , it was moved in arrest of judgment , that this action lay
not : 1. because it was not shown that waste was done * * 2, that it
was never seen before this present that such an action had been brought ,
and therefore it is not allowable . But ALL THE COURT, held , that
the action was maintainable ; for , as to the first objection , the law will
not presume that he can come to a precise knowledge what waste is done
without a view . *
Warranty of Safety and Fitness.
LIBBEY V. TALFORD , in Me . Sup. Ct ., 1861 – 48 Me. 316 , 77 Am . Dec . 229 .
Assumpsit to recover fo
r
damages to goods in plaintiff ' s store by
want o
f repairs promised by defendant after leasing to plaintiff . Non
suit ordered . Plaintiff appealed .
By Court , APPLETON , J . In the lease of a store or warehouse , there
is n
o implied warranty that the building is safe , well built , or fit fo
r
any particular use : Dutton v . Gerrish , 9 Cash . 89 [ 55 Am . Dec 45 ) .
S
o , in a lease o
f
a house , there is none that it is reasonably fit for habita
tion : Foster v . Peyser , Id . 243 (57 Am . Dec . 43 ] ; Cleves v . Willoughby .
✓ Hill , 83 . On a demise of the vesture of land for a specific term , and
a
t
a certain rent , there is no implied obligation on the part of the
lessor that it shall be fi
t
for the purpose for which it is taken : Sutton
v . Temple , 12 Mee . & W . 52 . Nor of a house that it shall be reasonably
fi
t for habitation : Hart v . Windsor , Id . 68 . Nor is it implied that it
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can neither maintain an action , nor is he exonerated from the payment
of rent if the house is blown down or destroyed by fire, or the occupation
rendered impracticable by the act of God or the king 's enemies : Id .
When it is agreed that the landlord shall do the repairs , there is no
implied condition that the tenant may quit if the repairs are not done :
Surplice v . Farnsworth , y Man . & Gr. 576 ; S. C ., 49 Eng. Com . L . 574 .
In Gott v . Gandy , 2 El. & Bl. 845 , S. C ., 75 Eng . Com . L . 843 , the
plaintiff brought an action against his landlord for neglecting to make
substantial repairs to the premises, after notice that they were in a
dangerous state , by reason of which the premises fell during the tenancy ,
and injured his goods. The court held that no obligation on the part of
the landlord to make repairs arose from the relation of landlord and
tenant. “ The absence of authority to show a duty , as between landlord
and tenant ,” marks Erle, J ., " is very strong against the existence of
such a duty .” In the absence of any special agreement, the tenant
takes the risk of the future condition of the premises leased . “ The
tenant,” remarks Savage , C . J ., in Mumford v . Brown , 6 Cow . 475
( 16 Am . Dec . 440 ], " takes the premises for better and for worse , and
cannot involve his landlord in expense for repairs without his consent.”
In the present case , it does not appear that there was any agreement ,
when the contract of leasing was entered into , that the landlord should
keep the premises in repair . If there be no stipulation between the
parties to a lease on the subject of repairs , the tenant is bound to keep
the premises in repair : Long v . Fitzsimmons , 1 Watts & S. 530 .
The lease and it
s
terms and conditions were made . The duties of
the parties were left a
s a
t
common law . The landlord was under no





By law , the duty to repair devolved upon the tenant . It is not in proof
that the premises were out o
f repair when the tenant entered upon their
occupation . The landlord , being under no legal obligation to make re
pairs , promised the tenant , who was under such obligation , to make them .
The promise was without consideration . It was no part of the original
agreement . It was made while the tenant was occupying the premises .




INGALLS v . HOBBS , in Mass . Sup . Jud . Ct . , May 9 , 1892 – 156 Mass . 348 ,
3
1




. Rep . 460 , Tiedeman R . P .
Cas . 126 .
KNOWLTON , J . This is an action to recover $ 500 for the use and
occupation of a furnished dwelling house at Swampscott during the
summer of 1890 . It was submitted to the superior court on what is
entitled an “ agreed statement o
f
evidence , ” by which it appears that the
defendant hired the premises o
f
the plaintiffs for the season , as a
furnished house , provided with beds , mattresses , matting , curtains ,
chairs , tables , kitchen utensils , and other articles which were ap
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parently in good condition , and that when the defendant took possession
it was found to be more or less infested with bugs, so that the de
fendant contended that it was unfit for habitation , and for that reason
gave it up , and declined to occupy it . * * * Judgment was ordered
for the defendant , and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. * * *
The facts agreed warrant a finding that the house was unfit for habita
tion when it was hired , and we are therefore brought directly to the
question whether there was an implied agreement on the part of the
plaintiff that it was in a proper condition for immediate use as a dwell
ing house . It is well settled , both in this commonwealth and in England,
that one who lets an unfurnished building to be occupied as a dwelling
house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation . Dutton v .
Gerrish , 9 Cush . 89 ; Foster v . Peyser , Id . 242 ; Stevens v . Pierce , 151
Mass . 207 ; 23 N . E . 1006 ; Sutton v . Temple , 12 Mees . & W . 52 ; Hart
v . Windsor , Id . 68 . In the absence of fraud or a covenant , the pur
chaser of real estate , or the hirer of it for a term , however short , takes
it as it is , and determines for himself whether it will serve the purpose
for which h
e
wants it . He may , and often does , contemplate making
extensive repairs upon it to adapt it to his wants . But there are good
reasons why a different rule should apply to one who hires a furnished
room , or a furnished house , for a few days , or a few weeks or months .
Its fitness for immediate use o
f




appointments , is a far more important element entering into the con
tract than where there is a mere lease o
f
real estate . One who lets for
a short term a house provided with all furnishings and appointments
for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a
well -understood purpose o
f
the hirer to use it as a habitation . An im
portant part o
f what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy
it without delay , and without the expense o
f preparing it for use . It is
very difficult , and often impossible , for one to determine on inspection
whether the house and its appointments are fi
t
for the use for which they
are immediately wanted , and the doctrine caveat emptor , which is or
dinarily applicable to a lessee o
f
real estate , would often work injustice
if applied to cases o
f
this kind . It would be unreasonable to hold , under
such circumstances , that the landlord does not impliedly agree that what
h
e





time . This distinction between furnished and unfurnished houses in
reference to the construction o
f
contracts for letting them , when there
are no express agreements about their condition , has long been recognized
in England , where it is held that there is an implied contract that a
furnished house le
t
for a short time is in proper condition for immediate
occupation as a dwelling . Smith v . Marrable , 11 Mees . & W . 5 ; Wilson
v . Hatton , 2 Exch . Divi . 336 ; Warehouse Co . v . Carr , 5 C . P . Div . 507 ;
Sutton v . Temple , ubi supra ; Hart v . Windsor , ubi supra ; Bird v . Lord
Greville , 1 Cababe & E . 317 ; Charsley v . Jones , 53 S . P . Q . B . Div . 280 .
In Dutton v . Gerish , 9 Cush . 89 , Chief Justice Shaw recognizes the
doctrine as applicable to furnished houses ; and in Edwards v . McLean ,
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122 N . Y . 302 ; 25 N . E . Rep . 483 ; Smith v . Marrable , and Wilson v .
Hutton , cited above , are referred to with approval , although held inap
plicable to the question then before the court. See Cleves v. Willoughby ,
♡ Hill, 83 ; Franklin v. Brown , 118 N . Y . 110 , 23 N . E . 126 . We
are of opinion that in a lease of a completely furnished dwelling house for
a single season at a summer watering place there is an implied agree
ment that the house is fit for habitation without greater preparation
than one hiring it for a short time might reasonably be expected to make
in appropriating it to the use for which it was designed .
Judgment affirmed .
The exception established in this case o
f
leases of furnished houses for
short terms is repudiated in an extended opinion in Murray V . Albertson
( 1888 ) , 50 N . J . L . 167 , 13 Atl . 394 , 7 Am . St . Rep . 787 , by the highest court
in New Jersey ; in Fisher v . Lighthall , 4 Mackey ( D . C . ) 82 , 54 Am . Rep .
258 ; and doubted in the case of Franklin v . Brown (1889 ) , 118 N . Y . 110 ,
23 N . E . 126 , 16 Am . St . Rep . 744 , 6 L . R . A . 770 , and distinguished on the
ground that the offensive odors which rendered that place untenantable
arose off the premises in an adjoining livery stable . See also : Rubens v .
Hill ( 1904 ) , 213 ni . 523 , 72 N . E . 1127 .
MILES v . TRACEY , in Ky . Ct . of App . , Jan . 3d . , 1906 — 28 Ky . L . Rep . 621 ,
89 S . W . 1128 .
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to her peti
tion .
O ’REAR , J . Appellees , landlords , owned a two -story building , the
lower story o
f
which was let to tenants and the upper story to appel
lant . The building fell because structurally insecure , and damaged
appellant ' s furniture . She sues the landlords to recover the damages .
In Franklin v . Tracy , 25 Ky . L . Rep . 1409 , YY S . W . 1113 , 63 L .
R . A . 649 , it was held that there was no implied warranty b
y
the land
lord that the tenement was fit or safe ; that the tenant leases , as one
buys such property , with the duty to look and take notice for himself
of its condition . In this case , to avoid the effect of the opinion above
cited , it is admitted , and to conform presumably to the response to the
petition for a rehearing in that case ( 25 Ky . L . Rep . 1409 , 78 S . W .
1112 , 63 L . R . A . 949 ) , appellant here amended her petition in this case ,
and alleged that she was tenant o
f
the upper story alone , that the de
fendants had let the lower story to other tenants , and that appellees had
retained and reserved control and possession o
f
the walls and foundation
o
f
the building . The desire was to bring the allegations of this plead
ing up to the rule as stated b
y
some text -writers and courts , that where
the landlord lets portions o
f
a tenement to different tenants , reserving
a common entry , hallway , or stairway , which is not let to any of them ,
but is reserved for the use of al
l , he is liable for injuries occurring
in such reserved portion by reason of its defective condition . This case
falls short o
f




ESTATES FOR YEARS . 137
landlords retained possession and control of the walls and foundation ,
the pleading shows the fact to be that the possession of the entire prem
ises had been parted with . While if the landlord had reserved , for
example , a stairway for the common use of all his tenants , it could not
be said that any of them had exclusive control of it, or that all together
had . It was then his duty to keep it in repair , not by reason of any
implied covenant to that effect , but, as those using it were his licensees ,
he owed them the duty to keep the passageway in reasonably safe and fit
condition for their use . But here there could have been in fact no
reservation o
f possession or control . The technical averment is an
ideality , and inconsistent with the essential conditions resulting from the
facts alleged in the petition . It then is reduced to a legal conclusion ,
and does not help an otherwise defective pleading . There is no allega
tion that the defective condition of the building was known to the land
lords , or that the defect was concealed or warranted against by them .
Judgment affirmed .
SIGGINS v . MCGILL , in New Jersey Court of Err , and App . , Nov . 20 , 1905
— 7
2
N . J . L . 263 , 62 Atl . 411 , 111 Am . St . Rep . 666 .
PITNEY , J . Plaintiff was a tenant of the defendants , occupying an
apartment in a building owned b
y
them in Jersey City . There were
several apartments in the building , and these were separately rented
out b
y
defendants to different families . The halls and stairways
o
f
the building were used in common b
y
several tenants . While de
scending one o
f
these stairways the plaintiff stumbled and fell , sus
taining personal injuries . This action was brought to recover com
pensation therefor from the landlords , upon the ground that the plaint
if
f ' s fall was due to the bad condition of the stair covering .
The verdict and consequent judgment were in favor of the plaintiff .
There were motions for nonsuit and for direction of a verdict in favor
o
f
defendant , both o
f
which were denied . They were based in part
upon the ground that plaintiff knew , o
r ought to have known , the con
dition o
f
the stair covering , and either had assumed the risk o
r by his
own negligence had contributed to his injury . These grounds were
untenable , there being a
t
least disputable questions of fact for the
jury ' s determination with respect to the plaintiff ' s knowledge of the
condition o
f
the stairs and with respect to his care while using them .
The motions were based , also , upon the ground that there was no lia
bility on the part of the landlords for the condition of the staircase .
The learned trial justice , having refused the motions , submitted the
case to the jury with this instruction — that since the building was oc
cupied by several families , who had the use of the halls and stairways
in common , there rested upon the defendants the duty o
f using reason
able care to keep the halls and stairways in proper condition for the
common use o
f
the tenants . To this instruction , as well as to the
denial of the motions , exception was duly sealed .
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In this state it is established as a general rule that the landlord is
not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant or his family , or guests ,
by reason of the ruinous condition of the premises demised , there being
upon the letting of a house or lands no implied contract or condition
that the premises are or shall be fi
t
and suitable for the use o
f
the
tenants . So it was held b
y
the supreme court , in Naumberg v . Young ,
4
4
N . J . L . 331 , 43 Am . Rep . 380 ; Mullen v . Rainear , 45 N . J . L .
520 ; Clyne v . Helms , 61 N . J . L . 358 , 39 Atl . 767 , and Land v . Fitz
gerald , 68 N . J . L . 28 , 52 Atl . 229 , and , b
y
this court in Murray v . Al
bertson , 50 N . J . L . 167 , 7 Am . St . Rep . 787 , 13 Atl . 394 .
But it is recognized that this rule does not apply to those portions o
f
his property ( such as passageways , stairways and the like ) that are not
demised to the tenant , but are retained in the possession or control of the
landlord for the common use o
f
the tenants and those having lawful occa
sion to visit them , the ways being used as appurtenant to the premises de
mised . With respect to such ways it has been held b
y
our supreme court
that the landlord is under the responsibility o
f
a general owner o
f
real es
tate who holds out an invitation to others to enter upon and use his prop
erty , and is bound to see that reasonable care is exercised to have the pas
sageways and stairways reasonably fit and safe for the uses which he has
invited others to make o
f
them : Gillvon v . Reilly , 50 N . J . L . 26 , 11 Atl .
481 ; Gleason v . Boehm , 58 N . J . L . 475 , 34 Atl . 886 , 32 L . R . A . 645 .
This doctrine , we think , is indubitably sound . It is in nowise opposed to
the rule which exempts the landlord from liability for the condition
o
f
the premises that are demised , but is plainly distinguishable there
from . In the case o
f
a demise , the entry and occupancy are pursuant
to a
n estate vested in the tenant and are exclusive o
f
the landlord ,
while in the case of passageways and stairways that are retained in the
legal possession o
f










f necessity . This is the
ground o
f
the distinction as pointed out in Looney v . McLean , 129
Mass . 33 , 37 Am . Rep . 295 , cited with approval in Gillvon v . Reilly ,
5
0
N . J . L . 26 , 11 Atl . 481 . In Phillips v . Library Co . , 55 N . J . L .





ing injured while using a path to the rear that was arranged for the
common use o
f the tenants , this court affirmed the responsibility of
the landlord for the condition of the path .
The judgment under review should b
e
affirmed .
If the lessor knows of the dangerous condition o
f
the premises and con
ceals it from the tenant , he is liable to the tenant for all injuries incurred
therefrom . A tenant complained of the water in the well on the premises .
The lessor investigated and found a dead dog in the well ; but closed the
well without removing the carcass , told the tenant the water was not fi
t
to drink , but would do to wash with . The tenant ' s family continued to
drink the water , became very sick , later discovered the facts , and removed
without paying any rent . In an action for the rent these facts were pleaded
as a defense , verdict found for defendant , and affirmed o
n appeal with
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punitive damages to defendant for the vexatious appeal. Maywood v.
Logan ( 1889) , 78 Mich . 135 , 43 N . W . 1052 , 18 Am . St. Rep . 431.
Right to Emblements .
OLAND V. BURDWICK , in B . R ., Easter , 38 Eliz . -- A . D. 1597 , Cro . Elz. 460 .
Same case 5 Coke 416 , Goldsb. 189 , 190 , Moor 394.
A feme holding land during widowhood sowed corn , and before harvest
took baron ; and in trespass by the baron against the lord of the manor
for taking the corn , the question was who should have it. It was ad
judged for the lord by PoPHAM , C . J . and CLENCH , J . ; FENNER , J ., con
tra , and GAWDY , J ., absent. CLENCH , J ., said there is a difference when
the estate of him who sows the land is determined by his own act, by a
casualty , and when by the act of the law or by another man . And there
fore in this case , if the feme had let the land , and the lessee had sowo
it, and afterwards the feme had taken baron , yet the lessee should have
the corn . But if the determination be by the act of him who sows the
land it is otherwise . * * *
Right to Estovers .
ANDERSON v . COWAN , in Iowa Sup . Ct., Oct. 20 , 1904 — 125 Iowa , 250 ,
101 N . W . 92 , 106 Am . St . Rep . 303 .
Action by lessor to enjoin lessee for term of five years from cutting
timber trees for fire wood . On hearing , the petition was dismissed and
plaintiff appeals .
LADD , J . The lease contains no reference to the use of timber for
firewood , but appellees insist that the right to estovers is an incident
to be implied from the mere leasing of the farm , and such was un
doubtedly the rule at common law : 1 Wood on Landlord and Tenant ,
sec. 247 ; 1 Taylor on Landlord and Tenant , sec. 350 . See 18 Am . &
Eng . Ency . of Law , 448 ; Van Deusen v . Young , 29 N . Y . 9 ; Wright
v . Roberts , 22 Wis . 161 ; Webster v . Webster , 33 N . H . 18 , 66 Am . Dec.
705. This is conceded , but it is argued that the common of estovers
is so out of harmony with the spirit of our institutions that it ought
not to be adopted as a part of the law of the state . That the com
mon law obtains in this state is not questioned , and appellant has
not taken the trouble to point out any differences between our situation
and that of the people of England which should lead to the rejection
of this particular portion of it. Many decisions , in liberally inter
preting the rules relating to estovers , have given as a reason therefor
the existence of more extensive forests here than in England , and the
necessity of reducing the land to cultivation ; but we have found none
suggesting the rejection of the doctrine entirely as inimical to our in
stitutions . In many of the states woodland is abundant , and cutting
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it down by a tenant for life or for years has been allowed under cir
cumstances which would be regarded as waste there : Tiedeman on
Real Property , 69 ; Proffitt v . Henderson , 29 Mo. 325 ; 4 Kent's Com
mentaries , 76 . Mr. Washburn , in his work on Real Property , says
that: “ In respect to what timber and what trees may be used for fire
wood , and whether the cutting of trees, though for neither of these
uses , would be waste , depends upon the usages of the country, the
customary mode of managing lands , and the manner in which the in
heritance would be affected by such cutting , rather than the rules
of the English common law ; the rule here as to waste being that noth
ing which does not prejudice the inheritance of those who are entitled
to the remainder or reversion can be deemed waste " : 1 Washburn on
Real Property , 128 et seq .
In large portions of this state there were no native forests, and in
these innumerable artificial groves have been planted . In others, native
timber is found in abundance , and , while not enough in any part to per
mit of indiscriminate destruction , we cannot say that because of local
conditions the common of estover ought not to be regarded as a part of
the law of the land . Estovers are of three kinds : 1 Housebote , being
a sufficient supply of wood to repair and burn in the house ; 2 . Plow
bote for making and repairing instruments of husbandry ; and 3.
Haybote , for repairing hedges and fences. The tenant is allowed to
cut only for present use on the premises, and not elsewhere , and only
on such as may be suitable for the purpose . Few , if any , houses in
this state have been constructed from native timber and rarely will
timber be made use of in the repairs of the house , or in the making
instruments of husbandry , or in the repair of fences , save in replacing
of posts . The dead and fallen timber is usually of no value save for
fuel, and ordinarily the only benefit the tenant obtains from the wood
lots is the fuel for his stove . Indeed , it is of little value for any other
purpose . This , undoubtedly , the tenant may burn as firewood . It is
said in Coke on Littleton , 53b , that, if there is sufficient dead wood
for fuel, the tenant has no right to cut down growing trees for that
purpose , and in Simmons y. Norton , ✓ Bing . 640 , it was held that in
felling trees for repairs only those suitable might be taken . According
to Blackstone the tenant was not permitted to cut timber trees : See
Cooley's Blackstone , 122 , 144 . And this appears to have been the
view of Coke : Coke on Littleton , 53 . In McCullough v. Irvine's Exrs .,
13 Pa. St. 438 , the court held that whether cutting timber will be
deemed waste depends on the custom of farmers, the situation of the
country , and the value of the timber . If timber trees have been planted ,
they are presumed to have been placed to meet the special purposes of
the owner , as to serve as an ornament to his farm , or as a windbreak
for his stock ; and in determining whether any may be appropriated
by the tenant the use of the owner designed for them is always to be
kept in view . Indeed , it may be safely laid down that the main object
had in planting an artificial grove is not ordinarily to raise fuel, and
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that growing trees so planted may not be cut down without the owner 's
assent. With respect to the native forests we are inclined , because
of the conditions in this state , to adhere to the common law more strictly
than has been done in other jurisdictions in this country , and , unless
growing trees are such as are customarily cut down for firewood , the
tenant ought not to be permitted to make use of them for this pur
pose . In the instant case the defendants cut for fuel, besides the
dead and fallen timber, a number of live trees . They were of a kind
ordinarily used in that vicinity for fuel, were suitable fo
r
that purpose
only , and whether their removal worked any injury to the reversion
was in dispute . The witnesses were before the court , and , in view o
f
it
s superior opportunities of weighing the testimony , we are not in
clined to interfere with the decree .
Affirmed .
Apportionment of Rent on Destruction .
ANON , Mich . , 30 Edw . I , A . D . 1302 — Year Book , ( Pike ) 30 & 31 , Edw . I ,
p . 476 .
A man demanded arrears o
f
a rent , & c . for a mill leased for a term
o
f years . The defendant said that the mill was burned by the Scots
& c . ; and that consequently he ought not to pay the rent ; and the same
plaintiff brought a writ o
f
covenant respecting the same mill , stating
that the defendant ought to have left the mill at the end of the term
in a
s good a state & c . ; and the defendant gave the same answer , whereby
h
e
was bound without exception .
RICHARDS LETAVERNER ' S CASE , Trinity , 35 Hen . 8 . - A . D . 1544 –
Dyer 56a .
A man makes a lease for years of land , and of a flock o
f
sheep , render
ing certain rent , and all the sheep died . It was asked upon indenture
o
f Richards le Taverner , whether this rent might be apportioned . And
some were o
f opinion that it should not , although it is the act of God ,
and n
o
default in the lessee or lessor ; as if the sea comes upon part
o
f
the land leased , o
r part is burned with wild - fire , which is the act of
God , the rent is not apportionable , but the entire rent shall issue out o
f
the remainder . Otherwise it is if part be recovered or evicted by an
elder title , then it is apportionable . And o
f
this opinion were
BROMLEY , PORTMAN , HALES , sergeants , LUKE , justice , BROOKE , and sev
eral o
f
the temple . But MARVYNE , BROWN , justices , TOWNSEND , GRIF
FITH , and FOSTER , e contra . But al
l
thought it was good equity and
reason to apportion the rent . And afterwards this case was argued in
the readings b
y
MOORE , in the following lent . And it seemed to him and
to BROOKE , HADLEY , FORTESCUE and BROWN , justices , that the rent
should b
e apportioned , because there is no default in the lessee .
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GRAVES v . BERDAN , in New York Ct. of App ., 1863 — 26 N . Y. 498 , Finch






Action for rent on rooms on second story which had been destroyed by
fire before the rent accrued .
ROSEKRANS, J. - The opinion delivered by Justice Emott in this case ,
in the Supreme Court , is a correct exposition of the law applicable to
it , and for the reasons stated t in , the judgment should be affirmed .
The case o
f
Stockwell v . Hunter , 11 Metc . 448 , may be added to the
t rities cited b
y
Justice Emott to show that a lease of basement rooms
o
r
chambers , in a building o
f
several stories in height , without any stip
ulation , b
y
the lessor or lessee , for rebuilding , in case of fire o
r
other
casualties , gives the lessee no interest in the land upon which the build
ing stands , and that if the whole building is destroyed b
y
fire , the lessee ' s
interest in the demised rooms is terminated , and the lessor may , after
the destruction o
f
the building , enter upon the soil and rebuild upon the
ruins of the former edifice .
It may be added that at common law , where the interest of the lessee .
in a part o
f






0 that it was incapable o
f any beneficial enjoyment , the rent might be
apportioned . In Rolle ' s Abridgment , 236 , it is said that if the sea
break in and overflow a part o
f
the demised premises , the rent shall
b
e apportioned , for , though the soil remains to the tenant , yet as the
sea is open to every one , he has no exclusive right to fish there . A




the sea , and fresh
water , because , though the land be covered with fresh water , the right
o
f taking the fish is vested exclusively in the lessee , and in that case the
rent will not be apportioned . In the latter case the tenant has a bene
ficial enjoyment , to some extent , of the demised premises , but in the
former h
e
has none , and if the use be entirely destroyed and lost , it is rea
sonable that the rent should be abated , because the title to the rent is
founded on the presumption that the tenant can enjoy the demised
premises during the term . Com . Land . and Ten . 218 ; Gilb . on Rents ,
182 .
Where the lessee takes an interest in the soil upon which a build
ing stands , if the building is destroyed b
y
fire , he may use the land
apon which it stood , beneficially , to some extent , without the build
ing , or he may rebuild the edifice ; but where he takes no interest in




a basement , or o
f upper rooms
in the building , he cannot enjoy the premises in any manner after
the destruction o
f
the building , nor can he rebuild the edifice . He
cannot have the exclusive enjoyment of the vacant space formerly
occupied b
y













the sea , mentioned in Rolle ' s
Abridgment ; and the established rule for the abatement o
r apportion
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ment of the rent should be applied in the former as well as in the latter
case . The same reason exists for its application in both cases .
But even if the lessee ' s interest in the demised apartment , in a case
like this , was not terminated b
y
the total destruction o
f
the building ,
it may be doubted whether the lessor could recover rent so long as he
failed to give the demised upper rooms the support necessary to them
for special enjoyment . The rule seems to be settled in England , that
where a house is divided into different floors or stories , each occupied
b
y
different owners , the proprietor o
f
the ground floor is bound , b
y
the
nature and condition o
f
his property , without any servitude , not only
to bear the weight of the upper story , but to repair his own property so
that it may be able to bear such weight . The proprietor of the ground
story is obliged to uphold it for the support of the upper story .
Humphrey v . Brogden , 12 Q . B . 739 ; s . c . 1 Eng . Law and Eq . 241 ;
Rowbothem v . Wilson , 36 Id . 236 ; Harris v . Roberts , 6 El . & Br . 643 ;
6 . C . 9 Id . 625 . In the case last cited the duty of such support is
recognized as a general common law right . In a lease o




the entire building , a covenant should be implied on the
part of the lessor to give such support to the upper rooms as is necessary
for their beneficial enjoyment . It has been decided in this court that
the statute forbidding the implication o
f
covenants in conveyances o
f
real estate , does not apply to leases for years . Mayor of New York v .
Maybee , 3 Kern . 151 ; Vernam v . Smith , 15 N . Y . 332 , 333 .
The judgment should b
e
affirmed . DENIO , C . J . , SELDEN , BALCOM ,
and MERVIN , JJ . , concurred .
The dissenting opinion o
f
WRIGHT , J . , concurred in by DAVIES , J . , is
omitted .
Liability for Waste .
STATUTE OF MARLBOROUGH , 52 Hen . III , c . 23 , § 2 - A . D . 1267 .
Also , farmers during their terms shall not make waste , sale , nor exile ,
o
f
houses , woods , men , nor o
f anything belonging to the tenements
that they have to farm , without special license had b
y writing of cove
nant , making mention that they may do it ; which thing , if they do ,
and thereof b
e




STATUTE OF GLOUCESTER , 6 Edw . I , c . 5 – A . D . 1278 .
It is provided also that a man from henceforth shall have a writ
o
f






otherwise for term o
f
life , or for term of years , or a woman in dower ;
and he which shall be attainted of waste shall lose the thing that he has
wasted , and moreover shall recompense thrice so much as the waste shall
be taxed a
t
. * * *
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ANON ., In Common Pleas, Mich . term , 4 Edw . II – A . D. 1310 - 4 Selden
Society Year Books p. 136 .
A writ of waste was brought against a bailiff . It was challenged and
it was abated by BEREFORD [ C . J .] , who said : If my bailiff does waste




ANON . , in Common Bench , 6 Eliz . - A . D . 1564 . - Cases rep . by Dalison in
Keilwey , p . 206 , p
l
. 10 .
In waste . Waste was assigned in a parish , in that the lessee suffered
a sea wall adjoining the parish to become ruinous , whereby the land be
came flooded by the tide . Carus moved that this could not be assigned




a house destroyed b
y
tempest . DYER ( C . J . ) It
seems reasonable that if there should be a small breach in the bank
o
r
wall , and the tenant suffers it to continue so that later the violence
o
f
the sea destroys the whole wall and floods the land , this is waste ;
for the lessee might easily have prevented it in the beginning . But if




the water , that might be pleaded
in bar . And he said that this was a rare case , and he demanded o
f
the
clerks if they had any precedent for such an assignment , and they said
no . In another action o
f
waste the same year it was held b
y
DYER ( C .
J . ) and WELSH ( J . ) , that if the lessee for years permits the banks
o
f
the sea to decay so that the adjoining land is flooded by the flowing
sea , this is waste . But where it is by a storm of the sea it is otherwise ,
which note . * * *
And observe also , that the same year Walter Griffin brought waste ,
and assigned that the lessee permitted the banks o
f
the river Trent to
wash away and remain unrepaired , through which the water broke the
banks and flooded the land , b
y





judges that this was waste ; for the Trent is not so violent but that the
lessee by vigilence and industry might easily enough maintain the




e restrained ; so that if the sea tempestuously breaks its bounds , and
floods the land , this is not waste .
COUNTESS OF SHREWSBURY ' S CASE , in King ' s Bench , Mich . 42 & 43
Eliz . - A . D . 160045 Coke 13b ; same case by title ALSOP y . CROMPTON ,
Cro . Eliz . 777 , 784 .
The countess o
f Shrewsbury brought an action on the case against
Richard Crompton , a lawyer o
f
the Temple , and declared , that she leased
to him a house a
t will , and that he so carelessly and negligently kept his
fire that the house was burned ; to which the defendant pleaded not
guilty , and was found guilty , & c . And it was adjudged that for this
permissive waste no action lay , against the opinion o
f
Brooke in the
abridgment of the case o
f
4
8 Edw . III , 25 , Waste 52 . And the reason
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of the judgment was because at the common law no remedy lay for waste
either voluntary or permissive against a tenant for life or years , because
the lessee had an interest in the land by the act of the lessor , and it was
his folly to make such lease , and not restrain him by covenant, condition ,
or otherwise , that he should not do waste . So , and for the same reason
a tenant at will shall not be punished for permissive waste . But the
opinion of Littleton is good law , $ 71 : if lessee at will commits voluntary
waste v




the woods , there
a general action o
f
trespass lies against him ; for , as it is said in 2 & 3
Phil . & Mary , Dyer 122b , when a tenant a
t
will takes upon him to do
such things which none can do but the owner of the land , these amount
to the determination o
f
the will , and of his possession , and the lessor
shall have a general action o
f trespass without any entry . * * * .
A
s
to liability on covenant to repair and return in good condition , see
post , Covenants . —
* * mina Anglice ( the coa
l
-mine ) , in the saiu presco
Tenant ' s Right to Open and Work Mines .
SAUNDERS ' CASE , in the Common Pleas , Trinity Term , 41 Eliz . - A . D .
1599 – 5 Coke 12 .
Saunders brought an action o
f
waste against Marwood , assignee of
the term in the tenements , for waste done in digging seacoals . The de
fendant pleaded in bar , that the first lessee , who opened the mine ,




interest in the land with a
ll profits , excepting





the mine ( the coal -mine ) , in the said parcel o
f
land , and
all fallen trees ; and averred that the said mine was at the time o
f
the
assignment and yet is open . Whereupon the plaintiff demurred in
law . And on great deliberation it was adjudged for the plaintiff : and
in this case three points were resolved :
1 . If a man hath land in part of which is a coal -mine open , and he
leases the land to one for life or fo
r
years , the lessee may dig in it ; fo
r
a
s much as the mine is open a
t
the time , & c . , and he leases all the land ,
it shall be intended that his intent is as general as his lease is , scil .





mine in it . See 17 Edw . III , 7 a , b , John Hull ' s Case , accord ; and so
the doubt in Fitz . Nat . Brev . 149 C is well explained .
2 . If the mine were not open but included within the bowels of the
earth a
t
the time of the lease made , in such case b
y leasing the land
the lessee cannot make new mines , for that shall be waste . Fitz . Nat .
Brev . 59 , & 22 Hen . VI , 18b , accord .
3 . If a man hath mines hid within his land , and leases his land and al
l
mines therein , there the lessee may dig for them , for whenever anyone
grants anything h
e
is understood to grant that without which the thing
itself may not be , and therewith agrees 9 Edw . IV , 8 , where it is said ,
that if a man leases his land to another , and in the same there is a
mine (which is to be intended o
f
a hidden mine ) he cannot dig for
it ; but if he lease the land and all mines in it , then although the mines
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be hidden , the lessee may dig for them ; and by consequence the digging
of the mine in the principal case was waste in the first lessee .
4 . It was resolved that although the mine be first opened by the first
lessee, yet if his grantee dig in it, it is waste in him .
5 . It was resolved that the exception was void ; for , first, by the ex
ception of the profits of the mine, or of the mine itself , the land is not
excepted ; and then it follows , that he hath excepted that which he
could not have or take ; as if a man assigns his term , and excepts the
timber trees on the land or the gravel or clay within the land , it is void ,
for he cannot except to himself a thing which doth not belong to him by
the law . And although it was said , that forasmuch as the lessee first
opened the mine, and thereby committed the waste, and so had quodam
modo appropriated it to himself and by his wrong had subjected himself
to lose the place wasted and treble damages , it should be a reason that
he might keep it to himself and so continue punishable for the waste of
which he was the first author ; but nothwithstanding that it was resolved
as above , for his wrong which he committeth cannot divest the interest
in the mine, being in the land demised to him out of the lessor ; and
therefore he cannot except that to himself which belongs to another .
ASTRAY V. BALLARD , in King 's Bench , 29 Car. 2. - A . D. 1677 — 2 Lev .
185 , 2 Jones 71 . Abridged from Levinz .
Trover , not guilty pleaded , special verdict . One seised in fee of lands
wherein were mines opened , b
y
indenture leased the lands and mines
therein to defendant , who opened a new coal mine and there dug the
coals for which this action was brought . The question was whether
the lease gave right to open new mines . It was said for the plaintiff
that it did not , citing Coke Lit . 54 b , and Liford ' s Case , 11 Coke 46 ,
For defendant it was agreed that Coke Lit . 54b is as cited ; but to war
rant his opinion he cites , Saunders ' s Case , 5 Coke , which does not war
rant it , nor does any other book . But the Court held , that b
y
the words
land and mines , there being mines open a
t
the time of the demise , no






LOW v . ELWELL , in Mass . Sup . Judicial Ct . , Nov . Term , 1876 — 121 Mass .
309 , 23 Am . Rep . 272 .
Tort for assault in forcibly entering and ejecting plaintiff from her
dwelling house . Plaintiff ' s husband had rented the house orally , oc
cupied it two years , and been given notice to quit . The case comes here
o
n agreed facts , b
y
consent o
f parties without verdict . If the agreed
facts justify defendant , there should be a nonsuit ; otherwise , the case
to stand for assessment o
f damages .
GRAY , C . J . A tenant holding over after the expiration of hi
s
tenancy
is a mere tenant a
t
sufferance , having no right of possession against his
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landlord . If the landlord forcibly enters and expels him , the landlord
may be indicted for the forcible entry . But he is not liable to an action
of tort for damages either for his entry upon the premises , or for an
assault in expelling the tenant , provided he uses no more force than is
necessary . The tenant cannot maintain an action in the nature of tres
pass quare clausum fregit , because the title and the lawful right to the
possession are in the landlord , and the tenant as against him , has no right
of occupation whatever . He cannot maintain an action , in the nature
of trespass to his person , for a subsequent expulsion with no more force
than necessary to accomplish the purpose ; because the landlord having
obtained possession by an act which , though subject to be punished by
the public as a breach of the peace , is not one of which the tenant has any
right to complain , has, as against the tenant, the right of possession of
the premises ; and the landlord , not being liable to the tenant in an
action of tort for the principal act of entry upon the land , cannot be
liable to an action for the incidental act of expulsion , which the landlord
merely because of the tenant's own unlawful resistance , has been obliged
to resort to in order to make his entry effectual. To hold otherwise would
enable a person , occupying land utterly without right, to keep out the
lawful owner until the end of a suit by the latter to recover the possession
to which he is legally entitled .
This view of the law , notwithstanding some inconsistent opinions , is
in accordance with the current of recent decisions in England and in this
Commonwealth .
In Turner v. Meymot , 7 Moore , 574 , S . C . 1 Bing . 158, it was decided
that a tenant whose term had expired could not maintain trespass against
his landlord for forcibly breaking and entering the house in his absence .
In Hillary v . Gay , 6 C . & P . 284 , indeed , Lord Lyndhurst at nisi prius ,
while recognizing the authority of that decision, ruled that if the land
lord , after the expiration of the tenancy , by force put the tenant's wife
and furniture into the street, he was liable to an action of trespass quare
clausum fregit. And in Newton v . Harland , 1 Man. & Gr. 644 ; S . C.
1 Scott N . R . 474 ; a majority of the court of common pleas, overruling
decisions of Baron Parke and Baron Alderson at nisi prius , held that
under such circumstances the landlord was liable to an action of trespass
for assault and battery .
But in Harvey v . Brydges , 14 M . & W . 437 , Baron Parke stated his
opinion upon the point raised in Newton v . Harland, as follows : “ Where
a breach of the peace is committed by a freeholder , who , in order to get
into possession of his land , assaults a person wrongfully holding posses
sion against his will , although the freeholder may be responsible to the
public in the shape of an indictment for a forcible entry , he is not liable
to the other party . I cannot see how it is possible to doubt that it is a
perfectly good justification to say that the plaintiff was in possession of
the land against the will of the defendant , who was owner , and that he
entered upon it accordingly ; even though , in so doing , a breach of the
peace was committed .” Baron Alderson concurred , and said that he re





expressed in Newton v . Harland , notwithstand
the decision o
f
the majority of the court o
f
common pleas to the con
trary . The opinion thus deliberately adhered to and positively declared
b
y
those two eminent judges , though not required b
y
the adjudication in
Harvey v . Brydges , is o
f
much weight . In Davis v . Barrell , 10 C . B . 821 ,
825 , Mr . Justice Cresswell said , that the doctrine of Newton v . Harland
had been very much questioned . And it was finally overruled in Blades
v . Higgs , 10 C . B . ( N . S . ) 713 , where , in an action for an assault b
y
forcibly taking the defendant ' s property from the plaintiff ' s hands , using
n
o more force than was necessary , Chief Justice Erle , delivering the
unanimous judgment o
f
the court , approved the statement o
f
Baron
Parke , above quoted , and added : " In our opinion , al
l
that is so said o
f
the right o
f property in land applies in principle to a right of property in
a chattel , and supports the present justification . If the owner was
compellable b
y
law to seek redress b
y




f property , the remedy would be often worse than the mischief , and the
law would aggravate the injury , instead o
f
redressing it . See also Lowe
v . Telford , 1 App . Cas . 414 , 426 .
In Commonwealth v . Haley , 4 Allen , 318 , the case was upon an indict
ment for forcible entry , and no opinion was required or expressed as to
the landlord ' s liability to a civil action .
The judgment in Sampson v . Henry , 11 Pick . 379 , turned upon &
question o
f pleading . The declaration , which was in trespass for an as
sault and battery ( alleged that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff , and
with a deadly weapon struck him many heavy and dangerous blows . The
pleas o
f justification merely averred that the defendant was seised and had
the right of possession of a dwelling house , that the plaintiff was unlaw
fully in possession thereof and forcibly opposed the defendant ' s entry ,
and that the defendant used no more force than was necessary to enable
him to enter and to overcome the plaintiff ' s resistance ; but did not deny
the use o
f
the dangerous weapon and the degree o
f
violence alleged in
the declaration ; and were therefore held bad , in accordance with Gregory
v . Hill , 8 T . R . 299 , there cited . The remarks of Mr . Justice Wilde ,
denying the right o
f







the peace , would , if construed by themselves , and
extended beyond the case before him , allow the tenant to maintain an ac
tion o
f trespass against the landlord for entering the dwelling -house , in
direct opposition to the judgment delivered b
y
the same learned judge , in
another case , between the same parties , argued at the same term and
decided a year after . Sampson v . Henry , 13 Pick . 36 .
In the latter case , which was an action for breaking and entering the
plaintiff ' s close , and for an assault and battery upon him , the court held
the plea o
f




breaking and entering the house , but not of the personal assault and bat
tery . That decision , so far a
s




trespass quare clausum fregit by a tenant a
t
sufferance for a
forcible entry , has been repeatedly affirmed . Meader v . Stone , 7 Met . 147 :
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Miner v . Stevens, 1 Cush . 482 , 485 ; Mason v . Holt , 1 Allen 45 ; Curtis
v . Galvin , 1 Allen 215 ; Moore v . Mason , 1 Allen 406 . And, so far as it
allowed the plaintiff to recover , in such an action , damages for the inci
dental injury to him or to his personal property , it has been overruled .
Eames v. Prentice , 8 Cush . 337 ; Curtis v. Galvin , ubi supra .
It has also been adjudged that a landlord , who , having peaceably en
tered after the termination of the tenancy , proceeds , against the tenant 's
opposition , to take out the windows of the house, or to forcibly eject the
tenant , is not liable to an action for an assault , if he uses no more force
than is necessary for the purpose . Mugford v. Richardson , 6 Allen , 76 ;
Winter v . Stevens, 9 Allen , 526 . For the reasons already stated , we are
all of opinion that a person who has ceased to be a tenant, or to have
any lawful occupancy , has no greater right of action when the force ex
erted against his person is contemporaneous with the landlord 's forcible
entry upon the premises .
Our conclusion is supported by the American cases of the greatest
weight. Jackson V. Farmer, 9 Wend . 201 ; Overdeer v . Lewis, 1 W . &
S . 90 ; Kellam V. Janson , 17 Penn . St. 467 ; Stearns v . Sampson , 59
Maine, 568 ; Sterling v . Warden , 51 N . H . 217 . The opposing decisions
are so critically and satisfactorily examined in an elaborate article upon
this subject in 4 Am . Law Rev . 429 , that it would be superfluous to refer
to them particularly .
The tenancy of the plaintiff 's husband under an oral lease was but a
tenancy at will, which by the written lease from his landlord to the de
fendant, and reasonable notice thereof was determined , and he became
a mere tenant at sufferance . Pratt v . Farrar , 10 Allen , 519. It being
admitted that , if the defendants had the right to remove the plaintiffs by
force , no more force was used than was reasonably necessary , this action
cannot be maintained . Plaintiff nonsuit.
This decision has been approved and followed in later cases in Massachu
setts and a few other states, denying actions of trespass and assault and
battery by the tenant holding over against the person making the forcible
eviction without process : Lambert V. Robinson , 162 Mass . 34, 37 N . E .
753, 44 Am . St . Rep . 326 ; Manning v. Brown , 47 Md. 506 ; Sterling V .
Warden , 51 N . H . 217 ; Allen y. Keily , 17 R . I . 731, 24 Atl . 776 , 17 L . R . A .
798, 33 Am . St . Rep . 905 ; Johnson v. Hannahan , 1 Strobh L . ( S . Car. ) 313
(a mere intruder ) ; Beecher v. Parmlee , 9 Vt. 352, 31 Am . Dec . 633 ( a mere
intruder ) .
But in the supreme court of the United States and in a number of the
states it has been held that a person entitled to the possession of land orbuildings is liable for nominal damages at least in an action of trespass
by the person forcibly evicted while holding peaceably without right , for
the injury to his person and goods, but not for the loss of the premises
in which he had no right ; and it has also been held that the jury may
award exemplary damages : Denver & R . G . Ry. Co . v. Harris , 122 U . 8.
597 , 7 Sup . Ct. 1286 ; Fox v. Brissac, 15 Cal. 223 ; Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn .
304 ; Entelman v . Hagood , 95 Ga . 390 , 22 S. E . 545 ; Jasper v. Purnell , 67 Ill.
358 ; Whitney v . Brown , 75 Kan . 678 , 90 Pac . 277 ; Brock v. Berry, 31 Me.
293 ; Krevet v. Meyer , 24 Mo . 107 ; Thiel v. Bulls Ferry Land Co ., 58 N . J . L .
212 , 33 Atl. 281 ; Bristor v . Burr , 120 N . Y . 427 , 24 N . E . 937 , 8 L . R . A . 710 ;
Mosseller v. Deaver , 106 N . Car . 494 , 11 S. E . 529, 8 L . R . A . 537 and note ,
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19 Am . St. Rep . 540 ; Sperry v. Seidel , 218 Pa . 16, 66 Atl. 853; Dustin v.
Cowdry , 23 Vt. 631 .
TENANTS AT WILL .
Tenant at Will Defined .
LITTLETON 'S TENURES, Sec . 68 (Littleton died A . D. 1482 .)
Tenant at will is where lands or tenements are let by one man to
another, to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, by force of
which lease the lessee is in possession . In this case the lessee is called
tenant at will, because he has no certain nor sure estate , for the lessor
may put him out at what time it pleases him . Yet if the lessee sows the
land , and the lessor , after it is sown and before the corn is ripe, put him
out , yet the lessee shall have the corn , and shall have free entry , egress ,
and regress to cut and carry away the corn , because he knew not at
what time the lessor would enter upon him . Otherwise it is if tenant
for years, who knows the end of his term , sows the land , and his term
ends before the corn is ripe. In this case the lessor , or he in reversion ,
shall have the corn , because the lessee knew the certainty of his term
and when it would end .
Same § 70 . Also if a man make a deed of feoffment to another of cer
tain lands , and deliver to him the deed , but not livery of seisin ; in this
case he to whom the deed is made may enter into the land and hold and
occupy it at the will of him who made the deed , because it is proved by
the words of the deed that it is his will that the other should have the
land . But he who made the deed may put him out when it pleaseth
him .
COKE LIT . 55a. - A . D . 1620 ?
It is regularly true that every lease at will must in law be at the will
of both parties ; and therefore when the lease is made to have and to
hold at the will of the lessor, the law implyeth it to be at the will of the
lessee also ; for it cannot be only at the will of the lessor, but it must be
at the will of the lessee also . And so it is when the lease is made to have
and to hold at the will of the lessee , this must be also at the will of the
lessor . And so are all the books that seem prima facie to differ clearly
reconciled .
ANON ., in Common Bench , Trinity, 20 Hen . 7. - A . D . 1505 . —Keilwey 65a.
In debt the plaintiff counted on his lease to the defendant to have at
the will of the lessor , rendering annually 20 s ., and so from year to
year at the will of the lessor , and for so much arrear at such a day action
accrued to the plaintiff , for the sum demanded . On which came
Yaxley for the defendant , and said that after the lease and before the
day , to -wit , at such a day and place , the defendant came to the plaintiff
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and declared that he did not wish longer to occupy the land , after
which notice the rent was arrear . The case was argued by all the bar
and by a
ll
the bench for this doubt , viz . whether the lessee in such case
should be tenant a
t
the will of the lessor or a
t







FROWIKE , [ C . J . ] . Si
r , it seems to me that it is not at the will o
f
either , for then we would have a tenant at liberty to terminate his es
tate a
t
his own will , and so tenant at his own will , which is not reason ,
for h
e





the plaintiff . And so it seems to me he should
b
e




the lessor . And on the other hand , to
adjudge his estate merely at the will of the lessor would be to create a
perpetuity if the lessor pleased , which is unreasonable . But this will
o
f
the lessor must have a reasonable construction , and should be in this
form , to -wit , if he ( lessee ) entered and occupied till a rent day is passed
he remains al
l
such year a tenant b
y
the year , so his entry shall charge
him , for in an action o
f
debt against a tenant a
t will it is proper for the





the lease , and this entry is traversable . But in such
declaration against the tenant for years his entry is not traversable , for
he is chargeable without entry , and so a diversity .
But yet the lessee may discharge himself reasonably , and this is as the
year is ended ; when he may determine his estate at his pleasure if he
give up the occupation , but if he enter the commencement of the second
year h




n indefinitely . But the lessor is still at liberty to oust him ; for he
made his lease with these words , and also the tenant is not thus prej
udiced , for else if he hold till the last day of the year and then the




his occupation to his own advantage . But on
the part of the lessor , if the lessee after he had discharged himself one
o
r two days before the end o
f
the year , from this it follows that he takes
the advantage o
f






his own act , which is contrary to reason and against the custom
o
f
the realm ; for b
y
such means , if this were the law , no tenant at will
in England could be compelled to pay his rent but a
t
his own pleasure .
* * * * And it was adjourned ,
ANON . , In Common Bench , Mich . , 3 Hen . 8 . - A . D . 1512 . — Keilwey 162b .
A lease was made to one R . H . to have to him a
t
his own will , and
it was held b
y
all the justices o
f





either the lessor o
r
lessee ; for if it should be at the will of
the lessee h
e might will to have it for life ; and then it would be a free
hold in him , which may in no way pass without livery , for it is a prin
ciple o
f
law that no man shall have a freehold without livery o
r
what
is equivalent thereto , as livery within the ville or where the king b
y
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matter of record gives land by his letters patent. And, si
r , if land
is leased a
t
the will of the lessor , yet the lessee may notify his lessor that





his lessor it is in law a
t
the will of both . This matter
is discussed in 35 Hen . 6 , & 18 Hen . 6 . * * *
Estates at Will — How Determined .
HENSTEAD ' S CASE , in Common Pleas , Mich . , Term , 36 & 37 Eliz . - A . D .
1595 , 5 Coke 10 .




a house and certain land in Shoram in
Kent , made a lease at will rendering rent and afterwards took husband
and she and her husband brought an action o
f
debt for arrearages after
the marriage ; and if the lease at will were determined b
y
the inter
marriage or not was the question .
And it was agreed b
y
the whole court , that the will was not deter
mined by the intermarriage ; for although the woman had by marry
ing submitted herself to the will of her husband as her head , yet for
asmuch as it might be prejudicial to the husband to have the lease de
termined for then h
e
would lose the rent to be paid the next day after
the marriage , and it could not be in any manner prejudicial to the wife
if the lease continue but rather to her benefit . And generally it might
be great prejudice to a
ll
husbands who intermarry with women who have
tenants at will , for the losing of their rents . For these causes it was re
solved , that without express matter done by the husband after the mar
riage to determine the will , it is not determined .
The same is the law if a lease be made to a woman at will and she
marries ; the will continues notwithstanding the marriage . So if a
lease b
e made to three , rendering rent , and one dies , it is no determina
tion o
f
the will ; and although nothing can survive , yet because every
joint -tenant is possessed per my & per tout , they shall be charged with
the whole rent ; and so the quaere in 10 Eliz . Dyer 269 b ( p
l
. 20 ) well
resolved . But in the case at bar , after the marriage the woman herself
could not countermand or determine the lease a
t
will , no more than
where she and her husband make a lease a
t will rendering rent during
the coverture , or if the lease be made to them a
t will ; for she hath sub
mitted herself and all her will to her husband . And so a feme covert
may have a tenant at will and be tenant at will , and yet she herself
cannot countermand it ; because she b
y
her intermarriage hath put her
countermanding power in this case (which doth not concern freeholds
o
r inheritance ) into her husband ' s mouth . Also if the husband and wife
lease land a
t will rendering rent and the husband dies , it is no counter
mand o
f
the will , but the lease continues . So it was said if two joint
tenants make a lease a
t
will rendering rent and one dies , all survives to
the other and if the lessee continues his possession the survivor shall have
a
n
action for the whole rent for the privity , and it shall not be counter
manded for the one moiety for the mischief which might ensue to lessors ,





mischief or prejudice ca
n
come to the lessees
in such case .
SHAW v . BARBER , in Common Bench , Easter , 43 Eliz - A . D . 1601 . - Oro .
Eliz . 830 .
In ejectione firmæ , upon evidence it was agreed per totam curiam ,
and so delivered for law to the jury , that if a tenant a
t will make a lease
for years , and the lessee enters , he is only the disseisor : and a release o
r
confirmation to the tenant a
t
will afterwards is void , because the pri
vity is determined . WALMSLEY , J . , said that so it had been resolved ,
against the opinion in 12 Edw . 4 , p
l
. 12 .
LEIGHTON v . THEED , in King ' s Bench , Hilary 13 Wm . 3 , 1701 – 2 Salk .
413 , s . c . 1 L . Raym . 707 .
If H holds lands at will , rendering rent quarterly , the lessor may de
termine his will when he pleases ; but if he determines it within a
quarter , he shall lose the rent which should [ *414 ] have been paid for
that quarter in which he determines it . So the lessee may determine
it when he pleases , but then he must pay the quarter ' s rent . Per
HOLT , C . J .
PARKER d . WALKER V . CONSTABLE , in King ' s Bench , Mich . 10 Geo . 3 .
- A . D . 1769 . — 3 Wils . 25 . 3 Gray Cas . 412 .
Per WILMOT , C . J . , and totam curiam : It has not been doubted of
late years (and it was now resolved in this case ) , that half a year ' s
notice to quit possession must be given to a tenant at will ; before the
end o
f which time an ejectment will not lie to turn him out of the









B . R . ; and per Leigh , sergeant , in Easter term , 6
o
r







t will . In the case at bar , the plaintiff , having been nonsuited for want
o
f giving such half year ' s notice to defendant Constable ( a tenant at will )
to quit the premises , moved to set aside the non -suit ; and on showing
cause , the rule to set aside non -suit was discharged for the reason
above in ejectment , for lands in Surrey .
RIGHT d . FLOWER V . DARBY , in King ' s Bench , Easter Term , 26 Geo .
II
I
. - A . D . 1786 . - 1 Term 159 .
In ejectment it was found b
y special verdict that May 11 , 1781 , de
fendant Darby leased the premises , a house in Salisbury , and occupied
them a
s
a public house from that time under a parol lease at a rent of ten
pounds yearly , the rent to commence from midsummer following ; that
h
e let part o
f
the premises to defendant ; and that March 26 , 1785 ,
defendant Darby was served with notice to quit on Sept . 29 following .
On case reserved for the opinion o
f
this court the question was whether
the plaintiff was entitled to recover .
LORD MANSFIELD , C . J . : When a lease is determinable on a certain
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event , or at a particular period , no notice to quit is necessary , because
both parties are equally apprised of the determination of the term .
If there be a lease for a year , and by consent of both parties the tenant
continue in possession afterwards , the law implies a tacit renovation of
the contract . They are supposed to have renewed the old agreement ,
which was to hold for a year. But then it is necessary for the sake of
convenience , that, if either party should be inclined to change his mind ,
he should give the other half a year's notice before the expiration of the
next or any following year : now this is a notice to quit in the middle
of the year, and therefore not binding , as it is contrary to the agreement.
As to the case of lodgings, that depends on a particular contract , and
is an exception to the general rule . The agreement between the parties
may be for a month or less time, and there to be sure , much shorter
notice would be sufficient , where the tenant has held over the time agreed
upon , than in the other case . The whole question depends upon the nature
of the first contract .
ASHHURST , J . - There is no distinction in reason between houses and
lands, as to the time of giving notice to quit . It is necessary that both
should be governed by one rule. There may be cases , where the same
hardship would be felt in determining that the rule did not extend to
houses as well as lands ; as in the case of a lodging house in London ,
being let to a tenant at Lady -day to hold as in the present case : if the
landlord should give notice to quit at Michaelmas , he would by that
means deprive the lessee of the most beneficial part of the term , since
it is notorious that the winter is by far the most profitable season of
the year for those who le
t
lodgings .
BULLER , J . — It is taken for granted by the counsel fo
r
the plaintiff ,
that the rule o
f





lands into a tenancy from year to year , does not apply to the case of
houses ; but there is no ground for that distinction . The reason of it
is , that the agreement is a letting for a year at an annual rent ; then if
the parties consent to g
o
o
n after that time , it is a letting from year to
year . This reason extends equally to the present case ; an annual rent
is here reserved ; and upon such a holding it has been determined that




in the reign of Henry VIII ( 13 H . 8 , 15 b ) . The moment the
year began , the defendant had a right to hold to the end o
f
that year ;
therefore there should have been half a year ' s notice to quit before the end
o
f
the term . This gives rise to another objection in this case , upon the
distinction between si
x
months and half a year . The case in the year
books requires half a year ' s notice ; but here there is less than half a year ' s
notice , and therefore it is bad on that ground also .
Judgment for the defendant .
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TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR .
LAYTON v . FIELD , in King 's Bench , Hilary 13 Wm . 3. - A . D . 1701. - 3
Salk . 222 .
Per Holt , C. J . Where a lease is made at will , the lessee , after a
quarter of a year is commenced , may determine his will , but then he
must pay that quarter 's rent ; and if the lessor determine his will after
the commencement of a quarter , he shall lose his rent for that quarter.
But if a lease be made from year to year , quamdui ambabus partibus ,
placuerit ; in such case , after a year is commenced , neither the lessor nor
the lessee can determine their wills for that year , because they have willed
the estate certain for so long a time.
DOE d . RIGGE v . BELL , in K . B ., Mich . 34 Geo . 3. - A . D . 1794 . - 5 Terma
471, 2 Smith Lead . Cas . * 72 , 3 Gray Cas. 416 .
Ejectment. At the trial it appeared that the agent for the lessor of
the plaintiff let the farm in question to defendants , for seven years , by
parol . Defendant entered accordingly and paid rent. Afterwards notice
to quit on Lady-day was served Sept. 22d , 1792 . Plaintiff being non
suited , obtained a rule on defendant to show cause why the nonsuit should
not be set aside .
KENYON , C . J. Though the agreement be void by the Statute of Frauds
as to the duration of the lease, it must regulate the terms on which the
tenancy subsists in other respects , as to the rent, the time of year when
the tenant is to quit , & c . So where a tenant holds over after the ex
piration of his term , without having entered into any new contract , he
holds upon the former terms. Now , in this case , it was agreed that the
defendant should quit at Candlemas ; and though the agreement is void
as to the number of years for which the defendant was to hold , if the
lessor chose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven
years , he can only put an end to it at Candlemas . Rule discharged .
CLAYTON V. BLAKEY , in K . B ., Mich . 39 Geo . 3. - A . D . 1799 . — 8 Term
3, 2 Smith ' s Lead . Cas. 74 , 3 Gray Cas . 417.
This was an action against a tenant to recover double rent, for hold
ing over after the term ended , and after regular notice to quit . One
count of the declaration stated a holding under à certain term ; and
the others, a holding from year to year. At the trial it appeared that
defendant had held two years under a parol lease for twenty -one years .
It was claimed that there was a variance , because the Statute of Frauds
declared such leases should operate only to create a tenancy at will.
ROOKE , J ., instructed the jury that it amounted to a tenancy from year
to year . Wood now moved to set aside the verdict, on the ground of a
misdirection ,
KENYON , C . J . The direction was right, for such a holding now oper
ates as a tenancy from year to year . The meaning of the statute was ,
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that such an agreement should not operate as a term ; but what was then
considered as a tenancy at will has since been very properly construed
to enure as a tenancy from year to year .
Rule refused .
COUDERT v. COHN , in New York Ct. of App., Jan . 14 , 1890 – 118 N . Y .
309 , 23 N . E . 298 , 16 Am . St . Rep . 761 , 7 L . R . A . 69, Finch 780 .
BRADLEY , J. : The action was brought to recover rent of premises
described in a written lease made by the agent of the plaintiff 's intestate
to the defendants in January , 1881 , for the term of two years and five
months , commencing on the first day of March , 1884, and ending on
the first day of August , 1886 , at the yearly rent of $ 3,000, payable in
equal monthly payments , on the last business day of each month . The
authority of the agent to make the lease not being in writing , it was
void . 2 R . S . 131 , § 6 . The defendants went into possession on the
first of March , 1884 , and continued to occupy and pay rent up to
August , 1885 , when they left the premises and sought to surrender
the possession up to the plaintiff 's intestate , who declined to accept it .
He recovered for the amount of rent at the rate mentioned in the lease
from the first of August to the first of March following . While the
cases are not entirely in harmony on the subject, the doctrine now in
this state is such that the defendants on going into possession of the
premises and paving rent, became, by reason of the invalidity of the
demise , tenants from year to year , and in such case the continuance
of occupancy into the second year rendered them chargeable with the
rent until it
s
close . They could then only terminate their tenancy
at the end of the current year . Reeder v . Sayre , 70 N . Y . 180 , 26 Am .
Rep . 567 ; Laughran v . Smith , 75 N . Y . 205 .
The question presented is : When did the rental year arising out of
such relation commence and terminate ? It is contended b
y
the defend
ants ' counsel that inasmuch as the end of the term designated by the
terms o
f
the lease was the first o
f August , 1886 , that was the time
when the yearly tenancy in contemplation o
f
law terminated , and ,
therefore , the surrender was properly made on the first of August , 1885 .
It is urged that this view is in harmony with the recognized principle
that , although the lease was invalid , the agreement contained in it regu
lated the terms of the tenancy in al
l
respects , except as to the duration
o
f
the term , and Doe v . Bell , 5 D . & E . 471 , ſante ] is cited * * *





upon the question o
f
the force remaining in the terms o
f
the agreement
embraced in a void lease . And in Schuyler v . Leggett , 2 Cow . 663 , it
was remarked b
y
Chief Justice Savage , in citing it , that such an agree
ment " must regulate the terms o
n which the tenancy subsists in other
respects ; as the rent , the time o
f
year when the tenant must quit , etc . ”
And the citation was repeated to the same effect by the chief justice in
People v . Rickert , 8 Cow . 230 .
The question here did not arise in either of those two cases , nor can
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they be treated as authority that the time for termination of a tenancy
from year to year , in any year other than that of the designated expira
tion of term , is governed by such designation in a void lease for more
than one year rather than by the time of entry . The effect sought to
be given in the present case to the case of Doe v . Bell is not supported
by English authority . In Berrey v . Lindley , 3 M . & G . 496 , the tenant
entered into possession of premises under an agreement void by the
statute of frauds , by the terms of which he was to hold five years and a
half from Michaelmas . Several years after his entry , and after expira
tion of the period mentioned in the agreement , the lessee gave notice
to his landlord to terminate the tenancy at Michaelmas . It was there
contended on the part of the latter , and Doe v. Bell was cited in sup
port of the proposition , that the time designated in the agreement for
the termination of the tenancy governed in that respect . But the court
decided otherwise , and held that the notice was effectual to terminate
the tenancy . The views of the court there were to the effect , that ,
although the tenancy was from year to year , the tenant might without
notice have quit at the expiration of the period contemplated in the
agreement, but having remained in possession and paid rent subsequently
to that time, he must be considered a tenant from year to year with
reference to the time of the original entry. The same principle in respect
to holding over a term was announced in Doe v . Dobell , 1 A . & E . ( N .
R . ) 806 , where it was said that “ in all cases the current year refers to
the time of entry unless the parties stipulate to the contrary.”
The doctrine of the English cases seems to be that a party entering
under a lease , void by the statute of frauds , for a term , as expressed
in it, of more than one year , and paying rent, is treated as a tenant
from year to year from the time of his entry , subject only to the right
to terminate the tenancy without notice at the end of the specified term .
And to that extent and for that purpose only , the terms of agreement,
in such case , regulate the time to quit. This right is held to be recip
rocal . Doe v. Stratton , 4 Bing . 446 . That proposition is not without
sensible reason for it
s support . The lease , for more than one year ,
unless made in the manner provided b
y
the statute , cannot be effectual
to vest the term in the lessee , yet in other respects the rights of the
parties may be terminated b
y
its terms , so far as they are consistent with
it
s failure , to create any estate or interest in the land or any duration
o
f
term for occupancy b
y
the lessee . And that principle is properly ap
plicable to such leases . Porter v . Bleiler , 17 Barb . 154 ; Reeder v . Sayre ,
7
0
N . Y . 184 , 26 Am . Rep . 567 ; Laughran v . Smith , 75 N . Y . 205 , 209 .
This view does not aid the defendants . They became tenants from
year to year a
s




the terms of the agreement , in that respect , in the lease , they may have
been a
t liberty to quit on the first o
f August , 1886 , if they had remained
until then , such time in that , o
r
the year previous , could not be treated
a
s the end o
f any year o
f
the tenancy . The defendants having entered
upon the second year from the time o
f
the original entry , it was not
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within their power to terminate their relation or liability as tenants
until the end of the then current year, which did not terminate until
the first day of March , was reached . * * *
Judgment affirmed .
ARBENZ V. EXLEY , in W . Va . Sup . Ct. App ., April 25 , 1905 , 57 W . Va . 580,
50 S. E . 813 , 4 A . & E . An . Cas. 625 .
BRANNON , P . John Arbenz , Sr., made a written lease, but not under





three months a brick building , including the vacant parts of certain
lots , in the city of Wheeling — the term commencing January
1 , 1896 , and ending March 31 , 1902 — for the annual rent o
f
$ 700 , commencing April 1 , 1896 , payable in monthly installments ,
The lessees took possession on the first week o
f January , and occupied
the premises , paying rent monthly . On September 15 , 1898 , a fire
totally destroyed said building . The lessees paid rent for that Sep
tember , and also for October , but with the rent of October sent a letter ,
October 31 , 1898 , to Arbenz , informing him that they " hereby ” vacate
the premises , and surrender them to him . In November , 1898 , Arbenz
sued out a distress warrant against said lessees for rent from November
1 , 1898 , to October 31 , 1899 , and , the same having been levied , a
forthcoming bond was given , and in the proceedings upon it in the
circuit court of Ohio county a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff
for $ 502 . 54 , after deducting for failure to repair an engine , and judg
ment given thereon , and the defendants took a writ o
f
error . The de
fendants filed a plea denying grounds o
f
attachment , and denying all
liability for the rent claimed . The judgment below was affirmed
by this court . Those matters will appear in 52 W . Va . 476 ,
4
4
S . E . 149 , 61 L . R . A . 957 . On August 1 , 1903 , Arbenz
brought assumpsit against Exley , Watkins & Co . to recover rent
accruing later than that recovered in the proceeding above mentioned
( to recover rent for the period beginning November 1 , 1899 , and end
ing December 31 , 1902 , a period o
f
3
8 months , a
t
$ 700 per year ) , and
the suit resulted in a verdict for only $ 148 . 15 (that is , for the 2 months
o
f
November and December , 1899 ; the court holding that no recovery
could b
e
had after the current year ending that date , on the theory
that the tenancy from year to year then closed ) .
The theory against the right to recover is that a few days after the
fire defendants wrote Arbenz the following letter :
“ Oct . 31st , 1898 . Mr . John Arbenz , City - Dear Sir : We beg to
advise that we have vacated the premises known a
s
west building on
20th street , destroyed by fire Sept . 15th , last , and hereby surrender
possession o
f
same . Yours truly , Exley , Watkins & Co . ”
On the former writ of error we held that , for want of seal to the lease ,
the term o
f years named in it was not created , but that it created an
estate from year to year , and that said letter did not operate as a notice
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to quit — to end the tenancy - 90 as to preclude recovery of rent up to
November 1, 1899 , the rent in litigation in the former proceeding .
We did not go further , as no later rent was involved in that case. The
question presented in the second suit is, did the tenancy end December
31 , 1899 ? Did that letter close the tenancy and stop the rent at that
date the close of the current year 1899 ? For the defendants the con
tention is that the letter , accompanied by actual vacation of the prem
ises and coupled with the fact that in the circuit court in April ,
1899 , Exley , Watkins & Co. made defense in the former pro
ceeding , denying liability for rent , operated as a notice to quit , and
closed the tenancy December 31 , 1899 . Take the letter . The question
rests mainly on it. It states the facts that the lessees had vacated ,
and then surrendered possession . It does not notify that at the
end of a current year in future the tenant would quit, but states
present acts or past vacation and surrender . The common law , for
centuries , has required , in order that lessor or lessee , under a tenancy
from year to year , may close the tenancy of his own motion , that a
notice to quit should be given si
x
months before the end o
f
the current
year . That period or time of notice must be prior to the close of a year .




either party giving notice in writing to the other ,
prior to the end of any year , for three months , o
f
his intention to
terminate the same . ” That provision recognizes as still continuing the




notice to quit , and changed it only in requiring written
notice and fixing a shorter time o
f
notice . Hence it seems that we must
appeal to the common law and it
s




notice to quit . It does not notify of a future act of quitting ,
but relies on past vacation and present surrender of possession for the effect
o
f
the letter . It does not name a day or time in the future when the
tenancy is to end . The profession has always regarded this as a
requisite in a notice to quit , I think . 2 Taylor , Landlord & Ten . § 476 ,
says : " Form of . The notice may be given to quit on a particular
day , o
r , in general terms , at the end o
f
the current year o
f
the tenancy ,
which will expire next after the service o
f
the notice , or in one month
after the next rent day . The latter form o
f expression is generally
used where the landlord is ignorant o
f
the period when the tenancy
commenced , and it is preferable even when the commencement o
f
the
tenancy is known , as it provides against any misapprehension of the
exact day when the tenant entered . ” i Washburn , Real Prop . § 810 ,
says : “ Notice The Time . Whether a longer or shorter time of notice
is required , it must , in order to be binding , clearly indicate the time
when the tenancy is to expire , and , of course , must be given a suf
ficient number o
f
days before the time so indicated . ” The particular
question before u
s
is whether that letter is bad a
s
a notice to quit be
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Under the above and many other authorities , we are driven to say that
it did not end the tenancy at any time . Currier V. Barker , 2 Gray ,
224 ; Steward v . Harding, Id . 335 ; Hanchet v . Whitney , 1 Vt. 311 ;
Hunter v . Frost , 47 Minn . 1, 49 N . W . 327 ; Grace v. Michaud , 50
Minn . 139 , 52 N . W . 390 ; People v . Gedney , 15 Hun , 475 ; Prescott v.
Elm , T Cush . 346 ; Phænixville v . Walters , 147 Pa. 501 , 23 Atl . 776 ;
Berner v . Gebhardt , 87 Mo. App . 409 ; Huntington v . Parkhurst , 87 Mich .
38 , 49 N . W . 597, 24 Am . St . Rep . 146 ; Finklestein v. Herson , 55 N . J .
Law , 217 , 26 Atl. 688 ; Walters v . Williamson , 59 N . J . Law , 337 ,
36 Atl. 665 ; Godard 's Ex’rs v . S . Carolina Railroad , 2 Rich . Law ( S .
C .) 346 ; Huyser v. Chase , 13 Mich . 98 ; Rollins v. Moody , 72 Me. 135 .
The text -book writers seem to so regard the law . I have quoted from
some above . Tiedeman on Real Estate , § 218 , says that : “ The notice
must not only be given for a certain length of time before the estate is
to end , but the estate can only be determined at the expiration of the
time during which the tenant may lawfully hold : i. e ., at the end of
the rental period . It can only be determined at the end of the year ,
quarter , or month , according as the tenancy is respectively a yearly ,
quarterly , or monthly tenancy . The notice must be sufficiently clear
in its terms as to the time when the tenancy is to expire .” 3 Minor's
Inst. pt. 1, p. 241. “ The notice * * * must end with the period at
which the tenancy commences .” 2 Kerr , R . Prop . 1310 . 1 Lomax ,
Dig . 164 ; 1 Greenleaf's Cruise , R . Prop . p . 248, § 26 . Chitty on Con
tracts (11th Ed .) 485 , speaking of English common law , says , “ The
notice must be framed with reasonable certainty as to the time of
quitting .” In Currier v . Barker , 2 Gray , 227, it was held that a present
demand or notice to quit was insufficient , and the rule is stated as
follows : “ The notice to quit is technical , and is well understood . It
fixes a time at which a tenant is bound to quit, and the landlord has a
right to enter at a time which the rent terminates . The rights of both
parties are fixed by it and are dependent on it. Should the landlord
decline to enter , and the tenant quit according to notice , the tenant
could no longer be holden for rent , although he had given no notice to
the landlord . The lease is determined by such notice properly given by
either party . It is manifest, therefore , that, when such consequences
depend upon the notice to be given , the notice should fix with reason
able exactness the time at which these consequences may begin to take
effect . See , also , Walker v. Sharpe , 14 Allen , 45.” Of course , much
force is to be given to the harmonious construction of the many cases
by the text -writers. Still I have had a question whether the cases mean
only that the period of time before the termination must expire on the
day of the close of the year , or that the notice must designate the time
when the tenant intends to quit. Such seems to be the law . The only
question is, does it fit this case ?
It does seem of great force to say that the only object of notice is
to manifest an intent o
f
one party to end the tenancy , and to inform
the other party o
f that intent , and that the letter in this case did that .
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Arbenz surely knew that his tenants designed to end the tenancy , be
cause he knew that they had quit the premises and surrendered pos
session . What more could formal notice do ? True , it could not go
to end the tenancy December 31, 1898 , because from the letter to that
date was not three months. But could it not end the tenancy at close
of 1899 ? Now , if the tenants had on the date of the letter given notice
that they would quit December 31 , 1899 , who would say that it would
not be sufficient ? Did not that letter disclose intent to quit ? By
law it could not operate to close the tenancy December 31, 1898 , be
cause the time would be too short . Would it not operate then as soon
as the law would let it , just as a formal notice at the date of the letter
would have done ; that is , December 31 , 1899 ? Arbenz had notice
of his tenants ' intention to quit . Why could not that notice operate
at the earliest date the law would allow it to operate ? In addition , if
anything more could in reason be demanded to disclose the intention
of the tenants to stop the tenancy , and to inform Arbenz of such in
tention we add that the tenants in April , 1899 , in court , defended the
claim of Arbenz to rent prior to November , 1899 . Their defense was
that the building was destroyed , and they had sent that letter and
abandoned possession . But here comes in the answer that the statute ,
reiterating common law prevalent for centuries , tells how the tenant
must end his tenancy ; that is, by written notice . It is dangerous for us
to insert an exception by saying that , if the landlord had knowledge
of the tenant 's intention , it stands for notice . It may not be improper
to say that I have given labored investigation of this case , as other
members of the court have , and I have been impressed with the weight
of the line of defense just stated , and have struggled to find a justifica
tion for adopting it, as the payment of the whole rent by the defendants ,





court appreciate ; but I am compelled to say that to decide against
the plaintiff would be to fl
y
in the face o
f practically a unanimity of
authorities through several hundred years in all quarters where the
common law rules . As applied generally , the rule is right . As applied
in this case , it works hardship . But we cannot bend a fixed rule to
suit a hard case .
Counsel says that the statute only requires three months ' notice
before end o
f year , and that the written notice need not specify time
o
f quitting , and that to say so is to read such a requirement into the
statute . We answer that the statute only recognizes as the law already
the requirement o
f
notice to terminate a tenancy from year to year , and
it has not changed the common -law requisites o
f
the notice . We have
cited to u
s
the Georgia case o
f
Robertson v . Simons , 34 S . E . 604 , in
which the opinion says that while mere abandonment o
f premises at the
end o
f
the year "might perhaps ” be sufficient to bring home notice
to the landlord o
f
the tenant ' s intention to terminate the tenancy , " so
a
s to prevent the landlord recovering rent beyond the year immediately
succeeding such abandonment . ” This is mere opinion . It was not a
t





























all in judgment a thought in the mind , not maturely considered for
actual judgment . Betz v . Maxwell , 48 Kan . 143 , 29 Pac . 147 , seems
to support the defense in saying that as the landlord , from abandon
ment of possession , knew o
f
the intention to quit , formal notice was
useless . This seems to be answered b
y
the quotation above from Currier
v . Barker . And it runs counter to the principle which all authorities
assert — that mere abandon ent will not dispense with notice , but the
tenancy and liability for rent go on . “ The tenant ' s liability for rent
continues till he puts an end to the estate b
y
notice , whether he con
tinues to occupy the premises o
r
not . ” 1 Washb . R . Prop . § 807 . So far
is this so that the landlord may , a
t
his choice , relet and recover the
difference , or let the premises stand vacant . Merrill v . Willis , 51 Neb .
162 , 70 N . W . 914 ; 6 Ballard , R . Prop . $ 462 ; Schuisler v . Ames , 16
Ala . 73 , 50 Am . Dec . 168 . Adams v . Cohoes , 127 N . Y . 175 , 28 N .
E . 25 , is strongly relied on . The judge writing the opinion does say
that knowledge of intention to quit , brought home to the landlord , will
dispense with formal notice . In the vast mass of New York decisions
it is readily noticed there are multitudinous conflicts . This case is in :
conflict with other decisions in New York itself . It seems that the New
York statutes entered into the case .




the theory that the former decision is res judicata
to fi
x right to recover the rent involved in the present case . That case
was for rent for a certain period o
f
time ; this , for another . That case
is res judicata to establish that it was a tenancy from year to year , but
did not say how long . A case may settle principle , but not be res judi
cata as to matters not immediately involved .
We are compelled to reverse the judgment and render for the plaintiff
for his demand .
CHAPTER V .
USES AND TRUSTS .
I Before the Statute of 27 Henry VIII, c. 10.
THE STATUTE OF USES, 15 Rich . II , c. 5, A . D . 1391.
Whereas it is contained in the Statute De Religiosis , That no religious ,
nor other whatsoever he be, do buy or sell or under color of gift , or
term , or any other manner of title whatsoever, receive of any man , or
in any manner by gift or engine cause to be appropriated unto him
any lands or tenements , upon pain of forfeiture of the same, whereby
the said lands and tenements in any manner might come to mortmain ;
and if any religious, or any other , do against the said statute by art
or engine in any manner , that it be lawful to the king and to other
lords upon the said lands and tenements to enter ; as in the said statute
doth more fully appear : and now of late by subtle imagination and by
art and engine some religious persons, parsons, vicars , and other spiritual
persons, have entered in divers lands and tenements , which be adjoining
to their churches, and of the same, by sufferance and assent of the ten
ants , have made church yards , and by bulls of the Bishop of Rome
have dedicated and hallowed the same, and in them do make continually
parochial burying without license of the king and of the chief lords ;
therefore it is declared in this parliament , that it is manifestly within
the compass of the said statute ; and moreover it is agreed and assented ,
that a
ll they that be possessed of feoffment o
r by other manner to the
use o
f religious people , or other spiritual persons , of lands and tene
ments , fees , advowsons , or any manner other possessions whatsoever , to
amortise them , and whereof the said religious and spiritual persons take




. Michael next coming







the lords , o
r
else that they shall sell and aliene them to some other
use , between this and the said feast , upon pain to be forfeited to the king
and to the lords , according to the form o
f
the said Statute o
f Religious ,
a
s lands purchased b
y religious people ; and that from henceforth no
such purchase be made , so that such religious o
r
other spiritual persons
take thereof the profits , as afore is said , upon pain aforesaid ; and that
the same statute extend and be observed o
f all lands , tenements , fees ,
advowsons , and other possessions purchased or to be purchased to the
use o
f guilds or fraternities . And moreover it is assented , because
mayors , bailiffs , and commons , o
f
cities , boroughs , and other towns
which have a perpetual commonalty , and others which have offices per
( 163 )
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petual , be as perpetual as people of religion , that from henceforth they
shall not purchase to them and to their commons or office upon pain
contained in the said Statute De Religiosis ; and whereas others be pos
sessed , or hereafter shall purchase to their use, and they thereof take
the profits , it shall be done in like manner as is afore said of people of
religion .
MESSYNDEN V. PIERSON , in Chancery , A . D. 1417 -24 - Select Cases in
Chancery No . 117 .
To the most reverend and gracious father in God , the Bishop of Durham ,
Chancellor of England :
Humbly beseecheth your continual orator , Thomas Messynden the
younger , That whereas Thomas Messynden his father enfeoffed Richard
Pierson , parson of the church of Hatcliffe , John West , parson of the
church of Bradley , John Barnaby of Barton the younger, and John See
of Little Coates , in certain lands and tenements in the town of Healing
in the county of Lincoln , to the value of £10 a year , on condition that .
the said feoffees should enfeoff the said suppliant in the lands and tene
ments aforesaid when he should come to the age of 18 years ; and now
the said suppliant is of the age of 18 years and more , and he hath many
times requested the said feoffees to enfeoff him in the said lands and
tenements according to the wish and condition of his said father ; and
they do utterly refuse, and say that they will hold the said lands and
tenements to their own use : May it please your most gracious lord
ship to grant certain writs to send for the said feoffees on certain pains
by you to be limited , to answer before you in the chancery , and to
declare wherefore they will not enfeoff the said suppliant according to
the wish and condition aforesaid ; for God and in way of charity ; con
sidering , most gracious lord , that the said suppliant can have no recov
ery at common law .
The above is all that appears in the Calendar from which it is taken ,
spelling modernized . What was done with the case after the bill was
filed does not appear . There are very few decrees entered in the calendars .
From the fact of the filing of such a bill, and that the same book is filled
with others much like it , we may fairly infer that if the allegations were
sustained by the proof, a conveyance by the feoffees was ordered , though
prayer for such relief should have been made . This particular bill is of
interest , among other things , by reason of the fact that it so nearly resem
bles the form of the modern bill in chancery ; as do the others found with
it ; and the substance of the bill illustrates how such uses were enforced
at that time. Observe that the use to the complainant in this case corre
sponds in substance with what came to be known as the springing use
after the statute of uses , 27 Hen . VIII , c. 10 . The fact that such uses
were commonly given effect without question in chancery before the statute ,
is why they were admitted to be good at law after the statute , though in
violation of the law of remainders.
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EXAMINATION BY THE BISHOP OF BATH AND WELLS , Chancellor of
England . Reported in Calendar Chancery vol. 1, p. xliii , also in Digby's
History of Real Property (5th ed .) p. 337.
Be it had in mind that the x day of August , the reign of King Henry
the sixth , after the conquest xvi, [ A . D . 1438 ] . John Glover of Wynte
nayse Herteley , in the shire of Southampton , husbandman , and Thomas
Attemore , of the same town , husbandman , appearing before the right
reverend father in God , the Bishop of Bath and Wells , Chancellor of
England , in his manor of Dogmersfield , and there examined severally
upon a certain feoffment made to them by one Robert Crody , of certain
lands and tenements in the town afore specified , said and confessed
expressly by their oaths upon a book , how that said Robert , the Wednes
day next after the feast of St. Michael , the year of the reign of King
Henry the fifth , after the conquest viii , [ 1421 ] in the evening , lying
in a house of his own at the said town , so sore sick in his bed that
for his sickness he might not be removed , in to so much that in the
same night following he died , called to him the said John and Thomas ,
saying to them in this manner : “ Sirs, ye be the men in whom I have
great trust afore much other persons, and in especial that such will as I
shall declare you at this time, for my full and last will, shall through
your good help , by our lord 's mercy , be performed ; Wherefore I let you
have full knowledge , that this house which I lie in , and all my other
lands and tenements in this town , I give and grant to you , to hold to
you , your heirs and assigns , to this intent , that after my decease you
shall make estate of the same house , lands and tenements to Alice my
wife for term o
f
her life , so that after her death they remain to Mar
garet my daughter , and to the heirs of her body lawfully becoming ,
and if she die without heir of her body coming , that then they remain
to my right heirs forever more . And to the intent that this my last
will may be performed b
y you , as my trust is that it shall be , here at
this time I deliver you possession o
f
this house , in the name o
f
all my
lands and tenements afore specified , as wholly and entirely as they were
ever mine a
t any time . " By force whereof the said John and Thomas
were possessed o
f
the house , lands and tenements aforesaid , in their
demesne as of fee , and of the same house , lands and tenements made
estate to the said Alice , after the death of her said husband , according




ANON . , 7 Edw . 4 , A . D . 1468 — Brooke Abr . t . Conscience 27 .
Cestui que use shall have a subpæna against his feoffees in use for
their authority to maintain an action in their names ; and b
y
the judges ,
they shall plead such pleas a
s
the cestui que use shall give them , where
fore o
f delays . And if a man give his goods to his use , and another
seize them , the donee is bound to maintain an action of trespass on this ;
but not appeal of robbery : b
y
CHOKE and LITTLETON . For it would
Beem o
n this that the plaintiff should not have authority to wage battle
if the defendant should render battle .
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ANON ., in the Exchequer Chamber , 37 Hen . 6 , A . D . 1459 - Year -books of
37 Hen . 6 , pp . 35b , 36a , pl. 23 , noted also in Brooke Abr . tt . Subpoena 1,
Conscience 5, Uses 14 , Devise 14 .
In the exchequer chamber the case was this , that one had four feoffees
to his use , and sold his land to one H , and said to two of his feoffees
that his wish was that the four feoffees should make a feoffment to H ;
and these two feoffees gave notice to the others that the wish of their
feoffor was that they make feoffment in fee to H ; and these two refused
to make the feoffment to H ; but the two whom the feoffor notified made
estate to H of what was to them . And afterwards the feoffor sold the
land to one J , and came to the two feoffees who refused to make estate
to H and requested them to make feoffment to J , and so enfeoff of their
part. And the said H brought his writ of subpæna in the chancery
against these two feoffees that refused to make estate to him . And this
matter was adjourned into the exchequer chamber , because the two
feoffees to whom the feoffor gave notice did not say to the others
that their feoffor requested and commanded them to make the
feoffment , but only gave notice of the wish of their feoffor, on which they
were not bound to act without command and request of the feoffor . THE
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES was that they should go quit of this subpoena
and be discharged because they need not enfeoff but according to law .
Some said that although the feoffor should send one of his servants
to the feoffees to command them to make feoffment according to his
will , the feoffees would not be bound to make the feoffment without &
specialty to prove his will ; which note . And , it was said by JENNEY ,
out of court, that he saw a case in which the will of one was that his
feoffees should make an estate for the term of life to one J , the remainder
to one C in fee ; and the said J would not take the estate , this C had a
subpena against the feoffees to make the remainder to him after the
death of J . Finch agreed , and said that in this case the feoffees should
make an estate for life to J , and if he refused , the feoffees should make
an estate for his life to a certain person for the use of the deceased , the
remainder as above . So that although the first who would take the estate
should refuse , yet those in remainder should have their remedy , as above,
permitting it to remain with them in their lives . And this is not like
to a devise where one devises lands devisable , to -wit , to one for term of
life, the remainder over , or divers remainders over , and dies ; if the first
who should take the estate refuse , those in remainder would not have
subpena against the feoffees , or execution , to do as above . For although
he who should have the first estate refuse , yet the devise took effect
meanwhile in all by the death of the devisor ; and although the tenant
for term of life should not enter for al
l
his life afterwards , he in re
mainder may enter as well as the tenant for term o
f
life might enter , for




the devisor and a
ll
a
t one time . But
here it is not so , for he in the remainder may not enter while he for the
term o
f
life took an estate according to the will . And if the tenant
for term of life refuse , he in remainder having no remedy during the
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life , the feoffees might give or sell the land ,
and perhaps afterwards die during the life o
f
the tenant for term o
f
life ,
and then they would b
e without remedy . For default o
f subpæna they
might not enter , and so without remedy ; and this is why they should
have their subpona during the life o
f
the tenant for life . Which note .
ANON . , Easter term , A . D . 1469 — Yearbook 4 Edw . IV , 8 , p
l
. 9 , Digby ' s His
tory of the Law of Real Property 338 .
In a writ o
f
trespass for breaking the close with force and arms and
cutting down the trees , treading down and destroying the grass , & c .
Catesby [ for defendant ] : The plaintiff ought not to have his action ,
for we say that long before the supposed trespass one J . B . was seized
in fee of certain land and died so seized , which then descended to the
defendant as heir at law o
f
the said J . B . , being the place where the
trespass is supposed to have been committed , and the defendant being
seized in fee o
f
the said lands enfeoffed the plaintiff in fe
e , to the use of the





the plaintiff and at his will occupied the land and cut the trees within
the said land and depastured the herbage , which are the trespasses com
plained o
f
in the action . Jenney ( for the plaintiff ] : That is no plea ,
for that is no certain matter the sufferance of the plaintiff and that
the defendant occupied by the will o
f
the plaintiff - for such sufferance
and will cannot be tried , for the intent of a man is uncertain , and a man
should plead such matter as is or may be known to the jury , if issue
should b
e
taken thereon ; and this cannot be upon the alleged sufferance
o
r will of the plaintiff that the defendant should occupy , & c . ; wherefore
in such a case to make a good issue o
r matter traversable , he should plead
the lease made b
y
the plaintiff to the defendant to hold a
t
his will , which
is matter traversable and that may be tried . Catesby : Wherefore should
the defendant not avail himself of this matter , when it follows b
y
reason
that the defendant enfeoffed the plaintiff to the use o
f
the defendant ,
and so that the plaintiff is only in the land to the use of the defendant ,
and the defendant made the feoffment to the plaintiff in trust and confi
dence ? And the plaintiff suffered the defendant to occupy the land so
that b
y
reason that the defendant occupied the land a
t
his will , this
proves that the defendant shall have the advantage o
f
this feoffment in
trust , in order to justify his occupation o
f
the land by this cause , & c .
MOILE [ J . ] : This is a good ground of defense in chancery , for the de
fendant there shall aver the intent and purpose upon such a feoffment ;
for in the chancery a man shall have remedy according to conscience upon
the intent o
f




the common law ,
in the common pleas o
r king ' s bench , it is otherwise ; for the feoffee shall
have the land , and the feoffor shall not justify contrary to his own feoff
ment that the said feoffment was made in confidence or the contrary .
Catesby : The law of chancery is the common law of the land , and there
the defendant shall have advantage o
f
this matter and feoffment ; where
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fore then shall he not have it in the same manner here ? MOILE : That
cannot be so here in this court , as I have said already , for the common
law of the land is different from the law of chancery on this point.
Catesby passed over the point; and as to the trees he repeated the
former plea , and said that he had no other answer . As to the herbage , he
said that the plaintiff was seized in fee and leased the land to the de
fendant to hold at his will , & c . ; wherefore the defendant entered and
committed the alleged trespasses , for which this action was brought .
Jenney traversed the lease, & c.
ANON., Easter term , 22 Edw . IV , 6, pl. 18, A. D . 1483 .
In th
e





and the other , and many sergeants and apprentices , the archbishop o
f
York , then being lord chancellor o




f granting a subpæna ; and said that one had complained to
him that he was bound in a statute merchant to another , and had paid
the money and not taken a release , and notwithstanding this the recog
nusee had sued execution ; and he said that the recognusee did not wish
to say if he was examined but that it is paid ; and he said , my lords ,
ought I to grant the subpæna ? FAIRFAX [ J . ] . It seems to me that
it would be wholly against reason to grant a subpoena and by two wit
nesses after making a matter of record ; for where one is bound in such
form h
e
is not bound to pay without acquitance or release , as if a man
is bound b
y
bond , he is not bound to pay this debt unless the obligee
will make an acquitance ; and so it seems to me that it is his folly . The
CHANCELLOR said that it is the common course in the chancery to grant
a subpæna against an obligation , and also on a feoffment in trust where
the heir o
f




otherwise , for we find records
in the chancery o
f
such . HUSSEY , the chief justice o
f
the king ' s bench :
When I first came to the court , which is now 30 years ago , it was agreed
in a case b
y
the whole court that if a man should enfeoff another in trust ,
if he should die seized so that the heir is in b
y
descent , then no subpæna
lies ; and there is great reason that it should be so , for by the same reason
that a subpæna b
y
two witnesses may disprove descent in the chancery ,
I say that as well may it disprove twenty descents , which is against
reason and conscience . So that it seems to me no worse to make him




witnesses in the chancery . And so it is in
the statute merchant , and also in the bond , it is no worse to make them
pay who b
y
their negligence are behind , than that two witnesses in the
chancery should disprove a matter o
f
record o
r specialty , where it is his
own negligence and he is not bound to pay before he has the acquitance
o
f
the plaintiff or his release ; and I say this for law , and so is the law .
And this said the CHANCELLOR : Then it is great folly to enfeoff another
o
f my land . And afterward the chancellor assented as to the statute
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merchant because it is a matter of record , and as to the remainder he said
he would be advised .
STATUTE OF USES , 1 Rich . II
I , c . 1 , A . D . 1483 .
Forasmuch a
s by privy and unknown feoffments , great unsurety ,
trouble , costs , and grievous vexations daily grow among the king ' s sub
jects , insomuch that no man that buyeth any lands , tenements , rents ,
services , or other hereditaments , nor women that have jointures o
r
dow
ers in any lands , tenements , o
r other hereditaments , nor men ' s last will
to b
e performed , nor leases for term o
f
life or of years , nor annuities
granted to any person o







in perfect surety , nor without great trouble and
doubt o
f
the same because o
f
the said privy and unknown feoffments ;





the lords spiritual and temporal , and by the commons in this present
parliament assembled , and by authority of the same , that every estate ,
feoffment , gift , release , grant , leases , and confirmations , o
f
lands , tene
ments , rents , services , o
r






any person or persons , being o
f
full age , of whole
mind , a
t large , and not in duress , to any person o
r persons ; and all recov
eries and executions had o
r
made , shall be good and effectual to him to
whom it is so made , had , or given , and to all other to his use , against
the seller , feoffor , donor , or grantor thereof , and against the sellers ,
feoffors , donors , or grantors , his or their heirs , claiming the same only
a
s heir or heirs to the same sellers , feoffors , donors , or grantors , and
every o
f
them , and against al
l
other having or claiming any title or inter
est in the same , only to the use of the same sellor , feoffor , donor , o
r
grantor , sellers , feoffors , donors , o
r grantors , or his or their said heirs a
t
the time of the bargain , sale , covenant , gift or grant , made , saving to
every person o
r persons such right , title , action , or interest , by reason of
gift in tail thereof made , as they ought to have had if this act had not
been made .
ANON . , In Common Bench , Easter term , 17 Hen . 7 , A . D . 1502 - Keilwey 41b .
In the common bench the opinion was that he to whom the use of
lands is in fe
e simple , made b
y
the statute [ 1 Rich . 3 , c . 1 ] make a lease
o
r bargain of the land , also that he may well sell the trees growing on
the land , and his sale is good .
ANON . , in Common Bench , Easter term , 17 Hen . 7 , A . D . 1502 — Keilwey 41b .





land in conscience , it was moved and argued whether he might
seize in his own right beasts of one being o
n
the land damage feasant , or
not . It was said b
y
some that he may , for a tenant a
t will may distrain
for damage feasance , and may protect his interest b
y
outlawry , and so
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may such a feoffor who is a tenant at sufferance ; and a commoner may
seize distresses for damage feasance , and yet he has nothing in the soil,
but he may do this for the damage which he suffers ; wherefore , inquire
well what manner of tenant this feoffor should be said to be in law .
Afterwards it was held in the same term , that the said tenant at suffer
ance may not distrain beasts damage feasant , nor may he have an action
of trespass in his own name, but the feoffees shall have the action . NOTE
after in Mich . term , 18 H . 7 , it was adjudged that the feoffor may not
take the beasts , & c. More of this case , Pasche, 17 H . 7, Keilwey 42 ,
case 7 ; and tenant at sufferance, Michaelmas , 18 H . 7, Keilwey 46a ,
case 2 ( same case ? Y . B . Hilary , 15 Hen . VII, 2, pl. 4 ] .
LORD CHAMBERLAIN DAYBENEY V. CHICHESTER , in exchequer
chamber , Trinity , 22 Hen . 7, A . D . 1507 — Keilwey 93 , 4 Jenk . Cent . case 94 .
A man seized to the use of me and my heirs male of my body , and
for default of such issue male to the use of a stranger in fe
e , made a
gift o
f
it to me and my heirs general of my body , & c . Afterwards I die
seised without heir male , and my heir general (daughter ) of my body
enters . My heir general is seized to the use of the stranger to whom the
remainder in fee was in the use , in case that I have notice of the use
a
t


















ANON . , 14 Hen . 8 , 4 , p
l
. 5 , A . D . 1522 — Brooke t . “ Feoffments to Uses . ” 10 .
Replevin . The defendant avowed on a rent charge , on this that J . D .
and J . B . were seised of nine acres of land before , & c . , in fee to the use
o
f
R . N . ( W . N . ? ] of the gift of R . , and granted the rent to Alice , who
was the wife of R . , for the term of her life , with clause of distress ; and
she distrained and avowed a
s
in her rent charge . And the plaintiff said
that J . D . and J . B . were seised in fee to the use o
f
W . N . , and granted
the rent to said Alice , she having notice of the s i use ; and J . D . and
J . B . enfeoffed H . , and afterwards W . N . who was cestui que use released
to said II . all his right in the land , without this that J . D . and J . B .
· were seized to the use of said R . N . And the defendant demurred
in law on the bar of the avowery . And the matter is if the rent should be
to the use o
f
the cestui que use a
s





to the use of the grantee . By POLLARD , BROOKE , and Fitz
HERBERT , justices : The rent should be to the use o
f
the cestui que use ;
and the release o
f





1 Rich , 3 [ c . 1 ] ; which wills that the release o
f
the
cestui que use shall be good against him , his heirs and feoffees and their
heirs ; and it was agreed by all in a manner that the rent followed the
nature of the land , as in ancient demesne , borough English , gravelkind ,
and the like . * * * And it was held that where feoffees in use were ,
their heirs and feoffees and a
ll
who should be in in the per , without con
sideration , or with consideration if they had notice o
f
the first use , should
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be seised to the same use ; the contrary of those who were in in the post .
For by NUDYGATE , if feoffees to use die without heir and the lord enter
by escheat, he shall be seised to his own use ; and the heir of the feoffee
being within age, he shall be in ward to the lord , and the lord shall
have the profits ; and the widow of the feoffee shall be endowed to her
own use , for her estate is made by law though she is adjudged in through
her husband , for yet this is by the law , whether the man will or not ;
and a man taking a wife that is seised to use , shall be tenant by the
curtesy , and is in the post to his own use ; and if the feoffee to uses
should be bound in a statute merchant or the like, the land is liable to
execution . * * * FITZHERBERT , justice : If a man makes a feoffment
without consideration , the feoffees shall be seised to the use of the feoffor ,
or to the use to which the feoffor was seised ; and if a feoffee in use was
of a seigniory , and the land escheats , he should have the land to the same
use that he had the seigniory , for this came in the place of the seigniory ;
on the contrary above where the feoffee in use dies without heir , and
the land escheats . Note well the diversity . And the same is the law
if the feoffee in use recover the land in value on a warranty , this shall
be to the first use. POLLARD concurred in this . And by BROOKE , justice :
If a feoffee in use makes a feoffment on consideration to one who has no
notice of the former use , this changes the use ; and on the contrary if
the feoffment was without consideration . And the widow of the feoffee
that is endowed by the common law shall be seised to her own use ; the
contrary it would seem of dower ex accensu patris or ad ostium ecclasiae ;
for these are by the feoffee , and the other is in in the per , by the husband ,
and yet by the law without the act of the husband . But if a feoffee in use
makes a gift in tail , the donee shall be seised to his own use , for there
is a consideration , s. the tenure between them , unless the use is expressed
on the donation , or in the gift ; and the feoffee leasing fo
r
life having
fealty , this is to the use of the lessee if the use was not expressly re
served , & c . And the same is the law of devise and testament ; the de
visee shall be seised to his own use unless it is otherwise expressed , for
there is a consideration implied , and so where a feoffment is made to
a
n abbey o
r corporation , this shall be to their own use if not otherwise
expressly made . POLLARD , justice : Feoffees in use enfeoffing others
without consideration , this is to the first use , though the heirs o
f
the
feoffee have no notice o
f
the first use . But if it was on consideration
and to one who had no notice the use is changed ; but if it was on notice





feoffees in use , this shall be to the use o
f
the grantees , and if
the feoffee in use release to the tenants that hold of the manor , this
shall not be to the use o
f
the cestui que use . BRUDNEL , chief justice :
If the feoffees to use made a lease for life , the remainder for life , the
remainder in fe
e , and they had notice o
f
the use , they should be seised
to the first use , notwithstanding the division o
f
their estates . And b
y
him , for this that a man cannot have land and rent out of the same
land , likewise a man cannot have a use o
f
land and a use o
f
the rent
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out of the same land ; for this is contrary to a
ll
the other three justices ,
and it seems to me clearly that the law is with BRUDNEL , and the rent
may not be avoided if not in chancery , and there ought to b
e notice o
f
the use in the grant and other notice , and a disseisee would neither occupy
nor b
e
seised to any use . And , BY ALL THE JUSTICES except BRUDNEL ,
where feoffees to use make a lease o
r
the like , and the cestui que use
enters and makes a feoffment over , this should not disprove the first
estate , nor avoid any mesne acts , as leases , dower , statute merchant , o
r
the like , made b
y
the first feoffees : On the contrary , BRUDNEL , to whom
it seemed that these cases were contrary to themselves and in a manner
contrary to their other reasons . * * *
GREY ' S CASE , in Common Bench , Easter term , 10 Eliz . , A . D . 156843
Dyer 274a .
R . G . , before the statute 2
7
H . 8 , c . 10 , was seised in use o
f
certain
lands , to him and the heirs o
f
his body , remainder to H . G . , his brother ,
and the heirs o
f
his body , & c . And before the said statute , a common
recovery was suffered b
y
R . G . , who vouched the common vouchee ; which
recovery was executed , and afterwards the recoverers enfeoffed one T .
H . to the use o
f
said T . H . , and afterwards R . G . died without issue .
Whether the ancient feoffees might enter or have an action to recover
the land to the first use , or not ? And CATLYN , DYER , WESTON , GER
RARD and ONSLOW , attorney and solicitor general , thought that they
might .
Under the Statute , 27 Henry VIII , c . 10 .
THE STATUTE OF USES , 27 Henry VIII , c . 10 , A . D . 1536 .
A
n Act Concerning Uses and Wills .
Where b
y
the common laws o
f
this realm , lands , tenements , and hered
itaments be not devisable b
y
testaments , nor ought to be transferred
from one to another but b
y
solemn livery and seizin , matter o
f
record ,
writing sufficient and made bona fide without covin or fraud ; vet never
theless divers and sundry imaginations , subtle inventions , and practices
have been used , whereby the hereditaments of this realm have been con
veyed from one to another by fraudulent feoffments , fines , recoveries ,
and other assurances craftily made to secret uses , intents and trusts ;
and also by wills and testaments , sometime made b
y
nude parolz and
words , sometime b
y signs and tokens , and sometime b
y writing , and
for the most part made by such persons as be visited with sickness , in
their extreme agonies and pains , o
r a
t
such time as they have scantly
had any good memory or remembrance ; at which times they being pro
voked b
y
greedy and covetous persons lying in wait about them , do
many times dispose indiscreetly and unadvisedly their lands and inher
itances ; b
y





ments , fines , recoveries , and other like assurances to uses , confidences
and trusts , divers and many heirs have been unjustly a
t sundry times
disherited , the lords have lost their wards , marriages , reliefs , heriots ,
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escheats , aids pur fair fits chivalier & pur file marier , and scantly any
person can be certainly assured of any lands by them purchased , nor
know surely against whom they shall use their actions or executions for
their rights, titles and duties ; also men married have lost their ten
ancies by the curtesy , women their dowers , manifest perjuries by trial
of such secret wills and uses have been committed ; the king 's highness
hath lost the profits and advantages of the lands of persons attainted ,
and of the lands craftily put in feoffments to the uses of aliens born ,
and also the profits of waste for a year and a day of lands of felons
attainted , and the lords their escheats thereof ; and many other incon
veniences have happened and daily do increase among the king 's sub
jects , to their great trouble and inquietness , and to the utter subversion
of the ancient common laws of this realm ; for the extirping and extin
guishment of all such subtle practiced feoffments , fines , recoveries ,
abuses and errors heretofore used and accustomed in this realm , to the
subversion of the good and ancient laws of the same, and to the intent
that the king' s highness , or any other his subjects of this realm , shall
not in any wise hereafter by any means or inventions be deceived , dam
aged or hurt , by reason of such trusts , uses or confidences : it may please
the king 's most royal majesty , that it may be enacted by his highness ,
by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , and the commons , in
this present parliament assembled , and by the authority of the same,
in manner and form following : that is to say , That where any person
or persons stand or be seised , or at any time hereafter shall happen to
be seised , of and in any honors , castles , manors , lands , tenements, rents,
services , reversions, remainders or other hereditaments , to the use , con
fidence or trust of any other person or persons, or of any body politic ,
by reason of any bargain , sale , feoffment , fine, recovery , covenant, con
tract, agreement will or otherwise, by any manner means whatsoever
it be ; that in every such case, all and every such person and persons ,
and bodies politic , that have or hereafter shall have any such use , con
fidence or trust , in fee simple , fee tail, for term of life or for years, or
otherwise , or any use , confidence or trust , in remainder or reverter , shall
from henceforth stand and be seised , deemed and adjudged in lawful
seisin , estate and possession of and in the same honors , castles , manors ,
lands , tenements , rents , services , reversions , remainders and heredita
ments , with their appurtenances , to all intents , constructions and pur
poses in the law , of and in such like estates as they had or shall have
in use , trust or confidence of or in the same; and that the estate , title ,
right and possession that was in such person or persons that were, or
hereafter shall be seised of any lands, tenements or hereditaments , to the
use , confidence or trust of any such person or persons, or of any body
politic , be from henceforth clearly deemed and adjudged to be in him
or them that have , or hereafter shall have, such use , confidence or trust ,
after such quality , manner , form and condition as they had before, in
or to the use , confidence or trust that was in them .
82 . And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid , that where
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divers and many persons be , or hereafter shall happen to be, jointly
seised of and in any lands , tenements , rents , reversions , remainders or
other hereditaments , to the use , confidence or trust of any of them that
be so jointly seised , that in every such case that those person or per
sons which have or hereafter shall have any such use , confidence or
trust in any such lands , tenements , rents , reversions , remainders or
hereditaments , shall from henceforth have, and be deemed and adjudged
to have only to him or them that have, or hereafter shall have any such
use , confidence or trust, such estate, possession and seisin , of and in the
same lands , tenements , rents , reversions , remainders and other heredita
ments, in like nature , manner , form , condition and course , as he or they
had before in the use , confidence or trust of the same lands, tenements
or hereditaments ; saving and reserving to all and singular persons and
bodies politic , their heirs and successors , other than those person or per
sons which be seised , or hereafter shall be seised , of any lands, tene
ments or hereditaments , to any use, confidence or trust , all such right,
title , entry , interest, possession , rents and action , as they or any of them
had , or might have had before the making of this act.
$ 3. And also saving to all and singular those persons, and to their
heirs , which be , or hereafter shall be seised to any use , all such former
right, title , entry , interest , possession , rents , customs, services and action ,
as they or any of them might have had to his or their own proper use ,
in or to any manors , lands, tenements , rents or hereditaments , whereof
they be, or hereafter shall be seised to any other use , as if this present
act had never been had nor made ; any thing contained in this act to
the contrary notwithstanding .
84 . And where also divers persons stand and be seised of and in any
lands , tenements or hereditaments , in fee -simple or otherwise , to the
use and intent that some other person or persons shall have and per
ceive yearly to them , and to his or their heirs , one annual rent of x. li.
or more or less, out of the same lands and tenements , and some other
person one other annual rental, to him and his assigns for term of life
or years , or for some other special time , according to such intent and
use as hath been heretofore declared , limited and made thereof :
$ 5 . Be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid , that in every
such case the same persons, their heirs and assigns , that have such use
and interest , to have and receive any such annual rents out of any
lands , tenements or hereditaments , that they and every of them , their
heirs and assigns, be adjudged and deemed to be in possession and seisin
of the same rent, of and in such like estate as they had in the title ,
interest or use of the said rent or profit , and as if a sufficient grant , or
other lawful conveyance had been made and executed to them , by such
as were or shall be seised to the use or intent of any such rent to be
had , made or paid , according to the very trust and intent thereof, and
that a
ll
and every such person and persons as have , or hereafter shall
have , any title , use and interest in or to any such rent or profit , shall
lawfully distrain for non -payment of the said rent , and in their own
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names make avowries , or by their bailiffs or servants make conisances
and justifications , and have a
ll
other suits , entries and remedies for
such rents , as if the same rents had been actually and really granted
to them , with sufficient clauses o
f
distress , re -entry , o
r
otherwise , accord
ing to such conditions , pains , or other things limited and appointed ,




$ 6 . And be it further enacted b
y
the authority aforesaid , that
whereas divers persons have purchased , o
r
have estate made and con
veyed o
f
and in divers lands , tenements and hereditaments unto them
and to their wives , and to the heirs of the husband , or to the husband





their bodies begotten , or to the husband and to the wife
for term of their lives , or for term of life of the said wife ; o
r
where
any such estate or purchase o
f any lands , tenements , or hereditaments ,
hath been o
r
hereafter shall be made to any husband and to his wife ,
in manner and form expressed , or to any other person or persons , and
to their heirs and assigns , to the use and behoof of the said husband
and wife , o
r
to the use o
f
the wife , as is before rehearsed , for the jointure
of the wife ; that then in every such case , every woman married , having
such jointure made or hereafter to be made , shall not claim , nor have
title to have any dower o
f
the residue of the lands , tenements or hered
itaments , that at any time were her said husband ' s , b
y
whom she hath
any such jointure , nor shall demand nor claim her dower o
f
and against
them that have the lands and inheritances of her said husband ; but if
she have no such jointure , then she shall be admitted and enabled to
pursue , have and demand her dower b
y
writ of dower , after the due
course and order o
f
the common laws of this realm ; this act , or any
law o
r provision made to the contrary thereof notwithstanding
$ 7 . Provided alway , that if any such woman be lawfully expulsed
o
r
evicted from her said jointure , or from any part thereof , without
any fraud or covin , b
y












her husband ' s tenements or hereditaments , whereof she was
before dowable , as the same lands and tenements so evicted and expulsed
shall amount or extend unto .
$ 8 . Provided also , that this act , nor anything therein contained or
expressed , extend or be in any wise hurtful o
r prejudicial to any woman
o
r
women heretofore being married , o
f , for or concerning such right ,
title , use , interest o
r
possession , as they or any o
f
them have , claim or
pretend to have for her or their jointure or dower , o
f , in o
r
to any
manors , lands , tenements , o
r
other hereditaments o
f any of their late
husbands , being now dead or deceased ; anything contained in this act
to the contrary notwithstanding .
$ 9 . Provided also , that if any wife have , o
r
hereafter shall have any
manors , lands , tenements or hereditaments unto her given and assured
after marriage , for term of her life , or otherwise in jointure , except the
same assurance b
e
to her made by act of parliament , and the said wife
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after that fortune to overlive her said husband , in whose time the said
jointure was made or assured unto her , that then the same wife so over
living shall and may at her liberty , after the death of her said husband ,
refuse to have and take the lands and tenements so to her given , ap
pointed or assured during the coverture , for term of her life, or other
wise in jointure , except the same assurance be to her made by act of
parliament , as is aforesaid , and thereupon to have , ask , demand and
take her dower by writ of dower or otherwise , according to the common
law , of and in all such lands, tenements and hereditaments as her hus
band was and stood seised of any state of inheritance at any time during
the coverture, anything contained in this act to the contrary thereof
notwithstanding .
$ 10 . Provided also , that this present act, or anything herein con
tained , extend nor be at any time hereafter interpreted , expounded or
taken , to extinct , release , discharge or suspend any statute, recognizances
or other bond , by the execution of any estate , of or in any lands, tene
ments or hereditaments , by the authority of this act , to any person or
persons, or bodies politic ; anything contained in this act to the contrary
thereof notwithstanding .
$ 11. And forasmuch as great ambiguities and doubts may arise of the
validity and invalidity of wills heretofore made of any lands, tenements
and hereditaments , to the great trouble of the king 's subjects ; the king's
most royal majesty minding the tranquillity and rest of his loving sub
jects , of his most excellent and accustomed goodness is pleased and
contented that it be enacted by the authority of this present parliament ,
that a
ll
manner true and just wills and testaments heretofore made b
y
any person or persons deceased , or that shall decease before the first day
o
f May , that shall be in the year of our Lord God 1536 , o
f any lands ,
tenements o
r other hereditaments , shall be taken and accepted good
and effectual in the law , after such fashion , manner and form as they
were commonly taken and used at any time within forty years next
afore the making of this act ; anything contained in this act , o
r
in the
preamble thereof , or any opinion of the common law to the contrary
thereof notwithstanding .
$ 1
2 . Provided always , that the king ' s highness shall not have , de










this act , to any person or persons ,
o
r
bodies politic , which now have , o
r
o
n this side the said first day o
f
May , which shall be in the year of our Lord God 1536 , shall have any
use o
r
uses , trusts o
r
confidences in any manors , lands , tenements or
hereditaments holden o
f
the king ' s highness , by reason of primer seisin ,
livery , ouster le main , fine for alienation , relief or heriot ; but that
fines for alienations , reliefs and heriots shall be paid to the king ' s high
ness , and also liveries and ouster les mains shall [be ] used for uses ,





this act , after and from the said first day o
f May , o
f
lands and
tenements , and other hereditaments holden of the king , in such like
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manner and form , to al
l
intents , constructions and purposes , as hath




the laws of this realm .
$ 1
3 . Provided also , that no other person o
r persons , or bodies poli
tic , of whom any lands , tenements o
r
hereditaments be or hereafter
shall be holden mediate o
r
immediate , shall in any wise demand o
r
take any fine , relief or heriot , for o




the authority of this act , to any person o
r persons , or
bodies politic , before the said first day of May , which shall be in the
year o
f our Lord God 1536 .
$ 1
4 . And be it enacted b
y
authority aforesaid , that al
l
and singular
person and persons , and bodies politic , which a
t any time on this side
the said first day o
f May , which shall be in the year of our Lord God
1536 , shall have any estate unto them executed of and in any lands ,
tenements o




this act , shall and may
have and take the same or like advantage , benefit , voucher , aid prayer ,
remedy , commodity and profit by action , entry , condition or otherwise ,
to all intents , constructions and purposes , as the person or persons seised
to their use of o
r
in any such lands , tenements or hereditaments so exe





tion of the estate thereof , by the authority of this act , against any other
person o
r persons , or for any waste , disseisin , trespass , condition broken ,
o
r any other offence , cause or thing concerning or touching the said






5 . Provided also , and be it enacted b
y
the authority aforesaid , that





any lands , tenements or hereditaments , to any use , trust or confidence ,
shall not abate n
e
b







y authority of this act , before the said first day of May ,
which shall be in the year o
f
our Lord God 1536 , anything contained
in this act to the contrary notwithstanding .
$ 1
6 . Provided also , that this act , nor anything herein contained ,
shall not be prejudicial to the king ' s highness for wardships of heirs
now being within age , nor for liveries , or for ouster les mains , to be sued




full age , of any
lands or tenements unto the same heir or heirs now already descended ;
anything in this act contained to the contrary notwithstanding .
$ 1
7 . Provided also , and be it enacted b
y
the authority aforesaid , that
all and singular recognizances heretofore knowledged , taken , or made
to the king ' s use , for or concerning any recoveries of any lands , tene
ments o
r
hereditaments heretofore sued or had , b
y
writ or writs of entry
upon disseisin in le post , shall from henceforth be utterly void and of
none effect , to all intents , constructions and purposes .
$ 1
8 . Provided also , that this act , nor anything therein contained ,
b
e
in any wise prejudicial or hurtful to any person or persons born in
Wales or the marches o
f





this act , in any lands , tenements or other
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now stand or be seised to the use of any such person or persons born in
Wales or the marches of the same; but that the same person or per
sons born in Wales , or the marches of the same, shall or may lawfully
have , retain and keep the same lands, tenements or other hereditaments ,
whereof estate shall be so unto them executed by the authority of this
act , according to the tenor of the same; anything in this act contained ,
or any other act or provision heretofore had or made to the contrary
notwithstanding .
CHUDLEIGH 's Case , reported later in this book , contains a very full dis
cussion of the history of uses and of the causes and effect of this statute .
STATUTE OF ENROLMENTS , 27 Henry VIII , c . 16, A . D. 1535 .
An Act Concerning Enrolments of Bargains and Contracts of Lands and
Tenements .
Be it enacted by the authority of this present parliament , that from
the last day of July , which shall be in the year of our Lord God 1536 ,
no manors , lands, tenements, or other hereditaments , shall pass , alter ,
or change from one to another , whereby any estate of inheritance or free
hold shall be made or take effect in any person or persons, or any use
thereof to be made , by reason only of any bargain and sale thereof ,
except the same bargain and sale be made by writing intended , sealed ,
and enrolled in one of the king 's courts of record at Westminster , or
else within the same county or counties where the same manors , lands ,
or tenements so bargained and sold lie or be , before the custos rotulorum
and two justices o
f
the peace , and the clerk of the peace of the same
county or counties , or two of them at the least , whereof the clerk of the
peace to b
e
one ; and the same enrolment to be had and made within
six months next after the date o
f
the same writings indented ; the same
custos rotulorum o
r justices of the peace , and clerk taking for the en
rolment of every such writing indented before them , where the land
comprised in the same writing exceeds not the yearly value of 40 shil
lings 2s . , that is to say 12 d . to the justices and 12d . to the clerk ; and
for the enrolment o
f every such writing indented before them wherein
the land comprised exceeds the sum o
f
40s . in the yearly value , 58 . ,
that is to say , 2s . 6d . to the said justices , and 2s . 6d . to the said clerk
for the enrolling of the same ; and that the clerk of the peace for the
time being , within every such county , shall sufficiently enroll and engross
in parchment the same deeds o
r writings indented as is aforesaid , and
the rolls thereof a
t
the end o
f every year shall deliver unto the said
custos rotulorum o
f
the same county for the time being , there to remain
in the custody o
f




the same counties where any such enrolment
shall be so made , to the intent that every party that hath to do there
with may resort and see the effect and tenor o
f
every such writing so
enrolled .
$ 2 . Provided always , that this act , nor anything therein contained ,
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extend to any manors , lands, tenements, or hereditaments , lying or being
within any city , borough , or town corporate within this realm , wherein
the mayors , recorders , chamberlains , bailiffs , or other officer or officers
have authority , or have lawfully used to enroll any evidences , deeds ,
or other writings within their precinct or limits , anything in this act
contained to the contrary notwithstanding .
What Uses are Executed by the Statute of Uses , 28 Henry VIII, c. 10 .
ANON ., 36 Hen . 8 , A . D . 1545 — Brooke 's New Cases , pl. 282 , Marsh 's Trans
lation t. Feoffments to Uses , Bro . Abr . t. Feoffments to Uses 52 .
A man makes a feoffment in fee to his use for term of life, and that
after his decease J . N . shall take the profits , this makes a use in J . N .
Contrary if he said that after his death his feoffees shall take the profits
and deliver them to J . N ., for this doth not make a use in J. N ., for
he hath them not but by the hands of the feoffees .
e sa






Between ANDREW BAINTON , petitioner , and the Queen , in the Exchequer
Chamber , Mich . , 1 Mary , A . D . 1553 — Dyer 96a .
Sir Thomas Seymour , late admiral , who was attainted , b
y
indenture ,
covenanted and granted to Andrew Bainton , in consideration that the
said Andrew had conveyed divers manors , lands , and tenements to the
said Sir T . in fee simple after the death o
f
the said Andrew , that he





name ) , o
f
which the admiral was then seized , b
y
which
fine the said other manors should be assured to the said Sir . T . Seymour
for the term o
f
his life , remainder to the said Andrew in tail , and no fine
was levied o
f
it . And it was moved a
t Serjeants ’ Inn , whether this
covenant would change an use or not . And BROMELEY , chief justice ,
PORTMAN , BROWN , SAUNDERS [JJ . ] , BROOKE , chief baron , WHIDDEN
[ B . ] , and GRIFFITH , attorney general , and MYSELF , thought that this
shall alter no use immediately ; for then b
y
n
o possibility could the
covenant ever be performed , and it is in the future tense . But they
agreed in a manner , that if I covenant , in consideration o
f marriage ,
o
r for a sum o
f










made . It was also agreed , that if cestui que use wills
that hi
s
feoffees shall make estate to J . S . in tail or fee , and die , the use
changes before the estate be executed , & c .
In consideration o
f
a marriage to be had , one seised in fee covenanted to
levy a fine before such a day , and that the covenantor shall stand seised to
the use , & c . , but no fine was levied ; and it was held that no use was raised ,
and that the words could not operate as a covenant to stand seised , for
thereby power to levy the intended fine would be lost . Hale v . Cockerell
( in C . B . 35 Car . 2 , A . D . 1685 ) , 3 Lev . 126 . To the same effect see Bar
rington v . Crane ( 1686 ) , 3 Lev . 306 , citing and following Bainton ' s Case .
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TYRREL'S CASE , in Court of Wards, 4 & 5 Mary, A . D . 1557 , 2 Dyer 155a .
Jane Tyrrel , widow , for 4001 . paid by G . Tyrrel , her son and heir
apparent , by indenture enrolled in chancery , in the 4th year of Ed . 6 ,
bargained , sold , gave , granted , covenanted , and concluded to said G . Tyr
rel all her manors , lands, tenements , & c ., to have and to hold , the said ,
& c., to the said G . T . and his heirs forever , to the use of the said Jane
during her life, without impeachment of waste, and immediately after
her decease to the use of the said G . T . and the heirs of his body lawfully
begotten , and in default of such heirs to the use of the heirs of the said
Jane forever . Quære well whether the limitation of those uses upon the
habendum are not void and impertinent , because an use cannot be spring
ing , drawn , or reserved out of an use , as appears prima facie ? And here
it ought to be first an use transferred to the vendee before that any free
hold or inheritance in the land can be vested in him by the inrollment,
& c . And this case has been doubted in the common pleas before now ,
ideo quære legem . But all the judges of C . B . and SAUNDERS , chief
justice , thought that the limitation of uses above is void , & c . ; for sup
pose the statute of inrollments [27 Hen . 8, c. 16 ] had not been made ,
but only the statute of uses , in 27 Hen . 8 [ c. 10 ] , then the case above
could not be , because an use cannot be ingendered of an use .
GIRLAND V. SHARPE , in Queen ' s Bench , Easter , 37 Eliz ., A . D . 1596 , Cro .
Eliz . 382.
Trespass . Upon demurrer the case was , that one infeoffed his sons to the
use of himself for life, and after to the use of them and their heirs , to
perform his last will ; and afterwards he devised it to Sharp , the defendant,
in fee ; and whether Sharpe thereby shall hereby have the land was the ques
tion . GAWDY [ J . ] conceived that he should not ; for an use cannot be
limited upon an use ; then when he limits it to the use of his two sons and
their heirs , he cannot afterwards limit it to the uses of his last will ; but
the words to perform the last will , as to limit any uses thereby , are void
words. And to that opinion CLENCH [ J . ] agreed ; but FENNER ( J . )
doubted thereof; wherefore it was adjourned .
ANON ., in Exchequer Chamber, 2 Eliz . A . D. 1561 , 2 Dyer 179b , 5 Jenk
Cent . Case 70 .
A man seised in fee of lands in borough English , after the statute
27 H . 8 [ c. 10 ] , made a feoffment to divers persons in fee to the use
of himself and of his heirs male of his body, begotten according to the
course of common law ; and afterwards died seised accordingly , having
issue two sons . The eldest entered and held out the youngest . Quære .
And a
ll
the board in Sargeants ’ Inn thought that the youngest shall have
it b
y
descent , notwithstanding the words aforesaid . See 26 H . 8 [Dyer ) ,
fol . 5a .
Jenkins says this decision was b
y
Catlin , Dyer , Saunders , Whiddam ,
Browne and Bendlowes .
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ANON ., in Common Bench , Trinity term , 14 Eliz ., A . D . 1572 — 3 Dyer 314b ,
pl . 97 .
A man by his deed indented and sealed , and dated 13 Hen . 8 , de
clared , that whereas he had suffered a common recovery against him
self, by divers of his friends , upon trust and confidence , of certain lands,
to the intent of performing his will touching the disposition of the said
lands : first , he willed , that his said feoffees and their heirs should suffer
him to have and receive annually the issue and profits thereof coming
and issuing during his life , and after his decease to stand seised of the
third part thereof to the use of his wife during her life , and after her
decease to stand seised of the premises , and the reversion thereof after
his decease , to the use of R ., his son , and the heirs of his body, with
other remainders over, & c. Whether he may alter and change during
his life the uses limited in the indenture or not ? And it seems to
me that he may well alter this will , for will and last will are understood
to be a
ll
one , and this recovery was to the intent to perform the will ,
and this indenture is as a will , which is alterable ; therefore it is not a
limitation o
f
uses upon livery made , according to the 19th year o
f
Hen .
8 [118 , p
l
. 5 ] . And other justices agreed to this opinion .
ANON . , in Common Bench ? Hilary , 18 Eliz . , A . D . 1576 — Dyer 349a .
The conusor levied a fine o
f
his lands to the conusee and others , and
to the heirs o
f
the conusee , to the use o
f
a stranger in fee . Whether
that extinguishes the execution of the recognizance or not ? And it
seems not , for the statute 27 Hen . 8 of uses , & c . , hath a saving fo
r
elder
rights , titles , interests , actions , & c . , that they then had , or afterwards
should have , & c .
QUESTION BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR , in Exchequer Chamber , 22
Ellz . , A . D . 1581 — 3 Dyer 369a , p
l
. 50 , 6 Jenk . Cent . case 30 , p . 244 .
A being possessed o
f
a lease for a term o
f
years , granted all his estate
and interest to B and C and their assigns , to the use of said A and his
wife , for the term o
f
their lives , and o
f
the longer liver o
f
them . And
afterwards said A gave to a stranger such interest a
s
he then had in the





B and C o
r not ? And it was answered by al
l
the justices
and the chief baron , in a meeting on the first day o
f
the next Trinity
term , that the gift o
r grant of him , in trust for whom the term was
granted , was void , and out of the statute of cestui que uses [ 27 H . 8 ,
C . 10 ] .
PAGE v . MOULTON , in Common Pleas , 12 & 13 Eliz . , A . D . 1572 — 3 Dyer
296a .
The father , upon communication of marriage o
f
his youngest son ,
promised to the friends o
f
the wife , that after his death and the death of
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his own wife the son should have the land to him and his heirs . And
the marriage is had , but this promise is by parol only , and no consider
ation on the part of the woman , and the father was seized in his demesne
and not in use ; and this found by special verdict upon not guilty .
Whether the use changes by this covenant or not was the doubt . And
by opinion of all the four justices of the bench , without open argu
ment, the use is not altered by such a naked promise , and so adjudged .
In Corbin v. Corbin (1586 ) . Moore 544, s . c . 2 Roll Ab. 784 , pl. 4, three
Justices declared that a use might be created by parol on natural affection ,
but the point was not decided .
CALLARD v. CALLARD , in B . R ., Hilary, 35 Eliz ., and in Exc . Chamber ,
Hilary term , 39 Eliz ., A . D . 1597 — Moore 687, s. c. 2 And ., 64 , Popham 47 ,
Oro . Eliz . 344 , Jenk . Cent. 245 .Pent: 1597
ary
,
Ejectione firmæ on the demise of Eustace Callard . And on not guilty
pleaded , it was found by special verdict , that Thos. Callard was seized
in fee , and in consideration of the marriage of Eustace his son and heir
apparent , being on the land , spoke these words to Eustace : " Eustace ,
stand forth . I do here, reserving an estate for mine own and my wife 's
life , give unto thee and to thine heirs forever , those my lands and Bar
ton of Southcot .” Afterwards Thomas enfeoffed in fee with warranty
to Richard , a younger son , now defendant , and died . Eustace entered
and made demise to the plaintiff , who entered , and the defendant
ejected him . On which special verdict , in the queen 's bench , after long
argument , judgment was given for the plaintiff : on which the defend
ant brought a writ of error in the exchequer chamber , where the judg
ment was reversed , Hilary 39 Eliz . Note that in the queen 's bench ,
POPHAM , chief justice , held strongly , that the consideration of blood
raised the use to Eustace without writing , and so he had the possession
by the statute of 27 Hen . 8 [ c. 10 ] . But GAWDY , FENNER , and CLENCH
[JJ. ] , against this opinion ; yet in the final judgment they agreed , be
cause they held that the words amounted to a feoffment with livery ,
being on the land , and the use to be to the feoffor and his wife for life ,
and then to Eustace and his heirs . But note that in the exchequer
chamber, EwANS [ B . ] held the law to be as the puisne justices of the
queen 's bench said , and so the judgment should be affirmed ; but he
was against PoPHAM [ C . J . ], that a use did not arise without writing .
BEAUMONT [ J . ] held this a feoffment to Eustace in fee , and the reserva
tion to the father and his wife void for repugnancy ; and so he would
have the judgment affirmed ; and he was also against POPHAM [ C . J .] .
But al
l
the other justices , ANDERSON [ C . J . ) , PERIAM , CLARK [BB . ] ,
WALMSLEY , and OWEN [JJ . ] agreed that no feoffment was executed ,
because the intent was repugnant to law , vi
z
. : to pass an estate to
Eustace , reserving a particular estate to himself and his wife ; and a
use it cannot be , because the purpose was not to raise a use without
a
n
estate executed , but by an estate executed that could not have effect .
And they a
ll agreed that if this was a use , yet it would not arise on
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natural affection without deed . Note that the witnesses who proved
these words were attainted of perjury in the star chamber Easter 40
Eliz .
In Callard v . Callard , in B . R . 36 & 37 Eliz ., vide Cro . Eliz . 345 , Gawdy ,
J ., said : " I have not seen any book , that at common law , a use shall arise
by parole , but in a bargain and sale which is by reason of the consideration
given for the land .” But Popham , C. J ., said it was adjudged in 7 Edw . 6
that a use may arise by parole , and he could show the record of it.
CRAWLEY 'S CASE , in Common Bench , Mich . term , 41 & 42 Eliz ., A . D .
1600 — Cro . Eliz . 721 .
Replevin . A rent was granted to two during the life of J . S., to his
use . Whether if the two die , living J . S., the rent were gone or no was
the question . For it was agreed that there cannot be an occupancy of a
rent . Dyer 186 . It was held that it was not gone, especially in this
case ; [ for ] the rent being granted to the use of J . S ., it vested in him
by the 27 Hen . 8 , c . 10 , so as he had an absolute estate during his life ,
and the lives of the grantees are not material, the estate being trans
ferred from them . Otherwise it would have been a grant to an use
before the statute.
HUSSEY 'S CASE , in Exchequer, 2 Jac. 1, A . D. 1605 —Moor 789 .
Hussey , a bastard , bought a manor and made his will by which he de
vised it ; and afterwards he made a feoffment of the same manor to
the use of such persons and estates as he had by his will given and de
clared . It was adjudged that the feoffment countermanded the will,
and yet that the revoked will sufficiently declared the uses of the feoff
ment , so that there was no escheat to the crown .
CASTLE V. DOD , in King 's Bench , Mich . 5 Jac. 1, A . D . 1608 - Cro . Jac .
200 , 1 Cruise Dig . 455 .
A , tenant for life , granted by finehis estate to B and by indenture lim
ited the use to B for the life of A and B , and if he died living A , that it
should remain to C . Afterward B died living A . C entered and le
t
to D for years and died , living A . Whether the lessee should retain it
a
s a
n occupant , living A , or that A should have it again (because no




his ancient use ,
was the question . And after argument IT WAS ADJUDGED that C should
have it as an occupant , and his lessee should hold it as an occupant ,
and that A had not any residue o
f
the use in him . For although , where
tenant in fee makes a deed o
f
feoffment , and limits the use for life or
in tail , and doth not speak o
f
the residue , it shall be to [ the use o
f
the
feoffor , or conusor , because he had the ancient use in him in fee ; yet
when a tenant for life , or he who hath a particular estate , grants his
estate b
y
fine , and limits the use for years , or for a particular time , it


















h l deed that
C s se
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without any consideration ; because he who hath the particular estate
by fine is subject to the ancient rent and forfeiture , which is a sufficient
consideration to convey the estate unto him . And although it was ob
jected , that at the common law there was not any occupant of an use ,
and this statute [ 27 Hen . 8, c . 10 ] hath vested the possession in such
manner and nature as the use was, ergo there shall not be an occupant
of a possession vested to an use . * *
COOPER V. FRANKLIN , in King' s Bench , Trinity , 12 Jac . I, A . D . 1616
Cro. Jac . 400 , 3 Bulst . 184 , 1 Gray P . C . 514 , 5 Jenk . Cent. case 1. Given
according to Croke .
Ejectione firma . Upon a special verdict , for lands in Phelphan , the
case was : John Walter was seised of lands in fee, and made feoffment of
them to Thomas Walter, habendum to him and his heirs of his body
to the use of him and his heirs and assigns forever . Whether Thomas
Walter had an estate in fee - tail only , or a fee determinable upon an estate
tail, was the question . First , whether a use may be limited upon an
estate -tail at the common law , or at this day after the statute of 27
Hen. 8, c. 10 , of uses ; secondly , whether this limitation of uses to him
and his heirs shall not be intended the same uses, being to the feoffee
himself , and to the same heirs , as it was in the habendum . Quære , quia
non adjudicatur.
But the opinion of the COURT upon the argument inclined , that he
was tenant in tail ; and the limitation of the use out of the tail is void
as well after the statute as before ; for the statute never intended to
execute any use but that which may be lawfully compelled to be exe
cuted before the statute ; but this cannot be of an estate - tail , for the
chancery could not compel him at the common law to execute the estate.
And so the statute doth not execute it at this day. Vide : 27 Hen . 8, pl.
2 ; 24 Hen . 8, pl. 62 , “ Feoffments al Uses ” 41. Et adjournatur.
NYTTON V. LUTWICH , in Court of Wards , Mich . term , 18 James I, A . D .
1621 — W . Jones 7, s . c . Croke Jac . 604 .





f Shipton in the county
o
f Salop by knight - service tenure in capite , and of other hereditaments
in said county ; and being so seized , b
y
indenture dated 31 March , 13
James , for a certain sum in silver , granted , bargained , and sold said





annunciation last past , for three years ; and
by another indenture bearing the same date he covenanted with the
said Ball and one Robert Rawlins , that he would levy a fine to them o
f
the premises before the pentecost ensuing , and that the said fine and al
l
other fines so to be levied by any o
f
the said parties should be to the
use o
f John Lutwich in tail , and after to the use o
f
such person and
persons and of such estate and limitation as he should declare by his
last will in writing . The said John Lutwich , b
y
indenture dated April
1 , 13 James , reciting th
e
first bargain and sale to Ball , granted and













confirmed to Lewis Prowde and the said Robert Rawlins the said rever
sion o
f
said manor and hereditaments in fee to the use o
f
himself in
tail , and after to the use of such person and persons and of such estate
and on such limitation as h
e b
y
his last will in writing should appoint ;
to which grant said Ball said day attorned , but Ball made no entry .
Afterward , 15 April , 13 James , J . Lutwich made his last will in writing
and published the same in these words : “ Whereas I have granted and
confirmed to Lewis Prowde and Robert Rawlins the reversion , after a
lease ade to William Ball should be determined , of the manor o
f Skip
ton and other hereditaments in the county o
f Salop , to the use o
f myself
and the heirs o
f my body and for default o
f
such issue then to the use
o
f
such person and persons , and of such estate and under such limita
tion , as I should appoint b
y my last will and testament ; Now my
intent is , that after my decease without issue of my body lawfully be
gotten , that said grant o
f
the reversion shall be , and may , and the said
Lewis Prowde and Robert Rawlins shall stand and be seised thereof
to the use o
f
Edward Mitton for life , the remainder in tail to Edward
Weston (with other remainders in tail ) , and for default of such issue
to Lewis Prowde and his heirs forever , with power for Edward Mitton
the father to make leases for 21 years . " William Ball , 21 April , 13
James , did surrender said indenture o
f
lease and all his estate therein
to Lewis Prowde and Robert Rawlins ; and in Easter term 13 James ,
John Lutwich levied a fine thereof to Robert Rawlins and William Ball .
J . Lutwich published said will accordingly . May 10 , 13 James , J . Lut
wich died without heir o
f
his body . All this was found b
y
office , and
the said tenure in capite , and that Edward Lutwich was his cousin and
heir of the age of 40 years . And on this office a doubt was raised in
the court o
f
wards ; and on this a case was made as aforesaid ; and the
question o
f
the said case was whether two - thirds o
f
the premises de
scended to Edward Lutwich , or whether al
l
was well conveyed to Edward
Mitton .
And this was argued in the court o
f
wards in the presence o
f
the two
chief justices and the chief baron in Mich . term , 18 James , b
y
Jenkins
for Edward Lutwich and b
y
Jeffryes for the defendant , and on another
day by Wandisford for Lutwich and b
y myself for Mitton ; in which
the main question was : 1 . Where such a bargain and sale is made
for years , and before entry b
y
the bargainee the vendor grants the rever
sion to another in fee and the bargainee for years before entry attorns ,
whether this is good . 2 . Where a fine is levied after the will and yet b
y
the will on the grant of the reversion he declares the use , whether this











Jeffryes ; and Sir James Ley , the attorney , delivered
the resolution o
f
the judges , that by the bargain and sale for years the
vendee had a
n
estate for years divided from the reversion before entry ,
and that a reversion was in the vendor which b
y
his grant and the at
tornment o
f
the vendee for years was well conveyed . 3 . They resolved
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that the grant of the reversion and fine and the will being declared
by the original agreement were to the first use , and the will is a limi
tation of the use on the first conveyance and not a devise of two- thirds
of the land ; and according to this resolution a decree was made for
Mytton that no third part descended to Edward Lutwich , and that the
king should not have any third part nor any livery of the said lands.
NEVIL V. SAUNDERS, in Chancery, before Lord Chancellor Jeffreys, Mich .
term , A . D. 1686 - 1 Vernon 415 , Digby Hist. R . P . 376 , 1 Gray Cas. on
Prop . 535 .
Lands were given by will to trustees and their heirs , in trust for Anne,
the defendant ' s wife , and her heirs , and that the trustees should from
time to time pay and dispose of the rents and profits to the said Anne,
or to such person or persons as she by any writing under her hand , as well
during coverture as being sole , should order or appoint the same, without
the intermeddling of her husband , whom he willed should have no benefit
or disposal thereof ; and , as to the inheritance of the premises , in trust
for such person or persons, and for such estate and estates as the said
Anne by any writing purporting ( to be ] her will , or other writing under
her hand , should appoint ; and for want of such appointment , in trust for
her and her heirs . The question was , whether this was an use executed
by the statute , or a bare trust for the wife ; and the court held it to be a
trust only , and not an use executed by the statute .
Effect of Consideration .
ANON ., court no
t
named , Trinity , 28 Hen . 8 , A . D . 1537 — Dyer 18
a , pl . 10
5
.
It was moved upon evidence by KNIGHTLEY , that if one recover
against me by common recovery , and then I enfeoff the recoverer , that
he shall be seised to my use , for he shall be adjudged in b
y
the recovery ,
and not by the feoffment ; which SHELLEY and FITZHERBERT in a man
ner confirmed .
In a note to this case some editor says , “ If a man at this day enfeoff a
stranger without consideration , the feoffee is seised to the use of the feoffer .
Perkins 533 ; Dyer 96 . Therefore intend that the feoffee in this case gave
consideration . " .
ANON . , 36 Hen . 8 , A . D . 1545 . Brooke New Cases p
l
. 284 , Marsh ' s transla
tion t . Feoffments to Uses .
A man cannot sell land to J . S . to the use o
f
the vendor , nor le
t
land
to him rendering rent , habendum to the use o
f
the lessor , for this is
contrary to reason and law , for h
e has recompense for it . * * *
ANON . , in Common Bench , Mich . 4 & 5 Phil . & Mary , A . D . 1558 — 1 And .
3
7 , Cas . 96 .







a deed for 2001 . , should bargain and sell his land
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or to the use of a stranger, this use so limited is wholly void ; for the
bargain for money implies in it a use , and the limitation of the other
use is merely contrary , for by this means the use in fee that is in the
bargainee in fee only would be tolled if the law were not as before ; by
the justices in bank .
ANON ., time of Elizabeth, court not named - 1 And . 37, pl. 95 .
Note by a
ll
the judges that if one without any consideration infeoff
another b
y
deed , habendum & tenendum the land to the feoffee and his
heirs , to his own use , and the feoffee suffer the feoffor to occupy the
land for many years , yet the right is in the feoffee , because of the ex
press use contained in the deed , which is sufficient without other con
sideration . The same is the law as to a feoffment b
y
deed to the use o
f
a
stranger and his heirs .
WILKES v . LEUSON , in Court of Wards , Trinity , 1 Eliz . , A . D . 1558 —
Dyer 169a .
Wilkes * * * made a feoffment in August before his death to one
Leuson ( a knight ) and his brother and another , of the manor of Hod
nel in the county of Warwick ; and the deed (seen ) , for 7000£ , to him
paid by the feoffees , of which sum he made acquittance in the same deed
(although in fact and in truth not a half -penny was paid ) , gave ,
granted , and confirmed , & c . , habendum to them and theirs forever , to
the proper use and behoof o
f
said A , B , & C , forever , and not their
heirs , together with a clause o
f warranty to them , their heirs and as
signs , in form aforesaid . And notwithstanding this feoffment he occu
pied the land with sheep , and took other profits during his life ; and
afterwards his death was found on a diem clausit extremum b
y
office ,
that he died seised of the said manor in fee , and one I . Wilkes his brother
o
f
full age found his next heir , and a tenure in capite found ; and now
within the three months the said feoffees sued in the court of wards to
b
e admitted to their traverse , and also to have the manor in farm until ,
& c . And although the said I . Wilkes the brother had tendered a livery ,
yet he had not hitherto prosecuted it , but for cause had discontinued .




his discretion could remove
the feoffees by injunction out o
f





the said feoffment which was false , and none such in
truth , and retain it in the hands of the queen donec e
t
quousque , & c . ,




the learned counsel o
f
that court , he cannot do it ; but the queen is bound in justice to give
livery to him who is found heir b
y
the office , o
r
if he will not proceed
with that , to grant to the tenderers the traverse , and to have the farm ,
& c . , the request above mentioned . And this by the statutes 34 Edw . 3
[ c . 147 and 36 Edw . 3 [ c . 137 and 8 Hen . 6 [ c . 16 ] and 3 Hen . 8
[ c . 2 ] , notwithstanding the opinion of BRIAN and others in Benstede ' s
Case , Trinity , 1 Hen . [27b , p
l
















reports . And note , that no averment can be allowed to the ir , that
the said consideration was false against t e and acknowledgment
o
f
his ancestors , for t o l be to admit an inconvenience . And note
the limitation o
f
the use above , for divers doubted whether the feoffees
shall have a fee -simple in the use , because the use is not expressed , except
only to themselves (by their names ) forever ; but if these words had
been wanting , it would have been clear enough that the consideration
[ * 169b ) o
f





the said sum . But when the use is expressed
otherwise b
y
the party himself , it is otherwise . And also the warranty
in the deed was to them , their heirs and assigns , in form aforesaid , which
is a declaration of the intent o
f
Wilkes , viz . , that the feoffees shall not
have the use in fee -simple ; and it may be that the use during their three
lives is worth 7 ,000£ and more . * * *
" I take it as a ground of doctrine in our law , that when a sole and
single cause or consideration or intent is expressed in a deed or writing
of gift , grant , or feoffment , no other cause or consideration or intent shall
be joined , mixed , or averred , by matter of fact dehors . And therefore
before the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum [ 18 Edw . 1 , St . 1 ] , if a man
made a deed of feoffment without any cause or consideration , the feoffee
should have it to his own use ; because it was a tenure between the feoffor
and feoffee ; but since that statute , if no consideration be expressed , nor any
money paid besides , it shall be intended to be the use of the feoffor .
The law is the same of a gift in tail at this day , & c . * * * The law is
the same where an use is expressed in a deed ; and no one shall be received
to aver a contrary use to what the deed purports . And 2 Edw . 2 [ 4 Edw . 2 ,
90 ] this case is ruled in ad terminum qui praeteriit , upon a demise by his
ancestor , the tenant pleaded the demise in fee -simple to one whose estate
the tenant had , by the same ancestor of the demandant , whose heir , & c . ,
by the deed shown to the court . And the demandant would have averred
his writ , of the demise for life , & c . , and it was not permitted , but he was
driven to answer the deed . * * * Then it is to be considered here , whether
Beamont , who is the tenant , and who is heir to the great -grandfather and
his wife , shall be received to aver any other cause , joint or several , to be
the consideration o
f
those estates made in use , than is comprised within
the indenture o
f his ancestors ? And it seems not ; and this for the
causes above ; but perhaps , if he were a stranger , it would be , & c . " Villers
v . Beamont , Easter , 3 & 4 Phillip and Mary , A . D . 1557 , 2 Dyer 146a , 146b ,
147a .
SHARINGTON V . STROTTON , in King ' s Bench , Mich . term , 7 & 8 Elz . ,
A . D . 1565 — Abridged from Plowden Com . 298 -309 .
Trespass b
y Henry Sharington et a
l . against Thomas Strotton et al . ,
for entering a close a
t
Bremble in Wilts , and cutting and carrying
away 200 cart - loads o
f
wood , value 401 . The defendants plead that




Bremble , and that Andrew Baynton ,
being seised o
f
the manor in fee , 3d o
f July , 2 Eliz . , b
y
indenture with
his brother Edward Baynton , reciting that whereas said Andrew was
settled and determined how such lands should be and remain , as well
in his life as after his death , and because he was desirous that said
lands should remain and descend to the heirs male of his body , and
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remain to the blood and name of Baynton , and for the good -will , broth
erly love, and favor which he bore for his brother Edward and the
others named in the deed , said Andrew covenanted , granted , and agreed ,
for himself and his heirs , that he and his heirs should from thence
stand seised to the use of said Andrew for life , then to the use of said
Edward and Agnes his wife for their lives , then to the use of the heirs
male of said Andrew lawfully begotten on the body of Frances Lee, then
to the use of the heirs male of the body of said Edward , with divers
remainders over ; that said Andrew afterwards died without issue , and
said Edward and Agnes entered in their remainder , and were ejected
by the plaintiffs ; on whom defendants , as servants of said Edward and
Agnes re- entered ; which is the trespass complained of. On this plea ,
plaintiffs demurred . The matter was argued Michaelmas term , 7 & 8
Eliz .
Fleetwood and Wray for the plaintiffs . First it is to be considered
that Andrew Baynton , at the time of making the indenture , was seised
of the said manor in fee - simple , clear of all estates and interests of any
stranger therein ; and if he intended to make a stranger have a use in
it , he ought to have taken one of these two ways to raise such use : The
one is , to part with the possession , by the circumstances required by the
common law , to the use intended , as to make a feoffment , to levy a fine,
or to suffer a recovery of the land to the use intended ; and this way
the common law is satisfied , as well as the party also who has the use ,
for the circumstances of the common law are pursued ; and the use is
no more than a confidence annexed to the estate which the person parto
with , and when he parts with the estate by his own consent, he may
make it upon confidence , and this way the use is properly made . The
other way is , to keep the land in his hands without parting with it, and
yet to do such a thing as shall make the possession to be to the use of
another, and that cannot be unless the thing done imports in itself a
good and sufficient consideration to make the possession be to the use
of another , which shall be upon a contract , or upon a covenant, or grant
on consideration . As if a man is seized of land in fee , and bargains
and sells the land to another on consideration of a certain sum paid
to him , or agreed to be paid at a certain day , here is a contract , and the
bargainor shall be seized to the use of the bargainee by the course of
the common law , because he has done an act upon consideration , that
is, he has bargained the land for money ; and inasmuch as he hath the
money , or security for it, it is reasonable that the bargainee should
have something for it, and the land he cannot have as hi
s
own , because
he had not livery o
f
seizin , and therefore reason has necessarily vested
the use in him , which is but a right in conscience to have the profits ,
and to have the land ordered according to hi
s
will ( H . 21 Hen . 7 , 18b ,
per Read , J . ) ; and if the bargainor will not permit him so to have it ,





o it ( P . 32 Hen . 8 , Brooke Abr . Conscience 25 , and Brooke
New Cases , $ 181 ) . So it is in the case o
f
a covenant upon consideration .
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As if I promise and agree with another that if he will marry my daugh
ter , he shall have my land from thenceforth , and he does so , there he
shall have a use in my land , and I shall be seized to his use, because
a thing is done whereby I have benefit , viz ., the other has married my
daughter , whose advancement in the world is a satisfaction and com
fort to me, and therefore this is a good consideration to make him have
a use in my land [ M . 36 Hen . 8 , Brooke Abr. t. Feoffments to Use 54 ) .
So that a good consideration is always requisite to create a use de novo
in the land of another, where there is no transmutation of the posses
sion of the land. Then in our case here , inasmuch as Andrew Baynton
was seized of the land in fe
e
-simple , and intended to raise uses in it
without any transmutation o
f





the common law unless the circumstances pursued in the rais
ing of such uses import a good and sufficient consideration to support
the same ; for this reason we ought to weigh the considerations here ,
and see what substance they have in the law . And the causes contained
in the indenture are three . First , a desire which he had that the lands
might come , remain , and descend to the heirs males of his body limited
in the indenture ; secondly , his intent that the lands should continue
and remain to such o
f
the blood and name o
f Baynton as are named
in the indenture ; thirdly , the good will and brotherly love and favor ,
which he bore to his brother Edward Baynton and to his other brothers .
And these are all the considerations ; for the matter in the rehearsal ,
viz . , that the said Andrew had no issue male , and that he was determined
and resolved how his f * 302 ) manors and lands should remain and be as
well in his lifetime as after his death , is no consideration a
t all , but the
want of issue male is the cause that moved him to resolve , and the reso
lution is but a demonstration o
f
his mind , and none of them is any con
sideration , for the considerations are the three before mentioned . And
a
s
to the first , viz . , his desire that the lands might come to the heirs
males o
f
his body , this does not seem to be any consideration to the
father , for the father has no gain or advantage by it , but the heirs
males of his body . And the consideration ought to be to him that is
seized o
f
the land , for if he has no recompence , there is no cause why
the use o
f
his land should pass . And none o
f
the considerations contain
a recompence here , for the continuance of the land in his blood and
name o
f Baynton is no recompence to him , nor cause worthy to raise a
use ; no more is the brotherly love and favor which he bore to Edward
Baynton or to his other brothers , for although these causes induce affec
tion , yet every affection is not a sufficient cause to alter the use . For




their great familiarity , or of their being scholars together in their
youth , or upon such like considerations , he will stand seized of his land
to his use , this will not change the use , for such considerations are not
looked upon in the law a
s worthy to raise a use , because they don ' t import
any value or recompence . For if upon consideration that you are my
familiar friend o
r acquaintance , or my brother , I promise to pay you 201 .
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at such a day, you shall not have an action upon the case , or an action
of debt for it, for it is but a nude and barren contract, ex et nudo pacto
non oritur actio , and there is no sufficient cause for the payment, nor
is anything done or given on the one part , for you were my brother or
my acquaintance before , and so will you be afterwards ; so that nothing
is newly done on the one part , as is requisite in contracts , and also in
covenants upon consideration . As if I sell my horse to you for money
or other recompence , here is a thing given on both sides , for the one
gives the horse , and the other the money or other recompence , and there
fore it is a good contract . So is it in the case of a covenant upon con
sideration , as if I covenant with you , that if you will marry my daugh
ter , you shall have my land , or I shall be seized to your use , here is an
act on both parts , for you are to marry my daughter , and for that I
grant to you the use ; so that there is an act done and a cause arising
newly on each part . But in the principal case there is no such thing ,
for the issue male of Andrew Baynton should have been his issue male ,
and his name and blood should have been his name and blood , and his
brothers should have been his brothers , and fraternal love should have
been between them , if this covenant or grant had not been made ; 80
that a
ll
this was before the indenture or covenant , and should have
been after the time o
f
the indenture or covenant , if the same had not
been made . Wherefore no new thing is here done or caused by the one
side , and there is no cause here but what would have been if no such
covenant o
r
indenture had been made . But the common law requires
that there should be a new cause , whereof the country may have intelli
gence o
r knowledge for the trial o
f
it , if need be , so that it is necessary
for the public -weal . For livery o
f





f notoriety , whereby people might have knowledge of estates , and be
more able to tr
y
them , if they should be empannelled on a jury ; and b
y
the like reason when a use shall pass , there ought to be , b
y
the com
mon law , a contract , or a public and notorious consideration to a cove
nant , which may cause the country to have knowledge of the use for
the better trial thereof , if it should be necessary . And such was the
intention o
f
the parliament in 27 H . 8 [ c . 107 when they made the act




f making which act was to remove ignorance , and that the coun
try might know in whom the estate of the land was . And the like
consideration they had in making the act of inrolments [ 27 H . 8 , c .
1
6 ] , which restrains estates o
f
freehold from passing b
y bargain and
sale , except it be b
y writing indented enrolled within six months . And
if uses might be so easily raised b
y
covenants upon such considerations
a
s
these here are , where no act or thing apparent is done whereof the
country may have notice , it would destroy the effect of the said statute
o
f
uses , and would be pernicious to the public -weal , and make it very
difficult for the people to know who were the owners o
f
lands and tene
ments . And it is to be presumed that the makers o
f
the said act of
inrolments did not take the common law to be so , for if they had , they
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body
, and said T shoubetween
would have remedied it in this case , as well as they did in the case of
a bargain and sale , which is much more notorious than a covenant upon
such secret consideration , where no apparent act or thing is done to
inform the country of the alteration o
f
the estate in the land ; and
forasmuch as they did not add any remedy to it , it is an argument that
they did not take the law to be that uses might pass upon such cove
nants without notorious considerations . But if the use had been in




cestuy que use without any consideration , for the cestuy que use may
a
s well give or grant his use without consideration as he may his horse
o
r
other chattel . [Dr . & Stud . lib . 2 , cap . 22 , fo . 185 ; lib . 2 , cap . 23 , fo .
187 , 188 ; 2 Finch 34 ] , and he may also devise it (Godolph . Orph . Leg .
391 , $ 2 ] ; but to create it de novo out o
f
the land cannot be done without
good consideration . And to this purpose they alleged the opinions of
Read and Tremail , two of the justices o
f





office traversed in 2
1
H . 7 , and the case there put b
y
Read [ H .
21 , H . 7 , 18 , 19 , Bro . Feoffments a
l
Uses 16 . Crompt , J . C . 62 b . ) ,
fo . 19 , was also cited , viz . , it was covenanted b
y
indenture between
Sir John Mordant and his wife and one T , that the said T should have
the land to him and to his heirs o
f
his body , and that for default of
such issue , the lands should remain to Sir John Mordant and his wife
in fe
e , and it was adjudged that he should not have any use by force o
f
the indenture , as it is there rehearsed b
y
Read , but they were put to
their action o
f
covenant . So here no use shall be raised upon these
considerations , for they are utterly [ * 303 ] ineffectual to such purpose ,
and then if no use could be raised b
y
the common law , from thence it
follows that the statute does not execute any possession here , for it
executes n
o possession but where there was a use before ; for which
reason the bar is not good , but the plaintiffs shall recover . And many
other things were said , and many cases put to enforce this argument ,
which I have omitted , my design being only to show briefly the principal
reasons thereof .
On the contrary , Thomas Bromley and the said apprentice argued
for the defendants . And first they admitted that if a man who is seized
o
f
land has a mind to raise a use in it without any transmutation of
the possession , there are two ways b
y
the common law to d
o
it , viz . , b
y
bargain and sale , or b
y
covenant upon consideration . For the statute
o
f
27 H . 8 , cap . 10 , for executing the possession according to the use ,
says in the purview , where any person stands seized of any lands , & c . ,
by any bargain , sale , covenant , agreement , & c . , the person who has the
use shall be seized o
f







the act a man might be seized b
y




r agreement . And a bargain and sale is , when a recompence is given
by both the parties ; as if a man bargains his land to another for money ,
here the land is a recompence to the one for the money , and the money
is a recompence to the other for the land , and this is properly a bargain
and sale . But here there is no such bargain and sale , nor such recom
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pence given on both sides, and therefore we have no need to dispute upon
this point. The other is the covenant or agreement, and this is to be
intended in every case upon consideration . But this consideration may
arise on the one side only , and it is not requisite to have a consideration
and a new act done by both parties ; and such consideration ought to
be sufficient . And therefore , they said , the considerations are to be
weighed . And hereupon the apprentice divided the matter into two
distinct points . First, whether the grant and agreement upon these
considerations (admitting it had been without deed or writing ) had been
sufficient to raise the uses according to the agreement or not. Secondly,
admitting the considerations to be insufficient if they had been without
deed , or admitting that there were no considerations at all, if neverthe
less the uses shall be raised here , inasmuch as the agreement thereunto
is by deed .
And as to the first point, which contains the considerations , he said
that the considerations are in number four, and each of them is sev
eral, and he made several points of them , and argued to them severally .
The first is , the affection of the said Andrew Baynton for his heirs
males which he should beget on the body of Frances Lee , and his pro
vision in the estate made for their security accordingly . For the deed
is recited to contain these words, the same Andrew Baynton as well
fo
r
the causes aforesaid , as for , & c . ; so that some of the considerations
precede the a
s well and some follow the as also ; and the first of them
which precede the a
s well is the consideration for the issues males be
gotten by him upon Frances Lee , and their security made by the limita
tion o
f
the estate accordingly . And it was said , this cause proceeds
from nature , for when God had first created man and woman , and
other living creatures , he said to them , increase and multiply , and the
way to increase and multiply is b
y procreation , and therefore when he
said increase and multiply , he intended it to be b
y procreation , and
h
e was willing it should be done , and for that purpose he instilled into
mankind an appetite for procreation , which instinct is nature in them ,
and the appetite for the same is natural ; so that to beget is natural ,
and the end o
f it is to have issues , and the having issue is the continu
ance o
f
the people , for otherwise the world would be at an end . But
all procreation is not lawful , only that which is b
y marriage . And
matrimony is ordained by God , and limited to rational creatures to beget
and procreate issues ; so that matrimony is the means of procreation ,
to which nature urges u
s . * * * And this point of nature has an
other point of nature joined with it , and that is , when the thing like
itself is begotten , to nourish it . For it would be in vain to beget a thing ,
and to suffer it to perish , for then nature loses its effect ; and the appe
tite o
f procreation is not without its end and design , which is , to bring
to perfection the thing begotten , and to leave it alive after him that
begot it . And for this purpose nature has instilled in the sire a love
for the thing begotten which urges him to take care o
f
the education
and nurture of it , and to provide it with everything that is necessary ,
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and to defend it against a
ll dangers , * * * * 304 ) * * * . From
whence it is evident that to beget is natural , and to preserve the thing
begotten , and to provide everything necessary for it
s support , is also
natural . Then le
t
us consider the parts hereof in our case . Andrew
Baynton recited that h
e was desirous that the tenements and heredita
ments whereof h
e
was seized ( part o
f
which are now in question ) might
come and descend to the heirsmales of hi
s
body begotten , in manner and
form in the said indenture expressed , and for this cause he covenanted
and granted to stand seized o
f
the same lands to the use o
f himself for
life , and afterwards to the use o
f
Edward Baynton and Agnes his wife
for their lives , and afterwards to the use o
f
the heirs males o
f
the said
Andrew lawfully begotten or to be begotten on the body o
f
Frances Lee .
Here this consideration recited , and the limitation of the estate accord
ingly , is founded purely on the said principles of nature , viz . , of beget
ting and procreating a thing like unto himself , and also o
f providing for
its sustenance , education , and living afterwards . For the tail limited to
Andrew Baynton shall in a
ll probability descend to the issue , and it is an
inheritance certainly made and appointed for the benefit and advance
ment o
f




Andrew only , and o
f
none other .
The second consideration is the continuance o
f
the land in the name
o
f Baynton , and this seems to be a good consideration to raise a use .
For by the continuance o
f
it in the name o
f Baynton he intended to
exclude all females from inheriting the land , and to place it in the heirs
males . * * *
The third consideration here is , the brotherly love , and continuance
o
f




the said Andrew as are mentioned
in the indenture , viz . , his brothers , for this is but one consideration ,
that is , the blood , and the brother is one of the next degrees of the
blood , after his parents and issues . And as to this consideration , viz . ,
the continuance of the land in his brothers and others of his blood , it is
also founded upon nature . For those who descend from one same parent
age , are joined nearest in blood , are b
y
nature joined in love . And the
founders o
f
our law knowing this have pursued the same , and in respect
thereof have established divers maxims and laws . * * * [ * 307 ] * * *
The fourth consideration is the marriage had between Edward Bayn
ton and Agnes his wife ; for the use is limited after the death o
f
Andrew
to Edward Baynton and Agnes his wife for term o
f
their lives . In
which words his wife it is implied that marriage was before had between
Edward Baynton and the same Agnes , for without marriage she could
not be his wife . And then none o
f
the considerations specified before
the estate limited serve as an inducement to the estate of Agnes but
one , and one does , which is , the good will and brotherly love which
Andrew bore to the said Edward Baynton . So that the whole being
put together , the sense is , that Andrew Baynton , in consideration o
f
the good will and brotherly love which he bore to Edward Baynton his
brother , covenanted to stand seized to the use o
f
himself for his life , and
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afterwards to the use of the said Edward and Agnes his wife, whom
he had before married . * * *
And thus the four considerations and the efficacy of them are dis
closed , which are greater than any money or matter of recompence , and
the more so , in that some of them are founded merely upon nature ,
et naturae vis maxima, and some of them are founded upon other causes
of great importance , and each of them alone by itself is sufficient to
raise the uses , and when they are al
l
put together , they are of greater
force , nam omnis vis unita fortior es
t
. So that the uses are here raised
b
y
these considerations , and then the Statute o
f
Uses executes the pos
session accordingly without inrolment o
f
the deed within si
x
months .
For the act o
f
inrolments extends only to bargains and sales , whereas
this is no bargain and sale , a
s
it is before granted , but a covenant and





for which reason the possession is executed according to the limitation
o
f
the uses . And therefore Agnes shall have a joint estate with Edward ,
and the defendants a
s
servants to them both , and by their command ,
have well justified the trespass . * * * [ * 308 ] * * *
Then a
s to the second point , admitting the considerations to be in
sufficient , o
r admitting that no considerations had been expressed , yet
the covenant o
f
itself without consideration is sufficient to raise the uses .
* * * Then when Andrew Baynton had the land to his own use , and
made an indenture between him and Edward Baynton , that from thence
forth h
e
should be seized o
f it to other uses , here is a sufficient con
sideration why the same should be done , viz . , the will of him that has
the thing , and greater than this there is no consideration . And , sir ,
by the law o
f
this land there are two ways o





chattels . The one is , b
y
words , which is the inferior
method ; the other is b
y writing , which is the superior . And because
words are oftentimes spoken b
y
men unadvisedly and without delibera
tion , the law has provided that a contract b
y
words shall not bind with
out consideration . As if I promise to give you 201 , to make your sale
de noro , here you shall not have an action against me for the 201 . as




x nudo pacto non oritur actio . And the reason is , because it
is by words which pass from men lightly and inconsiderately , but where
the agreement is b
y
deed , there is more time for deliberation . For
when a man passes a thing b
y
deed , first there is the determination
o
f
the mind to d
o it , and upon that he causes it to be written , which is
one part o
f
deliberation , and afterwards he puts his seal to it , which
is another part o
f
deliberation , and lastly he delivers the writing as
his deed , which is the consummation o
f





the deed from him that makes it to him to whom it is made ,
h
e gives his assent to part with the thing contained in the deed to him
to whom h
e
delivers the deed , and this delivery is as a ceremony in law ,
signifying fully his good -will that the thing in the deed should pass
from him to the other . So that there is great deliberation used in the
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making of deeds , for which reason they are received as a lien final to
the party, and are adjudged to bind the party without examining upon
what cause or consideration they were made . And therefore in the
case put in 17 Ed. 4 , put it [ * 309 ] thus, that I by deed promise to give
you 201 . to make your sale de novo , here you shall have an action of debt
upon this deed , and the consideration is not examinable , for in the deed
there is a sufficient consideration , viz., the will of the party that made
the deed . * * * So that where it is by deed , the cause or considera
tion is not enquirable, nor is it to be weighed , but the party ought only
to answer to the deed , and if he confesses it to be his deed , he shall
be bound , for every deed imports in itself a consideration , viz ., the will
of him that made it, and therefore where the agreement is by deed , it
shall never be called a nudum pactum . And in an action of debt upon an
obligation , the consideration upon which the party made the deed is
not to be enquired , for it is sufficient to say that it was his will to make
the deed . And so inasmuch as in the principal case it is agreed that
the uses might be raised by the deed , if there had been a consideration
in it, and here there is a consideration contained in the deed , viz ., the
will of Andrew Baynton , which is sufficient of itself , for this reason
the uses shall be raised thereby ; and if this should not be sufficient to
raise them , yet they should have been raised by other considerations if
they had been without deed , whereas here they are by deed , and so they
shall be raised a fortiori. For which reasons they prayed judgment that
the plaintiffs might be barred . And many other things were said , and
cases put to enforce these arguments .
And after these arguments the court took time to deliberate until
Hilary term , and from thence until Easter term , and from thence until
this present Trinity term , * * * and the defendants now prayed
judgment . * * * And afterwards at another day , CATLINE , chief
justice , being present, the apprentice prayed judgment. And CATLINE
and the court were agreed that judgment should be entered against the
plaintiffs , and he ordered Haywood the prothonotary to enter it. And the
apprentice said , May it please your lordship to show us , for our learning ,
the causes of your judgment ? And CATLINE said , It seems to us that
the affection of the said Andrew for the provision of the heirs males
which he should beget, and his desire that the land should continue in
the blood and name of Baynton , and the brotherly love which he bore
to his brothers , are sufficient considerations to raise the uses in the land .
And where you said in your argument naturæ vis maxima , I say , natura
bis maxima , and it is the greatest consideration that can be to raise a
use . But as to the other consideration moved in the argument , viz .,
of the marriage had between Edward Baynton and Agnes , the record
does not prove this , nor is it so averred , and it shall not be so intended ,
and therefore I don 't regard it ; but the other causes and considerations
are effectual, and those which moved us to our judgment . Wherefore
judgment was given as follows : [Here follows the record of judgment
for defendants . ]
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MILDMAY 'S CASE , in Court of Wards , Hilary , 24 Eliz . ; in Common Pleas ,
Hilary , 26 Eliz . ; in King 's Bench , Mich . 26 & 27 Eliz ., A . D . 1585 – 1 Coke
175 , Cro . Eliz . 34 , Moore 144, 632 , Jenk Cent. 247, 1 Gray P . C. 498 .
Given according to 1 Coke 1752 - 177b .
The case in an information exhibited in the court of wards by Richard
Kingsmill , Esq., attorney of the same court, against the lady Anne
Sharington , late wife of Sir Hen . Sharington , Knt., and John Talbot,
Esq ., and Oliff his wife , one of the daughters and heirs of the said
Sir Henry Sharington , which was resolved Hil. 24 Eliz . and afterwards
Hil. 26 Eliz., adjudged in the court of common pleas, rot. 745 , between
Anthony Mildway , Esq., plaintiff, and Roger Standish , Gent , defend
ant, in an action upon the case for slandering his title, & c., which judg
ment was M . 26 & 27 Eliz ., rot. 35 , affirmed in the king's bench , in
a writ of error , and was in effect thus : The said Sir Henry Sharing
ton having a wife the said Dame Anne, and three daughters , Grace
married to the said Anthony Mildmay , Ursula married to Thomas
Sadler , Esq ., and Oliff married to the said John Talbot , by
indenture bearing date 20 August, 15 Eliz ., made between the said
Sir Henry Sharington of the one part , and Edmund Pirton and James
Paget , Esqrs ., of the other part, in consideration of a jointure for his
wife , for the advancement of his issue male of his body , if he should
have any, and for the advancement of his said three daughters and the
heirs of their bodies , if he should have no heir male of his body , and
for the continuance of his land in his blood , and for other good and
just considerations did covenant to stand seised of six hundred acres of
land (exempli gratia ) to the uses, intents, and purposes, and under the
proviso following , scil . of all to the use of himself for his life, and after
for 300 acres of land , in certain , to the use of his wife for her life for
her jointure ; and of the other 300 acres after his death , and of the said
300 acres limited for the jointure of the wife after their deaths to the
use of the heirs males of his body begotten ; and for the default of such
issue, then for the 300 acres not being limited for jointure , & c., to the
use of his three daughters severally by themselves , and to the heirs of
their bodies ; and for default of such issue, to the use of the right heirs
of the said Sir Henry , with like limitation of the other 300 acres to
them of the like estate , with the reversion to his right heirs. And if
any of his said three daughters should die without issue , then her por
tion should be by moieties to the survivors of the like estate , ut supra ,
with remainder ut supra ; with proviso for the three several husbands
of the said three daughters to have several portions for their lives, if they
should survive their wives , and should not be entitled to be tenants
by the curtesy , with this proviso in these words following , scil . Provided
always , and it is covenanted and agreed between al
l
the said parties ,
that it shall be lawful for the said Sir Henry b
y
his will in writing to
limit any part of the said lands to any person or persons for any life ,





his servants , or any other reasonable considerations as to













him shall be thought good , and all persons thereof seised , to stand seised
thereof to the use o
f
such persons and for such interests as shall be
so limited b
y
his will . After which the said Ursula died without issue ,
Grace and Oliff surviving , whereby her portion b
y
moieties came to them :
and afterwards the said Sir Henry b
y









the said Oliff , limited a great part , limited b
y
the in
denture for the portion o
f
Grace , after the death o
f
his wife , and another
great part o
f




the said Ursula ,
to the said Oliff and her husband , and to the heirs of the body of Oliff
for 1000 years without reservation o
f any rent ; and afterwards the said
Sir Henry died without issue male , and whether this limitation for
1000 years being made for the advancement of his daughter Oliff and




the said Oliff , be good in law
b
y




ir Christopher WRAY , Ch . Just . of England , Sir Edm .
ANDERSON , Ch . Just . of the court of common pleas , and all the Judges
o
f England , that the limitation for 1000 years was void , and not war
ranted b
y
the said proviso ; and in this case five points were resolved .
First , that an use cannot be raised b
y any covenant or proviso , or b
y
bargain and sale upon a general consideration ; and therefore , if a man
b
y
deed indented and enrolled according to the statute for divers good
considerations bargains and sells his lands to another and his heirs ,
nihil operatur inde ; for no use shall be raised upon such general consid
eration , for it doth not appear to the court that the bargainor hath quid
pro quo , and the court ought to judge whether the consideration be
sufficient o
r
not ; and that cannot be when it is alleged in such gener
ality . But note , reader , the bargainee in such case may aver that money
o
r
other valuable consideration was paid o
r given , and if the truth be
such , the bargain and sale shall be good . So if I by deed covenant with
J . S . for divers good considerations , that I and my heirs will stand
seised to the use o
f
him and his heirs , no use without a special aver
ment shall be raised by it ; but if J . S . be of my blood , and in truth
the covenant was made for the advancement of his blood , he may aver
that the covenant was in consideration thereof ; for in both these cases
the person who shall take the use is certain ; and that such averment
may be taken which stands with the deed , although it be not expressly
comprised in the deed , is proved b
y
a case adjudged in an assise between
Villers and Beamont , term . Pasch . 3 & 4 Ph . & M . reported by Bendloes
[ B
r
. N . C . 182 , 2 Anders . 47 , N . Ben . 39 ] , serjeant at law ; which case
you will find also Pasch . 3 & 4 Ph . & M . Dyer , fo . 146 , where the case
in effect was , that George Beamont and Jane his wife , as in the right
o
f
his wife , was seised o
f
the manor o
f Northall , & c . , and had issue Will .
Beamont , who had issue Rich . Beamont , and he and his wife , b
y
inden
ture 12 H . 8 , between them o
f
the one part , and Rich . Clark o
f
the other
part , in consideration of 701 . given by Rd . Clark , did bargain and sell
the land to the said Rich . Clark for 30 years , the remainder to themselves
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fo
r
their lives , the remainder to Will . Beamont for life , the remainder
to Rich . Beamont and to one Collet the daughter o
f Rd . Clark in tail ,
& c . , and afterwards a recovery was had to the same uses ; Rd . Beamont
and Collet did intermarry ; and it was found and averred , that the said
indenture was made , and the said recovery had tam in consideratione
maritagii præd intr Rich ' Beamont & Colletam , habend & celebrand
( to make it a jointure within the statute o
f
1
1 Hen . 7 ) [ c . 20 ] quam
o
f
the said sum o
f
701 . and it was adjudged , that although there was a
particular consideration mentioned in the deed , yet an averment in the
same case might be made o
f
another consideration which stood with the
indenture , and which was not contrary to it ; a fortiori in the said cases ,
for in the deed there is no certain consideration , but the deed is general
for divers good considerations then the averment that the bargainee gave
money , & c . , o
r
that the covenantee was o
f
his blood , is but an explana
tion and particularising of the general words o
f
the deed , which include
every manner o
f
consideration , and in all the said cases the matter so
averred is traversable and issuable .
Secondly , it was resolved , that when uses are raised by covenant in
consideration of paternal love , & c . , to his sons and daughters , o
r
for the
advancement of any of his blood ; and after in the same indenture a
proviso is added , that the covenantor for divers good considerations may
make leases for years , & c . , that the covenantor in such case cannot
make a lease for years to his son or daughter , or to any other of his
blood (much less to any other person ) because the power to make leases
for years was void when the indenture was sealed and delivered ; for the
covenant upon such general consideration cannot raise the use for the
causes aforesaid and no particular averment can be taken because his
intent was as general as the consideration was , and his intent was not
a
t
the time of the delivery o
f
the deed to demise to any person in certain ,
to one more than another , but to demise generally to whom he pleased ;
and therefore his power to make leases (the uses being created and raised
b
y
covenant upon the considerations aforesaid ) was void ab initio . But
if the uses had been limited upon a recovery , fine or feoffment , in that
case there needs not any consideration to raise any o
f
the uses , and so
a manifest difference . And the case at bar is stronger , because the










the same indenture . So note a difference when
the consideration is general , and the covenant or bargain made with a
person certain , there an averment according to the truth o
f
the case
may be taken a
s
aforesaid ; but when the consideration is general ,
and the person uncertain , there no averment can help ; and therefore
if I for divers good considerations covenant with you , that I will stand
seised to the use o
f
such a one as you shall name , now although you
name my son , or my cousin , yet no use shall be raised thereby , because .
for the generality and incertainty , it was void in initio , and never coul !
b
e
made good to any purpose after ; and no averment can make it good ,
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or reduce it to any certainty , for the intent of the covenantor was as
general as his words were . But if I covenant with you that in considera
tion of fatherly love , or for the advancement of my blood , I will stand
seised to the use of such of my sons, or to the use of such of my cousins
as you shall name, upon the nomination made the use shall be raised ,
for there the consideration is particular and certain , and the person
by matter ex post facto may be made certain .
3. Upon these words in the proviso (other considerations ) it was held ,
that this word (other ) could not comprehend any consideration men
tioned or expressed in the indentures before the proviso ; for (other )
ought to be other in nature , quality , and person , and the advancement
of his daughter is the consideration mentioned before.
4 . It was resolved , that the said limitation of 1000 years was as well
against the intent of the parties , as against the words of the proviso , for
the intent and scope of the indentures was to make distribution of his
lands amongst his three daughters , and the heirs of their bodies ; and
every of them , upon good consideration and by agreement between their
parents, had her portion by herself ; but if this limitation of 1000 years
should be good , it would rather frustrate the estate of the other sister ,
and defraud the intent of the parties grounded upon a consideration of
marriage , than perform and pursue the intent and meaning of the pro
viso , for the intent of the proviso was never to give any power to make
void the estates of the other sisters ; but it appears by all the parts of the
indenture , that each daughter should be advanced equally ; and so this
limitation for 1000 years without any rent reserved was against the in
tent and meaning of the parties ; it seems also to be against the words of
the proviso , for that cannot be called a reasonable consideration which
tends to the subversion of the estates vested and settled by the said





After the said resolution o
f
the justices certified into the court o
f
wards , it was adjudged in the common pleas , and also affirmed upon a
writ of error in the king ' s bench in an action upon the case brought b
y
the said Anthony Mildmay against Roger Standish , because the said
Roger had said , and openly published that the said land was lawfully as
sured to the said John Talbot and Oliffe his wife for 1000 years , and that




the said term , whereas , in
truth the said land was not lawfully assured for the term aforesaid nor
were the said John Talbot and Oliffe lawfully possessed of the interest
thereof , and so for slandering of the estate and title which was conveyed
to his wife b
y
the said indentures , and showed al
l
in certainty , and how he
was prejudiced b
y
the said words , he brought the said action . And
Standish pleaded the said proviso in the same indentures , and the said
limitation for 1000 years b
y




e pretended ) b
y
virtue whereof he said the said Oliffe had
a
n interest for 1000 years , and justified the words upon which the
plaintiff demurred . And it was adjudged , that the action upon th
e
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case was maintainable : and in this case two points were resolved in both
the courts : first , that the said lease for the causes aforesaid was void in
law . Secondly, although de facto the said John Talbot and Oliffe had a
limitation of the land by the said will of Sir Henry Sherington in writ
ing for 1000 years, which was the occasion that Standish , being a man
not learned in the law , did affirm and publish that Oliffe had a term
for 1000 years ; yet forasmuch as he hath taken upon him the knowl
edge of the law , and meddling with a matter which did not concern
him , had published and declared , that Oliffe had a good estate for 1000
years, in slander of the title of Mildmay , and thereby had prejudiced
the plaintiff , as appears by the plaintiff 's declaration ; for this reason
the judgment given for the plaintiff was affirmed in the writ of error ;
et ignorantia juris non excusat.
TAYLOR V. VALE , in Queen 's Bench , 32 Eliz ., A . D . 1591 - Cro . Eliz . 166 .
Replevin . The case was upon demurrer . Vale having a rent charge
in fee , by indenture , which was inrolled within six months , giveth and
granteth it to Hall in fee , and there was no attornment . NOTE . In
truth the case was that he for a certain sum of money giveth , granteth ,
and selleth the rent ; but it was pleaded only that he by indenture dedit
et concessit . And it was ruled without argument that the rent without
attornment passeth not, being only by way of grant , and not of bargain
or sale , although the deed was inrolled . But WRAY ( C . J. ] said that
if by indenture , in consideration of a certain sum of money, dedit et
concessit and the deed is inrolled , this shall pass the rent without attorn
ment, though there be no words of bargain and sale. And the plaintiff
had judgment .
WARD V. LAMBERT, in Common Bench , Hilary term , 35 Eliz ., A . D . 1594
- Cro . Eliz , 394 .
Upon a special verdict the case was that one by indenture , reciting ,
“ That whereas J. S . was bound in a recognizance and other bonds for
him ; now he, for divers good considerations , bargained and sold the
land to him and his heirs." The deed was enrolled within the six
months , but it was found there was not any part paid ; and whether this
was a good bargain and sale or not was the question upon demurrer .
ANDERSON [ C . J. ] : Every owner of land may part with it as he
pleases , if it be according to law ; and here it is not shown that the
bargain and sale was because the vendee was bound to him ; and if
he were , yet it cannot be a good bargain and sale . But if there had
been apt words , he might thereby have raised an use by way of covenant,
but clearly not a bargain and sale .
WALMSLEY ( J . ] : Accord . In every bargain and sale there ought to
be a quid pro quo . But the vendor here hath nothing for his land , and
therefore it is void . But it might have arisen by way of covenant ;
but there ought to have been apt words, vi
z
. , a covenant to stand seised
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to uses ; for if I give land , or bargain or sell land to my son , no use
ariseth thereby .
And to that opinion the other justices inclined , that it is not good
by way o
f bargain and sale , but that it had been a good consideration
to raise a
n
use by way o
f
covenant . Wherefore it was adjudged accord
ingly .
WHITMAN v . CORLEY , in S . Car . Sup . Ct . , Oct . 7 , 1905 - 72 S . Car . 410 ,
52 S . E . 49 .









future support , and the failure of the defendant to perform his agree
ment . The answer denies the promise and alleges the conveyance was




$ 200 actually paid . The plaintiff
recovered judgment and the defendant appeals . The deed was intro
duced , and was found to express only a consideration o
f
$ 200 . The
plaintiff was then allowed to introduce evidence to the effect that the
real consideration was , not the payment o
f
$ 200 , but the promise o
f
support set out in the complaint . This evidence was objected to as an
attempt to vary the terms o
f
a written instrument b
y
parol , and the a
l
leged error in its admission is the basis o
f
this appeal . The case o
f Lati
mer v . Latimer , 53 S . Car . 483 , 31 S . E . 304 , is authority for the proposi
tion stated in the syllabus : “ Except in cases o
f
fraud , it is not competent
to show b
y
parol that a deed , purporting to be based on good considera
tion and executed for a specific purpose , was based on valuable considera
tion and executed for an entirely different purpose . ” But that case
recognizes and affirms the rule that , where a deed expresses a considera
tion , an additional o
r
a different valuable consideration may be proved b
y




LITTLETON ' S TENURES , § 169. (Littleton died in 1482.)
Also by such custom a man may devise by his will that his executors
may alien and sell the tenements that he has in fe
e
simple , for a certain
sum in money to distribute for his soul . In this case , though the de
visor die seized o
f
the tenements , and the tenements descend to his heir ,
yet the executors , after the death o
f
the testator , may sell the tenements
so devised to them , and put out the heir , and thereof make a feoffment ,
alienation , and estate , b
y
deed o
r without deed , to them to whom the
sale is made . And so you may here see a case where a man may make
a lawful estate and yet has nothing in the tenements at the time of the
estate made . And the cause is that the custom and usage is so ; for a
custom used o
n
a certain reasonable cause displaces the common law .
FARINGTON V . DARREL , Trinity , 9 Hen . V
I , A . D . 1431 - Yearbook , e
Hen . VI , 23b .





London against John Darrel . Newton : The action does not lie : for we
tell you that before the day of the alleged trespass , one R was seized
of a house with the appurtenances in London in his demesne as of fee ;
and the city o
f





city at the time , & c . , whoever has an inheritance by descent or purchase
may devise it ; and the said R being so seized , b
y
his will probated in
the hustings o
f
London common pleas , devised said house to one L ,
his wife , for the term of her life , and that after her death the said
house and appurtenances should remain to his son J and his heirs
males of his body , and for default of issue said house should remain
to the heir male o
f
said R and the heirs males of the body of said heir ,
& c . ; and the said R died , after whose death said L his wife entered
said house and died seized without issue male ; after whose death one
P . G . , and Joan , his wife , in the right of the wife as grand - daughter
and heir of said R , viz . , the daughter of one J , daughter of said R in said
house then had issue a son called E ; and afterwards said P . G . and J
his wife , b
y
their deed enrolled in the hustings o
f
London such a day
and year gave the said house in fee to said John Farington ; and later
the said E , son of the said Joan , in the said house as next heir male o
f
said R , & c . , entered on the said John Farington , which estate the said
John Darrel had and before the day of the trespass alleged ; on whom the
(203 )
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said John Farington entered , and the said John Darrel at the time
alleged re-entered as he well might ; on which the said action was con
ceived . Rolf : On his own admission we are entitled to our damages .
Newton : On these facts you should be barred . And so the case was
submitted to the judges at the trinity term 8 Hen . VI, and adjourned
from term to term till now ; on which day Rolf said : It seems to me that
the plaintiff should have his damages ; for it is admitted that at the
time of the devise and when the remainder fell due the devisor had
no heir male ; and this E who claims as heir male was born after the
remainder accrued , so that the remainder is void . For if land is given
to a man for term of life, the remainder to the right heirs of my Lord
Babington , and afterwards the tenant for life die in the life of my
Lord Babington , this remainder is void , because Babington cannot have
heirs while he lives . In the same manner here , it is not alleged that
Joan , who was grand -daughter and heir of R , was dead at the time that
the remainder accrued ; wherefore , & c., and thus I understand that an
estate tail or a remainder is merely void and cannot be revived after
wards . If land is given to a man and the heirs males of his body and
he has a daughter and dies without heir male , and the donor enters,
and later the daughter has issue male and dies, her issue male shall
not have the land , and yet he is now heir male of the body of the donee ,
& c., so here . * * * FULTHORP : A devise is stronger than a grant at
common law ; for everyone is held to perform the last will ; then in this
case the said E is heir male of said donee by force of the gift ; and
if one devise or grant that his executors may sell his land after his
death , if the land is not devised all is void ; for it is against common
reason that any executor may sell that in which he has nothing ; but by
the custom it may well be, and he may sell and put the vendee in pos
session though the heir is in by descent ; so that a devise is stronger
than a grant ; wherefore it seems to me that the intent should be executed
as this may be executed . And as to what is said to the point that this
reversion is merely void , because there was no one to take as heir male
at the time the remainder fell due , if one should be seized in fee simple
or fee tail and die without heir except that his wife was enceinte , and
the lord or the donor should enter, and afterwards the wife should have
issue , the issue should have the land ; and yet at the time of his death
he had not any issue nor heir ; wherefore in the same manner here .
ELDERKAR : This remainder was determined at one time , as has been
said , and cannot be revived ; and if one devise that his executors shall
sell his land to him who will pay the most for the land , and they sell
the land to a man , and later another comes to them and offers more ,
they cannot sell the land to him , for their power is then determined .
And , sir , I hold that if land is given to a man for term of life, the re
mainder to the right heirs female of a stranger who is dead and had
issue a son and a daughter , and the tenant for life die, the daughter
of the stranger shall not have the land , for she is not right heir of the


























devises is that the executors may sell , and that it shall be effectual b
y
the devise , and yet the executors have nothing in the freehold ; but the
custom o
f
devises is not to make a man to inherit a
s heir who is not heir .
And also it would be inconvenient that when an estate tail had been






years after . And , sir , in many cases , notwithstand






s if land is given to a man and to the heirs males of his body , who
has a son and daughter and dies , the son enters , the daughter has issue
a son and dies , and later the son of the donee dies without issue , the
son o
f
the daughter shall not have the land , and yet he is heir male
o
f
the donee and o




TIN . ) As to the statement that if one die without heir except that his
wife is enceinte , and later she has issue , his issue shall have the land ,
and yet h
e
was dead without issue at one time ; it is true that he shall
inherit , for in this case the inheritance was not absolutely determined ;
for though he had no visible heir on earth , yet he had an heir in being
a
t the time o
f
his death , though not then born , and in this case the
heir may be vouched while en ventra sa mere . MARTIN : It has been
held that if land is given to a man for life , the remainder to the right
heirs o
f
A , and A is in full life , and later A has issue and dies , and
later the tenant for life dies , the heir of A shall have the land , and
vet at the time of the grant the remainder was in a sense void . (Which
was not denied ; but PASTON said it was not reasonable . ) * * * MAR
TIN : In a stronger case it has been held that if one devise that his
executor o
r
the executor of his executor may sell his land , and a
t
the
time of this devise the executor of the executor was not in existence , yet
his sale has been held good and sufficient . PASTON : That may well
b
e , for he was in existence at the death of the first executor . * * *
GODRED : A devise is stronger than a grant b
y
deed ; for if one lease land
b
y
deed to a man in possession (who has no capacity ) for term o
f
life ,
the remainder over in fe
e , or land is leased for term o
f
life to a man
who does not exist , the remainder over in fee ; this remainder is void
for lack o
f support ; but if one devise to one who has no capacity , or to
a man who does not exist , for term o
f life , the remainder over in fee ,
yet the remainder over is good . So in this case , notwithstanding this
would perhaps be void b
y
deed , yet b
y
devise it is good . BABINGTON :
The nature o
f
a devise where lands are devisable is that one may devise
that the land shall be sold b
y
his executors , and this is good , as has
been said , and is marvelous law in reason ; but this is the nature of a
devise , and devises have been used at al
l
times in this form ; and so
one may have lawful freehold from another who had nothing , just as
one may have fire from flint and yet there is no fire in the flint ; and
this is to perform the last will o
f
the devisor . And also a guardian in
chivalry may endow a widow , and a writ o
f










the devisor or it is void ; for if it should be
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void at his death it may not be effectual afterwards . As if one devise
land to his priest for a chantry or for a college in the church at A and
die, at which time there is no chantry nor any college , this devise is void
notwithstanding it be by the king's license ; and if afterwards a chantry
or a college is made in the same place , yet they shall not have the land ,
because at the time of the devise there was no corporation in which the
devise might take effect. PASTON : A devise is marvelous in the way
it may take effect ; for if one devises in London that his executors shall
sell hi
s







shall be ousted , and in the same manner his
heir after him . But if one devise his lands to his executors so that the
freehold is in them b
y
the devise , and afterwards the heir o
f
the devisor
abate and die seized and his heir is in b
y
descent , in this case the execu
tors may not oust him that is in b
y
descent . * * * See more of this
case a
t
Mich . term , 11 Hen . VI , fo . 12 . [ At which time the case was
further discussed b
y
the judges and again adjourned without decision ,
and we find nothing more concerning it . ]
This case is exceedingly interesting and instructive in many ways ; not
by reason of what is decided , for nothing is decided , but because of what
is admitted , taken for granted , and said by way of argument . Observe
that this is an action in a law court , and that what is said concerning
powers recognizes them as legal institutions , then well established and
understood , creating legal rights in no way depending on uses or the liberal
rules of the chancery for their validity and effect . That powers are here
recognized as existing and valid before the statute and apart from uses ,
should assist us to escape the common error of assuming that powers con
cerning land derive their origin from uses , and their effect in the law courts
from the statute of uses .
Unlike a reservation (which could only be made to the grantor and his
heirs ) , of a rent , a profit , an easement , a condition subsequent , or a power
of defeasance , these powers of revocation , appointment , and sale , are given
(without estate in the land ) to others , and yet are admittedly valid .
The power might be devised without devising the land if the land were
devisable ; and since the land descends to the heir in the meantime , we will
later see in this arrangement the forerunner and justification of the execu
tory devise , springing use , and shifting use , which obtained recognition in
the law courts after the statute of uses and the statutes of wills . We will
later observe that the doctrine recognized in this case that the contingent
estate may vest at any time before the termination of the particular
estate , and then must come to possession or fail forever , is older than many
have supposed . On the facts of this particular case it is remarkable that
no one suggested that one could not make an estate to his own heir , or heir
of his body , as a purchaser , a doctrine established at least as early as Abel ' s
case , ante over a hundred years before .
" Powers are either common - law authorities ; declarations or directions
operating only on ‘the conscience o
f
the persons in whom the legal interest
is vested ; or declarations or directions deriving their effect from the statute
of uses . A power given by a will to A to sell an estate , and a power given
by an act of parliament to sell estates , as in the instance of land -tax re
demption acts , are both common law authorities . The estate passes by
force of the will , or act of parliament , and the person who executes the
power merely nominates the party to take the estate . A power of attorney
is also a common -law authority ; but the estate is not in this , as in the
other cases , transferred by the instrument creating the power . " Sugden on
Powers , c . 1 , $ 1 .
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ANON . in King's Bench , Easter term , 9 Hen . VII, A . D. 1494 — Y . B . 9 H .
7, 26 , pl. 13 .
Mordant asked of BRIAN and his companions this question in the
king's bench : A man had feoffees to his use and made feoffment to
a stranger , and afterwards made a letter of attorney to deliver seizin to
the stranger , and so he made it : now if by this livery and seizin taken
by the stranger it was a good feoffment , or whether it was a disseizin of
the feoffees , or whether he had it at will , or not ? But some of them
said that this was a good feoffment , because he had authority to enter
and make feoffment, so he may cause another to make livery ; for he who
acts through another is considered to act himself. But BRIAN FC . J . ]
and all the other justices said that this is a disseizin of the feoffees ;
for immediately after that cestuy que use had sold or bargained his
use to a stranger , then he had no right to meddle with the land . But
in the way he was seized of the land before any bargain or sale he may
not give license to any stranger to enter in the land , or make any tres
pass on it ; and also the feoffees might punish cestuy que use if he comes
on the land , and he had nothing to do with the land if not by the express
words of the statute, viz . , to enter and make feoffment ; and if he should
enter on the land and remain there himself the feoffees would have an
assize against him . But as his interest is defined and given by the statute
h
e ought to pursue the authority that is given to him by the statute ;
and this authority is that he may give to another ; but a
ll
leases , grants ,
and recognizances made by him bind the feoffees because the statute
warrants these . As if a man has feoffees to his use and he makes his
will that his executors or that one John o
f
Down sell his lands ; in this
case neither the executors nor John o
f
Down may enter in the land
and make feoffment , because the statute does not authorize them to do
so , but cestuy que use himself . But the executors may bargain and
sell the use to another , and the vendee may enter and make feoffment
in fee to his own use , because the statute warrants this . But the statute
does not say that a stranger may enter and give livery , but cestuy que use
himself . Which was agreed by all the justices .
But see Kellet v . Bishop of London , post , — , which overrules this case as
to the delegation o
f
a power .
ANON , in Exchequer Chamber , by all the Judges o
f England , 13 Hen , 7 ,
A . D . 1498 — 4 Jenk . Cent . case 75 .
A devises land to be sold b
y




a disseisor enters ; and the heir or disseisor makes a feoffment of
this land to B . B dies seised , and his heir is in b
y
descent . Yet the
executors may enter into this land and sell it ; for a descent takes away
rights o
f entry not titles or powers , as entry fo
r
a condition broken ,




land , where an abator enters before them , and dies
seised ; for they have no other remedy . And executors have only a power ,
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and when they sell the vendee is in by the will of the devisor , paramount
the descent.
ANON ., in King 's Bench , Trinity term , 14 Hen . VII, pl. 10, A . D . 1499.
- In the king's bench the case was such : A man had certain feoffees
in his land to his use, and made his will , and willed that his land
should be sold after the death of one A , whom he wished to have the
profits during his life , which feoffees had enfeoffeed others to the use
of the first feoffor to perform his will and testament ; and if the sec
ond may sell the land or not, this was the matter . And KINGSMILL
thought the second feoffees might sell well enough . See more Trinity
15 Hen . 7, 11 (pl. 22 , below ] .
SAME CASE AS ABOVE , in Exchequer Chamber , Trinity term , 15 Henry
VII , 11 , pl. 22 , A . D. 1500 .
“ This case is always referred to on this subject .” Sugden , Powers, 49 note .
A man enfeoffs A & B on confidence , and afterwards he makes his
will and recites that A & B were seized to his use , and that his will
is that the said A & B should make an estate to his wife for term
of her life, the remainder to his son and heir , and to the heirs of his
body begotten , and if the son die without heir of his body begotten ,
then he wills that the aforesaid feoffees alien the said land , and that
the money arising thereby should be distributed for his soul ; and
afterwards the feoffor dies, and the feoffees make a feoffment over
to the same use , and declare their will that the second feoffees shall
act according to the first will, and the wife dies , and the son of the
first feoffor dies without heir , and the second feoffees alien the land
over to a stranger in fee ; and if this alienation is good or not, that
is the matter , on demurrer in judgment .
REDE , justice : It seems to me that the second feoffees cannot make
alienation according to the will of the first feoffor ; for the will of a man
ought to be taken according to the intent of him who made the will and
according to the law of the land . For if one makes his will that the land
of which he is seized shall be sold and alienated by J . S . after his death ,
and afterwards dies seized , here his will shall not be performed , because
his will is contrary to the law of the land , to make will of land of which
he is seized and dies seized (which was conceded by TREMAILE ) . And so
if a man has feoffees on confidence in his land, and makes his will that
one J . S . shall alien his land , and there is no such person in being ,
here his will is void , because no other man can sell it ; and for that
reason the feoffees shall be seized to the use of the heir, & c ., because it
appears by the will that no other man can make alienation . And so
it is if a man has feoffees in his land , and makes his will that J . N .
alien the same land, here if J . N . die without heir his executors can
not alien , because that is not warranted by the will ; but the feoffees
shall remain seized to the use of the heir of the first feoffor. So it is
here, when he names the feoffees from the first in the will, and then
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he says that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien the land for his soul ,
where the authority is given to them only , their executors may not
alien it ; but if these feoffees make feoffment over to the same use,
yet the first feoffees may alien the land according to the will of the
first feoffor (which was conceded by FINEUX and TREMAILE ) . And
also the second feoffees may alien the land by commandment of the
first feoffees , and this is good ; for it is a sale and the alienation of
the first feoffees in law . And none may deny that the second feoffees
may alien the land during the life of the first feoffees , though it be
not by their commandment so that it be in fact their own alienation ;
and by consequence no more can they sell after the death of the first
feoffees .
TREMAILE to the same purpose : And there is a diversity where
the will is that that the alienation shall be made to a person certain ,
and where it is that the alienation shall be made generally ; for if the
will was that the aforesaid feoffees alien to one J . S ., there if they
make feoffment over to the same use , yet the second feoffees shall alien
this , for it is in a manner a use to J . S . (which was conceded by REDE
and FINEUX .) But when the will is that the aforesaid feoffees alien ,
there this authority is given to them only ; for if the will was that his
executors shall alien his land , although they refuse to alien , yet the
feoffees cannot alien . So if his will was that the feoffees shall alien ,
and they will not but die, yet the executors may not alien ; and so it is
here .
FINEUX , chief justice , to the same intent: And , sir , if one makes
no will the common law makes a will for everyone of his lands and
goods , and that is, viz ., that the heir shall have the land , and the ordi
nary his goods ; but if one will that his land shall be sold in another
form than the common law ordains , then the common law suffers him
to make his will of them . And every will which one makes ought to
be construed and taken according to the purports of the words, or as
it may be implied and intended by the words what his intent was ;
but it should not be construed otherwise than the words imply where
they signify . Therefore , here when he recited the names of the feof
fees , and then says that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien , there it is
as much as to say in effect that no other than they shall alien , and
if the will was that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien within the two
years next ensuing , if they do not so they may not do it afterwards ,
but the heir of the feoffor shall have it for all time. And if one makes
his will that J . S . shall have the land forever during his life, here by
this he shall have it for his life only, for these words during hi
s
life
abridge the interest given before ; and so here , when he says the afore
said feoffees shall alien , there no other can have this power but them
only . And there is a diversity where the power given to the feoffees
is annexed to the land and where not ; for if the will be that the afore
said feoffees shall make an estate over to a certain person for certain
years , there if they make feoffment over to the same use the first
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feoffees may not do that, for this power is a thing annexed to the land
which none may exercise except him who has the land ; but here the
will was , that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien the land , and this may
well be done after the feoffment made by them to the same use ; and
therefore their power is not determined by this feoffment. And if one
has feoffees in confidence in his land and makes will that the feoffees
shall alien his land to pay his debts, there the creditors may compel
the feoffees to alien (which was conceded by REDE and TREMAILE ) .
And so if the will was that a stranger should alien this land to one
J . S ., there J . S . shall compel this stranger by subpæna to alien this
land to him , and the feoffees cannot alien . But if the will
is that the feoffees shall alien his land for money to distribute ,
& c., there none may compel them to make alienation ; for no one is
damaged though it is not sold ; and so a diversity (which was con
ceded ) . And if one has feoffees in confidence and makes a will that
his executors shall alien his land, there if the executors renounce the
administration of the goods , yet they may alien the land, for the will
of land is not a thing testamentary , nor need the executors to meddle
in this will except as they have the special power given to them . And
if one has feoffees in his land and makes will that his executors shall
sell his land and then he makes no executors , there the ordinary shall
not meddle with the land , nor the administrator neither ; for the ordi
nary had not to meddle but of things testamentary , as of goods ; and
by consequence , no more can he administer who is only his deputy .
And therefore it was lately adjudged in the exchequer chamber by
all the judges of England, that if one make a will of his lands that
his executors shall sell the land , and alien , & c ., if the executors re
nounce the administration , and to be executors , there neither the ad
ministrators nor the ordinary can sell or alien it ; which note ( which
was conceded by REDE and TREMAILE for good law ) . And if one
makes his will that his executors shall alien his land without naming
their proper names , if they refuse the administration and to be execu
tors , yet they may alien the land (which was conceded by FINEUX
and TREMAILE for clear law . REDE spoke not ) . And if one makes
will that his land which his feoffees have shall be sold and aliened ,
and does not say by whom , there his executors shall alien it and not the
feoffees (by REDE , TREMAILE , and FROWICK ). FINEUX said nothing
to this this day, but the day before he in a manner affirmed this . CONISBY
said that the fcoffees shall alien this ; for they had the confidence
placed in them . But this was denied ; for the executors have much
greater confidence placed in them than had the feoffees ; for the money
to arise by the sale of the executors shall be assets in their hands ;
wherefore that the executors shall sell . FINEUX , REDE , and TREMAILE
said that if one make will that his feoffees shall alien his land , all the
time before the alienation the heir may take the profits , and they are
seized to his use, and if an alienation be not made by them the heir







KELLET V. BISHOP OF LONDON , in King 's Bench , Mich . term , 25 Hen .
VIII , A . D. 1534 – 3 Dyer 283a , pl. 30 , same case 1 And . 28 , pl. 66 , Bendloes
12 , pl. 10, Bendloes in Kellwey 207 , pl. 2, cited 1 Leonard 265 .
A question was moved by Gerrarde , attorney -general : If cestuy que
use before the statute of 27 Hen . 8 [ c. 10 ] of three acres of land in
divers vills lying apart within one county, by several feoffments , make
a feoffment of all the three acres by deed and letter of attorney , and
the attorney make livery in one acre in the name of al
l
the three acres ,
whether that b
e
good for the other acre ? And h
e
said many were o
f
opinion that it was not , because the statute of [ 1 ] Rich . 3 [ c . 1 ] gave
authority to cestuy que use to enter and make a feoffment , which he
ought to do in his proper person , and not b
y attorney for him . But
the case above was ruled upon demurrer in law to the evidence in tres
pass , M . 25 H . 8 , Rot . 71 , in B . R . cor . FITZJAMES ( C . J . ] , & c . , that
the feoffment was good for all three , upon great debate ; and it was be
tween the Bishop o
f
London and others and Kellet . But quære if the




the acre where livery
was made , whether the other two acres should pass or not ?
ANON . , in Common Pleas ? Hilary , 2 Eliz . , A . D . 1560 — Dyer 177a , p
l
. 32 .
Cestui que use (before the statute ) in fee willed b
y
his testament ,
that A , B , and C , his feoffees , should suffer his wife to take the profits
o
f





his said feoffees , and the money therefrom received
that the feoffees should pay certain persons and to certain intents pre
scribed . The testator died , A died , and the wife died . Whether B
and C , the survivors , may sell ? And it seems not , and so it was ruled ;
but quære if they had not been named A , B , and C , but feoffees only .
See 15 Hen . 7 , 12 [ b , p
l
. 22 ] .
In Lee v . Vincent (Hil . 26 Eliz . , A . D . 1584 , in Common Bench ) , Cro .
Eliz . 26 , Moore 147 , 3 Leon . 106 , a man devised to his son in tail , and if
he died without issue , that the four sons - in - law should sell and distribute
the money to his daughters . The son died without issue , one of the sons - in
law died , and afterwards the devisor died ; and it was adjudged that the
sons - in - law who survived might well sell ; for it appeared that his intention
was to advance his daughters ; and a difference was taken where they are
named by their proper names , and where not .
STILE V . THOMSON , in Court of Wards ? Hilary , 4 Eliz . , A . D . 1562 - Dyer
210a .
A man seised of lands in fe
e
-simple made his executors A and B ;
and b
y
his last will in writing after 32 Hen . 8 , willed that his executors
should have and hold the issues and profits o
f
two parts of his lands
until his heir by the common law should come to the age of 21 years ,
to the intent that his said executors with the profits of it should pay
his debts , perform his legacies , and for the education of his children .
One o
f
the executors died ; the survivor made his executors and died
also , the heir being yet within age . Quære , whether the executor of
212 POWERS .
the survivor may meddle with the profits of the lands and with the
disposition thereof during the non -age or not ? And CATLYN , chief
justice ; SAUNDERS , chief baron ; A . BROWNE [ B . ] ; and myself [DYER ,
chief justice of the common pleas ] , thought that he well may ; for this
was an interest in the executors by the devise , and not an authority or
trust only . Simile, ante [Dyer ], 177a (pl. 32 ].
DANNE v . ANNAS, in Common Pleas ? Mich . term , 4 & 5 Eliz ., A . D. 1563 —
Dyer 219a .
A man devised his lands to his wife for the term of her life, re
mainder to K , his daughter , in tail ; and if she died without issue ,
that then , after the death of his wife, the land should be sold for the
best price by his executors together with the assent of A . B. ; and made
his wife and a stranger his executors, and died . The wife entered and
died , and A . B . died ; and the executor who survived sold the land
alone. The question was whether it is a good sale or not. And by the
















ALBANY ' S CASE , (GRENDON V . ALBANY ) , in the King ' s Bench , 28 Eliz . ,
A . D . 1597 - 1 Coke , 110b — 113a .
In trespass brought b
y
John Grendon , plaintiff , against Thomas
Albany , defendant , for a trespass committed in twenty acres of land
in W . in the county o
f
Middlesex . The defendant ' as to five acres
pleaded that Francis Bunny , 1 May , 20 Eliz . , b
y
deed indented did
enfeoff Miles Hitchcock to the use o
f
the said Francis for life , and
after to the use o
f
one David Bunny in tail , and after to the use of
one Walter Bunny in tail , and after to the use of Stephen Bunny in
fee . And afterwards , viz . , 1 May , 21 Eliz . , the said Francis of the
said five acres , in which , & c . , di
d
enfeoff one Richard Tompson in
fee , upon whom the said David entered for the forfeiture . And after
wards , viz . , 1 May , 22 Eliz . , demised the said five acres to Adam Blunt
for 21 years , who infeoffed the said Thomas Albany , the now defend
ant , and justified the trespass , and gave color to the plaintiff . And
a
s
to the said 15 acre residue , the defendant pleaded , that the said
David so seised a
s
aforesaid in tail , 2 May , 22 Eliz . , b
y
deed indented
and inrolled in chancery , according to the statute , di
d
bargain and
sell the said 15 acres to the said defendant in fee , and justified the
trespass , and gave color to the plaintiff . The plaintiff replied and
said , that in the said deed of feoffment of the said Francis Bunny , it
was provided , that if it should happen that one Peter Penruddock
should die without issue male of his body , that it should be lawful





his pleasure , during his life , b
y
his
deed indented to be sealed and delivered in the presence o
f
four honest
and credible witnesses a
t
the least , to alter , change , determine , di
minish , or amplify any use or uses , limitations , intents , or purposes
limited or appointed in or b
y
the said deed o
f
feoffment , or the use
o
f any parcel o
f
the premises . And afterwards , 1 May , 23 Eliz . , the
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said Peter Penruddock died without issue male, and after , that is to
say , 20 March , 24 Eliz ., the said Francis by indenture between him
and the said David Bunny, and sealed and delivered in the presence
of four honest and credible witnesses (naming their names as he ought )
did alter the uses in the said deed contained ; and further covenanted
and agreed with the said David that forever after the said Miles Hitch
cock and his heirs , & c., should stand seized of the said 20 acres to
the use of the plaintiff in fee, as by the said indenture more
fully appears, by force whereof he was seised until the defendant did
the trespass , prout , & c. The defendant rejoined and confessed , that
in the said deed of feoffment there was such a proviso as the plaintiff
in his replication hath alleged ; but he said that the said Francis Bunny
in the lifetime of the said Peter Penruddock , sc . 1 April , 23 Eliz ., by
his deed did renounce , relinquish , and surrender to the said Miles ,
David , Nicholas , Walter, and Stephen , all such liberty , power , and
authority of revocation , & c., which he had after the death of the said
Peter without issue as aforesaid . And further the said Francis by
the said deed did remise , release , and quit - claim to them the said con
dition , proviso , covenant, and agreement aforesaid , and all his power ,
liberty , and authority aforesaid . And further the said Francis by
the same deed granted to them and their heirs, that for ever after, as
well the said condition , proviso , covenant, and agreement , as the said
power , liberty , and authority , should cease , and be to all intents void ,
& c. Upon which rejoinder the plaintiff did demur in law .
And Altham and others of counsel with the plaintiff did argue , that
a fine or feoffment could not extinguish such liberty or power ; a for
tiori a release could not extinguish it ; for a fine or feoffment hath
power and force to exclude the party from all rights and titles to the
land , as well present as future ; but an authority or power, which is
collateral to the right and title of the land , cannot be given or extin
guished by fine or feoffment , neither can he thereby disable himself
to make an estate according to his authority and power, when it comes
in esse. As in 15 H . 7, fol. 11 b , where cestui que use devised , that the
feoffees should sell his land, and died , and afterwards hi
s
feoffees made
a feoffment over , yet the feoffees might sell against their own feoff
ment , because the power to sell was mere collateral to the right of the
land . And so if executors have power to sell land to J . S . and they
enter and disseise the heir , and infeoff a stranger , yet they may sell
to J . S . for the reason before . And it was resembled to the case of
tithes in 42 Edw . 3 , 13a , where it is held , that a prior parson impar
sonee shall have tithes against his own feoffment , because he doth not




the land , or any right or title
therein , but as tithes in respect that he is parson b
y
collateral means .
And 12 Assize , plac . 41 , pending a praecipe , the tenant makes a feoff
ment , and afterwards an erroneous judgment is given against him , yet
h
e
shall have a writ of error against his own feoffment , fo
r
the error
is collateral to the right of the land ; a fortiori , in case of a release ,
214 POWERS .
for that which should be released is but a possibility , which cannot be
released . And a diversity was taken between a condition precedent and
a condition subsequent ; for a condition subsequent before the breach
thereof may be released , for there the estate passeth , and the condition is
annexed to that which may be released . But in the case of a condition
precedent, there it is but a possibility ; as if I grant to you , that if you
do such an act you shall have an annuity of 201. per ann . during your
life , and before the performance of the condition you release the annuity
to me, the release is void , because the release cannot extinguish a possi
bility. The case of Littleton , Chapter ( b ) Release 105 [ $ ], where
the son releaseth in the life of his father , the release is void . And 40
Edw . 3, 22 , a future duty as a relief, & c., is not released by this word
demand , 18 Edw . 3 , fol. 26a ; and [ Fitz. Abr. ), Avowry 99 .
And on the other side it was argued by one of the inner temple ; and
as to the first point, he said , that a fine or feoffment may utterly extin
guish the said power and authority , so that the feoffor had disabled
himself to execute it when it came in esse . And therefore the case by
way of admittance is no other in effect , but that A enfeoffs B to the
use of A himself for life , and after to the use of B in tail , and after
to the use of C in fee , with proviso and liberty to revoke the uses , and
to limit new uses, if A survive B ; and afterwards A makes a feoffment ,
and after B dies ; whether A may limit new uses against his own feoff
ment is the question ; and he conceived he could not. And first he said
that a livery is of such force that it gives and excludes the feoffor not
only from a
ll present rights , but from a
ll
future rights and titles .




the curtesy in 9 Hen . 7 ,
1
b , and in the case of intruder , and recovery in a writ of deceit in 9
Hen . 7 , 24b , and in the case where the son disseised the father and
made a feoffment , in 39 Hen . 6 , 43a . And in all actions which are in a





Edw . 3 , 16 , the case of deceit , in those cases those actions are extin
guished by the feoffment o
f
the land , and yet they are collateral to the




land is demanded , but are only to reform
the erroneous proceeding , the false oath , and false return of the sheriff ,
& c . , but because b
y
a mean the possession and inheritance o
f
the land
would be also removed and devested b
y





the land , those actions are gone . So in the case at bar , although
this power to revoke the former uses and estates , and to limit a new
use is not properly any interest or right in the land , ye
t
it is a means
b
y
which the possession and right of the land shall be altered and de
vested out of a third person . Also it is clear , that a future use shall
b
e given inclusively in the livery , as 27 Hen . 8 , 29b ; and in Delamer ' s
Case Plow . Com . [ 346 ) , and then if a future right , a future action ,
which is collateral to the right of the land , and a future use , shall be
given and extinguished in the livery o
f
the land ; so it was said , shall
it be in the case at the bar . For let us examine the case by parcels , and
suppose that in the case above , the proviso had been only , that if A
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survive B that then he might revoke the former uses, without more ,
it was clear that after the said feoffment he could not revoke , for then he
would have the land again against his own feoffment , which would be
against al
l
reason and against a
ll
the books aforesaid . Then in the
case a
t
bar the proviso goes further , scil . , that he may alter , change ,
& c . ; suppose then that he had power to revoke the ancient uses , and
power to limit new uses to a stranger , how should the stranger have




the first feoffment made by the
said A for out o
f
that all the present and future uses also arise . And
so the stranger shall have this use in a manner b
y
the said A against
his own later feoffment and livery , which for the reasons aforesaid can
not be . And it was said that the book in 15 Hen . 7 , 11b [ante ) ;
which hath been cited on the other side , is not to be compared to this
case , for two reasons : One , because there the feoffees having power
to sell , as is aforesaid , made a feoffment over to the first uses , for so is
the book , and then notwithstanding their feoffment they might sell as
much as the testator could devise , and that was the use . The second




f cestuy que use , as in the case o
f
executors who have power
to sell , their vendee shall be in b
y
the testator and not b
y
them ; but in the
case a
t bar , the new cestuy que use , as hath been said before , would be
in in a manner by the feoffor ; for the feoffor in case of an estate -tail
limited in use shall be supposed donor . And as to the case in 12
Assize 41 , of error , he said , that the feoffment cannot bar him o
f
the
writ of error , because notwithstanding his feoffment he remains tenant
a
s to the demandant , and shall plead al
l
pleas which the tenant might
plead , notwithstanding that shall be received , & c . , and judgment given
against him as tenant ; wherefore upon such judgment given against
him after his feoffment he shall have a writ o
f
error ; but if
after the judgment given he makes a feoffment , he shall never have
a writ o
f




2 Assize , as hath been urged , that the feoffment doth not extin
guish it , because it is collateral to the right of the land , for then by the
same reason his feoffment after judgment given should not extinguish
it . Wherefore it seemed to him , that a fine or feoffment may extinguish
the said future power .
And o
f
such opinion , upon conference had with the Lord ANDERSON
and other justices , was WRAY , Chief Justice o
f England , and all the
court o
f king ' s bench ; that is to say , that the said power ( as well to
revoke a
s
to limit new uses ) may be utterly gone and extinguished either
b
y
a fine or a feoffment .
And as to the second point , he conceived that the said future power
might be released , for it may be resembled to a condition subsequent ,
although the performance or breach thereof cannot be done without
a
n act precedent ; as if A enfeoff B and his heirs upon condition that if
B survive C if then A o
r
his heirs pay to B his heirs or assigns 40s . ,
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that then he and h
is
heirs shall re -enter ; in that case , it is a condition
subsequent , and although it cannot b
e performed but upon a contingency ,
yet is the inheritance in him , and shall descend to his heir , and therefore
may b
e
released , and his heir by his release may b
e
barred . And there




can vouch , he ought to be impleaded , so that the voucher depends
upon an act uncertain , that is to say , that he shall be impleaded in a
real action b
y
a stranger . Yet by a release o
f
all demands , Littleton
[ $ 748 ] in his chapter o
f warranty , fol . 171 , saith , that the warranty is
extinguished , for it is an inheritance in law , and may descend to the
heir , and b
y
consequence may be released . Also if a man covenant to
d
o
a collateral act , in that case before the breach of it , a release of all
actions , suits , and quarrels , is nothing worth ; for before the breach
o
f
it there is not any duty , nor cause o
f
action , but the breach ought
to precede a
s
it was adjudged , Trinity , 4 Eliz . , Rot . 1027 , in common
bench . But in the same case a release of al
l
covenants will bar it , as it
is said in 35 Hen . 8 , Dyer 56 , 57 . For by his death the law trans
fers it to his executor , and by consequence he may release it . And 16





whereof one is tenant for life , the reversion to another in fee , and
the woman releases to him in the reversion , it is a good bar in a writ
o
f
dower against tenant for life ; and yet at the same time she had
n
o present cause o
f
action against him , but in futuro after the death of
tenant for life . So 21 Hen . 7 , 41a , a release o
f
a
n annuity to the patron
in time o
f
vacation is good , yet no action lies against him , nor against
any other till a successor be made ; and yet a release will extinguish
it . And suppose in the case at bar , that the power of revocation upon
the said contingency had been reserved to the feoffor and his heirs ,
without doubt it was an inheritance in him , and should descend to his
heirs , and b
y
consequence his release shall extinguish it ; but as to that
point , the court gave no resolution .
But it was agreed per totam Curiam , that if the power o
f
revocation
had been present , as the usual provisoes of revocation are , that it might
be extinguished by a release , made b
y
him who had such power , to any
who had an estate o
f
freehold in the land in possession , reversion , or re
mainder , and thereby the estates which were before defeasible b
y
the
proviso , are by such release made absolute .
And he moved another point , that if it was admitted , that the said
future power could not be released , yet as well the power as the proviso
and covenant might b
y
the said words o
f
defeasance be defeated ; for
both are executory , scil . , the power itself which was created by the said
covenant and proviso , which , & c . ; and a
s
the proviso and covenant itself
commenced by deed , so b
y
deed they may be annulled and defeated .
And it was said , that in al
l
cases , when anything executory is created
b
y
a deed , that the same thing by consent of al
l
persons who were parties
to the creation o
f it , might b
y
their deed be defeated and annulled .
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And therefore it was said , that warranties , recognisances , rents , charges ,
annuities , covenants , leases for years , uses at the common law , and
such like , may by a defeasance made with the mutual consent of all
those who were parties to the creation of them , be by deed annulled ,
discharged , and defeated ; for it was said , it would be strange and un
reasonable , that a thing which is created by the act of the parties , should
not by their act with their mutual consent be dissolved again .
And of such OPINION , also , was WRAY , chief justice , and the whole
court , scil.. That by the said defeasance as well the said covenant which
created the said power , as the power itself created thereby , was utterly
defeated and annulled ; and according to their resolution judgment for








SIR EDWARD CLERE ' S CASE , in King ' s Bench , Mich . , 41 & 42 Eliz . ,
A . D . 1600 — 6 Coke 17a , Moor 476 , 567 , Cro . Eliz . 877 . From Coke .
Assise b
y
Parker against Clere o
f
lands in the county o
f
Norfork .




land , each o
f equal value ,




them to the use o
f





the third acre , to the use o
f
such person and persons , and
o
f
such estate and estates as he should limit and appoint by his last
will in writing ; and afterwards , by his last will in writing , he devised
the said third acre to one in fee , under whom the plaintiff claimed .
And whether this devise was good for a
ll
the said acre o
r not , or for
two parts o
f
it , or void for the whole , was the question .
(OPINION . ] And in those cases four points were resolved b
y
POPHAM ,
Chief Justice , and Baron CLARK , justices of assize o
f
the said county ,
upon conference had with the other justices :
1 . If a man seised of lands in fee makes a feoffment in fee to the use
o
f
such person and persons , and o
f
such estate and estates as he shall




law the use doth vest in the
feoffor , and he is seised of a qualified fe
e , that is to say , till declaration
and limitation be made according to his power . See Lit . fo . 109a .
When a man makes a feoffment to the use of his will he has the use
in the meantime .
2 . If in such case the feoffor by his will limits estates according to
his power reserved to him on the feoffment , there the estates shall take
effect b
y
force of the feoffment and the use directed b
y
the will ; so that
in such case the will is but declaratory . But if in such case the feoffor
b
y
his will in writing devises the land itself , as owner of the land , with
out any reference to his authority , there it shall pass b
y
the will ; for
the testator had an estate devisable in him , and power also to limit an
use ; and he had election to pursue which o
f
them h
e would . And when
h
e devised the land itself , without any reference to his authority o
r





his will , and not to limit an use according to his authority . And in
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such case , the land being held in capite , the devise is good for two parts
and void for the third part ; for as the owner of the land he cannot dis
pose of more. And in such case the devise cannot take effect by the will
for two parts , and by the feoffment for the third part ; for he made his
devise as owner and not according to his authority , and his devise shall
be of as much validity as the will of every other owner having any land
held in capite.
3. If a man makes a feoffment in fee of lands held in capite , to the
use of his last will , although he devises the land with reference to the
feoffment , yet the will is void for the third part ; for a feoffment to the
use of his will and to the use of him and his heirs is all one .
4 . In the case at bar, when Clement Harwood had conveved two
parts to the use of his wife by act executed , he could not as owner
devise any part of the residue by his will ; so that he had no power to
devise any part thereof as owner of the land ; and because he had not
elected as in the case put before , either to limit it according to his power ,
or to devise it as owner of the land ( for in the case at bar having as
owner of the land conveyed two parts to the use of his wife as above ) ,
he could not make any devise thereof ; therefore the devise ought of
necessity to enure as a limitation of an use , or otherwise the devise shall
be utterly void . And judgment was given accordingly for the plaintiff
for the whole of the land so devised . And afterwards on the said judg
ment Sir Edward Clere brought a writ of error in the king's bench ;
but he did not prevail , but the judgment was affirmed .
YELLAND v. FICLIS , in Common Bench , Mich . term , 2 Jac. 1, A . D. 1603 —
Moore 788 .
In ejectione firmæ the case was such : One covenanted to stand seized
to the use of himself for life , with divers remainders over to others ,
some for life and others in tail, with the reversion in fee in himself ,
with general power of revocation of all uses in remainder ; and after
wards he made a lease for years to a stranger , and afterwards during the
term he revoked . The question was whether he had power to revoke
or had suspended his power of revocation by his lease , during the term .
COKE , chief justice , that he may revoke for all except the term ; and
if one make a conveyance with power to make leases and with power of
revocation , if he make a lease he may revoke for the residue . But the
doubt here is where he had no power to make leases and yet made a lease .
At last the court was divided in opinion .
" According to Roll [Abr. K , pl. 3 ] , they agreed that he could not revoke
during the lease, and it was doubted whether he could revoke even after
the lease . * * * At this day , it is quite clear , that a lease for years
granted out of the interest of the donee of the power cannot be defeated
by a subsequent exercise of the power , for the power is quoad that sus
pended . The question then is , what is the operation of the suspension ?
Does it merely postpone the estates created by the power , or does it , accord
ing to the above opinion of Roll, actually suspend the very right of execut
ing the power . It seems clear that it only postpones the vesting in posses
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sion of the estates , and that a power may be exercised though suspended ."
Sugden on Powers 52.
BEAL V. SHEPHERD , in King 's Bench , term , Mich . 5, Jac. 1, A . D . 1608
Cro . Jac. 199.
Replevin . The case was a copyholder in fee surrenders to the use
of his will , and by his will deviseth to his wife his copyhold land , " and
if she hath issue by the devisor , that the issue shall have it at his age
of 21 years ; and if the issue die before that age, or before his wife , or if
she hath no issue , that then she shall choose two attorneys, and she to
make a bill of sale of my lands to her best advantage,” & c. It was held
per curiam , that she hath those lands for life ; and she not having issue ,
hath not any interest to dispose, but hath authority by his will to nomi
nate two who shall sell , and they may make sale ; and the vendee shall
be in by the first will, and there needs not be any new surrender .
WHITLOCK ' S CASE , in the Common Pleas, Hil . 6 Jac. 1, A . D. 1609 — 8 Coke
69b .
In a replevin between John Chappel , plaintiff , and William Whit
lock , defendant , for taking of a gelding in Rings-Ash , in the county
of Devon , in a place called Cunny-Park ; the defendant avowed the
taking in the place where , & c., as in his freehold , fo
r
damage feasant .
The plaintiff in bar of the avowry pleaded , that one William Whitlock ,
the elder , was seised of a messuage , 20 acres of land , 12 acres o
f
wood ,
and 20 acres o
f
heath , in Rings - Ash aforesaid , in fee , whereof the
place where , is parcel , and demised the said tenements to one John
Bullhead for his life , by force whereof he was seized for life , the rever
sion expectant to the said William Whitlock the elder , and the said
William Whitlock the elder , 11 March , 18 Eliz . , b
y
his indenture tripar
tite , in consideration of a marriage to be solemnized between William
Whitlock the younger and Margaret , daughter of John Botler , cove
nanted and agreed b
y
the said indentures , that the said William Whit
lock the elder , before the feast of the Birth of Christ next ensuing ,
would assure and convey to Leonard Yeo and Anthony Whitlock , and
their heirs , the tenements aforesaid , to the uses , intents and purposes
expressed and declared in the said indentures , and to no other uses o
r
intents , viz . , till the said marriage , to the use o
f
the said William Whit
lock the elder , and his heirs ; and after the said marriage , to the use
o
f
William Whitlock the elder , for hi
s
life , without impeachment o
f
waste , and afterwards to the use o
f
the said William Whitlock the
younger and the heirs of his body , and afterwards to the use o
f
J . Whit
lock and his heirs : Set per eand indenturem ulterius provisum , con
cesum e
t argreatum fuit , quod liceret et licitum foret præd ' Will Whit
lock , fen . ad aliquod temp ’ extunc facere dimissionem , ( Anglice lease )
sive dimissiones , consessionem sive concessions , tam in possessione quam
in reversione de tenementis præd ' cum ' pertin ' , unde , et inter alia , sive
d
e aliqua parte inde . Proviso semper quod præd dimissio sive dimis
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siones , consessio sive concessiones non excederent super numerum trium
vitarum ad majus vel viginti et unius annorum , et ita quod super
quamlibet talem demissionem et demissiones , concessionem et conces
siones , maxime untiq ' et confueť annual reddit , herioť et servita sive
plus redderentur et reservarentur , solubil duran ' dict ' demissione sive de
missionibus , concessione , sive concessionibus : and that the said Leonard
and Anthony , and their heirs , should stand seized , & c . , to the use o
f
every such fermor , & c . , and afterwards , 18 May , 18 Eliz . , the said




8 Eliz . , William Whitlock the elder levied a fine of the tenements
aforesaid , according to the same indentures , to the uses therein con
tained , b
y
force whereof , and of the statute of uses , the said William




the said tenements ,
& c . , for his life , the remainder over , according to the said indentures .
And the said William Whitlock the elder so seized , 1 Sept . , 31 Eliz . ,
dimisit cuidam Christian ' Hearne tenem ' præď cum pertin ' unde , et
inter alia habenď et occup ' eidem Christianæ et assignať suis pro term '
9
9 annor ' plenaire complend et finiend ' , si prad ' Christiana et quid
Petr ' Rattenbury , five eorum alter , tam diu vivere contingeret : the said





said John Bullhead , reddendo et solvendo proinde annuatim post incep
tionem dicta dimissionis , prafato Will Whitlock , seu haered ' et assign '
suis et tali personæ e
t personis quib ' hæreditament praemissorum post
mortem præd ' Will Whitlock , seu de jure spectaret seu pertineret du
rante dicto termino 14 s . ad quatuor maxime usualia festa annuatim
salvendo , & c . And the plaintiff justified under the said lease , and
averred the life o
f
the said Peter Rattenbury , and that the most ancient
and accustomed yearly rents , heriots , and services , & c . , were reserved ,
& c . , upon which the avowant did demur in law .
And in this case two questions were moved . 1 . Whether William
Whitlock the elder had pursued his authority o
r
not , in making
the said lease for 99 years , determinable on the said two lives ? 2 .
Whether the said reservation of the rent was according to the said Ita
quod , & c . And as to the first , it was objected , that the authority was
distinguished , sc . , either to make a lease not exceeding the number o
f
three lives , or for 21 years , b
y
which it appears that the intention was
either to make a lease for three lives , & c . , o
r
if he would make a lease
for years , that it ought to be for 21 years ; but in the case a
t
bar , the
lease is not for three lives , & c . , nor for 21 years , but for 99 years , if
two or either o
f
them shall so long live , and so his authority not pur
sued . And if one hath power to make a lease for three lives , he cannot
make a lease for 99 years determinable upon three lives , & c . , quod fuit
concessum per totam curiam . But it was answered and resolved by the
court , that in the case a
t
bar the lease was good , and the power which





to make leases , is in the beginning absolute , affirmative , and indefinite ,
scil . to make a lease or leases , grant or grants , & c . , as well in possession
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as in reversion of the tenements , or any parcel thereof, & c., which is
without any limitation . Then the proviso of correction is added , scil.
that such lease or leases , grant or grants , shall not exceed the number of
three lives at most , or 21 years, which clause is negative , and qualifies
the generality of the first proviso ; so the power by the first is gen
eral, and by the second the lease ought not to exceed three lives, & c .
And when the lease is made for 99 years determinable upon two lives ,
it doth not exceed the number of three lives , although in truth it is not
a lease for lives . 2. The power is to make leases as well in possession
as in reversion , with the limitation aforesaid ; and in a lease for three
lives cannot be made in reversion , but a lease for years determinable
upon lives may, and the lessor himself had but a reversion expectant
on an estate for life at the time of the creation of the said power : so
that the intention of the parties was [ not ] to make a lease for years
absolutely for 21 years , but any term of years determinable upon three
lives, & c ., which is in equipage with 21 years , he well might . And the
difference was taken and agreed between a particular power affirmative ,
and a general power restrained with a negative : for it is true, that if
one hath power to make a lease for three lives , or 21 years, he cannot
make a lease for 99 , if three shall so long live, & c., but if he has power
to make any lease or grant , provided such lease or grant shall not exceed
the number of three lives , or 21 years, there he may make a lease for
99 years , if three shall so long live , for that doth not exceed the number
o
f
three lives , but in truth is less ; for every term for years , which is
but a chattel , is less in estimation of law , than an estate for life , which
is a freehold .
As to the second point , it was objected , that the said reservation was
such , that it was not payable during the said lease , as it ought , but only
during the life of the lessor ; for he having but an estate for life , re
served the rent to him and his heirs , and his heirs cannot have it ,
and the latter words , scil . to such person and persons who have the
inheritance of the premises , & c . , are merely void , for no rent can be
reserved but to the lessor , donor , o
r
feoffor , and his heirs , who are
privies in blood , and not to any who is privy in estate , as to him in re
version , remainder , & c .
But IT WAS RESOLVED , that the reservation in the case a
t
bar is good .
For the said lease hath not it
s





hath for life , but the lease hath its essence out of the said
fine , and in construction of law precedes the estate for life and all the
remainders ; for after the lease made , it is as much as if the use had
been limited originally to the lessee for the said term , and then the
other limitations in construction of law follow it : and that is the reason
that the usual clause in such indentures is , that the conusees and their
heirs shall stand seised to the use o
f
such lessees , & c . So that the lessee ,
in the case a
t
bar , derives his estate out of the estate which passed
b
y
the fine . Then , when the lessor reserves rent to him and hi
s
heirs ,




law precedes the limitations o
f
222 POWERS .
the uses, and then it being well reserved , it is well transferred to every
one to whom any use is limited . So if the reservation be to the lessor ,
and to every person to whom the inheritance or reversion of the premi
ses shall appertain during the term , that is likewise good, for the law
will distribute it to every one to whom any limitation of the use shall
be made . And in such case no rent is reserved to a stranger , for the
reservation precedes the limitation of the uses to strangers . But it
was agreed , that the most clear and sure way was to reserve rent yearly
during the term , and leave the law to make the distribution , without
an express reservation to any person . But it was resolved , that all the
said three several ways were good enough and effectual in law .
PITS v. PELHAM , in House of Lords , 22 Car . 2, A . D . 1670 - 1 Lev . 304,
2 W . Jones 25 .
A man devises lands to his wife for her life , and that after her death
the reversion shall be sold , and the money arising thereby distributed
between his heir and three nephews . The heir refuses to sell or to
join with the wife in the sale ; and on a bill exhibited in chancery
against him , to compel him to join in the sale, the bill was dismissed
by the Lord Keeper Bridgman , who held the will to be void as to the
sale of the reversion , it not being said who shall sell . But in the House
of Peers , they , on advice with the judges , reversed the dismission , and
decreed that the heir should sell ; for when no person is appointed to
sell it ought to be intended that he shall sell who has the estate, which
is the heir . See 5 Hen . 7, 12b [ 15 Hen . 7, pl. 12 ; ante ) , by Hide ,
Fenwick , and Fineux ; a devise that lands should be sold and not said
by whom , they shall be sold by the executors ; and to the same intent
when they are to be sold for payment of debts .
" As the law now stands , it seems : 1. That where a power is given to two
or more by their proper names , who are not made executors , it will not
survive without express words ; 2. That where it is given to three or more ,
generally , as to 'my trustees ,' 'my sons,' & c ., and not by their proper names ,
the authority will survive whilst the plural number remains ; 3. That where
the authority is given 'to executors ' and the will does not expressly point
to a joint exercise of it , even a single surviving executor may exercise it ;
but, 4, That where the authority is given to them nominatim , although in
the character of executors , yet it is at least doubtful whether it will sur
vive ; 5 . But where the power to executors to sell arises by implication ,
the power will equally arise to the survivor . I shall close this subject
with Sir Edward Coke ' s advice , to give the authority to the executors or the
survivors or survivor of them , or to such or so many of them as take upon
them the probate of the will, or the like.” Sugden on Powers , c. 3, sec . 2.
DIGGES' S CASE , in Queen 's Bench , Hilary term , 42 Eliz ., A . D . 1600 .
Moore 603 , S. c. 1 Coke 173 , 2 And . 205 .
A case of a monstrans de droit in the queen 's bench was thus : Chris
topher Digges exhibited in the chancery his monstrans de droit of office
found after the death of Tho . Digges , his older brother , which proved
he died seized of certain land , and that Posthumous Digges was his
son and heir within age in ward of the queen . And Christopher made
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title that one Christopher Digges , father to Thomas and of Christopher
plaintiff herein , was seized in his demesne as of fee , and by will in writ
ing devised the land to Christopher now plaintiff , and died seized in
fee , Christopher entered and was seized when Thomas disseized him
and died seized by disseizin ,, wherefore , & c. The attorney of the queen
replied in maintenance of the office , that the said Christopher the father
was seized in fee and covenanted to stand seized to the use of himself
and his wife for life, remainder to Thomas and his heirs male of his
body ; the said Christopher so seized died seized , the wife died , Thomas
entered and was seized in tail and died seized having issue Posthumous
now in ward to the queen , without this that Christopher the father died
seized in his demesne as of fee . On which issue trial was had in the
queen ’s bench and special verdict found , viz ., that Christopher the
father seized of the land in the monstrans de droit mentioned and of
other land , covenanted by indenture 10 Eliz ., to stand seized to the use
of himself and his wife for life , remainder to the said Thomas and the
heirs males of hi
s
body , remainder to the heirs males of the body o
f
Christopher the father ; provided that it should be lawful for him a
t











record , for advance
ment o
f
his children , payment of debts o
r legacies , or any other neces
sary purposes , to make void and frustrate any of the use or uses , estate
o
r





him and the three
covenantees should b





limited , and to limit new use or uses b
y
the said writing , and
that the land should be held to the new uses and no other ; after which ,
May 6 , 12 Eliz . , Christopher the father , with the three covenantees ,
b
y
deed indented and enrolled in the chancery declared that because
Christopher was in debt and ought to be enabled to sell his land to pay
his debts , they agreed that the first uses as to the land not in the mon
strans de droit contained should be void and that these should be to
Christopher and his heirs in fee simple ; after which Christopher and
the three covenantees , b
y
another deed , Sept . 20 , 13 Eliz . , indented and
enrolled in the common bench , Mich . 13 & 14 Eliz . , for payment 10001 .
debt o




the uses in the first indenture
contained all the land from the time this deed should be enrolled in
chancery should be void , and that they should be to Christopher in fee
and to no other use ; after which Christopher , Oct . 26 , 14 Eliz . , cove
nanted to levy a fine of the land to the use o
f
himself and his wife for
part and to his own heirs , and of the residue to the use of their heirs ,
which fine was levied accordingly ; and after this fine levied , the deed
dated Sept . 20 was enrolled in the chancery ; and later this Christopher
devised the land in fee tail to Christopher now plaintiff , and died in




fee , the jurors prayed the advice of the court .
And after many arguments now Trinity term , 42 Eliz . , it was ad
judged that he did not die seized in his demesne as of fe
e
. As to the
reasons o
f
which judgment the justices resolved on seven points : 1 .
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That the words in the proviso , that it shall be lawful for him at any time
during his life , & c., should be understood as from time to time during
his life, not restrained to one time in his life. 2 . That the words
any use or estate of the premises or any part thereof should well enough
mean one part at one time and another part at another time, and not
restrained to election to make revocation one act of all or any part
and no revocation afterwards of any other part. 3. That if one has
power of revocation that extends to different lands , that if he levy a
fine, or make a feoffment by which he determines his power of revoca
tion of part of the land , yet the power remains for the residue. And
this was the Case of the Earl of Salop in the court of wards , and between
Bullock and Standen in the star chamber. But of the release of a power
of revocation in part it was doubted . 4. If one has a power of revoca
tion not in esse but in the future time to come or accrue, that he by a
fine levied or feoffment made of the land extinguishes this ; as the case
between Albany and Grendon in the queen ’s bench , where Sir Richard
Knightley made a feoffment to the use of himself for life , remainder in
tail to Valentine his oldest son , remainder in tail to Edward his second
son , with power in himself to revoke if Valentine should die without
issue male ; and adjudged that by a feoffment that he made in the life
of Valentine he had extinguished the future power of revocation . 5.
That he who has power to revoke estates and no estate himself in the land
may not by fine or feoffinent or release extinguish this power , because
it is a mere authority and no interest ; as if a devise should be that
one should sell certain land , and the party authorized levies a fine or
makes a feoffment or releases all his right, yet he may afterwards sell
the land . And on the other hand , if one executes an authority in any
land given by another he does not extinguish his own interest in this ;
as if a lessee for years makes livery as attorney of the lessor . 6 . If one
has power to revoke by deed or tender or other ceremony and he executes
the ceremony , there the uses and the estates should cease without entry
or claim if the party who had the power was tenant of the freehold ;
but if he had nothing in the land it was doubted if it was not necessary
to claim , because then it is in the nature of a condition , in the other
case is a limitation . 7 . That the words being that it shall be lawful
for him by writing , & c ., to make void and frustrate should be understood
and construed that as soon as he had executed the writing the uses and
estates should be void by the law . Wherefore , in the principal case they
resolved that as to the land when the first revocation was made by writ
ing enrolled in chancery , dated May 6 , 16 Eliz., the revocation was
good and the estates theretofore created were void without entry or claim
by Christopher Digges the father , but these lands were not contained
in the monstrans de droit. Also that this revocation of part was no
impediment for him afterwards to proceed to revocation of the residue .
But as the words of the deed of Sept. 20, 13 Eliz ., appointed the uses
to be void as soon as the deed should be enrolled in chancery and not
before , then the fine of the land levied by Christopher the father before
enrollment of the said last deed of Sept . 20 in the chancery had extin
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guished the power of revocation ; wherefore Christopher the father at
the time of his death held the land for life under the first indenture
of 10 Eliz ., and not in his demesne as of fee .
SAVILE v . BLACKET, in High Court of Chancery , Hilary term , 1721. - - 1
P . Wms. 777 .
A settlement of lands was made to the use of A fo
r
9
9 years if he
should so long live , remainder to trustees during the life of A , & c . ,
remainder over , with a power to A to charge the lands with divers sums
o
f money . A , the trustees , and the remainder man in tail join in suf
fering a recovery , and declaring new uses thereof , viz . , to the use of
A for life with remainder over .
LORD CHANCELLOR [MACCLESFIELD ] : This joining of A in making
the new settlement without reserving a power to charge the premises
with the said money , has destroyed that power which A had o
f charg
ing ; for the contrary construction would enable him to defeat his own
grant . There are two sorts o
f powers , one annexed to the estate , as a
power to make leases , & c . , which is destroyed b
y parting with the estate ,
another which may be termed collateral to the estate , as this power of
charging it with money , and this last A would have had though he
should have survived the term o
f
9
9 years ; for still he might have
charged the premises therewith . So might he have done though he had
assigned over the term . But having joined in the new settlement , he
must not now derogate from his own act , or undo what he has done
before . * * *
TOLLET V . TOLLET , in Chancery Mich . term , 1728 . - 2 P . Wms . 489 , 1
White & T . Leading Cases in Eq . * 227 .








cestor , was tenant for life , with remainder to his first , & c . , son in tail
male , with power to the husband to make a jointure on his wife by deed
under his hand and seal . The husband having a wife , for whom he made
no provision , and being in the Isle - o
f
-Man , by his last will under his
hand and seal , devised part of his lands within his power to his wife for
her life .
Objection : This conveyance being b
y
a will is not warranted b
y
the
power , which directs that it should be by deed , and a will is a voluntary
conveyance , and therefore not to be aided in a court of equity .
MASTER O
F
THE ROLLS [ Sir Joseph Jekyll ] : This is a provision
for a wife who had none before , and within the same reason as a pro
vision for a child not before provided for ; and as a court o
f
equity
would , had this been the case of a copyhold devised , have supplied the
want o
f




e it either for payment of debts or provision for a wife or children
unprovided for , I shall equally supply any defect of this nature . The
difference is betwixt a non -execution and a defective execution of a
power : the latter will always be aided in equity under the circumstances
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mentioned , it being the duty of every man to pay hi
s
debts , and a hus
band o
r
father to provide for his wife o
r
child ; but this court will not
help the non -execution o
f
a power , since it is against the nature o
f
a
power , which is left to the free will and election of the party whether
to execute o
r not , for which reason equity will not say he shall execute
it , or do that for him which he does not think fit to do for himself .
And in this case , the legal estate being in trustees , they were decreed
to convey an estate to the widow for life in the lands devised to her
b
y
her husband ' s will .
While courts o
f equity will aid a defective execution of a power in favor
of widow , children , creditors , and purchasers for value ; they will not give
their aid to mere volunteers unsupported by any meritorious consideration ,
such as brothers , sisters , cousins , or illegitimate children of the donee .
Tudor v . Anson , 2 Ves . Sr . 582 ; Breit v . Yeaton , 101 ni . 242 .
ANDREWS v . EMMOT , in Chancery , 1788 . — 2 Brown C . C . 297 .
Bill in chancery b
y
Elizabeth , widow of John Andrews , to have trans
fer o
f
30001 , 3 % annuities , which upon their marriage were settled upon
trustees to pay the interest to him for life , with trusts over , and with
power in him to appoint the residue , and if he should fail to appoint




will appoint , and in default of such appointment to her execu
tors o
r
administrators . She contended that he made no appointment .
He left a will b
y





his moneys and securities for money , goods , chattels , and
personal estate , whatsoever and wheresoever , after the death of his wife ,
to the defendant . The master of the rolls found that the testator left
personal estate insufficient b
y
6611 . to pay his legacies , and without
reporting the amount he had at the time o
f making his will , decreed
for the complainant . The defendant appealed .
LORD CHANCELLOR ( THURLOW ] : I think this case does not amount
to a probable argument . With respect to the evidence , when the case
came back his Honor thought the reference immaterial ; and I think it
is so . The testator , under the settlement , was competent to make a




should remain after the death
o
f
his wife . The question is whether , in making that will , he has exe
cuted the power against his wife , whose property the fund was . It is
necessary , in order to do this , that he should , b
y
his will , notify his
intention to do it . It is too late now to expect that a testator , in order
to execute a power , shall make an express reference to it ; because it has
been determined that , if a man disposes of that over which he has a
power , in such a manner that it is impossible to impute to him any other
intention but that of executing the power , the act done shall be an exe
cution o
f
the power . But the doctrine is not carried b
y
any case further
than this , and it would be cruel to do it ; as it would be throwing the
property o
f




the instrument itself , to gather the consruction o
f
it . I do not mean
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by saying this to exclude the rule that where there is what has been
called a latent ambiguity in the will you shall not go out of the will
to explain the testator 's intention by circumstances ; but to inquire into
the testator 's situation in order from thence to gather what is probable
he meant, is a great deal beyond that . Here the testator has made a
will by which it does not appear he recollected the settlement made upon
the marriage , at least there is only one circumstance , the postponement
of the residue till after the death of his wife , by which he appears to
remember it ; for I do not rely on the argument of those who insist that
from the attestation of the will by two witnesses, he intended to execute
the power. Decree affirmed .
BAINTON v. WARD , in Chancery , 1741. — 2 Atkin 172.
By marriage settlement of George Ward he had power " by appoint
ing two trustees under any deed in his lifetime, or by will at his death ,
to charge all the wife' s estate with a sum not exceeding £2000 .” By
his will he devised £500 apiece to his two sisters . He died in debt to the
plaintiffs, and the question was whether they should have satisfaction
out of the £2000 as part of his personal estate , against this appoint
ment.
LORD CHANCELLOR (HARDWICKE ] : I am of opinion that this ought
to be considered as the personal estate of George Ward . Where there
is a general power given or reserved to a person for such uses , intents ,
and purposes as he shall appoint, this makes it his absolute estate , and
gives him such a dominion over it as will subject it to his debts. For
it would be a strange thing if volunteers , as the legatees are , should
run away with the whole , and that creditors for a valuable consideration
should si
t
down by the loss without any relief in this court . The case
o
f Shirley v . Ferrars is directly in point . This money was not settled
a
t
all , but absolutely in the power o




o doubt but his creditors must have the benefit o
f
it . Sup
posing a man has a power to dispose b
y appointment o
f
a reversion in fe
e ,
and makes no disposition o
f it , yet it shall be assets to satisfy specialty
creditors .
HOLMES v . COGHILL , in Chancery , 1802 . — 7 Ves . 499 -508 , 28 Eng . Rul .
Cas . 577 .
Bill b
y
simple contract creditors o
f
John Coghill (deceased ) against
his widow and eldest son , praying an account and payment of their
debts out o
f
his personal estate , and out o
f
any real estate liable for his
specialty debts for so much as simple contract creditors may stand in
the place o
f specialty creditors . Defendant ' s answers showed that his
personal estate were insufficient to satisfy specialty creditors ; wherefore
the general question was whether complainants could avail themselves
o
f the fund with which deceased had power by a marriage settlement o
f
1754 and under a will and under indentures of settlement executed
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by him and others in 1787 , by which he had power to charge and en
cumber the premises by deed or will with any sum not exceeding 20001 .
for such uses as he should think proper . He died in 1790 , leaving a
will made in 1775 , by which he gave 20001. to be raised under his power
to be applied towards payment of his debts , and made his wife and
others executors .
THE MASTER OF THE Rolls (Sir Wm . GRANT ) : The question in this
cause is whether the sum of 20001 . which Si
r
John Coghill had power to
raise should b
e
considered assets for his debts . The creditors contend ,
first , that he has executed the power . If he has , there is an end of the
question . If he has not , secondly , they insist that this sum is substan
tially his property , as he had an absolute power to appoint it .
As to the first point , it is clear the only power in existence at his
death was created b
y
the deed of 1787 . The power reserved b
y
the
marriage settlement was discharged for valuable consideration . That
power he had executed by his will . But the power itself being gone
before his death , the will had nothing to operate upon , unless it can
b
e applied to the new power created for appointing the same sum , to
be raised out of different estates . It is admitted he has not directly
executed the new power ; but it is said that subsequent to the creation o
f
it he executed a codicil that has the effect of republishing the will , and




the republication . Be it so . It speaks
only o
f
the power given by the marriage settlement , which was a
s much
gone as if it never had existed . There is no way in which the will
can be made to speak o
f
the new power for a new consideration affecting
different estates . I am clearly o
f






Upon the second point , there is an evident difference between a power
and a
n
absolute right in property ; not so much with regard to the party
possessing the power , a
s





it . If our attention is to be confined to the former entirely , there
is no reason why the money he has a right to raise should not be con
sidered his property as much as a debt he has a right to recover . But





the power . The compact is not to raise 20001 . abso
lutely and in a
ll
events , but that it may be raised in a certain manner ,
viz . , according to his appointment by deed or will , to be duly executed
and attested by two o
r
more witnesses . To say that without a deed o
r
will this sum shall be raised , is to subject the owner o
f
the estate to a
charge in a case in which he has never consented to bear it . The chance
that it may never be executed , or that it may not be executed in the
manner prescribed , is an advantage he secured to himself b
y
the agree
ment , and which no one has a right to take from him . In this respect
there is n
o
difference between a non -execution and a defective execution
o
f
a power . By the compact the estate ought not to be charged in either
case . It is difficult therefore to discover a sound principle for the au
thority this court assumes for aiding a defective execution in certain
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cases . If the intention of the party possessing the power is to be re
garded , and not the interest of the party to be affected by the execution ,
that intention ought to be executed , wherever it is manifested ; for the
owner of the estate has nothing to do with the purpose . To him it is
indifferent , whether it is to be executed for a creditor or a volunteer.
But if the intent of the party to be affected by the execution is to be
regarded , why in any case exercise the power except in the form and
manner prescribed . He is an absolute stranger to the equity between
the possessor of the power and the party in whose favor it is intended
to be executed . As against the debtor , it is right that he should pay ;
but what equity is there for the creditor to have the money raised out
of the estate of a third person in a case in which it was never agreed
that it should be raised ? The owner is not heard to say it will be a griev
ous burden and of no merit or utility . He is told , the case provided
for exists, it is formally right, he has nothing to do with the purpose .
But upon a defect which this court is called upon to supply he is not
permitted to resort to this argument ; and to say it is not formally right,
the case provided for does not exist , and he has nothing to do with
the purpose. In the sort of equity upon this subject there is some want
of equality . But the rule is perfectly settled , and though perhaps with
some violation of principle , with no practical inconvenience . But further
than supplying a defect in the execution the court has never gone . In
Lassells v . Lord Cornwallis , 2 Vern . 465 , the lord keeper says that " the
court has not gone so far as, where a man has a power to raise money ,
if he neglect to execute that power , to do it for him ; although he thought
it might be reasonable enough and agreeable to equity in favor of cred
itors."
At the opening I was strongly impressed with an idea that there was
no authority for the proposition contended for by the creditors . None
was adduced except some generality of expression in Atkins 's statement
of the judgment in Bainton v. Ward [ above ). There is no such general
proposition necessary to the decision of that case , for the whole sum
was appointed ; in which particular the statement is more correct as
introduced ( 2 Ves. 2 ) in the report of Lord Townshend v . Windham :
and there Lord Hardwicke lays it down expressly that without an ap
pointment no person could be entitled to the money , though the power
was as large as in this instance . It was argued that because the court
will for creditors lay hold of the money when it is appointed for a volun
teer, the court ought to lay hold of it for them though there is no ap
pointment ; for in the former case the application is against his inten
tion . But in the given case the money is already raised by a due exe
cution of the power ; and the court only directs the application . It
does not follow that by it
s
own act it shall charge the estate when
the power is not executed nor attempted to be executed . Many of the
cases cited determine only that a limited gift to a man with power to
dispose o
f
the thing given will carry the ownership . But there is no
doubt this is a power in the proper sense o
f
the word ; and the power
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not having been executed , I am of opinion the money cannot be raised .
This decision was affirmed upon appeal by Lord Chancellor Erskine,
reported in 12 Ves . 206 .
" There is such flagrant injustice in applying the bounty of a testator to
the benefit of those for whom it was not intended , that the mind revolts
from it . An appointee derives the title immediately from the donor of
the power , by the instrument in which it was created ; and consequently not
under but paramount to the appointor by whom it was executed ; by reason
of which it is impossible to conceive that the appointor 's creditors have an
equity . A man who is employed to manage the conduit pipe of another 's
munificence is authorized by a general power of disposal to turn the stream
of it to any person or point within the compass of his discretion ; and his
creditors have no right in justice or reason to control him performing his
function , because it was not assigned to him as their trustee . It is the
bounty of the testator , and not the property of his steward , that is to be
dispensed ." Per Gibson , C . J ., in Commonwealth v. Duffeld , 12 Pa . St . 277 .
In Wales v . Bowdish ( 1889 ) , 61 Vt. 23 , 17 Atl. 1000 , a bill in equity by
creditors whose claims existed when the power was given , was dismissed
when filed after the donee of the use for life with power as to the residue
had exercised the power by devise to his wife and died . The creditors have
no claim at law in such a case . Brandies v . Cochrane ( 1884 ) , 112 U . S.
352 , 5 S. Ct. 194 .
When the donee of the power has exercised it in favor of volunteers ,
courts of equity have frequently held the appointee as a trustee for creditors
of the donee of the power or that the fund is assets liable to his creditors .
Patterson v. Lawrence , 83 Ga . 703 , 10 S. E . 355 , if no sufficient other assets ;
Clapp v. Ingraham , 126 Mass . 200 ; Johnson v. Cushing , 15 N . Ham . 298 ,
41 Am . Dec . 694 ; Smith v. Garey, 2 Dev . & B . ( N . Car. ) 42 ; Freeman v.
Butters , 94 Va . 406 , 26 S. E . 845 .
Statute of New York , Mich ., & c . “ Every special and beneficial power is
liable in equity to the claims of creditors , in the same manner as other inter
ests that cannot be reached by execution at law , and the execution of the
power may be decreed for the benefit of the creditors entitled .” N . Y . R . S.
( 1828 ) , pt . 2, c. 1, t. 2, Art . 3, 893 ; Mich . R . S . ( 1846 ) , c . 64 , C . L . ( 1897 ) ,
$ 8887 ; Minn . St. ( 1858 ) , c. 34 , $ 32 , St . ( 1905 ) , $ 3297 ; Wis . R . S. (1849 ) , c .
58, § 32 , St. ( 1898 ) , § 2131 .
GROSVENOR v. BOWEN , în R . I. Sup. Ct., July 2, 1887 . - 15 R . I. 519 , 10
Atl . 589.
DURFEE , C. J . This is a suit by the complainants , claiming to be
owners of a lot of land in East Providence , to enforce the specific per
formance of a contract with them by the defendant for the purchase
of said lot. The suit is amicable , the defendant being willing to per
form his contract if the complainants can make a good title in fee -simple .
The bill, which is demurred to , sets forth the title as follows , to -wit :
The estate formerly belonged in fee -simple to Rosa Ann Grosvenor ,
who died intestate, leaving five children , who inherited it subject to the
curtesy of her surviving husband . One of said children died intestate,
without issue , so that hi
s
share descended to the others . Another of
said children , to -wit , Alice G . Mason , wife o
f
John G . Mason , died
later , leaving a will b
y
which she devised all of her real estate which
she inherited from her mother to said John for life , and upon his decease
to such person o















e might by his last will and testament name , limit , and appoint , and ,
in default o
f
such appointment , to her own heirs a
t
law . The heirs at
law o
f Mrs . Mason are William Grosvenor , Jr . , Rosa Ann Grosvenor ,
and James B . M . Grosvenor , who , together with illia rosvenor ,
surviving husband o
f
Rosa Ann rosvenor , deceased , and said John G .
Mason , devisee for life under the will of said Alice , are the parties
complainant in this suit . The entire estate is in them , if those of them
who are the heirs a
t
law o
f Mrs . Mason took vested remainders under
her will ; no question being made but that the interest inherited b
y
Mrs .
Mason from her deceased brother descended upon her death to her sur
viving brothers and sisters ; and therefore they can make a clear title
to the defendant if John G . Mason , devisee for life and donee of the
power o
f appointment under the will , can release the power , or can
extinguish it b
y
joining with the other owners in a conveyance o
f
the
lot in fee -simple .
Upon the question whether estates limited in default o
f appointment
are to be considered a
s
vested o
r contingent during the continuance o
f
the power , there has been some diversity o
f
decision . In Lovies ' Case ,
1
0 Coke 78 , decided in A . D . 1614 , and in Walpole v . Conway , Barnard .
153 , decided in A . D . 1740 , such remainders were held to be contingent ;
but later , in Cunningham v . Moody , 1 Ves . Sr . 174 ( A . D . 1748 ) , they





power ; and in Willis v . Martin , 4 Term . R . 39 , the latter view was
affirmed after great consideration upon elaborate arguments ; and Chan
cellor Kent says : “ The doctrine is now definitely settled , and it applies
equally to personal estate . ” 4 Kent , Comm . 324 ; also Osbrey v . Bury ,










power given to John G . Mason .
We think it was competent for John G . Mason to release the power
to the tenants in remainder , or to extinguish it by joining with the
other complainants in remainder , in a deed conveying the bargained lot to
the defendant in fee -simple , and therein releasing the power to him .
" Powers relating to land , ” says Mr . Cruise , “ whether appendant or in
gross , may be destroyed b
y
a release to any person having an estate of a
freehold in possession , remainder , or reversion in the lands to which the
power relates ; for where powers are given to a person having an estate or
interest , either present o
r




f property advantageous to him ; and there is no
reason why he should not be allowed to part with o
r
exclude himself
from the benefit o
f
it . ” 4 Greenl . Cruise , c . 19 , § 4 , citing Digges '
Case , 1 Coke 174a . See , also , Albany ' s Case , 1 Coke 110b . The power
held b
y
Mason is a power in gross . Mr . Sugden says : “ A present power ,
not simply collateral , may be extinguished b
y
release to any one who
has an estate o
f
freehold in the land in possession , reversion , or re




the power are b
y
such release made absolute . ” Sugd . Power ,
8
7 ; citing Albany ' s Case , 1 Coke 110b , and 1 Inst . 265b . Of course ,
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if the life-tenant , having the power , can release it to the tenant in re
mainder , he can also release it to the latter 's grantee ; and if he can
do this there is no reason why he cannot join with the tenant or tenants
in remainder in a deed conveying the entire estate , and therein release
the power to the grantee . De Wolf v . Gardiner , 9 R . I. 145 .
In West v . Berney , 1 Russ . & M . 431, decided in 1819 , the vice -chan
cellor, Sir John LEACH , reviews the precedents ; and on the strength
of Albany 's Case and Leigh v . Winter , W . Jones , 411 , decides that such
a power can be released by the donee who is tenant for life , where he
himself is the grantor or settlor of the estate , and expresses his opinion
that it may equally be released if he is grantee simply “ because his re
lease must be to him who takes subject to the power, and the exercise
of the power would be inconsistent with the release , which is a species
of conveyance affecting the land .” Ile also held that such a power is
not a trust , even when it is to appoint particular persons, as children ;
it being optional with the donee to exercise it or not . And see King y .
Melling, 1 Vent. 225 ; Smith v . Death , 5 Madd. 371.
In IIorner v. Swann , 1 Turn . & R . 430 , an estate was devised to A .
for life, and , after her death , to such of the testator 's children living
at his death as A . should appoint, and , in default of appointment , to
the children equally , with survivorship in case of any dying under 21 .
A . and the three surviving children , all over 21 , contracted to sell the
devised estate , and upon a bill for specific performance the question was
whether the power could be released or extinguished ; and Sir Thomas
Plummer , M . R ., decreed specific performance . See , also, Osbrey v.
Bury , 1 Ball & B . 53 ; 4 Kent , Com . 317 .
We think the complainants are entitled to specific performance .
BROWN v. PHILLIPS , in R . I. Sup . Ct ., Aug . 17, 1889. - 16 R . I. 612 , 18
Atl. 249 .
STINESS , J . John Kelton devised his entire estate to his wife Sally
Kelton for life , with power to sell so much and such parts of the same
from time to time as she might think necessary for her comfortable sup
port . After his death Sally Kelton made a deed of the estate to Herbert
B . Wood in trust that he should manage the same , and from the income
or proceeds of sale thereof pay the cost and expenses of her care and
support ; no other reference than by this provision being made to the
power under which she might sell. In Phillips v. Wood , 16 R . I. 274 ,
15 Atl. 88 , this court held that the power was personal , and not assign
able ; that she only had authority to sell what was necessary for her
comfortable support , and that she could not transfer the estate , with
that discretionary power, to another . Consequently the trustee took
only what the grantor had the right to convey , outside of the power ,
which was her life - estate . Wood then held the legal title to her life
estate , and she had the equitable , beneficial interest therein . After
this decision , Mrs. Kelton made another deed to Wood of all her right,



























h to convey the
estate
whatever being made to her power to sell under the will for her support .
In Phillips v . Brown , 16 R . I . 279 , 15 Atl . 90 , this court held that
this second deed , in the absence o
f
any reference to the power and of
anything to show an intention to act under it , operated only to convey
the interest she then had in the estate , which was her equitable estate
for life . Mrs . Kelton died in August , 1887 . The complainant , to whom
Wood conveyed a part o
f
the estate , now seeks to have the second deed
o
f Mrs . Kelton to Wood reformed , upon the ground that . Kelton
intended b
y
that deed to convey t st te in execution o
f
the power ,
and that by the deed was so drawn that it failed to express her
true intent . The defendant Phillips , residuary legatee under the will o
f
John Kelton , demurs to the bill . The question , then , is whether the case
stated entitles the complainant to relief . It may well be questioned
whether , if the deed should be reformed so as to express an intention
to convey the property under the power , it would show a compliance
with the power . The bill does not set forth a sale o
f
the property to
provide for Mrs . Kelton ' s support , but a simple conveyance " for one
dollar and other good and valuable consideration . ” We may assume that










n agreement is a very different thing from selling so much
thereof as may be necessary for her support . However , as this point
has not been taken , nor argued , we pass it b
y
and consider the case as
presented .
It is well settled , as the complainant claims , that a court o
f equity
will aid the defective execution o
f
a power ; but , as stated in the leading
case o
f
Tollet v . Tollet , 2 P . Wms . 489 , 1 White & T . Lead . Cas . * 227 ,
* 228 [ ante - ] , there is a difference between a non -execution and a
defective execution o
f
a power . The " court will not help the non -execu
tion o
f
a power , since it is against the nature of a power , which is left
to the free will and election of a party whether to execute or not ; for
which reason equity will not say he shall execute it , or do that for him
which he does not think fit to do himself . ” In order to sustain the
execution o
f
a power the instrument must , at least , show an intention
o
r attempt to execute it . This may appear when the instrument would
otherwise be inoperative , o
r
when the reference to the subject o
f
the
power is such a
s
to manifest the intention ; but the non -execution of a
power cannot be aided by proof of an intention to execute . Wilkinson v .
Getty , 13 Iowa 157 ; Garth v . Townsend , L . R . 7 E
q
. 220 ; Foos v . Scarf ,
5
5 Md . 301 ; Mitchell v . Denson , 29 Ala . 327 . Mrs . Kelton ' s deed makes
n
o
reference to the power , nor to the subject o
f




the estate which she could sell under it , as distinct from her
life -estate . Nor was the deed inoperative without the aid o
f
the power .
Nothing appears in it to show an intent to convey anything beyond her
own interest . It is like the will in Andrews v . Emmet , 2 Brown , Ch .
297 [ante - ) , which Lord ALVANLEY , in Hales v . Margerum , 3 Ves .
299 , 301 , called a leading case upon this point . There , after saying the
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power need not be recited in express terms, but that the intent must
appear by some kind of reference to the power, the court added : “ But
the testator has not described anything ; all his expressions will refer
to his own property .” The recent case of Patterson v . Wilson , 64 Md .
193 , 1 Atl. 68 , gives a careful review of this subject. It was held , as
the will in question contained no reference to the power nor to the sub
ject on which the power was to operate , and as it was not denied that the




the power , and could not be regarded as an execution o
f
the
power . See , also , Bingham ' s Appeal , 64 Pa . St . 345 ; Lippincott v .
Stokes , 6 N . J . Eq . 122 . Our conclusion is that , as Mrs . Kelton did
not expressly undertake to act under the power , nor manifest an inten
tion or attempt so to d
o , but made a deed which , by its terms , was oper
ative only upon her own interest in the property , the bill presents a
case o
f
non -execution simply , which the court cannot aid . The demurrer
to the bill must be sustained .
VERNOR v . COVILLE , in Mich . Sup . Ct . , June 25 , 1884 . – 54 Mich . 281 ,
2
0
N . W . 7
5 .
Action on the common counts in assumpsit b
y
Benjamin Vernor as
trustee and indorsee to recover on a note for $ 598 . 25 given b
y
A . M .
Coville & Co . , as part o
f
the purchase price under a contract between
John Webster to buy and John G . Rumney , as executor o
f
the will of





ing clause in her will : “ I hereby nominate and appoint my son John
G . Rumney and my friend Guy F . Hinchman the executors of this my
last will and testament , with full power and authority to sell and convey
any real estate o
f
which I shall die seized . ” Hinchman refused to qual
ify , and Rumney had continually acted as sole executor . Defendants
pleaded the general issue and gave notice to several intended defenses .
The trial below resulted in judgment for defendants and plaintiff ap
pealed .
SHERWOOD , J . * * * It is claimed by counsel for the defendants
that the power was not conferred upon John Rumney alone , under the
will , to make the sale o
f
the homestead property in the contract hereto
fore given , contemplated , and that his letters of administration give
him no additional power for that purpose ; that the power attempted
to b
e




both persons named in the will
a
s
executors ; and that no sale of real estate could be made b
y
Rumney
alone , except as authorized by the judge o
f probate ; and that the con
tract which was the consideration o
f
Webster ' s indorsement , and which
gave the plaintiff his right to the custody of the note , was therefore
void , and the plaintiff could not recover . This point raised the only
question we deem it necessary to consider , and , adopting the counsel ' s
premises , the condition to which he arrives necessarily follows . The
question raised is one o
f
much importance to the people o
f
our state .
When the case was before this court before , this question was not finally
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determined , the proper party plaintiff not then being before the court.
The solution of the question depends upon the proper construction of
the will, and the statutes relating to the subject . The language of the
will under which the executor claims to derive his authority is plain
and explicit , and it must be construed the same as though the pro
visions of the statute relating thereto and applicable were written in
the instrument , as they necessarily constitute a part thereof , and it must
be regarded as having been made with reference thereto .
The power of the executor to make sale of the real estate , and the
contract of the sale thereof , which we are now considering , is given by
the will , if at all , and is not derived from any authority conferred by the
judge of probate . It is very clear, from the terms of the will , that
Mrs . Rumney had great confidence in the persons named as her execu
tors, as they were charged with important discretionary duties , and the
exercise of much discrimination and judgment in the disposition , man
agement , and control of the property designed for the children , of the
most difficult and delicate character . And, in such a case , nothing but
imperative duty can ever excuse a court in disturbing or interfering with
the action taken by the executors. No question is or can be made about
the power of both persons named as executors to do the act in question ,
had both consented to serve , and qualified . Hinchman renounced the
trust , and refused to qualify . His relation to the will and the trust
was thereby rendered the same as though he had died . Could the re
maining executor execute the powers and trust created under the will ,
when there was no express provision authorizing one of the executors
so to do , in case of the death of the other , or his failure to qualify ?
There is no question but that one, under such circumstances , may exercise
the powers and discharge the duties conferred upon both , in the man
agement and disposition of the personal estate , and bind al
l
persons
interested therein . Dyer , 23 ; Vern . Abr . 271 ; Bac . Abr . D , 1 ; 2 Wil
liams , Ex ’ rs , 810 ; Jacomb v . Harwood , 2 Ves . 267 ; Wheeler v . Wheeler ,
9 Cow . 34 ; Bogert v . Hertell , 4 Hill , 492 , 503 ; Weir v .Mosher , 19 Wis .
311 ; Herald v . Harper , 8 Blackf . 170 ; Dominick v . Michael , 4 Sandf .
374 ; Boughton v . Flint , 13 Hun , 206 . Co -executors and co - adminis
trators are regarded , in law , as but one person , and acts done b
y
one
are deemed the acts o
f
all in all matters relating to the personal estate .
One may execute a valid release o
f
a debt . Murray v . Blatchford , 1
Wend . 583 . Hemay discharge a mortgage (People v . Keyser , 28 N . Y .
226 ) ; may make an assignment o
f
a mortgage (Cronin v . Hazeltine ,




r more administrators was not void , and not subject to attack in col
lateral proceedings . Osman v . Tra p
l agen , 23 Mich . 80 .
It is claimed by plaintiff ' s counsel that the following provision of
our statute (see How . St . § 5844 ) , if the power did not exist a
t
common
law , gives full authority to the one executor in this case to make valid
sale o
f
the real estate o
f
the deceased , and authorized him to make the
contract in question . The statute reads a
s follows : "When all the
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executors appointed in any will shall not be authorized , according to the
provisions of this chapter , to act as such , such as are authorized shall
have the same authority to perform every act and discharge every trust
required and allowed by the will ; and their acts shall be as valid and
effectual for every purpose as if all were authorized and should act to
gether ; and administrators with the will annexed shall have the same
authority to perform every act and discharge every trust as the executor
named in the will would have had , and their acts shall be as valid and
effectual for every purpose.”
I think this provision clearly authorizes the executor in this case to
sell the real estate of the deceased mentioned in the will, and to make
the contract for the sale thereof , to secure the performance of which the
deposit of the note in question and its indorsement was made . Not only
is the sale authorized , but the designation of the person and his power
to make it are derived solely from the will. The probate of the will
and letters testamentary furnish no more than the evidence of the ex
istence of these things , and not the authority for doing them .
I think it may well be doubted whether the provisions of our statute ,
or that of 21 llen . VIII, c. 4, so far as it relates to executors , is any
thing more than confirmatory of the common law upon this subject .
Bonifant v. Greenfield , 1 Cro . 80 ; Co . Litt . 113a . Whether this be so
or not , it is quite certain that the spirit of the law requires that the in
tention of the testator, as expressed in his will, should be carried out.
This could be as well accomplished , usually , by one person as by more ;
and whatever number may be selected , they are all supposed to be chosen
with special reference to their qualifications for the position , and to be
prepared to act in accordance with the views and desires of the testator
concerning the execution of the trust ; and however large the number
may be, each is vested with all the powers of the others , and all are
required to perform the same duty or duties , and in the discharge of
them they act as an individual. But life and ability to act are always
uncertain . That the testator may always have some person of his own
choosing to execute his will, in case of the death or inability of the others
to act, is undoubtedly the principal object of appointing two or more
executors , and to hold that the inability of one thus appointed to act, or
his neglect to qualify , disqualifies the others , it seems to me would mani
festly be against the intention of the testator , and the true spirit of his
will , and defeat the very object he had in view in making the appoint
ment. To remove all doubt upon the subject, and secure the construc
tion here contended for , seems to have been the object of the statute
upon the subject both in England and this country .
It would in my judgment be a perversion of the true intention and
meaning of the statute , and do violence to what I believe to have been
for a long time the accepted interpretation of the law by the profession
generally in our state , to hold otherwise . It is possible , and , I think ,
quite probable , that were we to give the statute the construction claimed













purchased in entire good faith , and now quietly enjoyed , might become
unsettled , and all the evil consequences usually accompanying such ac
tions b
y
the courts would follow .
It seems to me there is no sufficient reason for , nor does public policy
require , such a construction of the law , nd it ought not to be given b
y
this court . The following authorities may be examined with profit in
examining the question raised in this case : Bonifaut v . Greenfield , 1 Cro .
8
0 ; Dike v . Ricks , 4 Cro . C . 335 ; 1 Sugd . Pow . (6th Lond Ed . ) 143 ,
144 ; Pitt v . Pelham , Ch . Cas . 178 ; Wardwell v . McDowell , 31 Ill . 364 ;
Clinefelter v . Ayres , 16 Ill . 329 ; S . C . 20 Ill . 463 ; - Conklin v . Edgerton ,
2
1 Wend . 430 ; Roseboom v . Mosher , 2 Denio , 61 ; Wills v . Cowper , 2
Ham . 124 ; Powell , Devises , 196 , 197 ; Judson v . Gibson , 5 Wend . 224 .
I think the executor in this case had the power to make sale of the
homestead property o
f
the Rumney estate , and the contract made there
for , and that the indorsement and transfer of the note in question were
not without consideration , and must be held valid .
It is unnecessary to consider the case further . This disposition of
the main question raised , renders it necessary to reverse the judgment ,
and a new trial must be granted .
CAMPBELL and CHAMPLIN , JJ . , concurred .
COOLEY , C . J . The question in this case arises under the statute ,
which provides that “ when al
l
the executors appointed in any will shali
not be authorized , according to the provisions of this chapter , to act as
such , such as are authorized shall have the same authority to perform
every act and perform every trust required and allowed b
y
the will ,
and their acts shall be as valid and effectual for every purpose as if a
ll
were authorized and should act together ; and administrators with the
will annexed shall have the same authority to perform every act and
discharge every trust as the executors named in the will would have
had , and their acts shall be as valid and effectual for every purpose . "
How . S
t
. § 5814 . Another statute provides that “ when a power is vested
in several persons , all must unite in its execution ; but if , previous to
such execution , one or more of such persons shall die , the power may be
executed b
y
the survivor or survivors . ” Id . § 5628 .
In this case two executors were named in the will , one o
f
whom de
clined to qualify , but is still living . The other qualified and acted .
The question discussed in the case was whether it was competent for
him alone to execute , not for purposes of administration , and long after
the time for the settlement of the estate had expired , a power which ,
b
y
the will , was conferred upon both . It is an interesting and important
question , and was ably argued , but it is not discussed in the opinion
o
f Mr . Justice SHERWOOD , which treats the case as if the power had
been executed a
s
a step in administration . No one has ever doubted ,
so far as I know , that for administrative purposes the acting executor
might execute such a power , and no authority beyond the statute itself




execution . Whether a case like the pres
ent is within the intent o
f
the statute first recited is quite a different
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question , which I do not discuss, because the prevailing opinion in the
case avoids any mention of it .
CARTER V. SLOCOMB , in N . Car. Sup. Ct., April 5, 1898 . — 122 N . Car.
475 , 65 Am . St. Rep . 714 , 29 S. E . 72
0
.
Action to set aside a sale made under a power in a mortgage . Judg
ment fo
r
the plaintiff . Defendant appeals .
FAIRCLOTH , C . J . The sole question presented is whether a sale of
land b
y
a mortgagee , under a power o
f
sale in a mortgage , made after
the death o
f
the mortgagor , without notice to the heir , conveys a good




the mortgagor the power of sale
ceases and becomes inefficacious . In his state , when a mortgage is exe
cuted , the mortgagee becomes the legal , and the mortgagor the equit
able , owner ; and until the day o
f
redemption is past the mortgagor has
a legal right , and afterwards an equity of redemption . Hemphill v .
Ross , 66 N . C . 477 . No question o
f
fraud enters into the controversy ,
nor any a
s
to the amount o
f
the mortgage debt . The mortgagor cannot
demand any notice o
f
intention to sell under the power , and the heir
a
t
law stands in the place o
f
his ancestor . Carver v . Brady , 104 N . C .
219 , 10 S . E . 565 ; Fraser v . Bean , 96 N . C . 327 , 2 S . E . 159 . The gen
eral rule is that a power ceases with the life of the person giving it ;
but where the power is coupled with an interest , it survives the life o
f
the person giving it , and may be executed after his death . By a “ power
coupled with a
n interest ” is meant an interest in the thing itself ; that
is to say , the power must be ingrafted on the estate in the thing , and
not o
n the product of the exercise o
f
the power . Hunt v . Rousmanier ' s








the mortgagor . 8 Am . & Eng . Enc .
Law , 875 ; Cranston v . Crane , 93 Am . Dec . 106 . " The death o
f
the
mortgagor does not revoke a power o
f
sale . ” 2 Jones Mortgages , § 1792 ,
and cases cited . “ In those states where the common law rule prevails ,
that such a power is coupled with an interest , the death or bankruptcy
o
f
the mortgagor does not revoke or suspend the power o
f
the legal
holder to sell under the power , as the power is coupled with an irrevoca
b
le interest , and cannot be revoked ; but in those states where this power
is not coupled with an interest , the rule is different . ” 2 Pingree Mort
gages , § 1336 . The principle here announced is fully recognized in
Parker v . Beasley , 116 N . C . 1 , 21 S . E . 955 , and other cases b
y
this
court . Upon these authorities we find that there was error in the judg
ment below . Error . Reversed .
This case is cited in an extended review o
f
the decisions to the same effect
on this point in Frank v . Colonial & U . S . Mortgage Co . (1905 ) , 86 Miss .
103 , 70 L . R . A . 135 , 38 So . 340 . " In a deed to secure a debt which passes
title , the power is coupled with an interest and is not revoked by the death
of the maker . In a mere mortgage it is otherwise . " Baggett v . Edwards
( 1906 ) , 126 Ga . 463 , 55 S . E . 250 .
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LANE v. LANE , in Del. Sup . Ct., June 16 , 1903 . - 4 Penn . 368, 55 Atl. 184 ,
64 L . R . A . 849 , 103 Am . St. Rep . 122 .
Bill in chancery by Fannie Lane as administratrix of Jesse Lane
against Martin Lane as trustee and others, for an accounting . The
question was whether by his will devising and bequeathing " all my estate ,
real and personal, of whatever kind and wheresoever situate ,” to said
Martin Lane as trustee, Augustin Lane had executed the following
power given him by the will of said Jesse Lane : “ And upon his de
cease , then in trust to dispose of said principal sum of $50 ,000 in such
manner as my said son Augustin by his last will and testament, or by
any writing executed as such , shall direct and appoint ;" the fund being
given by the will of Jesse to a trustee to pay the income to Augustin in
person during his life. From decree for plaintiff , defendants appeal.
SPRUANCE , J . * * * The question for our determination is
whether , by the will of Augustin S . Lane, there was a valid execution
of the power of appointment given to him by the said eighth item of the
will of his father , Jesse Lane , the elder . If there was not , then under
the will of Jesse Lane, the elder , upon the death of Augustin S . Lane ,
his son and only surviving issue , Jesse Lane , Jr., became entitled abso
lutely to the trust fund , and his administratrix , the complainant below ,
is entitled to recover the same , with the accrued interest and income
thereof . The rules of the common law applicable to this case have
been quite well established b
y
numerous decisions in England and in this
country .
In Parker v . Kett . 12 Mod . 469 , decided in 1701 , it was said by the
court : “ When one has an authority , and does an act which can be
good no other way but by virtue and in pursuance of that authority , it




his authority , than
void , though in doing the act he takes no notice of his authority ; but
where one has an interest and an authority together , and he does an
act generally , it shall be construed in relation to his interest , and not
to his authority . ”
Andrew ' s v . Emmot , 2 Bro . Ch . 297 , is a leading case upon this sub
ject . By a marriage settlement certain bank annuities were conveyed
to trustees in trust for certain purposes , and in trust , after the decease
o
f
John Andrews and his wife , if there should be no child , to transfer
the trust fund to such persons as the said John Andrews should b
y
deed o
r will appoint . John Andrews b
y
h
is will , after giving sundry
legacies , bequeathed , after the death o
f
his wife , "all the rest and residue
o
f
his monies , and securities for money , goods , chattels , and personal
estates , whatsoever and wheresoever , and o
f




soever , to John Emmot . ” The Master of Rolls , after quoting the
above citation from Parker v . Kett , said : “ If one applies this doctrine
to the present case , the testator has not referred to the power , but has




which he could dispose .
* * * The testator has not described anything . All his expressions
will refer to his own property . ” Held , that the will o
f John Andrews
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was not an execution of the power . Upon appeal the decree below was
affirmed ; the Lord Chancellor , holding that the power was not executed
by the will of John Andrews , saying : “ It is necessary , in order to do
this, that he should , by his will, notify his intention to do it ſexecute
the power ) . It is too late now to expect that a testator , in order to exe
cute a power, should make an express reference to it, because it has
been determined that , if a man disposes of that over which he has a
power in such manner that it is impossible to impute to him any other
intention but that of executing the power , the act shall be an execution
of the power . "
In Roach v . Haynes (1803) , 8 Ves. Jr. 581 , Lord Chancellor Eldon
held that a power of appointment was not executed by a general bequest
of property described as “ my estate and effects " ; that such a bequest
could pass only that in which the testator had an interest , and not that
as to which she had merely an authority to appoint.
In Bradley v. Westcott ( 1807 ) , 13 Ves . Jr. 445 , Sir William Grant ,
Master of Rolls , decided that a power of appointment was not executed
by a request of “ a
ll my personal estate , money , securities for money ,
goods , chattels , and effects , whatsoever and wheresoever , and of what
nature , kind , o
r quality soever , and all my estate and interest therein , "




the same effect are Lovell v . Knight ( 1829 ) , 3 Sim . 275 , and
Lem priere v . Valfy , 5 Sim . 108 .
In Denn v . Roake ( 1830 ) , 6 Bing . 475 , Alexander , C . B . , in deliv
ering to the House o
f Lords the unanimous opinion of the judges that
the will of one Sarah Trymer did not operate as an execution o
f
her
power to dispose o
f
certain real estate b
y
her will , said : “ There are
many cases upon this subject , and there is hardly any subject upon
which the principles appear to have been stated with more uniformity
o
r
acted upon with more consistency . They begin with Si
r
Edward
Clere ' s Case in the reign of Queen Elizabeth , to be found in the Sixth
Report , and are continued down to the present time ; and I venture to
say that in no instance has a power or authority been considered a
s
executed , unless b
y
some reference to the power or authority , or to the
property which was the subject o
f it , or unless the provision made b
y
the person intrusted with the power would have been ineffectual - would




r authority . In this case there is no reference to
the power , there is no reference to the subject o
f
the power , and there is
sufficient estate to answer the devise without calling in the aid o
f
the
undivided moiety now in question . * * * It is said that the present
is a question o
f
intention , and so , perhaps , it is . But there are many
cases o
f
intention , where the rules b
y
which the intention is to b
e
ascer
tained are fixed and settled . It would be extremely dangerous to depart
from these rules in favor o
f
loose speculation respecting intention in a
particular case . It is , therefore , that the wisest judges have thought
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proper to adhere to the rules I have mentioned , in opposition to what
they evidently thought the probable intention in the particular case be
fore them .”
Sir Edward Sugden , in his admirable work on Powers (vol. 1 , p . 385 ) ,
uses this language : “ It is firmly settled that a mere general devise
or bequest , however unlimited in terms, will not comprehend the subject
of the power , unless it refer to the subject , or to the power itself , or
generally to any power vested in the testator."
The rules of the common law in respect to the execution of powers
were changed by St. 1 Vict ., c . 26 , $ 27 , passed in 1837 , which provided
that a general devise of the real estate of the testator should be con
strued to include a
ll
real estate over which such testator may have had
a power o
f appointment , and should operate as the execution of such
power , unless a contrary intention should appear b
y
the will , and that a
bequest o
f personal estate in like general words should operate a
s
the
execution of such power under similar circumstances .
The leading American case is Blagge v . Miles ( 1841 ) , 1 Story , 426 ,
Fed Cas . No . 1 ,479 , in which Judge Story says : “ It is now admitted
to b
e
established , as the general rule , that the intention o
f
the testator
is the pole star to direct the court in the interpretation o
f wills . * * *
Similar doctrines now generally prevail in regard to the execution of
powers , and especially in regard to their execution b
y
last will and testa
ment . * * * The intention to execute the power must be apparent
and clear , so that the transaction is not fairly susceptible o
f any other
interpretation . If it be doubtful , under al
l
the circumstances , then
that doubt will prevent it from being decreed an execution of the power .
* * * Three classes o
f






f the power : ( 1 ) Where there has been
some reference in the will , or other instrument , to the power ; ( 2 ) or
a reference to the property , which is the subject on which it is to be
executed ; ( 3 ) o
r





the power , would otherwise be ineffctual , or a
mere nullity — in other words , it would have no operation , except as an
execution o
f
the power . ”





the United States in Blake v . Hawkins , 98 U . S . 315 , 396 , 25
L . Ed . 139 , and Lee v . Simpson , 134 U . S . 572 , 590 , 10 Sup . Ct . 631 ,
3
3
L . Ed . 1038 . In many of the states the common law rules as to
the execution o
f powers have been altered b
y
statute similar to that of
S
t . 1 Vict . ; but , where not so altered , with very few exceptions , said
rules appear to be in force in this country .
In Maryland a statute of this character was adopted in 1888 ; but
prior to that time it was uniformly held that the intention to execute a
power o
f appointment by will must appear b
y
a reference in the will
to the power , or to the subject of it , or from the fact that the will would
b
e inoperative without the aid of the power . Mory v . Michael ( 1861 ) ,
1
8 Md . 227 ; Foos v . Scarf (1880 ) , 55 Md . 301 ; Cooper v . Haines
( 1889 ) , 70 Md . 282 , 17 Atl . 79 .
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The common law rule was applied in New Jersey in the case of
Meeker v . Breintnall ( 1884 ) , 38 N . J. Eq . 345 , and in Connecticut in
the case of Hollister v. Shaw ( 1878 ) , 46 Conn . 248 .
In Massachusetts , in Amory v. Meredith , Allen , 397 , decided in
1863 , the common law rule was rejected , and the rule of St. 1 Vict.
adopted , as more likely to accomplish the intention of persons having
powers of appointment . The court say : “ We are aware of no decisions
in this commonwealth , binding on us as an authority , which should
compel us to adopt a rule of construction likely in a majority of cases
to defeat the intention it is designed to ascertain and effectuate . Seeking
for the intention of the testator , the rule of the English statute ( 1 Vict.,
c . 26 , § 27) appears to use the wiser and safer rule .” This case was
followed in the later Massachusetts cases , and also in New Hampshire .
Emery v. Haven (1893) , 67 N . H . 503, 35 Atl . 940 .
In Pennsylvania the courts adhered to the old rule of construction
until the adoption of the statute of 1879 , which provided that " a be
quest of the personal estate of the testator or any bequest of personal
property described in a general manner , shall be construed to include
any personal estate or any personal estate to which such description
shall extend as the case may be, which he may have power to appoint
in any manner he may think proper , and shall operate as an execution
of such power , unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will .”
If this statute was applicable to the question before us , the will of
Augustin S. Lane would , without doubt , be a valid execution of the
power . But the donor of the power, Jesse Lane , being a citizen and
resident of this state , and his will a Delaware will , and the trustee a
citizen and resident of this state , the question as to execution of the
power is to be determined by the law of this state , and not by the law
of Pennsylvania , the domicile of Augustin S . Lane .
Questions as to the execution of a power of appointment of personal
property are to be decided by the law of the domicile of the donor of
the power , and not by the law of the domicile of the donee of the power.
This was conceded in the argument of the counsel of the defendants ,
and is abundantly established by authority in this country and in Eng
land . Cutting v. De Sartiges , 17 R . I. 669, 24 Atl. 530, 16 L . R . A .
367 ; Sewall v . Wilmer , 132 Mass . 131 ; Bingham 's Appeal , 64 Pa. 345 ;
Pouey v . Hordern , L . R . [ 1900 ], 1 Ch . Div. 492 ; Hernando v . Sawtell,
L . R ., 27 Ch . Div . 281, 294 ; In re Megret [ 1901 ], 1 Ch . Div . 547 . *
* *
Applying the settled common law rules of construction to the will of
Augustin S. Lane , we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that
it was not an execution of his power of appointment . It certainly can
not be said of this will that the intention to execute the power is ap
parent and clear , and that it is not fairly susceptible of any other inter
pretation . It is at least doubtful, under al
l
the circumstances , and that
doubt is sufficient to prevent it from being decreed an execution of
the power . Blagge v . Miles , supra . There is nothing in the will , or in
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the circumstances of the testator, his family , or estate, so far as they
are known to us, to indicate that it was his intention to execute the
power . He designates the property bequeathed by him as “ al
l my es
tate , real and personal , o
f
whatever kind and wheresoever situate . ”
While he was entitled to the income o
f
the trust fund during his life ,




his will , it was not , in any proper
sense , his estate , o
r any part of his estate .
The words , " of whatever kind and wheresoever situate , " do not in
any degree enlarge the meaning or operation o
f




tate . ” In Andrews v . Emmot and Bradley v . Westcott , supra , similar ,
and even stronger , superadded words were held to have no such effect .
The words " a
ll my estate , " "my estate , " and " estate , ” as they occur
in the latter part o
f
the second item and in the third item o
f
the will ,
obviously refer to what the testator had already bequeathed , vi
z
. , his own
property , and not to that as to which he had only a power o
f appoint
ment .
This will does not allude to the will creating the power , or to the
power , or to the trust fund , the subject of the power . If the operation
o
f
the will be limited to the testator ' s own estate , it will not be ineffect
ual , as he had at the time o
f
his decease a personal estate the income o
f
which was abundantly sufficient to pay the annuity o
f
$ 1 ,200 fo
r
his
wife and to support and educate his son during his minority .
We are therefore o
f
the opinion that the decree o
f
the chancellor
should be affirmed , and it is so ordered .
CHAPTER VII.
CONDITIONS.
BRACTON, Book II, c . 6, fol. 18 - A . D. 1256 -60 ?
Likewise donations may be made with some modification and with a
condition added ; as if one should say, “ I give to such a one so much
land , & c., that he may give me so much ” (or that he may find me neces
saries ) , such a donation , although it be gratuitous , nevertheless is sim
ple and absolute , and if delivery follows , it cannot be revoked ; but
he who has delivered it may insist upon this , that he who has accepted
it should keep his bargain and do what he has promised . But if to
such a donation a condition has been forthwith attached at the com
mencement of the donation , that unless the acceptor keep his bargain to
the deliverer it shall forthwith be allowable for the deliverer to put
himself into that land and to hold it to himself and his heirs quietly of
the acceptor and his heirs, if afterwards he who has delivered the land
should put himself into seizin and the acceptor has attempted to bring
against him an assize of novel disseisin , in the first place an inquiry
must be made whether he who accepted the tenement has found for the
deliverer so sufficiently what are the necessaries which have been prom
ised that he ought thereupon to be content ; if not, indeed , the assize
fails, but if yea , he shall recover by the assize . But if he has not found
sufficiently the necessaries and the deliverer cannot put himself into
seizin under the aforesaid condition , he shall have an action upon the
condition to regain his seizin ; but if he should be in possession he may
maintain himself in his possession by the exception of the agreement.
* * *
(Same fo. 19 .) This condition is possible or impossible ; if it be
possible and within one's power , as if I say , “ I give you a certain thing
if you give me ten things ,” the donation is valid , but it is suspended
until the condition takes effect . As if you claim the thing , I can object
that you have not given me the ten things . Likewise , if the condition
be impossible , as if I say, " I give you that thing if you can touch the
sky with your fingers ,” the donation is not valid , and the condition is
held to defeat it. Likewise , a donation is not valid from the begin
ning, but is suspended in the power of another, a condition having been
added ; as if I should say, " I give you such a thing if Titus has willed ,"
(or has thought or has done a certain thing ) because unless he has done
this thing the donation will not be valid . * * * Likewise , there
are other conditions which are express and are made in negative words ;
as if it be said , " If Titus should not be heir you shall be the heir,” or,
(244 )
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" If you shall not have heirs of your body, then the lands so given shall
return to such persons," one or more , together or successively . Like
wise , there is sometimes a tacit condition and it is in affirmative words ;
as if it be said , “ If A be the heir of B , I substitute you in turn ,” that
is I make you heir , and if one of them predeceases the other the living
is to succeed the dead . Likewise , of conditions , some are double ; as
if it be said , 'If you have not heirs of your body or if you have had
( such ] and they have failed , then le
t
the given land revert to me and
to my heirs . " * * *
Likewise , a condition may impede the descent to the right heirs ,
against the common law ; a
s if I should say , " I grant you so much land
for the term o
f
ten years , and after the term let the land revert to me ,
and if I should die within the term o
f
ten years , I grant on behalf o
f
myself and my heirs , that the land shall remain to you for your life or
in fee , ” and so the condition makes it a free tenement and fe
e , and
the condition takes away from the heirs an assize on the death of their
ancestor , because if on first sight they have a direct action , the termor ,
however , will have an exception founded on the agreement . Likewise ,




n agreement into a term ; as if one should grant to
another land for life , a condition may be made between them , that if
the tenant die within a certain time , the heirs of the tenant , or his
assigns or his executors , may keep the land so given to the end o
f
a
certain time after the death o
f
the tenant himself ; and thus the condi
tion makes it a free tenement for a term and the contrary and furnishes
a
n exception against the true owner and his heirs . Likewise , in the same
way , it furnishes an exception against an assize o
f
novel disseisin , as has
been frequently stated above , respecting the supplying of necessaries .
* * * Likewise , it furnishes an exception against the true heirs and
against an assize on the death o
f
a
n ancestor if there be anyone who
says , when he is about to g
o
abroad , " I grant to A such a land of mine
for a certain term ( a
s
in the case o
f persons who have adopted the
badge o
f
the cross ) , and so , that if I shall have returned he shall restore
to me my land , but if I shall die on my journey or shall not return , the
land shall remain for A in fee ; " and if the condition arises that such
person has not returned , and his heir claims b
y
a
n assize on the death
o
f
his ancestor , the exception o
f
the condition shall bar him , and so
the donation will be mixed ; for instance , it will be a feoffment with
a term , and they shall have one beginning , although a different end
ing ; and then the term and the feoffment begin a
t
the same time , a
l
though they cannot stand together , nor do they march with equal steps ,
but one of them precedes and stands still , and the other is pendent
The original is : Ut si dicam : Do tibi istam rem si caelum digito tite
geris , non valet donatio , e
t pro non adjecto habetur conditio . Which , strictly
rendered , would be : As if I should say : I give you that thing if you can
touch the sky with your fingers ; the gift is invalid and the condition is
regarded as not written .
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until the condition takes effect or fails ; but if the condition fails, each
is terminated , that is, the tenement with a term or with a fee , and the
contrary . But if the condition takes effect , it forthwith ceases to be a
term , and the fee or tenement, which from the commencement began
and remained pending , now remains and holds firm and the term van
ishes .
Term on Condition to Enlarge to a Fee .
BRITTON , 1 Liber c. 5 , Sec . 15, p. * 96. - A . D . 1275 — 1300 .
A fee may be made to arise out of a term ; as is the case where one
going a pilgrimage leases his land for a term of years with this condition ,
that if he does not return , the land shall remain in fe
e
to the termor ;





pilgrim . And thus it appears that feoffments and purchases may be
conditional a
s
well as simple and without condition .
LITTLETON ' S TENURES . Littleton Died in 1482 .
§ 350 . Also if land be granted to a man for a term of five years , upon
condition that if he pay to the grantor within the two first years 40
marks that then he shall have fee , o
r
otherwise but for term of five years ,
and livery o
f




the grant , now he hath a fee
simple conditional , & c . And if in this case the grantee doth not pay
to the grantor the 40 marks within the first two years , then immediately
after the said two years past , the fee and the freehold is and shall be ad
judged in the grantor , because that the grantor cannot after the said
two years presently enter upon the grantee , for that the grantee hath
yet title b
y





grant , and so because the condition is broken by the grantee and the
grantor cannot enter , the law will put the fee and the freehold in the
grantor . For if the grantee in this case makes waste , then after the
breach o
f
the condition , & c . , and after the two years , the grantor shall
have his writ of waste .
COKE LIT . 2166 . - A . D . 1620 - 30 .
Many are o
f opinion against Littleton in this case , and their reason
is , because the fee - simple is to commence upon a condition precedent ,
and therefore cannot pass until the condition be performed ; and that
here Littleton of a condition precedent doth , before the performance
thereof , make it subsequent ; And for proof of their opinion they avouch
many successions o
f
authorities that no fee -simple should pass before
the condition performed . * * * 217 a * * * Notwithstanding all
this there are those that defend the opinion o
f
Littleton , both b
y
reason




law a livery o
f
seisin
must pass a present freehold to some person , they cannot give a freehold
in futuro , as it must do in this case , if after livery of seisin made the
freehold and inheritance should not pass presently , but expect until
the condition be performed ; and therefore if a lease for years be made
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to begin at Michaelmas the remainder over to another in fee, if the
lessor make livery of seisin before Michaelmas , the livery is void , be
cause if it should work at al
l
it must take effect presently and cannot
expect . Secondly , they say that when the lessor makes livery to the
lessee , that it cannot stand with any reason against his own livery o
f
seisin a freehold should remain in the lessor , seeing there is a person
able to take it . But if a man by deed make a lease for years , the re
mainder to the right heirs o
f I . S . , and the lessor make livery to the
lessee secundum formam chartæ , this livery is void because during the
life o
f
I . S . his right heir cannot take ( for nemo est haeris viventis ) ,
and in that case the freehold shall not remain in the lessor , and expect
the death o
f
I . S . during the term ; for although I . S . die during the
term , yet the remainder is void , because the livery o
f
seisin cannot expect .
And they say further that seeing all the books aforesaid [217b ] prove
that such a condition is good , and that the livery made to the lessee is
effectual , by consequence the freehold and inheritance must pass pres
ently or not a
t
all . And it is not rare , say they , in our books that words







ANON . , 31 Hen . 8 . - A . D . 1539 . — Brooke ' s New Cases p
l
. 152 , Bro . Abr . , t .
Conditions 191 .
By many , if a man makes a feoffment in fee to intent to perform his
will , this is not a condition but a declaration of the purpose and will of
the feoffor , and the heir may not enter for non performance .
RAWSON v . INHABITANTS OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO . 5 of UXBRIDGE ,
in Mass . Sup . Jud . C
t
. , Oct . 1863 – 89 Mass . ( 7 Allen ) 125 , 83 Am . Dec . 670 .






Daniel Taft after entry for breach o
f
condition in the deed by Daniel
in 1837 to the town o
f Uxbridge “ to their only proper use , benefit and be
hoof , for a burying place forever . ” The town had sold the premises
in 1860 to the tenants who used them for school purposes . Judgment for
demandant and the tenants appeal .
BIGELOW , C . J . The construction of the deed from the demandant ' s
ancestor to the town of Uxbridge is not free from difficulty ; but upon
careful consideration we are o
f
opinion that , adhering in its interpreta
tion , as we are bound to do , to the strict rules o
f
the common law respect
in
g
grants of real property , we cannot construe it as a deed upon condi
tion .
It is said in Shep . Touchstone , 126 , that “ to every good condition is
required a
n
external form ; " that is , it must be expressed in apt and suffi
cient words , which according to the rules o
f
law make a condition ; other
wise it must fail o
f
effect . This is especially the rule applicable to the
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construction of grants . A deed will not be construed to create an estate
on condition , unless language is used which , according to the rules of
law , ex proprio vigore, imports a condition , or the intent of the grantor
to make a conditional estate is otherwise clearly and unequivocally indi
cated . Conditions subsequent are not favored in law . If it be doubtful
whether a clause in a deed be a covenant or a condition , courts of law will
always incline against the latter construction . Conditions are not to be
raised readily by inference or argument . Co. Litt. 205 b , 219 b ; 4 Kent
Com . (6th ed . ) 129 , 132 ; Shep . Touchstone, 133 ; Merrifield v. Cob
leigh , 4 Cush . 178 , 184 .
In the deed on which the present controversy arises there are , strictly
speaking , no words of condition , such as of themselves import the creation
of a conditional estate . The usual and proper technical words by which
such an estate is granted by deed are , “ provided ," " so as” or “ on condi
tion .” Lord Coke says, “Words of condition are sub conditione , ita quod ,
proviso ." Mary Portington 's case , 10 Co. 42 a ; Co. Litt . 203 a , 203 b .
So a condition in a deed may be created by the use of the words “ si” or
“ quod si contingat ," and the like , if a clause of forfeiture or reentry be
added . Co . Litt. 204 a , 204 b . Duke of Norfolk 's case , Dyer , 138 b .
1 Wood on Conveyancing , 290 . In grants from the crown and in devises ,
a conditional estate may be created by the use of words which declare that
it is given or devised for a certain purpose, or with a particular intention ,
or on payment of a certain sum . But this rule is applicable only to those
grants or gifts which are purely voluntary , and where there is no other
consideration moving the grantor or donor besides the purpose for which
the estate is declared to be created . But such words do not make a condi
tion when used in deeds of private persons. If one makes a feoffment
in fee ea intentione , ad effectum , ad propositum , and the like, the estate
is not conditional , but absolute , notwithstanding Co . Litt . 204 a ; Dyer
ubi supra ; 1 Wood on Conveyancing , 290 ; Shep . Touchstone , 123 .
These words must be conjoined in a deed with others giving a right to
reenter or declaring a forfeiture in a specified contingency , or the grant
will not be deemed to be conditional . It is sometimes said that the words
" causa ” and “ pro ,” when used in deeds , create a condition ; that is, where
a deed is made in express terms for a specific purpose , or in consideration
of an act to be done or service rendered , it will be interpreted as creating
a conditional estate . But this is an exception to the general rule,
and is confined to cases where the subject -matter of the grant is in
its nature executory ; as of an annuity to be paid for service to be ren
dered or a right or privilege to be enjoyed ; in such case if the service be
not performed or the enjoyment of the right or privilege be withheld
which formed the consideration of a grant, the grantor will be relieved
from the further execution of the grant, to wit, the payment of the annu
ity. Shep . Touchstone , 124 ; Cowper v. Andrews, Hob . 41 ; Co . Litt .
204 a . But ordinarily the failure of the consideration of a grant of land ,
or the non -fulfillment of the purpose for which a conveyance by deed is
inade , will not of itself defeat an estate. The reason for this distinction
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between the two classes of cases is , as stated by Coke, “ that the state of
the land is executed and the annuity executory .” Co. Litt. 204 a . There
is one other class of grants which are sometimes said to be conditional ; as
when a feoffment is made ad solvendum , " for the matter shows that the
intent of the feoffor was to have the land or the money ;" or a grant ad
erudiendum filium , “ because the words purport that the instruction is to
be given , or the feoffment will be void .” Itmay be doubtful whether such
words do operate in strictness as a condition . The latter case is stated in
the Touchstone doubtfully , in this wise : “ Some have said this estate is
conditional.” But if grants so expressed can be construed to create a
condition by which to defeat an estate on breach and entry , it is clear
that such an interpretation of them is confined to cases where the whole
consideration of the grant is the accomplishment of a specific purpose, and
the enjoyment of the estate granted is clearly made dependent on the
performance of an act or the payment of money for the use or benefit
of the grantor or his assigns. We believe there is no authoritative sanc
tion for the doctrine that a deed is to be construed as a grant on a condi
tion subsequent solely for the reason that it contains a clause declaring
the purpose for which it is intended the granted premises shall be used ,
where such purpose will not enure specially to the benefit of the grantor
and his assigns, but is in its nature general and public , and where there
are no other words indicating an intent that the grant is to be void if the
declared purpose is not fulfilled .
If it be asked whether the law will give any force to the words in a
deed which declare that the grant is made for a specific purpose or to
accomplish a particular object, the answer is, that they may , if properly
expressed , create a confidence or trust , or amount to a covenant or agree
ment on the part of the grantee . Thus it is said in The Duke of Nor
folk 's case , Dyer, 138 b , that the words “ ea intentione " do not make a
condition but a confidence and trust . See also Parish v . Whitney , 3 Gray ,
516 , and Newell v . Hill, 2 Met. 180 , and cases cited . But whether this
be so or not, the absence of any right or remedy in favor of the grantor
under such a grant to enforce the appropriation of land to the specific
purpose for which it was conveyed , will not of itself make that a condi
tion which is not so framed as to warrant in law that interpretation .
An estate cannot be made defeasible on a condition subsequent by con
struction founded on an argument ab inconvenienti only , or on considera
tions of supposed hardship or want of equity .
In the light of these principles and authorities we cannot interpret the
words in the deed of the demandant 's ancestor , which declare that the
premises were conveyed " for a burying-place forever,” to be words of
strict condition . Nor can we gather from them that they were so in
tended by the grantor. The grant was not purely voluntary . It was
only partially so . It was not made solely in consideration of the love and
affection, which the grantor bore towards the grantees , but also " for
diverse other valuable considerations me moving hereunto .” Previously
to the time of the grant , the premises had been used for a burial-place .
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It is so described in the deed . Under what circumstances this had been
done does not appear . It may have been for a compensation . We can
not now know , therefore, that the sole cause or consideration which in
duced the grantor to convey the estate to the town was, that it should be
used for the specific purpose designated in the deed . There can be no
doubt of the intent of the grantor that the estate should always be used
and appropriated for such purpose. This intent is clearly manifested ;
but we search in vain for any words which indicate an intention that if
the grantees omitted so to use them , and actually devoted them to another
purpose , the whole estate should thereupon be forfeited , and revert to the
heirs of the grantor . The words in the deed are quite as consistent with
an intent by the grantor to repose a trust and confidence in the inhab
itants of the town, for whom he declared his affection and love , that they
would always fulfill the purpose for which the grant was made, so long
as it was reasonable and practicable so to do, as they are with an intent
to impose on them a condition which should compel them , on pain of
forfeiture , to maintain the premises as a burial place for all time, how
ever inconvenient or impracticable it might become to make such an
appropriation of them . Language so equivocal cannot be construed as a
condition subsequent without disregarding that cardinal principle of real
property already referred to , that conditions subsequent which defeat an
estate are not to be favored or raised by inference or implication .
Judgment for the tenants .
Rule to Distinguish Condition from Covenant.
SIMPSON V. TITTERELL , in the Common Pleas, Trinity , 33 Eliz . - A . D.
1592. - Cro . Eliz , 242 .
Ejectione Firmae . B let land to defendant for years : provided always
and it is further covenanted , that the lessee shall not assign . The lessee
assigned ; the lessor entered , and let it to the plaintiff . Were the words
a condition or a covenant only ?
All the Justices held it was a good condition to defeat the estate . PER
IAM , J ., said proviso always implies a condition if there be not words sub
sequent which change it into a covenant as where there is another penalty
annexed to it for non -performance , as Dockrey 's Case , 27 Hen . 8, pl. 14 .
But it is a rule in provisoes where the proviso is that the lessee shall
perform or not perform a thing , and no penalty to it , this is a condition ,
otherwise it is void . But if a penalty is annexed it is otherwise . To
which the rest of the justices agreed . And it was adjudged for the
plaintiff that the entry was lawful .
HORNER V. CHICAGO , M . & ST . P . RY. CO ., Wis. Sup . Ct., Aug . Term ,
1875 . - 38 Wis . 165 .
Appeal by defendants from judgment fo
r
plaintiff in an action to re
cover land conveyed to defendant ' s grantor b
y
plaintiff ' s grantor b
y
deed “ in consideration o
f
one dollar , " reciting that : “ The aforesaid piece
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or parcel of land hereby conveyed to the party of the second part only fo
r
depot and other railroad purposes . ” The defendant had remained in
possession o
f
the land for te
n
years after receiving the deed , and no
depot had ever been built thereon .
Lyon , J . It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff , that the clauses in
the deed from Mary E . Watson (plaintiff ' s grantor ) to the Milwaukee
& Horicon R . Co . expressing the purposes for which the lands con
veyed thereby were to b
e
used , are conditions subsequent , a breach o
f
which might work a forfeiture of such lands . The action is brought upon
that theory , and the most important , if not the controlling question to
b
e determined , is whether those clauses are conditions . The principles
o
r
rules of law which are believed to be conclusive upon that question
will be briefly stated :
1 . Although there are technical words , which , if used in a conveyance ,
unmistakably create a condition , yet the use thereof is not absolutely
essential to that end , and a valid condition may be expressed without
employing those words .
2 . It is not essential to a valid condition that , in case of a breach
thereof , a right of re -entry be expressly reserved in the deed , or that it
be expressed therein that the estate o
f




3 . Neither does the character of the clause alleged to be a condition
depend upon it
s
insertion in any particular part of the instrument .
“ Conditions regularly follow the habendum in a deed , but are good in
law in any other place . ” Jacob Law Dict . “ Condition . ”
4 . The construction of the clause or stipulation must depend upon the
intention o
f
the parties to be gathered from the instrument and the
existing facts . Says Chancelor Kent in 4 Com . 132 : “ Whether the
words amount to a condition or a limitation or a covenant may be matter
o
f
construction depending on the contract . The intention o
f
the party to
the instrument , when clearly ascertained , is o
f controlling efficacy ;
though conditions and limitations are not readily to be raised b
y
mere
inference and argument . The distinctions on this subject are extremely





and effect , will after all depend less upon artificial rules than upon the
application o
f
good sense and sound equity to the object and spirit o
f
the
contract in a given case . ”





estate or give a right o
f
re -entry in case o
f
default , words of limitation
o
r
restriction are sometimes , perhaps usually , necessary to create a con
dition . For want o
f
these in the lease in Brugman v . Noyes , 6 Wis . 3 ,
the instrument was held not to contain a condition o
r
covenant .
6 . In a voluntary conveyance words may be held to be a condition
which if used in a conveyance for a valuable consideration would b
e
held a covenant only .
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7 . Conditions subsequent are not favored in the law and are to be
strictly construed .
8 . To the foregoing may be added the following rule prescribed by
statute : “When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of
lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual and sub
stantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor they are to be
performed , they may be wholly disregarded , and a failure to perform
the same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the lands conveyed
subject thereto .” R . S . ch . 83, sec. 46 .
9. Although a deed contain a clause declaring the purpose for which
it is intended the granted premises shall be used if such purpose will not
inure specially to the benefit of the grantor , but is in its nature gen
eral and public , and if there are no other words in the grant indicat
ing an intent that the grant is to be void if the declared purpose is
not fulfilled , such a clause is not a condition subsequent. The appli
cation of this rule controlled the cases of Strong v . Doty , 32 Wis. 381 ;
and Rau'son v . Inhabitants . Allen 125 , cited and relied on by the de
fendants.
The foregoing rules are , it is believed , fully sustained in the elemen
tary treatises and by numerous adjudged cases . Many of these will be
found cited in the briefs of the learned counsel on both sides. Further
citation of authorities on these subjects is not deemed necessary . It
remains to be determined in the light of the above rules of law , whether
the deed from Mary E . Watson to the Milwaukee & Horicon R . Co .,
conveyed an absolute fee in the lands in controversy , or only a condi
tional fee . The deed conveyed two parcels of land . After the descrip
tion of the first parcel , and referring to it, are the following words :
“ The aforesaid piece or parcel of land hereby conveyed to the party of
the second part only for depot and other railroad purposes .” And
after the description of the other parcel , which in terms is granted for
a railway , the deed contains this clause : “ Both of said pieces or parcels
being granted solely for said road purposes .” The words only , quoted , and
solely , quoted , are words of restriction and exclusion . As used in this deed
their effect clearly is to prohibit the grantee from using the lands for any
other than the specified purposes. The grantor owned a tract of land
suitable for building purposes, adjacent to the land conveyed for a
depot site . She believed , as she well might , that the construction of
the railroad and the location and erection of the depot at that point ,
would enhance the value and facilitate the sale of her property . Hence
she was willing to donate, and did donate, the land in controversy to
the railroad for the purpose specified in the deed , and no other .
But it is argued that parol evidence was improperly admitted to
prove that no consideration was actually paid for the land . It is claimed
that because the deed recites a consideration of one dollar , it is a verity
in the case that the grantor received one dollar for the land . We do
not stop to inquire whether this position is correct or otherwise ; for
we think that it was competent for the plaintiff to prove by parol evi
RULE TO DISTINGUISH CONDITION FROM COVENANT . 253
dence, not for the purpose of showing the deed void in it
s inception , but
a
s
a circumstance bearing on the intention o
f
the parties , and as aiding
in a correct interpretation o
f
the instrument , that the construction o
f
the railroad , and the location of the depot on the granted premises , were
the principal inducements to the execution of the deed . See Hanna v .
Oxley , 23 Wis . 519 and cases cited . It may be further remarked on
this subject that if substance be regarded rather than form , the dis
tinction in principle between paying for the land a mere nominal con
sideration and paying nothing at a
ll
for it is not very apparent . It is
a very significant fact in the case that the grantor (acting through her
agent , Mr . Horner ) refused to execute an unconditional conveyance of the
land , and required the clauses under consideration to be inserted in
the conveyance which she did execute . But their insertion was a use
less act unless the clauses are held to be conditions . That the grantor
intended to reserve to herself some remedy in case the grantee should
make default , is too plain for argument . * * *
It must be held , therefore , that the parcel of land first described in
the deed was conveyed upon condition that the grantee should use it
for depot purposes , and the parcel last described upon condition that it
should b
e
used " for a railway , ” that is , as we undersand it , the railway
track should be laid upon it . And here it may be observed that we do
not think that the first condition in the deed applies to the second parcel
of land therein described . That is to say , we do not think the failure
to use the land first described for depot purposes can alone work a for
feiture of the strip conveyed " for a railway . " Having regard to the
rule above stated and that these conditions are to be strictly construed ,
we must construe them the same as though two deeds had been made ,
one conveying the depot lot on condition that it be used for depot pur
pose , and the other conveying the strip two and a half rods wide on
condition that it be used for a railway track . The track having been
laid upon such strip o
f
land in 1857 or 1858 , and having been maintained
there until the present time , it necessarily follows from the views just
expressed , that there has been no breach o
f
the condition upon which
the same was conveyed , and hence that the circuit court erred in ren
dering judgment therefor for the plaintiff . But the failure to use the
other parcel for depot purposes , evidenced b
y
the erection and main
tenance , b
y




the depot for Ripon eighty
rods south o
f
such parcel and separated from it b
y
a mill pond , was in
jurious to the grantor and a substantial breach o
f
the condition upon
which such parcel was conveyed .
We are next to determine whether the grantor , before she conveyed
to the plaintiff , made entry for condition broken , upon the land con
veyed for depot purposes . Without recapitulating the testimony on that
subject , we think the fact is established by a clear preponderance of the
evidence that in 1862 o
r
1863 the grantor , b
y
her agent , made sufficient
entry thereon to revest in her the title to such parcel . * * *
By the Court : The judgment of the circuit court is reversed , and the
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cause remanded with directions to that court to give judgment for the
plaintiff , modified as indicated in this opinion .
Conditions and Limitations Distinguished .
NEWIS et ux . V. LARK and HUNT , in C . B ., Mich . 13 & 14 Eliz . - A . D .
1572 . - Often Cited as SCOLASTICA 'S CASE , and Reported in 2 Plowd .
Com . 403 , and Partially in N . Bendlows 196 . Abridged from Plowd . Com .
Assize of novel -disseizin by Robert Newis and Scolastica his wife
against William Lark and John Hunt for land in Middlesex . The as
size was taken by default ; and plaintiff gave evidence to prove , that
Henry Clerk , seised in fee of the land in question , made his devise in
writing , whereby he gave it to his son John in tail , remainder to his
son Francis in tail , remainder to the plaintiff Scolastica his daughter
in tail , with remainders over ; and in this writing he declared his will
that if any of those to whom the land was so given should sell, waste ,
mortgage , or discontinue the lands , or their interest or possibility or any
part of it , or unlawfully vex or disquiet any to whom such lands were so
given , the persons and their heirs so doing shall from thenceforth be
clearly discharged and excluded from the entails to him or them , and
from all benefit and advantage as if they had never been mentioned in
the will : that after the death of the testator Francis and John joined
in a covenant to levy a fine and suffer a recovery to the defendants herein ,
which fine was levied and recovery suffered accordingly ; and that after
wards the plaintiffs entered claiming by force of the will, on whom the
defendants re -entered whereupon this suit was brought. Defendants de
murred in law to the evidence , and the plaintiffs joined in the demurrer .









THE COURT . It was held b
y
all the justices that the bar
gain , fine , and recovery are such acts as give title and occasion to defeat
the estates tail limited to John and Francis . But the great doubt was
whether the penalty which the testator had added be a condition , o
r
a
limitation and no condition , and how it stands with law , and who shall
take advantage o
f it , and b
y
what means .
All the justices argued that it is no condition ; for if it should be a
condition and should be broken b
y
any in possession o
r
in remainder ,
then the heir , to whom the privity o
f
conditions in inheritances descends ,
should enter , and thereby defeat all the estates . For if a man makes a
lease for life , remainder in tail , remainder in tail , remainder in fee , upon
condition that some o
f
them in the remainder shall do such an act , there ,
if it is not done the feoffor and his heirs may enter , and thereby defeat
a
s
well the estate in possession a





enters for a condition broken is in of such estate as he had before the
condition made , from whence it follows that he has defeated all the
estates . But here it was not the devisor ' s intent that all the estates
tail should be utterly defeated , for in his declaration and discourse , made
after the limitation o
f
the estates - tail he expresses that his mind was ,
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that the said hereditaments should continue in the name of the Clerks ,
to the memorial of his own name; and besides this he declares , that if
any of them attempt any act contrary to his limitation , the tenements
shall come to the party next in tail , as if such disorderous person had
never been mentioned in his will . From which clauses it manifestly ap
pears to all to be his intent that the estate tail of one should not be de
feated by the act of another, and the words of every man expressed in
his will shall be taken and expounded according to his intent and mean
ing , from whence it follows that the penalty expressed shall not be a
condition to defeat all the other estates . And hereupon the case in 29
Assize pl. 17 , was cited by HARPER and DYER , [ JJ. ] where a man
seized in fee of lands devisable devised them to one for term of his life , and
that he should be chaplain , and should sing for his soul al
l
his life , so that
after his death the said tenements should remain to the commonalty o
f
the same town , to find a chaplain perpetual for the same tenements , and he
died ; and the devisee , being of sufficient age to be a chaplain , entered
into the tenements , and held them for six years , but was no chaplain , and
the heir o
f
the devisor ousted him , and the devisee brought an assize ,
and the heir pleaded to the assize , and all this matter was found b
y
the
assize , and the justices encouraged the assize as much as they could to
find for the plaintiff , and at last they said that the plaintiff was seised









the breach whereof the heir might enter , for if he might enter , thereby
the remainder would b
e
defeated , and it appears that it was not the in
tent o
f
the devisor to defeat the remainder , because it was given to find a
chaplain perpetual , and the chaplain could not be found perpetually if the
remainder was annulled . From whence it appears that the words in &
will which seemingly tend to a condition , shall not in the law be taken
for a condition , when it appears to be the intent of the party that the
whole estate shall not be defeated . So here the words o
f
the penalty shall
not make a condition to defeat all the estates .
Another reason was also given in proof thereof , and that was , because
the tail was first appointed to John Clerk , who was his eldest son and
heir , and it was the intent of the devisor that he should be restrained
from discontinuing or barring his tail , as well as any of the others , and
if it should be taken to be a condition , and that there was no other
penalty for the breach of it but entry only , then if the eldest son himself ,
who is donee and heir , makes a feoffment , thereby the condition is ex
tinct , for the title o
f
the condition passes in the land , so that he cannot
enter for the condition broken by himself contrary to his own feoffment ,
and a
s he is a
t liberty to make a feoffment , so is he to suffer a recovery ,
and thereby to bar all the remainders , which would be contrary to the
intent of the devisor , who had a mind that he should be restrained as
well as the others ; and therefore , if his intent may hold place , it shall
not be a condition , but there shall be some other penalty to the eldest son
which is greater to him than a condition carries along with it if he
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breaks the intent of the devisor . And so all the justices unanimously
agreed that it was not a condition which implies a re-entry .
Further it was moved that if the penalty shall not amount to a con
dition containing a re -entry , whether or not it shall be a limitation in
estate , and if it be a limitation , whether entry is necessary before it be
ended , and whether the next in remainder be privy enough to make
entry . For LORD DYER , J ., said , if a man makes a gift in tail , upon
condition that if the donee does such an act his estate shall cease ,
Frowick [ C . J. ] holds in 21 Hen . 7 , 12 a , that if he does the act , hi
s
estate shall not cease before entry , because it is an estate of inheritance
which shall not cease b
y
parol without an entry in fact .
And as to this , all the justices argued that the clause in the will
which said : “ That the person mortgaging or entangling shall be clearly
discharged excluded and dismissed touching the entail , and that the
conveyance o
f








them , ” shall be taken and expounded in law a
s
a limitation , that
is to say , it shall be taken in sense to be a devise to him in tail until he
mortgage , alien , pledge , entangle , incumber , or do the other acts there ex
pressed , and when he shall do any o
f
these acts then the estate shall end
a
s fully as if he died without issue male ; so that after the acts done
the right o
f
the tail shall cease , and the tail is merely dissolved ; for when
the intent is shown b
y
words and the words are not aptly put , then such





in sense such words amount to a limitation , and especially
when the case is upon a devise , where the intent only is regarded , and the
words , although they are not apt in law for the matter , shall be drawn
to the intent . For as HARPER , J . , said , the devisor shall be accounted





death , and have not time to seek counsel ; for which
reason the law shall be their counsel and shall interpret the words , and
direct the operation o
f
them according to the intent o
f
the party .
And each of the justices cited the last case which Fitzherbert puts in
thewrit of ex gravi querela in his Natura Brevium , 201 o , which is thus :
A man devises land in London to his wife for life , upon condition that
if she marries the land shall remain to his son in tail , and for the default
o
f
such issue the remainder to the right heirs o
f
the donor in fee ; the
wife takes husband , and she and the husband occupy the land , he in re
mainder dies without heirs of his body ; the right heir o
f
the donor shall
have a special writ of ex gravi querela directed to the mayor and sheriffs
o
f
London , rehearsing this special devise and the said matter , command
ing them to call the parties and hear them , & c . , and to do right : So he
says , it appears that he in remainder shall have advantage of the condi
tion if it be broken , but that shall be b
y







the condition not performed ;and the said writ
appears in the register , and all this appears in the said Natura Brevium .
And the justices said that the words o
f
the condition there mentioned are
not properly a condition , but words o
f
limitation . But DYER , J . , said
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that where it seemed to Fitzherbert in that case that the heir of the
donor might not enter, in his opinion he might well enter .
And HARPER , J ., also cited the case in 34 Edw . 3, Fitz ., formedon pl.
ult . 4, where a man had issue a son and a daughter and devised land
devisable to one for life , upon condition that if the son disturbed the
tenant for life, or the executors of their administration , then the land
should remain to the daughter ; and he died and the daughter , after the
death of the tenant for life , brought a formedon in remainder against
the son , and alleged that he had disturbed the tenant for life and the
executors , and the son traversed it and thereupon issue was joined . So
that there the condition took away the fee out of the son , and put it in
the daughter by allowance of the law , in order to perform the intent of
the devise , although the remainder did not vest when the first estate
took effect .
And all the justices agreed upon the matter in law , viz ., that the said
clause of restraint shall be a limitation which shall determine the estate ,
and not a condition requiring re -entry , and that by the said acts , vi
z
. ,
the bargain , fine , and recovery , the estates tail ended , and that the plaint
iffs might enter , and should not be driven to any formedon or other
suit , as they should be upon discontinuance of any other estate tail
general by feoffment or fine , and by dying without issue after ; for here
the estate ended b
y
collateral limitation , so that the act which ends the
estate b
y
the limitation cannot make a discontinuance ; for the doing of
the act and the end o
f
the estate come together , a
t
one and the same in
stant ; for the fine levied by John determined his interest , and was no
discontinuance to Francis , because the estate tail o
f
John was not in
esse longer than the fine took effect , and it being determined could not
be discontinued as to him , or the other , or him in remainder , and the
recovery determined the estate o
f
Francis which preceded , and so there
is n
o
discontinuance to retard the entry o
f
the plaintiffs .
This is believed to be one of the first cases in which the rules to dis
tinguish conditions from limitations are fully discussed ; and in this respect
it has been followed and much cited since . But in so far as it holds valid
provisions creating forfeitures on alienations or attempts to alienate , it was
soon overruled . See Corbit ' s Case , post 172 ; and Mary Portington ' s Case ,
ante 45 .
In Mary Portington ' s Case , 10 Coke 41 , Lord Coke says : " The authority
of the book of 29 Assize 17 , is against that which was cited in Scholastica ' s
Case ; and thereby you may see , good reader , how dangerous it is to ground
an opinion upon any abridgement ; for Fitzherbert , in abridging the case
abridges it without any words of express condition , as cited in Scholastica ' s
Case . But Brooke , tit . , 'Condition , ' abridges it to be upon express condition .
And as to the said case in F . N . B . it is cited in Scholastica ' s Case in this
manner [stating as above ) ; which case so put by Fitzherbert out of the
original writ in the register is utterly mistaken in two points : 1 , because
the devise to the wife in the case put in F . N . B . was upon express words
of condition ; but inspecto registro fo . 246 , the devise was upon apt words of
limitation * * * ; 2 , where Fitzherbert saith that the right heir cannot
enter , it is clear that the right heir may well enter , because he has the
reversion by descent , and not by way of remainder . ”
Scholastica ' s Case was followed on similar facts in Sharington v . Minors ,
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in B . R ., Pasch . 41 Eliz ., Moore 543 , on the opinions of Fenner , Gawdy, and
Clench , JJ ., against the opinion of Popham , C. J .,who relied on Germin v .
Arscot , post .
The question was involved and argued at bar and bench in B . R . Mich . 39
& 40 Eliz ., in Tarrant' s Case , Moore 470 ; but because of the difference of
opinion among the judges no decision was reached in that case at that time.
See the discussion as to the distinction between a condition and a limita
tion in Willion v. Berkley , ante p .
WELLOCK v. HAMMOND , in Queen 's Bench , Trinity, 32 Eliz . - A . D . 1591 ,
Cro . Eliz . 204 .








f borough English , descendible to the
younger son and younger brother , had issue four sons and a daughter ,
and surrendered the land to the use o
f his will , and devised it to his
wife for life , remainder to his eldest son , paying forty shillings to each
o
f
his brothers and sister within two years after the death of the wife ,
and died . The wife entered and died . The eldest son entered and did
not pay the legacies within two years , but within five years he did pay
them . The youngest son died without issue . The oldest then surrendered
the land to the use o
f
his will , devised it to his wife , and died . She
entered and married defendant . A younger son o
f
Thomas entered , de
fendant ousted him , he brought trespass , and it was found that the land
was worth 4£ per annum . The question was whether the entry was
lawful .
Godfrey and Coke , for the plaintiff , argued that the oldest was
given only a life estate , since 8£ was too small a consideration to make
a fee -simple on a devise without limitation ; that the word paying was
a limitation , because void as a condition , being descendible to the heir .
Shirley and Johnson , for the defendant , argued ; that the devise was in
fee because of the consideration , and the value was not material , citing
2
9
H . 8 , Brooke ' s Abr . , “ Testaments " 18 ; 6 Edw . 6 , Brooke “ Estates "
7
8 ; Abr . 38 Edw . 3 , 14 ; that the words were sufficient and apt to make
a condition ; that it cannot be a limitation because the lands are limited
to another if he did not pay ; and whether condition o
r
limitation , it is
not found that there was any demand for the money and so no breach .
PER CURIAM : — It is a fee , for the value is not material , and no book
speaks o
f
the value . It is a limitation , and not a condition ; for if it be
& condition it extinguisheth in the heir , and no remedy for the money .
But being a limitation , the law shall construe it that upon the non
payment of the money his estate shall cease , and then the law shall carry
it to the heir by custom , without any limitation over . And in a devise
it may well be that an estate in fee shall cease in one , and shall be trans
ferred to another . The money was to be paid without request . And it
was adjudged for the plaintiff . See 3 Coke 20 b .
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HARDY V. SEYER , in Queen 's Bench , Easter, 37 Eliz . — A . D . 1596 . - Cro .
Eliz . 414 . Abridged .
Ejectione Firmae. Upon special verdict . A lease was made to a
widow for forty years , upon condition that during the time she remain
sole and live in the house. She continued unmarried in the house al
l
her life , but died within the forty years . The question between the ex
ecutor o
f
the widow and him in reversion was whether the term was de
termined . If these words were a condition the term remains , for she




God , which shall not
turn to her prejudice ; but if it is a limitation it is otherwise .
POPHAM [ C . J . ] and GAWDY and CLENCH [JJ . ] held that the words ,
upon condition that if , & c . were void words ; for they are insensible , and
are neither condition nor limitation ; for all conditions shall be taken
strictly , and no words shall be supplied b
y
intendment to make a con
dition to divest or destroy an estate . And so here it is no more than that
a man makes a lease for years rendering rent - on condition that if the
rent be not paid and says no more , which is without sense ; for it may
be intended that he shall forfeit a pain , o
r
that the lessor shall re -enter ,
which is uncertain . Every that if ought to be answered b
y
the words
what then , whereby to make the intention of the parties full , what shall
b
e done , otherwise we cannot judge of their intention : and for this un
certainty it is void , and the lease is absolute . But if the words were that
the lease was for forty years , " if she so long live unmarried and inhabit
therein , " POPHAM ( C . J . ] , held it to be a limitation , and to determine the
lease by her marriage or death , so that she cannot inhabit therein : and
so Bromley ( o
f
counsel for the reversioner ] affirmed was the intent o
f
the parties , and the truth o
f
the case , and that it was mistaken in draw
ing the verdict . But FENNER , J . , held that the words are full enough
to make a condition of re -entry without any other , and are a condition
and not a limitation , and that this condition is well performed , and the
lease remains absolute . Wherefore it was adjudged for the plaintiff .
HAYNSWORTH v . PRETTY , in Queen ' s Bench , Hilary 41 Eliz . — A . D . 1599 .
- Cro . Eliz . 833 , Moor 644 .
Trespass . Special verdict . One seised o
f
lands in socage had issue
two sons and a daughter , and devised to his second son and daughter
201 . to be paid b
y
his eldest son , and devised his land to his eldest son
in fe
e , on condition that if he paid not these legacies , that his land should
be to his second son and daughter and their heirs . The eldest son fails
o
f payment . Whether the younger son and daughter shall have the land
was the question . After argument it was resolved b
y
the Court clearly ,
that they should have it ; for the first devise to his son and heirs in fe
e ,
being no more than what the law gives , is void ; and it is but a future
devise to the second son and daughter upon the eldest son ' s default of
payment . The case is no other but as if one had devised that if his
eldest son did not pay all legacies , that hi
s
lands should be to the legatees ,
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and there is no doubt but that in default of payment the land should
vest in them . GAWDY and FENNER [JJ. ] held that if it were a good de
vise to the eldest son , yet this condition is a limitation of his estate , and
shall give it to the second son and daughter upon default of payment.
wherefore it was adjudged accordingly for the plaintiff.
For neglect to enter judgment, the case was reargued and again adjudged
for the defendant, for the same reasons . Cro . Eliz . 919 .
WRENFORD v. GYLES, in Common Bench , Mich . 40 & 41 Eliz. - A . D . 1600 .
- Cro . Eliz . 643 , Noy 70.
A lease was made for 21 years if the lessee lived so long and continued
in the lessor's service . The lessor died , and whether the term was de
termined was the question .
ANDERSON , [ C . J . ] , OWEN and GLANVILLE , [JJ. ], held that the lease
continued , for there is not any laches in the lessee that he did not serve ;
but it is the act of God that he cannot serve any longer ; and it is like
to Sir Thomas Wroth 's Case . [ Dyer 167 , Plowd . Com . 454 . ] But
WALMSLEY [ J . ] strongly against it : because it is a limitation to the
estate , that it shall not continue longer than he serves . Quaere.
HENDERSON V. HUNTER , In Pa . Sup . Ct., 1868 , 59 Pa . St . 335 , Pattee ' s
Cas. R . P . 258 , Tiedman 's Cases on R . P . 229 . Gate ' s Cases R . P . 149 .
AGNEW , J . This was an action of trespass by church trustees under
a deed of trust made by Thomas Pillow in 1836 , for taking down and
removing the materials of a church building in 1867 . The case turns
on the limitation in the deed . The legal estate of the trustees clearly
has no duration beyond the use it was intended to protect . The word
" successors ” is used to perpetuate the estate , but as the trustees are an
unincorporated body having no legal succession , there is nothing in the
terms of the grant to carry the trust beyond its appropriate use . This
brings us to the limitation of the use itself .
It is for the erection of “ a house or place of worship for the use
of the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States
of America (so long as they use it for that purpose , and no longer , and
then to return back to the original owner ) , according to the rules and
discipline which from time to time may be agreed upon and adopted by
the ministers and preachers of the said church at their General Confer
ence in the United States of America .” This is the main purpose of the
trust, the other portions of the deed relating to the use being ancillary
only to this principal object. The interjected words, “ so long as they
use it for that purpose and no longer , and then to return back to the
original owner,” are terms of undoubted limitation , and not of con
dition . They accompany the creation of the estate , qualify it, and
prescribe the bounds beyond which it shall not endure.
The equitable estate is in the members of the church so long as they
use the house as a place of worship in the manner prescribed and no
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longer . This is the boundary set to their interest , and when this limit
is transcended the estate expires by its own limitation , and returns to
it
s
author . The words thus used have not the slightest cast o
f
a mere
condition . No estate for any fixed or determinate period had been





r other indication o
f
a condition to be annexed .
" A special limitation , ” says Mr . Smith , in his work on Executory




estate , so as to determine it ipso facto in a given event without action ,





r according to , the general limitation . ” A special limitation may be
created b
y
the words " until , " " so long , " " if , " "whilst , ” and “ during , ”
a
s






Dale , or while
he continues unmarried , or until out of the rents he shall have made
£500 . 2 Black . Com . 155 ; Smith on Exec . Int . 12 ; Thomas Coke , 2 vol . ,
120 - 21 ; Fearne on Rem . 12 , 13 and note p . 10 . " In such case , ” says




e parson , marries a wife , or has received the £500 ) ,
and the subsequent estate which depends on such determination becomes
immediately vested , without any act to be done b
y










trustees terminated the moment the house ceased to be used as a place
o
f worship according to the rules and discipline of the church , b
y
the
members to whose use in that manner it had been granted ; and the






f worship , therefore , became a chief
question in the cause , because the title o
f
the trustees to the property ,
and consequently their right to maintain this action , hinged upon this
event . Then , as the use of the members of this church was to be accord
ing to the rules and discipline from time to time adopted b
y
the general
conference , it became a question whether the alleged abandonment o
f
the house as a place o
f worship was b
y
church authority , and according
to the rules and discipline then existing ; for a mere temporary sus
pension o
f
services there , or a discontinuance o
f
the use without authority ,
would not , ipso facto , determine the use . Hence an inquiry both into
the fact o
f
abandonment and the authority of the church became es
sential . * * *
The fact o
f





the jury . In his charge the learned judge submitted the
question on the testimony o
f
the presiding elder and the book o
f
dis
cipline as to the authority for so doing ; and on his testimony and that
o
f
others as to the actual discontinuance o
f
services there and the
causes thereof . This was all he could do , as the question o
f
fact be
longed to the jury . * *
Judgment affirmed .
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Impossibility of Performance .
THOMAS y. HOWELL , in King 's Bench , Trinity 4 Wm . & Mary . - A . D .
1693 . — 1 Salk . 170 , 25 Eng . Rul. Cas . 626 .
One devised to his eldest daughter upon condition she would marry
his nephew on or before she attained the age of 21. The nephew died
young , and the daughter never refused , and indeed never was re
quired to marry him . After the death of the nephew , the daughter ,
being about 17 , married J . S . And it was adjudged in C . B . that the
condition was not broken , being become impossible by the act of God ;
and the judgment was afterwards affirmed in error in B . R .
Right of Entry when not Expressly Reserved .
LITTLETON 'S TENURES . Littleton died in 1482 .
§ 331 * * * It is commonly used in all such cases as aforesaid to
put the clauses in the deeds , scilicet , if the rent be behind , & c ., that it
should be lawful to the feoffor and his heirs to enter , & c., and this
is well done, for this intent, to declare and express to the common
people, who are not learned in the law , of the manner and condition of
the feoffment & c ., As if a man seised of land letteth the same land
to another by deed indented for a term of years, rendering to him a
certain rent , it is used to put into the deed , that if the rent be behind
at the day of payment, or by the space of a week or month , & c. that
then it shall be lawful to the lessor to distrain , & c., yet the lessor may
distrain of common right for the rent behind , & c ., though such words
were not put into the deed , & c.
Who May Enter for Condition Broken .
LITTLETON 'S TENURES (Littleton died in 1482).
§ 346 . And here note two things : one is that no rent (which is prop
erly so called ) may be reserved upon any feoffment , gift, or lease , but
only to the feoffor , donor , or lessor , or to their heirs , and in no manner
may it be reserved to any strange person . But if two joint-tenants make
a lease by deed indented , reserving to one of them a certain yearly rent ,
this is good enough to him to whom the rent is reserved , for he is privy
to the lease and not a stranger .
§ 347. The second thing is that no entry nor re -entry (which is all one )
may be reserved or given to any person but only to the feoffor , donor ,
or lessor, or to their heirs ; and such re -entry cannot be given to any other
person . For if a man letteth land to another for term of life by in
denture, rendering to the lessor and to his heirs a certain rent, and for
default of payment a re -entry , & c., if afterwards the lessor by a deed
granteth the reversion of the land to another in fee, and the tenant
for term of life attorn & c., if the rent be after behind , the grantee of
the reversion may distrain for the rent, because the rent is incident
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to the reversion ; but he may not enter into the land and oust the
tenant , as the lessor , or his heirs, might have done, if the reversion had
been continued in them , & c. And in this case the entry is taken away
forever ; for the grantee of the reversion cannot enter for the reason
aforesaid ; and neither the lessor nor his heirs can enter , for if the
lessor might enter, then he ought to be in hi
s
former estate , & c . , and
this may not be , because he hath aliened from him the reversion .
STATUTE 32 HENRY VIII , c . 34 ( A . D . 1540 ) .
Concerning grantees to take advantage of the conditions to be performed
by the lessees .
Where before this time divers , as well temporal as ecclesiastical and
religious persons , have made sundry leases , demises , and grants , to
divers other persons , o
f sundry manors , lordships , ferms , meases , lands ,








f years , by writing under their seal or seals , con
taining certain conditions , covenants , and agreements , to be performed ,
a
s well on the part and behalf of the said lessees and grantees , their
executors and assigns , as on the behalf of the said lessors and grantors ,





this realm , no stranger to any covenant , action , or condition , shall
take any advantage or benefit o
f
the same , b
y any means or ways in the
law , but only such as be parties o
r privies thereunto , b
y
the reason
whereof , as well all grantees of reversions , as also all grantees and pat
entees o
f
the king our sovereign lord , of sundry manors , lordships ,
granges , ferms , meases , lands , tenements , meadows , pastures , o
r
other
hereditaments late belonging to monasteries and other religious and e
c
clesiastical houses dissolved , suppressed , renounced , relinquished , for
feited , given up , or b
y
other means come into the hands and possession of
the king ' s majesty since the fourth day of February , the seven and twen
tieth year o
f
his most noble reign , be excluded to have any entry or action
against the said lessees and grantees , their executors or assigns , which the
lessors before that time might b
y
the law have had against the same lessees
for the breach o
f any condition , covenant , or agreement comprised in the
indentures o
f
their said leases , demises , and grants ; ( 3 ) be it therefore
enacted by the king , our sovereign lord , the lords spiritual and temporal ,





the same , that as well al
l
and every person and persons , and bodies




ur said sovereign lord , b
y
his letters patents of any lord
ships , manors , lands , tenements , rents , parsonages , tithes , portions , o
r







which did belong o
r appertain to any o
f
the said monasteries , and other
religious and ecclesiastical houses , dissolved , suppressed , relinquished ,
forfeited , or b
y
any other means come to the king ' s hands since the
said fourth day o
f February , the seven and twentieth year of his most
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noble reign , or which at any time heretofore did belong or appertain
to any other person or persons and after came to the hands of our said
sovereign lord , (4 ) as also all other persons being grantees or assignees
to or by our said sovereign lord , the king, or to or by any other person
or persons than the king 's highness , and the heirs , executors, successors ,
and assigns , or every of them , ( 5 ) shall and may have and enjoy like
advantages against the lessees , their executors , administrators , and as
signs , by entry for non -payment of the rent, or for doing of waste , or
other forfeiture ; ( 6 ) and also shall and may have and enjoy all and
every such like , and the same advantage, benefit , and remedies , by action
only , for not performing of other conditions , covenants and agreements ,
contained and expressed in the indentures of their said leases, demises ,




the said lessees and farmers and
grantees , their executors , administrators , and assigns , as the said les
sors , o
r grantors themselves , o
r
their heirs or successors , ought , should ,
o
r might have had and enjoyed at any time or times , ( ) in like manner
and form a
s if the reversion o
f
such lands , tenements , or hereditaments
had not come to the hands o
f
our said sovereign lord , or as our said sover
eign lord , his heirs and successors , should or might have had and en
joyed in certain cases , by virtue of the act made at the first session
o
f
this present parliament , if no such grant b
y




II . Moreover , be it enacted by authority aforesaid , that all farmers ,
lessees , and grantees , o
f lordships , manors , lands , tenements , rents , par
sonages , tithes , portions , o
r any other hereditaments for term of years ,
life , o
r
lives , their executors , administrators , and assigns , shall and
may have like action , advantage , and remedy , against all and every
person and persons and bodies politic , their heirs , successors , and as
signs , which have o
r
shall have any gift o
r grant of the king our sov
ereign lord , or o
f





same manors , lands , tenements , and other hereditaments so letten , o
r
any parcel thereof , for any condition , covenant , o
r agreement , contained
o
r expressed in the indentures o
f
their lease and leases , as the lessees , or
any o
f
them might and should have had against the said lessors , and
grantors , their heirs and successors ; ( 2 ) al
l
benefits and advantages o
f
recoveries in value by reason o
f any warranty in deed or in law b
y
voucher o
r otherwise only excepted .
Section 3 , giving the statute effect from the Sept . 15th following , is omitted .
« "Throughout the United States and territories the subject matter of the
statute of 32 Henry VIII , c . 34 , has been handled in various ways . In a
majority of jurisdictions , the statute has been in effect re -enacted . While
the wording is always different from the original statute , the same end has
probably been attained . " Sims on Covenants , pp . 73 - 4 , citing the statutes
of the several states .
" The great ohject [ o
f
the statute ] was to enable grantees o
f
reversions to
take advantage of conditions ; but the grantee of a reversion was not
prevented from taking advantage o
f
a condition broken for want of
privity , but because by his entry he would defeat his reversion granted to
him , for by the entry the reversion would be determined , which was
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deemed repugnant and contrary to the acceptance of the reversion . " 3
Sugden on Vendors * 467 , citing 5 Hen . VII, 18b , pl. 12, reported above p.
COKE LIT . 214b - 215b . - A . D . 1620 - 30 .
Another diversity is between a condition annexed to a freehold and
a condition annexed to a lease for years. For if a man make a gift
in tail or a lease for life upon condition that if the donee or lessee
goeth not to Rome before such a day the gift or lease shall cease or be
void , the grantee of the reversion shall never take advantage of this
condition , because the estate cannot cease before an entry ; but if the
lease had been but for years there the grantee should have taken ad
vantage of the like condition , because the lease for years ipso facto
by the breach of the condition without any entry was void ; for a lease
for years may begin without ceremony , and so may end without cere
mony ; but an estate of freehold cannot begin nor end without cere
mony. And of a void thing a stranger may take benefit , but not of a
voidable estate by entry . * * *
If a man have a lease for years and demise or grant the same upon
condition , & c., and die, his executors or administrators shall enter for
the condition broken , for they are privy in right, and represent
the person of the dead . [ 215a ] If cestui que use had made a lease
for years , & c ., upon condition , the feoffees should not enter for the
condition broken , for they are privy in estate , but not privy in blood.
Another diversity is in case of a lease for years , where the condition
is that the lease shall cease , or be void as is aforesaid , and where the
condition is , that the lessor shall re -enter ; for there the grantee , as
Littleton saith , shall never take benefit of the condition . And it is
to be observed , that where the estate or lease is ipso facto void by the
condition or limitation no acceptance of the rent after can make it to
have a continuance ; otherwise it is of an estate or lease voidable by
entry .
Another diversity is between conditions in deed , whereof sufficient
hath been said before, and conditions in law . As if a man make a lease
for life, there is a condition in law annexed unto it, that if the lessee
doth make a greater estate , & c ., that then the lessor may enter. Of this and
the like conditions in law , which do give an entry to the lessor , the
lessor himself and his heirs shall not only take benefit of it, but also his
assignee and the lord by escheat , everyone for the condition in law broken
in their own time.
Another diversity there is between the judgment of the common law ,
whereof Littleton wrote , and the law at this day by force of the statute
of 32 Hen . VIII, c . 34 . For by the common law no grantee or assignee
of the reversion could (as hath been said ) take advantage of a re- entry
by force of any condition . For at the common law , if a man had made
a lease for life reserving a rent, & c., and if the rent be behind a re
entry , and if the lessor grant the reversion over , the grantee should
cake no benefit of the condition , for the cause before rehearsed . But
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now by the said statute of 32 Hen . VIII, the grantee may take advantage
thereof, and upon demand of the rent and non -payment, he may re
enter. By which act it is provided , that as well every person which
shall have any grant of the king of any reversion , & c ., of any lands ,
& c., which pertained to monasteries , & c., as also all other persons be
ing grantees or assignees , & c., to or by any other person or persons,
and their heirs , executors, successors , and assignees , shall have like ad
vantage against the lessees, & c., by entry for the non -payment of the
rent, or for doing of waste , or other forfeiture , & c ., as the said lessors
or grantors themselves ought or might have had . Upon this act divers
resolutions and judgments have been given , which are necessary to be
known : 1. That the said statute is general , viz . that the grantee of
the reversion of every common person , as well as the king, shall take
advantage of conditions . 2. That the statute doth extend to grants
made by the successors of the king , albeit the king be only named in
the act. 3. That where the statute speaketh of lessees that the same
doth not extend to gifts in tail . 4. That where the statute speaks of
grantees and assignees of the reversion , that an assignee of part of the
state of the reversion may take advantage of the condition . As if
lessee for life be , & c., and the reversion is granted for life , & c . So
if lessee for years be , and the reversion is granted for years , the gran
tee for years shall take benefit of the condition in respect to this word
( executors ) in the act. 5. That a grantee of part of the reversion
shall not take advantage of the condition ; as if the lease be of three
acres, reserving a rent upon condition , and the reversion is granted
of two acres , the rent shall be apportioned by the act of the parties, but the
condition is destroyed , for that it is entire and against common right. 6 .
That in the king' s case the condition in that case is not destroyed , but re
mains still in the king . 7. By act in law a condition may be apportioned in
the case of a common person ; as if a lease for years be made of two acres ,
one of the nature of borough English , the other at the common law ; and
the lessor having issue two sons , dieth , each of them shall enter for the
condition broken ; and likewise a condition shall be apportioned by the act
and wrong of the lessee, as hath been said in the chapter of Rents . 8 . If a
lease for life be made , reserving a rent upon condition , & c., the lessor levies
a fine of the reversion , he is grantee or assignee of the reversion ; butwith
out attornment he shall not take advantage of the condition , for the mak
ers of the statute intended to have all necessary incidents observed , other
wise it might be mischievous to the lessee. 9. There is a diversity between
a condition that is compulsory and a power of revocation that is vol
untary for a man that hath a power of revocation may by his own act
extinguish his power of revocation in part, as by levying a fine of part ;
and yet the power shall remain for the residue, because it is in the nature
of a limitation , and not a condition ; and so it was resolved in the Earl
of Shrewsbury's Case in the court of wards , Easter , 39 Eliz . & Mich . 40
& 41 Eliz . 10 . If the lessor bargain and sell the reversion by deed in
dented and enrolled , the bargainee is not in the per of the bargainor ,













and yet he is an assignee within the statute . [215b ] So if the lessor
grant the reversion in fee to the use o
f
A and his heirs , A is a sufficient
assignee within the statute ; because he comes in by the act and limit
ation o
f







y , and they be assignees to him although they be not b
y
him ; but such as come in merely b
y
act in law , as the lord of the vil
lein , the lord b
y
escheat , the lord that entereth or claimeth for mort
main , o
r
the like , shall not take benefit o
f
this statute . 11 . If the
lessor in the case before , bargain and sell the reversion b
y
deed indented and enrolled , or if the lessor make a feoffment in fee ,
and the lessee re -enter , the grantee or feoffee shall not take any ad
vantage o
f any condition without making notice to the lessee . 12 . Al






the rent , or
for doing of waste , or other forfeiture , yet the grantees or assignees
shall not take benefit o









either are incident to the reversion , as rent ,
o
r
for the benefit o
f
the estate , as for not doing of waste , for keeping









such like ; and not for the payment of any sum
in gross , delivery of corn , wood , or the like , so as other forfeiture shall
b
e
taken for other forfeitures like to those examples which were there
put (videlicet ) o
f payment of rent and not doing of waste , which are






life a certid the gr
a
ANON . , 22 Edw . IV . - A . D . 1483 . — Brooke Abr . t . Conditions 167 , 22 Edw .
IV , 17 .
t . The master and associates o
f
S
t . Bartholomews in London
had granted to J . S . for life a certain corody , & c . , for doing such serv
ices a
s
N and others had done , and grantee leased to the master
and his associates for seven years rendering 10£ rent . The grantee
brought debt , and the grantor said that the plaintiff had not done the





lease to the grantor which is a suspense , b
y
which it was argued that
the plaintiff should be paid his rent and the corody ; and see on this
case 2
0 Edw . IV , 18 , 19 , BRIAN , C . J . If a man enfeoffs me on
condition to pay to him 10£ on such a day or to re -enter , and I lease the
land to him rendering rent , and at the day I do not pay the 10£ , here
he may retain the land , and the rent reserved b
y
me is extinguished .
But if a man makes a feoffment in fee rendering rent with a clause
o
f re -entry for non - payment , if the feoffee re -enfeoff the feoffor the

















the lessee to the lessor for years o
r
life , for by this
the rent is suspended .
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NOTA , Easter Term . - A . D . 1496 . — Year Books, 11 Hen . VII, 17, pl. 14.
If I should lease for a term of years on condition that he should go
to Rome such a day , and if not that his estate should cease , here
if the lessor grant the reversion to another , and he attorn , and later
the condition is broken , he who has the reversion may enter , for by
breach of the condition the estate is void and determined ; so of a term
for life. But if the condition was that he might re-enter for the con
dition broken , and he had granted the reversion over , the grantee may
not enter .
CHAWORTH v . PHILLIPS , Moor 876 . About 7 Jac. 1, A . D . 1610 .
It was resolved that if a lease was made on condition to be void if
10€ be not paid by a dav named , the grantee of the reversion cannot
enter by such condition , because it is collateral . Resolved , also , that if
a lessee for 20 years make a lease for 10 years on such condition , and
afterwards the lessee for 20 years surrender to him in reversion , he
in reversion may not have benefit of the condition , because he is in of











WARREN V . LEE , in the King ' s Bench , Hilary , 2 & 3 Phil . & Mary . - A . D .
1556 . — Dyer 126b .
In trespass for breaking a close , b
y
Jasper Warren against Lee and
others . The defendants pleaded not guilty , and at nisi prius there
was a demurrer in law upon the evidence . And the case was : that
the father o
f
the plaintiff was seised in fee of land holden in
socage , and b
y
his last will in writing gave the land in the premises
thereof to his wife for the term o
f
[ * 127a ] her life , on condition that
she should provide for the said Jasper , being the eldest son a
t
school ,
and bring him up in virtue and good morals a
t
her own expense until
h
e should be of the full age of 21 years ; and afterwards in the end of
th will , he gave the land after the death of his wife to his second son
in tail , reserving the fee - simple ; and died . The wife entered and
broke the condition ; and he said Jasper , after he came of age , entered ,
and brought this action o
f
trespass during the life of the wife . The
question was , whether his entry was lawful o
r
not . First , it is to be
considered whether a condition can be knit to a devise or not ? And
it seems it may ; and this by the statutes of wills 32 [ Hen . 8 c . 1 ] and
3
5 Hen . 8 c . 5 which give power to the devisor to make devises a
t his
free will and pleasure for the advancement of his wife , & c . , or other
wise , & c . Also , to prove this b
y
a case in Littleton ( $ 125 ] , that the
executors of the devisor of land devisable by custom shall sell the land ,
they do it not , the heir enters , & c . Also , such devises o
f
land in use
have been common . And see a condition , that the devisee shall pay rent
to the wife of the devisor and a clause o
f
distress to the wife for the same ;
i Note how differently this free will and pleasure phrase is construed in
Soulle v . Gerrard , post 226 .
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whether this destroys the condition , quaere bene , H . 18 Eliz . [Dyer
348a ] Also , note for whose benefit and advantage this condition was made,
and by whom it ought to be performed . Also , whether the condition knit
to the particular estate only be destroyed and made void by the limitation
over in tail , the fe
e
-simple remaining in the devisor , o
r
not ? And it seems
not , although the remainder had been over in fee ; for there is a difference
between the reservation o
f
a rent and o
f
a condition ; for the one , viz . the
latter ,may be without deed b
y
livery accordingly , and the former not with
out deed indented , & c . ; and although the remainder be not entailed upon
the condition also , yet it takes effect upon this conditional livery ; and
se
e
Perkins accordant thereto , the last chapter of his book [ $ 831 ) ,
who makes no question o
f
the condition , but whether he in remainder




it ; and it seems not , & c . See also ,
Fitz . Nat . Brev . in ex gravi querela [ 201 C ] such a devise upon condi
tion , & c . , remainder over in tail without condition , and good . And if
a man make a lease for life reserving a rent and re -entry for default o
f
payment , remainder over in tail ; this remainder does not destroy the




one and the same time . But when
the condition is once annexed to the particular estate , and then by an
other deed the reversion is granted by the maker o
f
the condition ,




the devisor for breach o
f
the condition be lawful , or not ?
And what estate he shall be adjudged to have ? And whether the re




re - entry or entry are expressly reserved to him , because
it is tacitly implied in law when the condition is to be performed b
y
the devisee . [ * 127 b ] And this sort of condition carries with it a
penalty , viz . , the defeasance of the estate to which it is annexed . And
in common reason h
e who was prejudiced b
y
the devise , vi
z
. , the heir
who is disinherited by it , shall take advantage of the breach of the
condition . For b
y
Glanvil lib . 7 , c . 1 , fol . 44 the father cannot make
a devise o
f
land without the assent of the heir , but with his assent
he may . And it seems that the remainder is not destroyed b
y
the
entry , but the heir shall have only an estate for the life of the wife ; for
there is a difference between this remainder made b
y
will and a re
mainder created b
y
deed and livery ; for in the last case the entry de
feats the livery , but it is not so in a will ; for a remainder b
y
will , is
* If it is a condition , clearly the right of entry for breach exists as a nat
ural consequence , without express reservation .
* While Glanvil does make this statement , we hear little of it after him ;
and certainly it could not hold after the statute of wills expressly permitted
the devisor to dispose a
t his free will and pleasure .
Observe that the future estate here is called a remainder ; the name
executory devise is a later invention . Observe that the doctrine , that future
estates by will are liable to the rules as to remainders by deed if by possi
bility they could take effect as strict remainders , was as yet unknown .
This rule is believed to have arisen from a desire to limit the scope of the
rule in Pells v . Brown ( 1620 ) , post 242 .
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good although the particular estate were never good ;4 as if to a
monk , & c. And the law in this case shall be taken in the same manner
as if the devisor had expressly reserved an entry and retainer during
the life of the wife ; and such tempering and qualifying of the penalty
shall not altogether defeat the estate , & c ., as Littleton ( $ 327 ] says
of re - entry and retainer until , & c. * * * Also the case in 29 assize
[ 159 pl. 17 ] of a devise to Clerk to be priest, remainder to a com
monalty in fee, & c ., and he in remainder shall not take advantage of
the breach , because no words of the will give it to him , and also he is
a stranger to it ; but if the words had been provided that if the con
dition be broken , his estate shall cease , and he in remainder may im
mediately enter ; there he should take advantage , although he be a
stranger , because the estate determines there without re-entry . And
therefore , if I make such a conditional lease for life, with condition ,
viz . that the estate shall cease , and then alien the reversion , the alienee
shall take advantage of this condition , because the estate determines
without entry , & c . * * *
VAN RENSSELAER v . BALL, New York Ct. of Appeals , March , 1859. - 19
N . Y . 100 .
Ejectment for 1201 acres of land . Plaintiff gave in evidence an
indenture dated Oct. 20 , 1792 , by which Stephen Van Rensselaer con
veyed the land in question to William Ball in fee , reserving an
annual rent payable in wheat , fowls, and a day's service each year . The
deed contained a covenant by the grantee for himself , his heirs , repre
sentatives, and assigns to pay the rent and contained clauses for distress ,
and for re -entry on condition if the rent should not be paid . It was
proved that W . Ball died 12 years before the trial, that defendant his
son was in possession , and had paid the rent for his father but not
since his death . It was also proved that S. Van Rensselaer died Jan .
26 , 1839 , leaving a will by which he devised to the plaintiff " al
l
his
estate , lands , tenements , rents , and hereditaments , in the manor of
Rensselaerwick , on the west side of the Hudson river ” including the
lands here in question . The defendant objected that the indenture did
not create the relation o
f
landlord and tenant between the parties to it
o
r
their representatives ; that ejectment did not li
e except between land
lord and tenant ; that the reservation called rent was not such in law ,
but a personal contract between the original parties , affecting only
themselves and their representatives , and did not attach to o
r concern
the land ; that if this were not so , the plaintiff as devisee of the rent
could not enter or maintain ejectment , and that even if he could do
that , he must make strict demand o
f
the rent before suing , and must show
that there was no sufficient distress on the premises . The judge over
ruled the several objections , gave judgment for the plaintiff ; and de
fendant ' s counsel excepted , appealed to the general term , and now ap
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peals from the judgment of the general term affirming the judgment
below .
[* 102. ] DENIO , J .: A condition annexed to a conveyance in fee ,
that the grantee his heirs and assigns shall pay to the grantor and his
heirs an annual rent and that in default o
f payment the grantor or
his heirs may re -enter , is a lawful condition . Littleton puts it as an
example o
f
a condition in deed , at the commencement of that part o
f
his treatise which relates to estates upon condition . Such an estate ,
h
e says , " is as if a man b
y
deed indented enfeoffs another in fee simple ,
reserving to him and his heirs yearly a certain rent payable a
t
one
feast or divers feasts , per annum on condition that if the rent be be
hind , & c . , that it shall be lawful for the feoffor and his heirs to enter .
& c . , and if it happen the rent to be behind b
y
a week after any day of
payment of it , o
r by a month after any day of payment o
f
it , or b
y
a half
a year , & c . , that then it shall be lawful for the feoffor or his heirs to
enter , ” & c . In these cases , if the rent be not paid at such time , o
r
before
such time limited and specified within the condition comprised in the
indenture , then may the feoffor or his heirs enter into such lands or
tenements , and then of his former estate to have and hold , and the
feoffee quite to oust thereof . And it is called an estate upon condition ,
because that the estate o
f
the feoffee is defeasible , if the condition be not
performed , & c . ( 8 325 . ) The systematic writers upon the law of real
property from that time to the present have assumed the legality o
f
such conditions ; and the substance o
f
the condition in the conveyance
under consideration is usually put as an example . 2 B
l
. Com . 154 ;
2 Cruise ' s Dig . c . 1 § 1 p
l
. 3 , 9 ; 4 Kent Com . 123 . Among the numerous
authorities referred to b
y
the defendant ' s counsel , I have been unable
to find a single dictum or the slightest hint that such conditions were
contrary to law , or that they could only be attached to estates for life
o
r years , or that a common law tenure between the parties , or a re
version in the grantors , were necessary to uphold them . There is
moreover , nothing in the case o
f
De Peyster V . Michael , 2 Seld [467 ]
lately decided in this court , which , properly understood , creates a
doubt as to the validity o
f
such a condition , or the lawfulness o
f
annex
ing one to an estate in fee . [ * 103 ] .
The books which treat o
f
such estates d
o , indeed , state that a con
dition repugnant to the nature of the estate granted is void ; and the in
stances given are o
f
feoffments , or conveyances in fee , b
y
bargain and
sale , with a condition that the feoffee o
r grantee shall not alien ; and they
say that even this could be done before the statute o
f
quia emptores










the tenant . Coke
Lit . * 223a . The argument in the opinion of the chief judge in
De Peyster v . Michael consisted in showing that a condition for the
payment o
f




the land and improvements
upon each sale b
y
the grantee , or those who should succeed to his




simple , within the sense of the authorities ; and that, although this
could be done where there was a reversion , as upon the grant of an
estate for life or years, or a possibility of reverter, as upon a feoffment
before the statute of quia em ptores , it was unlawful in this state , in
respect to a conveyance in fee , after the re -enactment of that statute
by the legislature . It seems to me, that there is nothing in the reason
ing of that opinion to encourage one to question the validity of the
clauses of re -entry for non - payment of rent in a conveyance in fee, even
though the chief judge had not taken care to state , as he has done, that
the principles which he laid down would leave to the grantee in these
conveyances , and his representatives , the full benefit of the remedy of
re -entry for the enforcement of their right to the rent .
But assuming that the estate conveyed to William Ball was de
feasible by the non -performance of the condition to pay the annual
rent ; no one but the grantor or his heirs could , at common law , enter
for the breach of a condition subsequent . Littleton 347 ; Coke Lit .
* 214b ; 4 Kent Com . 127 ; Nicoll v . N . Y . & E . R . R ., 12 N . Y . 121.
This was the consequence of a maxim of the common law that nothing
in action , entry or re -entry , could be granted over ; for , as Coke says :
“ Under color thereof pretended titles might be granted to great men ,
whereby right might be trodden [ * 104 ] down and the weak oppressed ,
which the common law forbiddeth , as men to grant before they be in
possession .” Coke Lit. Supra . The reason upon which this maxim
was founded has , no doubt , become in great measure obsolete ; still ,
the principle that the right of entry cannot in general be granted
over is, I am inclined to believe, still a part of the law , notwithstanding
the tendency of modern decisions and the provisions of the code . This
then is the first difficulty in the plaintiff 's case. He brings this action
as the assignee , by devise , of the grantor , and not as his heir ; and he
is disabled from maintaining the action unless the act of 1805 and its
different re - enactments apply to the case . Laws 1805 , c . 98 ; 1 R . L .
1813 , 364 $ 3 ; 1 R . S . . 748 § 25 . I have elsewhere stated the origin and
history o
f







which this forms a supplement , and have shown that it enabled
the grantees o
f
a perpetual rent charge to maintain an action on
the covenants for the payment o
f rent . But the original statute of 32
Henry VIII , c . 34 , gives to the assignee mentioned in it not only a
remedy by action , but the " like advantages ” " by entry for non -payment
o
f
the rent ” which the grantors might have had , and this feature is pre
served in the re -enactments in this state ( 2 Jones & Var . 184 ; 1 R . L .
1813 , 363 , $ 1 ; in the Revised Statutes o
f
1830 the expression is that the
assignees “ shall have the same remedy by entry action o
r otherwise , "
a
s their grantor or lessor had or might have had . 1 R . S . 747 § 23 .




1805 , and con
tinued in the revisions , that this provision shall extend to grants or
leases in fe
e reserving rents , as well as to leases for life or years . But
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in all the acts the expression is retained , which is found in the statute
of Henry VIII , “ as if the reversion had remained in the lessor or
grantor .” In grants in fee, there being no reversion, these words are
inapplicable , or at least incongruous : and to make the provision coherent
they should be read as though the language were , “ as if said right of
entry had remained in the lessor or grantor ;" or this particular expression
in the statutes [ * 105 ] should be limited to the case embraced in the
provision where the grantor had a reversion , and be dropped in the
cases it is made to relate to grants in fee , upon the rule of construc
tion redendo singula singulis . No one can for a moment doubt the
intention of the legislature to confer upon the assignees of a grantor
in fee reserving rent, the remedy by entry for the non -payment of such
rent , precisely as the grantor himself had it before he parted with the
right. In other words , the design is plain to make the right of entry
transferable , and thus to change to this extent , in favor of this class
of conditions , the rule of the common law . This is so manifest to my
mind from the reading of the statutes that anything I could further
say would be likely to obscure rather than to elucidate it.
There is the question , in the next place , whether where one has a
perpetual rent and a right of entry on the land of another to enforce
it
s payment , transmissible to his heirs , but not legally transferable by
sale o




actment declaring that thenceforward the rent and the right of entry
shall be subject to transfer like a rent incident to a reversion ; in
other words , whether the act of 1805 can be applied to conveyances and
reservations of rent existing when it was passed , without violating the
provision o
f
the constitution of the United States , which protects
contracts from being impaired b
y
the state legislatures . I think the
statute is not subject to question on that ground . A conveyance , I
agree , is as fully within the constitutional provision as an executory
contract ; and the only point is whether the obligations o
f
the contract
contained in this conveyance have been impaired within the sense o
f
the provision . Clearly the rights of Van Rensselaer , the grantor , have
not been affected unfavorably . They have been manifestly advanced ;
for the rent and the remedy to enforce it , have been improved b
y
hav





his representatives or assigns , been increased , or their rem




a re -entry for non -payment ( * 106 ) o
f
rent before
the statute , and no new or further liability is attached to it now . A
re - entry can b
e
sustained in precisely the same cases in which it could
before , and in no others . The contract in question is affected in pre




f procedure , when it rendered them capable o
f
as
signment so as to vest the legal title and the right to sue upon them in
the assignee . § 111 . Yet the courts have uniformly applied this pro
vision o
f
the code to all existing contracts , equally with those made
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after the code was enacted . As to the remedies of the grantee and his
representatives and privies in estate , if they have been changed at al
l
,
it is to give them a right of action where none existed before . The
act of Henry VIII , which has been regularly followed in this particular
in our re -enactment , and in the revision , gave a reciprocal remedy to
the grantee or lessee , and his representatives , against the assignee of




1805 , bringing grants in fee within
the purview o
f
these provisions , the grantees acquired a remedy against
the assignees o
f the grantor , which they did not possess before . They
can now sue such assignees for any breach o
f
the grantor ' s covenants ,





the statutes prior to the act o
f
1805 ; and they are not
deprived o
f any remedy which they might have had against the grantor
himself , and his personal representatives , upon his express covenants .
It is , moreover , argued on behalf o
f
the defendant , that if all other
difficulties were removed , an action in the nature of ejectment could not
b
e maintained without strict demand o
f
the rent on the land and at
the precise time a
t
which it became payable — a formality which it is
admitted has not taken place . The common law requires such a demand
preparatory to bringing ejectment . ( Coke Lit . * 2016 , 202a . ) ; and it
was for the purpose o
f avoiding “ the many niceties which attend re
entries a
t
common law , " a
s it is expressed in the preamble , that the
statute 4 Geo . II , c . 28 , was passed . It is limited to cases between
landlord and tenant where there is a right by [ * 107 ] law in the former to
re -enter ; and it makes the service o
f
a declaration in ejectment to stand
in the place and stead o
f
a demand and re -entry . The provision was
early re -enacted in this country , and has been continued in each sub
sequent revision o
f
the laws . 2 Jones & Var . 238 , § 23 ; 1 K . & R . 134 ,
§ 2
3 ; 1 R . L . , 1813 , 440 $ 23 ; 2 R . S . 505 § 30 . The statutes require ,
to warrant the action , evidence that no sufficient distress can be found
o
n the premises to satisfy the rent due . The defendant ' s position is that




n annual payment upon a conveyance in fee is not properly rent , as no
distress can o
f






n express provision contained in the indenture ; and the
statute requires it to be a case between landlord and tenant , which
implies , it is said , that the relation should exist a
t
common law . But
such reservations as the one before u
s
were considered as creating a
rent within the legal meaning o
f
that term , from the time o
f
Littleton
to the present . We have seen that it was called rent in § 325 of the
treatise already quoted ; and b
y
looking into § 217 and § 218 , we see
that it was one o
f
the recognized species o
f
rent , and was called rent
charge . It was rent , too , as has been shown , for the non -payment of
which a re -entry was given a
t
common law , where the right to re -enter
was provided for in the deed . The act o
f
1805 assumes that rent may
b
e
reserved upon a conveyance in fee , and the preamble o
f that act
states that such reservations had been , long in use in this state . Now
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the inconvenience which the statutes making a declaration in eject
ment stand in the place of a strict demand were intended to remedy,
was the great particularity and nicety attending this demand at common




s upon leases for life or years . I do not , therefore , see any
reason , in the nature of the case , o
r
in the language of the statutes , for
confining this remedy b
y ejectment to cases of rent service ; and I am
o
f opinion that it is applicable to all cases o
f
non -payment of rent
where there was a right to re - enter at common law . * * *
These reasons have led me to the conclusion that none of the points





sustained ; and I am in favor of affirming the judgment of the
supreme court .
ALLEN and SHELDON , JJ . , took no part in the decision , all the
other judges concurring . Judgment affirmed .
Division and Waiver o
f
Conditions .
ANONYMOUS , Easter , 20 Eliz . - A . D . 1578 . — Moor 113 .
A man seised o
f copyhold held o
f
a manor , part borough English
and part at common law , leased the land b
y
deed indented for 21 years
by license of the lord , provided always that if the lessor , his wife , heirs ,
assigns , or any of them , give a year ' s warning to the lessee that the
husband , wife , or heirs will dwell there , that then the lease shall be
void , except that the lessor or his heirs shall pay to the lessee 20£ . The
lessor and his wife died , and the reversion o
f
the one part descended to
the oldest son , and the reversion o
f
the other part descended to the
youngest , and he purchased the reversion o
f
his older brother ; and
later , claiming to be a person within the proviso , gave notice
to the lessee . On this two questions were moved : 1 , if he
was such a person as might give the warning or if the condi
tion is destroyed , the reversion having been severed ; 2 , if b
y
the words , except the lessor o
r
his heirs shall pay , & c . , the intent was
that this should be a consideration to the lessee for his departure , if
these words were sufficient to give the lessee the 20€ . MOUNSON and
MANWOOD [JJ . ] held that he might give the warning , and that
the law which had severed the reversion had severed also the condition ,
although a
t




s heir and of the other as assignee o
f
the older brother he might
have advantage of the condition . But MANWOOD , J . , said that if
h
e had made feoffment o
f
the borough English lands , and had issue
two sons and died , now the elder only might have advantage o
f
the
condition , for that is a condition in gross , but in this case it was a
reversion reserved to the lessor . But if two joint tenants with war
ranty make partition , o
r
if one grant his part to another , now the
warranty is gone ; for this is their own act , and they were not compellable
276 CONDITIONS .
to make partition . And so there was a diversity taken . And as to the
other question they held that the words were sufficient to give him the
20£. * * *
HARVY v. OSWOLD , in B . R . Trinity , 38 Eliz . - A . D . 1596 . —Moor 456 .
In ejectione firmae the case was that one made a lease rendering rent,
with condition that the lessee should not lease without assent of the
lessor. He leased part , and the lessor without notice of it accepted
the entire rent of the first lessee ; and now the question was if he might
enter by the condition . And it was adjudged that he might notwith
standing the acceptance , because he had no notice of the breach , which
want of notice the defendant had pleaded in his rejoinder ; but if he had
notice the acceptance seems a bar, though the condition was collateral .
Per GAWDY and POPHAM .
DUMPOR 'S CASE , in King 's Bench , Hilary Term 45 Eliz . - A . D . 1603 . - 4
Coke, 119b , 1 Smith Lead . Cas. * 85 .
“ The profession have always wondered at Dumpor's Case , but it has been
law so many centuries that we cannot now reverse it." Per Mansfield ,
C. J ., in Doe v. Bliss , 4 Taunton 736 .
In trespass between Dumpor and Symms , upon the general issue ,
the jurors gave a special verdict to this effect : the president and
scholars of the college of the Corpus Christi in Oxford , made a lease
for years in anno 10 Eliz ., of the land now in question , to one Bolde ,
proviso that the lessee or his assigns should not alien the premises to
any person or persons without the special license of the lessors . And
afterwards the lessors by their deed , anno 13 Eliz . licensed the lessee
to alien , or demise the land , or any part of it, to any person or per
sons quibuscumque . And afterwards anno 15 Eliz . the lessee assigned
the term to one Tubbe , who by his last will devised it to his son , and by
the same will made his son executor , and died . The son entered
generally , and the testator was not indebted to any person , and after
wards the son died intestate , and the ordinary committed adminis
tration to one who assigned the term to the defendant . The president
and scholars by warrant of attorney entered for the condition broken ,
and made a lease to the plaintiff for 21 years , who entered on the
defendant , who re-entered , upon which re - entry this action of trespass
was brought ; and that upon the lease made to Bolde the yearly rent
of 33s. 4d . was reserved , and upon the lease to the plaintiff , the yearly
rent of 22s. was only reserved . And the jurors prayed upon all this matter
the advice and discretion of the court, and upon this verdict judg
ment was given against the plaintiff. And in this case divers points
were debated and resolved : 1. That the alienation by license to Tubbe ,
had determined the condition , so that no alienation which he might
afterwards make could break the proviso or give cause of entry to the
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time and that the same estate should remain subject to the proviso after .
And although the proviso be , that the lessee or his assigns should not
alien , yet when the lessors license the lessee to alien , they shall never
defeat, by force of the said proviso , the term which is absolutely aliened by
their license , in as much as the assignee has the same term which was
assigned with their assent : so if the lessors dispense with one aliena
tion they thereby dispense with a
ll





the lessor ' s license and of the lessee ' s assignment ,
the estate and interest o
f
Tubbe was absolute it was not possible that
his assignee who has his estate and interest shall be subject to the





others , so it is as to the persons , for if the lessors
dispense with one , all the others are at liberty . And therefore it was
adjudged , Trinity 28 Eliz . , Rot . 256 , in the common pleas between
Leeds and Crompton ( Cro . Eliz . 816 , Godb . 93 , Noy 32 , 4 Leon . 58 , 2
Bulstr . 291 ) that where the Lord Stratford made a lease to three , upon
condition that they or any o
f
them should not alien without the assent of
the lessor , and afterwards one aliened by his assent , and afterwards the
other two aliened without license , and it was adjudged that in this





the lessor was determined in all . And POPHAM , C . J . , denied the
case in 16 Eliz . , Dyer 334 , that if a man lease land upon condition
that he shall not alien the land or any part o
f
it without the assent o
f
the lessor , and afterwards he aliens part with the assent o
f
the lessor ,
that he cannot alien the residue without the assent of the lessor : and
conceived that is not law , for he said the condition could not be
divided o
r apportioned by the act o
f
the parties ; and in the same
case a
s





condition is determined ; for although the lessee alien any part of
the residue , the lessor shall not enter into the part aliened b
y
the
license , and therefore the condition being determined in part is de
termined in a
ll . And therefore the chief justice said he thought the
said case was falsely printed , for he held clearly that it was not law .
NOTE reader , Paschae 14 Eliz . Rot . 1015 , in the common pleas , that
where the lease was made b
y
deed indented for 21 years o
f
three
manors , A , B , C . rendering rent , for A 6
1 . for B 51 , for C 101 . , to
b
e paid in a place out o
f
the land , with a condition o
f
re -entry into
all three manors for default of payment o
f
the said rents , o
r any o
f
them , and afterwards the lessor b
y
deed indented and enrolled bar







A to one and his heirs , and afterwards b
y
another
deed indented and enrolled bargained and sold a
ll
the residue to an
other and his heirs ; and if the second bargainee should enter for condition
broken or not was the question . And it was adjudged that he should
not enter for the condition broken ; because the condition being entire ,











the reversion is destroyed in a
















a condition may be apportioned in two cases : 1 , By act in law ; 2 ,
B
y
act and wrong of the lessee . By act in law , as if a man seised of
two acres , the one in fee , and the other in borough English , has issue
two sons and leases both acres for life o
r
years rendering r t , with
condition , the lessor dies ; in this case b
y
t s descent , which is an
act in law , the reversion , rent , and condition are divided . By act
and g o
f
the lessee , as if the lessee makes a feoffment of part or
commits waste in part , and the lessor enters for the forfeiture or re
covers the place wasted , there the rent and condition shall be appor
tioned ; for none shall take advantage of his own wrong , and the





the lessee . And the
Lord Dyer , then chief justice of the common pleas , in the same case
said , that he who enters for a condition broken ought to be in o
f
the
same estate which he had at the time o
f
the condition created , and
that he cannot have when he has departed with the reversion o
f part ;
and with that reason agrees Littleton 80b . And vide 4 & 5 Phil . & Mary ,
Dyer 152 p
l
. 7 , where a proviso in an indenture of lease was that the
lessee his executors or assigns should not alien to any person without
license o
f




the lessee ; the lessee
died , his executor assigned it over to one of his sons ; it was held by
Stamford and Catlin JJ . ] that the son might alien to whom he pleased
without license , for the condition as to the son was determined , which
agrees with the resolution of the principal point in the case at bar . 2 .
it was resolved that the statutes o
f
1
3 Eliz . c . 10 ; and 18 Eliz c . 11 ,
concerning leases made b
y
deans and chapters , colleges and other ec
clesiastical persons , are general laws whereof the court ought to take
knowledge though they are not found b
y
the jurors , and so it was re
solved between Claypool and Carter [ Yelv . 106 , 1 Leon . 306 , Moor
593 ] in a writ of error in the king ' s bench .
Conditions in Restraint o
f
Alienation .
LITTLETON ' S TENURES , 88 360 -363 . Littleton died in A . D . 1482 .
$ 360 . Also if a feoffment be made upon this condition , that the feoffee
shall not alien the land to any , this condition is void , because when a
man is enfeoffed o
f lands or tenements , he hath power b
y
law to alien
them to any person ; for if such a condition should be good then the con
dition should oust him o
f
all the power which the law gives him , which
should b
e against reason , and therefore such a condition is void .
" And the like law is o
f
a devise in fee upon condition that the devisee
shall not alien , the condition is void , and so it is of a grant , release , con
firmation , or any other conveyance whereby a fee simple doth pass ; for
it is absurd and repugnant to reason that he that hath no possibility to
have the land revert to him , should restrain his feoffee in fee simple of all
his power to alien . And so it is if a man be possessed of a lease for years ,
or of a horse , or of any other chattel , real or personal , and give or sell his
whole interest or property therein upon condition that the donee or vendee
shall not alien the same , the same is void because his whole interest and
property is out of him , so as he hath no possibility of a reverter . " Coke
Lit . 223a ( A . D . 1620 - 30 ) .
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$ 361. But if the condition be such that the feoffee shall not alien
to such a one, naming his name, or to any of his heirs , or of the issues of
such a one , & c., or the like, which conditions do not take away all power
of alienation from the feoffee , & c ., then such condition is good .
$ 362 . Also , if lands be given in tail on condition that the tenant in
tail nor his heirs shall not alien in fee nor in tail nor for the term
of another 's life , but only for their own lives, & c ., such condition is
good ; and the reason is that when he makes such alienation and discon
tinuance of the entail he does contrary to the intent of the donor for
which the statute of Westminster 2d , c. 1, was made , by which statute
the estates in tail were ordained .
" If a feoffment be made upon condition that the feoffee shall not alien
in mortmain , this is good because such alienation is prohibited by law ;
and regularly whatsoever is prohibited by law may be prohibited by condi
tion , be it malum prohibitum or malum in se." Coke Lit . 223b .
" And yet if a man make a gift in tail upon condition that he shall not
make a lease for his own life , albeit the state be lawful , yet the condition
is good , because the reverson is in the donor ; as if a man make a lease
for life or years upon condition that they shall not grant over their estate
or let the land to others , this is good , and yet the grant or lease should be
lawful. * * * If a gift in tail be made upon condition that the donee
shall not alien ; this condition is good to some intents and void to some ;
for as to all those alienations which amount to any discontinuance of the
state tail (as Littleton here speaketh ) or is against the statute of West
minster 2d , the condition is good without question ; but as to a common
recovery the condition is void , because this is no discontinuance but a bar ,
and this common recovery is not restrained by the said statute ." Coke
Lit. 223b .
$ 363. For it is proved by the words comprised in the same statute
that the will of the donor in such cases shall be observed , and when the
tenant in tail makes such discontinuance he does contrary to that, & c .
And also in estates in tail of any tenements when the reversion of the
fee simple or the remainder of the fee simple is in other persons when
such discontinuance is made , then the fee simple in the remainder is
discontinued ; and because the tenant in tail shall do no such thing ,
against the profit of his issues and good right, such condition is good ,
as is aforesaid .
$720 . I have heard say that in the time of King Richard II there
was a judge of the common pleas dwelling in Kent called Richel , who
had issue divers sons , and his intent was that his eldest son should
have certain lands and tenements to him and to the heirs of his body
begotten , and for default of issue the remainder to the second son , & c .,
and so to the third son , & c . ; and because he would that none of his sods
should alien or make warranty to bar or hurt the others that should
be in remainder , & c ., he caused an indenture to be made to this effect ,
viz . that the lands and tenements were given to his eldest son upon
such condition that if the eldest son alien in fee or in fee tail , & c.,
or if any of his sons alien & c ., that then their estate should cease and
be void , and that then the same lands and tenements immediately
should remain to the second son and to the heirs of his body begotten ,
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and so to the last, the remainder to his other sons, and livery of seisin
was made accordingly .
721. But it seems by reason , that al
l
such remainders in the form




value , and this for three causes : One
cause is that every remainder that begins b
y
deed ought to b
e
in him
to whom the remainder is entailed by force o
f
the same deed
before the livery o
f
seisin is made to him who shall have the free
hold ; for in such case the growing and being o
f




seisin to him that shall have the freehold , and such remainder







case aforesaid , & c .
722 . The second cause is , if the first son alien the tenements in fe
e ,
then is the freehold and the fee simple in the alienee and in none
other ; and if the donor had any reversion , b
y
such alienation the re
version is discontinued ; then how in reason can it be that such remainder
shall commence it
s being and it
s growing immediately after such
alienation made to a stranger who has b
y
the same alienation a free
hold and fee simple , & c . ? And also , if such remainder should be good
then might he enter upon the alienee where he had no manner o
f
right before the alienation , which should be inconvenient .
723 . The third cause is , when the condition is such , that if the elder
son alien , & c . that his estate shall cease and be void , & c . , then after such




such condition , as
it seems ; and so the donor or his heirs in such case ought sooner to
have the land than the second son that had not any right before such
alienation ; and so it seems that such remainders in the case aforesaid
are void .
Note that Richel ' s settlement was long before common recoveries were
invented , and that Littleton wrote about the time of the decision of Tal
tarium ' s Case , ante .
ANON . , in Assize , 33 Edw . II
I , A . D . 1360 — Liber Assize 33 , p
l
. 11 , p . 201 .
It was found by verdict of the assize that one J was seized of certain
lands and gave the same to one R and Alice his wife , to them and the
heirs of their two bodies begotten , on condition that if the tenant or his
heirs alien , the donor and his heirs may enter ; the tenants in tail entered
and aliened to a stranger , who aliened over to a man and to his wife and
the heirs o
f
the man , the man died leaving issue two sons ; the first
donor had issue and died , the issue of the first donor within age entered
o
n
the wife and leased the land to the wife for term o
f
her life , and
then the wife died and he in reversion entered and leased to the son
o
f
the man and his wife to hold a
t
will , and the issue o
f
the man and
wife died and the issue o
f






t will entered , on whom the issue of the donor brought
assize .
Hill for the tenant said : Since it is found that the first feoffee was in
loy title and the second also , and died seized , and that his issue came to
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the tenancy , which can only be considered as by descent of the inheritance ,
to which his brother had title , therefore we demand judgment that he is
barred .
Finch for the plaintiff : There is nothing to determine but whether the
condition on which the first gift was dependent may be maintained by the
law . I believe by the law the entry of the donor or his issue is given
against any person ; for he who would receive the estate of the donor may
restrict his estate as to those who are parties to the condition , for between
the donor and his heirs the tenant is subject to the condition . For if I
enfeoff a man in fee, reserving to me a rent and for default of payment
an entry , he who has the fee by his deed has restricted his estate so that
all is dependent on the condition ; and at any hour that the condition is
broken , entry by those who were parties to the condition is maintainable .
Wherefore it seems that as to this point the entry is maintainable ; and
as to the other point, the entry on each person is maintainable if he is
not restrained by warranty . And where there are two claims the better
reason is to save the older right than it would be to save the warranty
of the junior if they cannot both be saved by law . But now in this case if
the entry of the donor and his heirs is not maintainable the right is lost
forever , for no other recovery is given by the law ; for a writ of right he
cannot have , because he will not be able to join at all in the mise on the
better right of this possession . Wherefore it seems that there is greater
reason to save the older right than there is to save the warranty of the
junior .
MOUBRAY [ J . ) . I say that in this case he may have a writ ad terminum
que præteriit , and also where one aliens in fee on condition . (Which was
denied by CHELRE [ J . ) . Quaere . )
Finch : I say that a party can have no advantage of a condition found
by the assize where the same party may not have pleaded in bar . But in
the case here the party would not be received to plead the condition if he
had not had the condition before , and only where entry is reserved . There
fore it seems in this case he will get no advantage of the verdict. For
if a man enfeoff me rendering rent , reserving to himself an entry for default
of payment of the rent, and the rent be arrear , if he die and his issue
enter , or if he alien , unquestionably the estate of the tenant is defeasible .
And again it is no answer at all to those who were parties to the condition
for the others that they were not parties to the indenture which shows
the condition ; wherefore it seems so in this case .
Cl. [ J . ? ] : If I lease to a man for term of years and deliver him seizin
by deed , on condition that if he be ousted he shall have the fee , I say that
on the livery of seizin and the condition his estate is dependent . So
say I in this case . THORP, [Chief ] Justice, said that in this case the
issue of the donee should have a writ of formedon . GREEN , Justice :
If I alien to a man in fee on condition that if he or his heirs make
assignment , I or my heirs may enter , though he make assignment I
may not enter ; for it is contrary to law that he should have a fe
e b
y
my feoffment to him and his heirs and that he may not make any de




the lessee who held for term o
f years , I should have ad
terminum qui præteriit if a stranger enter , but in this case never may
another who may enter recover . Wherefore , by the opinion o
f SKIP




the others , the entry was maintainable ; and
also h
e
said that unquestionably before entry the tenant would have the
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fee ; so that this writ ad terminum qui præteriit does not lie . And ad
journed to xv Hilary .
ANON . , in Hilary Term 21 Hen . V
I , 33 , p
l
. 21 . - A . D . 1443 .
Note that a question was moved between the justices (NEWTON
absent ) , a
s
to this : A lease was made for a term o
f years on condition
that the lessee should not grant over his estate , and whether this con
dition was void or not was the question . Paston : The condition
seems clearly void ; for in that the lease is made is included that the
lessee may grant over his estate . For , suppose that a feoffment is made
in fee simple on condition that the lessee shall not make waste : the con
dition is void , for what is in him includes that he may commit waste ;
so it is repugnant to the estate granted . YELVERTON : In your case ,
where a feoffment is made in fee on condition that he may not commit
waste , o
r
that he may not alien , I will grant that the condition is void ,
because a
t
the time of the feoffment the fee and right passes out of the
person of the feoffor , and so that he had no right reserved in him ; and
so the condition reserved to him is void . But in the case that is here
moved , the freehold and the fee did not pass out of the person of the
lessor ; so that he may well reserve this condition . PASTON : Suppose
that the lease was made for term o
f life on condition that he may not
commit waste , I contend that this condition is void ; and yet a reversion
in fee simple remains in the person o
f
the lessor : and I claim that in
such a case the condition is void , not for the damages that may result ,
but for the inconvenience . FULTHORP ( J . ) : Suppose that one gives
land in tail on condition that the donee in tail shall not discontinue the
estate tail , is this condition void ? I hold that it is not ; for Thirning ,
who was chief justice here , gave his land to his eldest son on condition
that if he alien , & c . it should remain to his younger son , and so he
made the remainder to two o
r
three others . ASCUE ( J . ) : I under
stand that such a gift in tail with the condition is good and effectual ,
for Thirning made this gift on the advice of the justices o
f
his time .
PASTON : Not exactly ; I know it was done with the assent of the
justices , and he said he would have the gift openly stated in the court ,
and Hankey said it would be valid .
And he laughed and said that the whole condition was void ; and so
it seems to me . And note that in [ Liber ] Assize 24 plea 81 was found
another gift in tail on the condition recited b
y Filthorp and Ascue , and
the condition was held good b
y
the whole court ; but of a fee simple it
was said the contrary was the law . And note that it was after
averment . And note also that another gift in tail was made on great
deliberation on the conclusion o
f
accord between Lord FitzHugh and
Lord Lescrop . See 13 Henry IV , in a writ of ejectione firma , which
agrees with what Paston said .
There are only seven cases in the printed book o
f
that year .
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ANON ., in Mich . Term . - A . D . 1495 . — Yearbooks, Mich . Term , 10 Hen . VII
11, pl. 28 .
Land was given in tail , remainder in fee, on condition that if the
donee in tail or his heirs alien , to the damage of the issue, the donor
and his heirs might enter : and the opinion of the court was that
the condition was good , and one may make a condition on any act
prohibited by law . For I may lease my land to one for term of life
proviso that he shall not alien in fee, or proviso that he shall not
commit waste ; and I may make feoffment proviso that the feoffee shall
not commit felony, or that he shall not alien in mortmain or within
age. And also , I may enfeoff one and his wife on condition that they
shall not enfeoff any man by deed ; but I may not enfeoff them on
condition that they shall not levy a fine, for this [condition ] is merely
contrary to their estate . Yet I may restrain the feoffee by condition
in deed that he shall not do an unlawful act.
KEBLE held that if I infeoff a man in fee, omitting the word
assigns , provided that he shall not alien , the condition is good , for the
condition is consistent with the estate ; for it is given to him and his
heirs, the nature of which gift is not to have perpetual continuance ,
& c. Which the majority denied .
ANON ., in Common Bench . - A . D . 1496 . — Yearbooks, Mich . Term , 11 Hen .
VII , 6 , pl. 25 .
Note that it was held by all the justices of the common bench , trinity
term 8 Hen . VII, that if land is given in tail , remainder over to the
right heirs of the tenant in tail, on condition that if he or his heirs
should alien in fee the donor or his heirs might enter , this is a good
condition notwithstanding the fe
e
simple in reversion ; and the di
versity was taken between a fee simple in possession and a fee simple
depending on another estate . And it was well argued .
ANON . , in Common Pleas ? of England , Easter term , A . D . 1498 – 13 Henry
VII , 22 .
In a formedon in remainder the tenant said that his ancestor whose
heir , & c . , was seized and gave the manor in tail the remainder to the
right heirs of the donee , on condition that if he or any of his heirs o
f
his body should alien in fee or in tail or for term o
f
life , or grant in
any manner an estate that they should not have , then the donor and
his heirs might enter ; and he said that one such issue in tail , being seized
by force of the gift , discontinued the manor to a stranger in tail the
remainder to the ancestor of the demandant in fee ; and because that
one discontinued in breach of the condition , he entered as heir , & c . ,
and h
e
demanded judgment if the action ; and he showed said deed ,
proving that if the donee or his heirs o
f
his body , & c . , o
r
his right heirs
should make alienation a
s
above , the donor o
r
his heirs might enter ;
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and this deed was entered in haec verba ; and on this bar the demandant
demurred in judgment , and the demurrer was entered Easter last.
Rede. You note that the condition alleged in the bar speaks only of
alienation by the donee and the heirs of his body , and the deed extends
over to his right heirs ; so the bar is not warranted by the deed . Because
of this that the first deed extends to his heirs in tail, as is alleged in the
bar, and beyond this to his heirs in fee simple , of which nothing is said in
the bar, so the bar is well warranted by the deed and more ; which is not
admitted . Moreover , it seems that the bar is not good , because the con
dition is repugnant to the estate ; for the gift is not merely of an estate tail,
but of a fee simple ; and in a feoffment in fee simple on condition that
he shall not alienate , the condition is void because it is contrary to the
estate . Since the condition went in defeasance of all his estate , in which
case it should be held void as to the remainder in fee simple ; and being
void as to part , it is void as to all. And suppose that I make a lease for
life on condition that if I grant the reversion the tenant shall have the
fee , I say that this condition is void , because by the grant of the reversion
a third person has a lawful interest before the condition can have effect .
So here , by the grant of the remainder of the fee simple to the same donee ,
because of the interest he had in the fee simple , the condition annexed to
the estate tail may not have effect , because it went in destruction of both .
And it is clear that this fee simple may lawfully be sold notwithstanding
the condition , because it is contrary to the estate in fee simple ; and because
the condition is repugnant in part and contrary to law in part , it must
be wholly void . Wherefore , & c .
Keble to the contrary : It seems to me that one may condition with a
feoffee in fee simple that he shall not alien . (BRIAN ( C . J . ] interrupted
him , and said that they would not hear him argue this conceit , for it was
merely against common learning, which is now in a manner a principle ;
so that by this we would overthrow all our ancient precedents ; wherefore
he need say no more of that point. ) Keble : Sir , it seems to me that this
condition is good ; there are three conditions not allowable, and this is
none of the three : first if the condition is impossible , second if repugnant
to itself , third if the condition is contrary to law ; but the condition here
is none of these ; and is good according to the estate , for it enforces the
very estate . In every case in which the thing to which the condition refers
is prohibited by law , I may restrain the person by my condition that he
shall not do this thing which is contrary to law . As if I make a feoffment
on condition that he shall not discontinue, or that he shall not alien in
mortmain , or I enfeoff a man and wife on condition that he shall not dis
t he shall not alien , or the like .
And also in every case in which one may covenant with his feoffee , it would
seem that he may condition ; as if that he shall pay certain money to the
feoffor or to a stranger . And also at the common law one might have
made a feoffment to hold of himself , on condition that the feoffee should
not alien to any ; for by the alienation the lord would be injured , in that
by this the tenancy is prolonged and the lord 's escheat delayed . And thisthing lies well in covenant , and therefore in condition as it seems to me;
wherefore it seems to me that the condition is good .
Fisher , to the contrary . It seems to me that the condition is contrary
as well to the estate tail as to the estate of fee simple , and both estates
absolutely in the same person , for the remainder is wholly in him . And
it has been adjudged in such a case that if a writ of right is brought against
& tenant in tail who has the remainder in fee , that he may be joined in
the mise on the mere right ; which proves that he has the fee simple inpossession , to which fee simple the condition is merely repugnant ; and
so void in part , void in all. And so it changes the nature of the case wherethe donee has the fee simple and where not, for the reason stated ; for if
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he should reserve the fee simple or grant the remainder over , then would
the condition not extend to the fee simple directly but only to the estate
tail on which the remainder depends . And also , it seems to me that the
condition is contrary to the estate tail ; for at the common law the tenant
in tail had power to alienate after issue begotten , and was tenant in fee
simple ; and because such was the common law in this case , I understand
that if the donor makes a condition that the donee in tail shall not alienate ,
the condition is also as contrary to this estate at this time as to an estate
in fee simple at this day ; wherefore the statute of Westm . 2d has not re
strained this power of alienation , for by the alienation the heir is put to
his action of formedon given by the statute . So the statute has done nothing
but give an action to recover the tail , but the same power of alienation
which was at common law remains at this day , and so the condition is as
contrary to the one estate as to the other ; wherefore , & c .
FINEUX [ J . ] to the contrary : Whether the remainder was in the
donor or in the donee or was granted over does not change the case ,
for the privity is sufficient cause of entry . For if I make a lease for
term of life , the remainder over on condition that if he alien I may
re -enter, this condition is good ; the same is the law of a condition that
he shall not commit waste ; and yet in both cases he in remainder would
have the land by a condition in law if there were no condition in the
deed . But in every case in which the reasonableness of the law speaks
of any condition , the feoffor may well speak of this by a condition in
deed ; for nothing in the world speaks so reasonably as the law speaks.
And by this the law in each case makes a condition as available to the
feoffor without anything said by the feoffor as if he should plainly ex
press the condition ; as if I enfeoff you to re- enfeoff me, and before you
re -enfeoff you charge the land , or take a wife, or make feoffment over ,
in all these cases a regress is open to me by law ; and this is often ad
judged . (Which KEBLE conceded , but BRIAN [ C . J . ] would not grant
the first two cases, quare of these .) So the condition is consistent with
the estate . But if the condition is repugnant it is otherwise ; as if I
give you land in fee simple by the premises of my deed and by the
words of the habendum only for years or term of life ; the habendum
is void because repugnant to the estate preceding ; but if the premises
give you an estate for term of life or in tail and the latter clause a fee
simple all may be good ; and so if the premises give a fee simple and the
sequel only an estate tail , for this is not contrary to the premises.
VAVISOUR [ J . ] : I hold the condition good ; and I agree with you
that such condition to a tenant in tail at the common law was void , be
cause the issue was not sure to have the land ; for by the alienation of
the ancestor he was without remedy . So he had power to make a lawful
alienation , but now he has not , for the issue may recover the land by
action ; and so it seems to me that the condition is good in the case
here . But such a condition to a donee in tail at common law , and to
a feoffee in fee so long as J of S should have issue is void .
TOWNSEND [ J . ) held the condition good in both cases the last term .
Ideo quære.
DANVERS [ J .] to the contrary : The statement that the condition
enforces the tail is not true ; but it tends to destroy the estate tail, for
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by the re -entry it is entirely destroyed ; and so the condition is repug
nant. And he denied the cases of condition that the feoffees should not
discontinue , commit felony, alien in mortmain , & c ., and said that the
condition in a
ll
these cases was void , for third persons had an interest ,
viz . , the lord by alienation in mortmain , and the lord has a present
interest in these cases to have the land . But VAVISOUR [ J . ] and
TOWNSEND [ J . ] agreed in their argument that the condition in these
cases is good .
TOWNSEND [ J . ) : All are agreed that if the reversion should continue
in the donor , then the condition would be good ; and I will show that
this does not alter the case ; fo
r
if in the first place he should make the
condition on the donee , and later should grant the reversion over on the
same condition that if the tenant in tail on which the reversion is d
e
pendent make discontinuance o
f
his own estate then it should be lawful
for the grantor to enter , it cannot be denied that these conditions in
several grants would be good ; and so why not both pass at one time ?
And suppose that I make a lease for life the remainder in tail on con
dition that if the termor alien I may re -enter , this condition is good ;
and yet if there were no condition he in remainder in tail might enter
because o
f
the alienation ; but in such case the feoffor o
f
whom he had
the land might have spoken by a condition in deed , and this should
b
e preferred before the condition in law . And as to what Danvers said
that the condition operated in destruction o
f
the estate tail , si
r , that is




the gift , to the
intent that this alienation should not have effect ; so it is a pain depend
ent on the alienation to discourage it and make it not good . And as
to what some said , that a collateral warranty made to descend or a
lineal warranty with assets descended to the issue , and the like , bars
him in formedon ; which cases prove in their opinion that the tenant
in tail had power to alienate in fee notwithstanding the estate , because
the discontinuance in this way ought to be affirmed in law ; sir , these
prove that the alienations were never lawful deeds ; for the feoffment is
not enough without this recompense outside ; and one may sell a thing
which may be lawfully sold , and this may not be b
y
a tenant in tail ;
wherefore , & c . BRIAN to the same . And the remainder in fe
e simple
depends on the estate tail , which may not by any means be executed
before the issue in tail is exhausted .
This case is cited and commented on in Coke Lit . * 223b - 224a , and contains





fee to be found in the old books .
ANON . , in Common Bench , Mich . 31 Hen . 8 . — A . D . 1540 . — Dyer 45a .
A lease was made to one for term o
f years upon condition that the
lessee should not alien his term to J . S . ; and he aliens to R . B . , who
aliens to the said J . S . It was moved in C . B . , whether the condition
b
e
broken ? And it should seem not , because every condition is taken
strictly ; for if a man make a feoffment upon condition that he shall
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not enfeoff J . S., and he die , and his heir enfeoff J . S . this is not a
breach of the condition . * * *
PARRY v . HARBERT , in Court of Augmentation , Mich . 31 Hen . 8. - A . D.
1540 , -- Dyer 45b .
A lease was made for a term of years , upon condition , that if the
lessee during his life should assign his term to any other without the
assent of the lessor , it should be lawful for the lessor to re -enter. The
lessee devised his term by his will to another without the assent, & c .
Whether this was cause of forfeiture ? Because during his life the as
signment did not take effect . And yet R . BROOKE , and HALES , the
master of the rolls , thought this was a forfeiture ; for the devisee , when
he is in , shall be said to be in by assignment , which the lessor [lessee ]
made during his life. * * *
ANON ., Mich . 3 Edw . 6 - A . D . 1550 . - Dyer 65b .
A question was asked upon these words in a lease, viz . and it shall not
be lawful for the lessee to give , sell or grant his estate and term to any





said term . The lessor and lessee die , and the executors sell the term
without the leave of the heir . It was holden , that this is out of the
case o
f
forfeiture , because the restraint was only [ * 66a ] during the
lives o
f
the lessor and lessee . And yet it was agreed in the bench ,
that the words above make a condition .
GOSTWICK ' S CASE , in Common Pleas . - A . D . 1591 . - Cro . Eliz . 163 .
A lease was made for two years , upon condition , that they nor either
o
f
them shall alien any part o
f
the land without the assent of the lessor .
They make partition , and one aliens his part . This is a forfeiture of
the whole .
GERMIN V . ASCOT , in Common Bench , Mich . 37 & 38 Eliz . — A . D . 1596 .
Abridged from Moor 364 , 1 And . 186 , 2 and 7 .
Waste . Carew , being seised in fee o
f
the land , made a lease for years ,
and afterwards devised it to his sons in tail male successively , with
proviso that if any of the devisees or their issue g
o
about to alien , dis
continue , or incumber the premises , then from the time they so g
o
about their estate shall cease as if they were naturally dead , and from
thenceforth it shall be lawful for him next in remainder to enter and
hold the land for the life o
f
him that shall so alien , and that on his
death the land shall go to his issue as if no such offense had been
committed . The devisor died . The eldest son and all other except





the devise . Afterwards the lessee committed waste ,
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this matter and the
plaintiff demurred .




r for alienation was wholly repugnant , and that the remainder
to the second son limited to commence o
n such attempt was void ; for
which they adjudged against the second son , who brought this action .
The justices argued the case openly , and conferred with all the justices
o
f England , who agreed as one that the proviso was repugnant .
SHARINGTON V . MINORS , in Queen ' s Bench , Hilary term , 38 Eliz . , A . D .
1596 — Moore 543 .
A special verdict in ejectione firmæ was this : devise of land to one
in tail with other remainders in tail , and with this clause : “ My mind
is that if any of the said persons afore entailed to my said lands , or their
heirs do unlawfully vex , disquiet , or trouble , any other of them for the
same ; or do mortgage , sell , or pledge , the same or any part thereof ,
o
r
his interest , possibility or title therein , or any part thereof , or do
hurtfully dismember , dissipate , or waste the same , or any part thereof ;
that then every such person , and his and their heirs shall forthwith be
clearly discharged , excluded , and dismissed , as touching the said entail
o
f










force to him o
r
them , but the same immediately
to descend and come to the next party in tail , to him o
r
them , as effectu
ally as if such disordered person had never been minded o
f
in this my





the first estate , now she and her husband levied a fine , and he in the
next remainder entered . And if this entry was lawful the jurors found
for the plaintiff ; if not , for the defendant .
The case was often argued ; and three of the justices , viz . , FENNER ,
GAWDY , and CLENCH , held that the estate of him in the remainder is
subject to the limitation to cease by alienation , and the next in re
mainder may enter ; wherefore they held with the commentaries
[ Newis v . Lark , 2 Plowd . Com . 403 , ante p . - ] that the entry of the
lessor o
f
the plaintiff was lawful .
POPHAM [ C . J . ] to the contrary ; and he said , that , although it should
be a limitation and not a condition , and tho the will is to have a favor




n act impossible or against law it is void , as Germain and Arscot ' s
case [ante p . — ] adjudged in the common pleas , that the proviso that
the estate o
f
the one who had entailed should entirely cease in his life
is a void limitation because repugnant and impossible . In the case at
bar if the estate o
f
the seller should cease a
s if no such estate had been
made ( a
s
the words of the will indicate ) , then he should be a trespasser
from the beginning , which is repugnant and impossible , because it should
b
e
construed to cease only from the time of the alienation ; and if so ,
then it is to say that it shall not cease till the alienation consummated ,
and b
y
that time there is a discontinuance o
f
the entail already tho
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but for an instant , which discontinuance is to be purged by a formedon
by him in remainder by pleading the special matter as if the first tenant
were dead without issue , and by this he would avoid the discontinuance
and the estate , but his entry is not lawful, and so it now remains .
But afterwards , Easter 41 Eliz ., it was adjudged for the plaintiff on









CORBET ' S CASE , in Common Pleas , Easter , 42 Eliz . - A . D . 1600 , 1 Coke
83b , 2 And . 134 . - Abridged from Coke .
Christopher Corbet being seised o
f
manor of S , covenanted b
y in
denture with several for himself and his heirs , to stand seised of it
for his own use for life , then to the use o
f
his son Roland in tail male ,
and for want o
f
such issue to use o
f Christopher ' s son Arthur in tail
male , then to the use of others o
f
his blood in tail , and finally to the
use o
f
the right heirs of said Christopher . By the same deed it was
covenanted that if anything should be done b
y
Roland o
r any of his
heirs of his body to alienate the manor or bar the entail , that then
immediately before such act attempted the use and estate in him limited
should cease and the manor should immediately pass to the person next
entitled in the same manner a
s
if the p rson so attempting were natur
ally dead . Christopher died , and Roland suffered a common recovery
to his own use , whereupon Arthur entered , Roland re -entered , and Arthur
sued him in trespass . Whether Arthur ' s entry was lawful was the
question .
By ANDERSON , [ C . J . ] and WALMSLEY , GLANVIL , and KINGMILL ,
JJ . ] , it was resolved that this proviso to cease an estate limited to one
and his heirs male o
f
his body as if the tenant in tail was dead , was
repugnant , impossible , and against law ; for the death of the tenant in
tail is not a cesser o
f
the estate tail , but the death o
f
the tenant in
tail without issue of his body is the determination thereof . And if
the estate tail should cease as if he was dead his issue inheritable to
the estate in tail would have it b
y
descent in the life of hi
s
father , or
he in remainder or reversion would have it in the life of the tenant
in tail which is not possible ; for to every descent , remainder , o
r re
version , upon the determination o
f
a
n estate tail , death , either civil
a
s entry into religion , or natural , as dissolution of the soul from the





the breach in the case a
t
bar , because the
tenant in tail had no issue a
t
the time . To that it was answered
that the having of issue was not material , that this was repugnant to
the beginning : for b
y
the express limitation he has an estate o
f in
heritance , which b
y
possibility may continue forever , and his estate of




issue , but presently before
any issue he has an estate o
f
inheritance ; and therefore before issue
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his feoffment is a discontinuance and no forfeiture , neither shall he
in reversion be received upon his default in a praecipe.
ANDERSON , C . J ., put the case in 8 Assize pl. 33, where a man gave
land to Mary and Joan her sister and to the heirs of their bodies be
gotten , by which they had a joint estate for life and several inheritances ;
and the donor intending that neither of them should break the jointure ,
but that the survivor should have all by survivorship , added this clause ,
that by this provision she who survived would have the land entire ; but
for as much as his intent is contrary to law , therefore if the jointure
be severed by a fine levied , the survivor shall not have the part so
severed , by the clause which he hath inserted out of his own conceit
and imagination repugnant to law and reason . So here the intent
of Christopher was that the estate tail should cease as if the tenant in
tail was dead , which intent is repugnant to the rules of law and against
sense and reason . And he cited also Plesington ' s Case , 6 Rich . 2, [Fitz
herbert 's Abr . ) tit . Quid Juris Clamat , p
l
. 20 , [ in which ] a man makes
a lease on condition that if the lessor grant the reversion the lessee
shall have the fee . If the lessor grant the reversion by fine , he shall
not have the fee , for the condition is repugnant and void . He also dis
cussed a
t length two cases adjudged in point on the case a
t
bar , one
in the case o
f
a will Germin v . Arscot , Moor 364 , 4 Leonard 83 , 1
Anderson 186 , ) and the other in the case of a use , Chomley v . Humble ,
[ 1 Anderson 316 , Cro . Eliz . 379 , post — . ]
WALMSLEY , J . , said that when an estate is given to one it may be de
feated wholly by a condition o
r




it cannot be determined as to one , and given in part or in
all to another , for that is repugnant to the rules of law . As if a man
makes a lease for life on condition that if he do not pay 20£ that
another shall have the land , this future limitation is void . And in
the case at the bar the donor might have annexed a condition o
r limi
tation to determine his estate ; but in this case the donor intended
to continue the estate tail , and to cease it as to one , and in his life
transfer it to another . It would be strange and against reason that
this estate in the case a
t
bar should end in regard to one and continue
in regard to another , and that Roland should be dead when one saw
him , and be alive when another saw him . An act of parliament or
the common law may make an estate void a
s
to one and good as to







. ] , said that betwixt the making of the statute De Donis
Conditionalibus , 13 Edw . 1 , c . 1 , and the Statute o
f
Uses , 27 Hen . 8 .
c . 10 , such proviso annexed to an estate tail that it should cease as if
the tenant in tail was dead was never seen nor heard of ; and therefore
h
e
concluded that it cannot be done b
y
the law . Uses were not within
the letter o
f
the statute De Donis , which speaks only o
f
lands and
tenements , but are within the equity , and therefore ought to follow the
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nature of the land . Richill , who was a judge in the time of Richard
2, and Thirning , who was chief justice of the common pleas in the
time of Henry 4 intended to have made perpetuities , and upon for
feiture of the estate tail of one of their sons to have given the remainder




these reasons it was resolved b
y
the whole court without
dissent that judgment should b
e given against the plaintiff .
This is usually cited a
s
the leading case on the questions decided ; but why
it should be considered so important is not easy to see , when it follows other
decisions in the same court so nearly like it on the facts , viz : Germin v .
Ascot ante , and Chomley v . Humble , post .
SIR ANTHONY MILDMAY ' S CASE , in King ' s Bench , Mich . term , 3 Jac . I ,
A . D . 1606 — 6 Coke 40a .




Newton in the county of Northampton , between James Hethersall ,
lessee o
f Humphrey Mildmay , Esq . , plaintiff , against Sir Anthony Mild
may , knight , defendant (which was mutatis mutandis al
l
one with Cor
bet ' s Case , reported b
y
me in the first part o
f my reports f . 84 ) [ above ] ,
was argued at the bar , as it had been in sundry terms past ; and was
also argued b
y
the judges ; and this was adjudged against the plaintiff
according to the judgment given in Corbet ' s Case . And in this case
some points on great consideration were resolved , which were not moved
in Corbet ' s Case :
1 . That all these perpetuities were against the reason and policy of
the common law ; for a
t
common law all inheritances were fee -simple ,
a
s
Littleton saith (Lib . 1 , c . Estates -tail , $ 13 ) ; and the reason thereof
was , that neither lords should be defeated o
f
their escheats , wards , & c . ,
nor the farmers or purchasers lose their estates or leases , or be evicted
by the heirs of the grantors or lessors nor such infinite occasions o
f
troubles , contentions , and suits arise . But the true policy and rule o
f
the common law in this point , was in effect overthrown b
y
the statute
De Donis Conditionalibus ſante - ] made anno 13 Edw . I [ A . D . 1285 ] ,
which established a general perpetuity b
y
act o
f parliament , for all who
had o
r






in some effect were entailed accordingly , which was the occasion and
cause o
f
the said and divers other mischiefs . And the same was at
tempted and endeavored to be remedied at divers parliaments , and divers
bills were exhibited accordingly (which I have seen ) ; but they were
always on one pretense or other rejected . But the truth was , that the
lords and commons , knowing that their estates tail were not to be for
feited for felony o
r
treason , as their estates of inheritance were before
the said act (and chiefly in the time o
f Henry III , in the barons ' war ) ,
and finding that they were not answerable for the debts o
r
incumbrances
of their ancestors ( nor did the sales , alienations , or leases of their an
cestors bind them for the lands which were entailed to their ancestors ) ,
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they always rejected such bills. And the same continued in the residue
of the reign of Edward I, and in the reigns of Edward II, Edward III,
Richard II , Henry IV , Henry V , Henry VI, and till about the 12th
year of Edward IV ; when the judges , on consultation had amongst them
selves , resolved , that an estate tail might be docked and barred by a
common recovery ; and that by reason of the intended recompense the
common recovery was not within the restraint of the said perpetuity
made by the said act of 13 Edw . I. By which it appears , that many
mischiefs arise on the change of a maxim and rule of the common
law , which those who altered it could not see when they made the change ;
for rerum progressus offendunt multa quæ in initio præcaveri sev prævi
deri non possunt.
2. It was resolved that it was impossible and repugnant that an
estate tail should cease as if the tenant in tail was dead (had he issue
or no ) , for an estate tail cannot cease so long as it continues ; but here
his intent was to continue the estate tail , and to cease it in respect to
the party offending only , and not as to any other , which is impossible ,
repugnant , and against law . For every limitation or condition ought
to defeat the whole estate , and not to defeat a part of the estate , and
leave part not defeated ; and it cannot make an estate to cease quoad
unam personam and not quoad alteram . But an act of parliament may
make an estate cease as if one were dead , [ as ] 21 Hen . 8 that by the
acceptance of a second benefice the first shall be void as if he were
dead ; and in 10 Eliz ., Dyer 274 , pl. 41, there is restitution by parlia
ment with a quoad . So the policy of the common law may make a
quoad , as in 22 Eliz., 3 Dyer 369, pl. 48 , 49 , a marriage infra annos
nubiles is perfect quoad dotem , and quoad other purposes it is but in
choatum et im perfectum . So if two are jointly and severally bound
upon a bond , and judgment is given against one, by which it is become
of record as to one, but as to the other it remains a writing as it was
before . But no condition or limitation framed by the party 's words in
his deed can make one and the same estate in any lands cease as to one
person and be in esse as to another , or cease for one time and revive
afterwards (as a rent newly created may ) . And none can have an estate
in tail but parties in estate secundum formam doni.
3. It was resolved that if a man makes a gift in tail on condition
that he shall not suffer a common recovery , that this condition is re
pugnant to the estate tail , and against law ; for there are divers incidents
to an estate tail : 1 , to be dispunished for waste ; 2, that his wife shall
be endowed ; 3, the husband of a woman tenant in tail , after issue shall
be tenant by the curtesy ; 4 , that tenant in tail may suffer a common
recovery, and thereby bar the estate tail and the reversion or re
mainder also . And these inseparable incidents which the law annexes
to an estate tail cannot be prohibited by condition . And therefore , if a
man makes gift in tail on condition that the donee shall not commit
waste , or that his wife shall not be endowed , or that the husband of a
woman tenant in tail after issue shall not be tenant b
y
the curtesy , or
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that tenant in tail shall not suffer à common recovery , these conditions
are repugnant and against law ; because by the gift in tail he tacitly
enables him to commit waste , that his wife shall be endowed , and to
suffer a common recovery . And therefore it is repugnant to restrain
it by condition , for that would be to give a power and to restrain the
same power in one and the same deed . And as to the case of dower ,
vide 22 Edw . 3, 19 ; accord ., 19 Eliz., Dyer 343 , the Earl of Arundel 's
Case . And although a common recovery is but a common assurance ,
yet by the law every tenant in tail has power to suffer it to bar as well
the estate tail as the reversion or remainder over ; and such act in re
spect of the intended recompense is not restrained by the statute De
Donis Conditionalibus (as it has been said ), but tenant in tail by a
common recovery has potestatem alienandi notwithstanding the said
statute . As if a man before the said statute had made a gift to one and
to the heirs of his body , in this case post prolem suscitatam he had by the
common law postestatem alienandi and therefore in the same case , if the
donor add such a condition , that after issue the donee should not alien ,
it was resolved that the condition in such case had been repugnant , be
cause after issue , by the common law , the donee had potestatem alien
andi , and then in one and the same deed to give him power post
prolem suscitatam postestatem alienandi tacite by the law , and in the
same deed to restrain him of that power is repugnant and against law .
Pari ratione after the statute if a man makes a gift in tail on condition
that he shall not suffer a common recovery , it is repugnant ; for by the
gift in tail he has given power im plicite to suffer a recovery . So if a
man makes a proviso that warranty and assets shall not bar the issue in
tail , or that a collateral warranty shall not bar the issue or the donor ,
these provisoes are against law and repugnant : [Newdigate v . Capell ]
6 Eliz ., 2 Dyer 227 . A proviso good at the beginning by consequence
may become repugnant ; as if a man by his deed grants a rent for life ,
proviso that he shall not charge his person , this is a good proviso , yet if
the rent is arrear and the grantee dies , his executors shall charge the
person of the grantor in an action of debt, for otherwise they would be
without remedy , and therefore now it is become repugnant and by conse
quence void .
But it was resolved , that if a man makes a gift in tail on condition
that he shall not alien , this condition to some intent is good and to some
void ; and therefore if he makes a feoffment in fee , or any other estate
by which the reversion is wrongfully discontinued , the donor shall enter
for the condition broken , for every act which is prohibited by the law , or
which doth wrong , a man may prohibit by condition : Vide 10 Hen . 7,
11a [ ante - ) . But (as it has been said ) if in such case the donee
suffers a common recovery , the condition by the law cannot extend to it ,
causa qua supra . In the same manner is a deed of feoffment to husband
and wife in fee on condition that they shall not alien ; this is a good con
dition to restrain a feoffment or alienation by deed , for that is wrongful ;
but not to restrain an alienation by them both by fine , for that is lawful
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and incident to their estate. So if a man infeoffs an infant in fee on con
dition that he shall not alien ; it is a good condition to restrain an aliena
tion during hi





full age , for that is repugnant to his liberty which the
law gives him in case o
f
a fee -simple . And with these two cases agree : 10
Hen . 7 , 11a [ ante - 1 ; 13 Hen . 7 , 23a [ante - ] : and so you will better
understand your books in 33 Assize p
l
. 11 [ ante – ] ; 11 Hen . 6 , 6 ; 21
Hen . 6 , 30 , 33 , p
l
. 21 [ ante - ] , 39 ; 10 Hen . 7 , 11a [ ante - ) ; 11 Hen .
7 , 6b [ante - ] ; 13 Hen . 7 , 23a [ante - ] ; 21 Hen . 7 , 11a , b . And it
is to b
e
observed that before the reign of Edward IV it was not resolved
( a
s
hath been said ) , that a common recovery should bar the estate tail
and the reversions and remainders depending thereon ; and therefore
the said ol
d
books which speak of alienations made by tenant in tail
cannot b
e
intended but to restrain discontinuance and alienations which
did wrong , and not to prohibit a common recovery , the operation o
f
which was not known and till the reign of Edward IV was not in use .
And the reason of Littleton [ $ 360 , ante - 1 was well observed ; who
saith , that if a man makes a feoffment on condition that the feoffee






e has power to alien them to any person
b
y
the law ; for if such condition should be good then the condition would
oust him o
f
the whole power which the law gives him , which is against
reason , and therefore such condition is void . All which are the very
words of Mr . Littleton , the reason of which agrees entirely with the
resolution of this point in this case . And it was said that the law favors
estates tail in possession , and doth not regard remainders or reversions
expectant on the estate tail . For it was adjudged in Capel ' s Case , 1 Coke
61b , that if tenant in tail suffers a common recovery , it shall bar not
only the estate tail and remainder and reversion but the rent also that
he in remainder o
r
reversion has granted . So it was adjudged in 12
Eliz . between Terling and Trafford , in the king ' s bench , that a remainder
o
r
reversion expectant on an estate tail is n
o










the common pleas in Copwood ' s Case , that if there be
tenant in tail the remainder to the right heirs of J . S . , and tenant in
tail suffers a common recovery , J . S . being then alive , it shall bar the
remainder which was in abeyance and consideration o
f
law .
4 . Where the proviso is , “ That if when and as often as the said An
thony Mildmay , & c . , shall be fully and finally resolved and determined ,
and shall advisedly , determinedly , and effectually , devise , conclude , and
agree , or enter into any communication , promise , or covenant , what
soever , or shall advisedly attempt , procure , g
o
about , or assent to or for
any act o
r
acts , thing or things , for or touching any bargain , sale , dis
continuance , alienation , conveyance , o
r
assurance , to be had or made of
any o
f
said manors , & c . , whereby any estate , & c . , may , should , or might ,
in any wise or b
y
any means , be undone , discontinued , & c . , or shall advis
edly and effectually attempt , procure , go about , to or for any act or thing ,
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for or touching any bargain , sale, discontinuance , & c., and [ by ] the
same bargain , or any other open matter, & c., shall attempt , go about,
cause , & c., by acknowledgment of any note of any fine , or any warrant or
warrants of attorney for any recovery or voucher , or by acknowledgment
of any deed , or by any other act or acts , thing or things , whatsoever, in
deed or in law , & c., that then immediately after such time of such pro
curing , attempting , or going about, in form aforesaid , and before any
such bargain , sale , discontinuance , & c., had , made, & c ., or done, the said
use and uses , estate and estates , & c ., shall from time to time cease , as
only in respect and having regard to such person or persons so attempt
ing , going about, & c., in such sort as if such person or persons , & c., were
naturally dead, and no otherwise :" — it was resolved that these words
attempt , & c., or go about , & c ., or enter into communication , & c., are
words uncertain and void in law ; and God forbid that the inheritances
and estates of men should depend upon such uncertainty ; for it is true,
quod misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum ; et quod non definitur in
jure quid sit conatus , ne quid est a going about, & c ., or communication ;
and therefore the rule of la
w
decides this point non efficit conatus nisi
sequitur effectus ; and the law rejects conations , goings about , a
s things
uncertain , which cannot be put in issue . For if one who is bound with
such a perpetuity goes to counsel learned , to know whether he might
alien part for payment of his debts , or for advancement o
f
his younger
children , or for any other needful use , is that a breach of the proviso
o
r
not ? Or if the heir or other in remainder who knew not of the pro
viso , & qui habet justam ignorantiam , thinks that he may levy a fine ,
and thereupon a note o
f
a fine is drawn , & c . , and before it be recorded
he knows of the proviso , and then al
l
is cancelled , is that a breach o
f
the proviso ? And a hundred such like questions where nothing is done
may arise , which the eye o
f
the law never saw , but o
f
late times are in
vented . And such proviso is full o
f
cruelty , and against the freedom and
liberty o
f
a freeman ; for this ( as if he had bolts of iron on his legs ) .
restrains him to g
o





his tongue , for it restrains him to enter into communi
cation . And in the said books aforesaid , where the alienation o
f
a tenant




r entering into a communication to alien , for that was thought
then so idle that there is not any touch o
f
any such matter in any o
f
the said books o
r
in any other book o
f
the law . And in the Case of
Richel , reported by Littleton , [ $ 720 , ante - Richel restrained his sons
from aliening , and not from going about o
r entering into communication
o
f
aliening , and yet if he could have restrained the going about it had
avoided one o
f
the causes , that his conveyance was against law . For
Littleton saith , that if the first son aliened the tenements in fee , then is




e , that such remainder should commence its being
and it
s
essence immediately after such alienation made to a stranger who
had b
y
the same alienation the freehold and the fee simple ? But if
296 CONDITIONS .
Justice Richil could have restrained the going about, or entering into
communication or the making of a charter of feoffment or a note of
a fine, & c., he might have avoided the principal cause for which his
conveyance was insufficient in law . And in the samemanner it may be
said of the conveyance of Thirning , chief justice , reported in 21 Hen .
6 , 33b [ante - ]. And it was said that a going about or entering into
communication was not issuable .
Farther , it was said if a man makes a gift in tail on condition that
he shall not make a feoffment , it is a good condition ; but if the condition
be that he shall not make a charter of feoffment, that is not good , for
that without livery ( as Littleton saith ( $ 70 , ante - ]) amounts but
to a tenancy at will , which tenant in tail cannot be restrained from mak
ing. So if a man makes a gift in tail on condition that he shall not
make a lease for his own life , it is void and repugnant . But if a man
makes a lease for life or years on condition that he shall not alien or
lease the lands it is good ; for at the common law lessee for life or years
might commit waste , which was ad exhaereditationem of the lessor, and
therefore there was a confidence betwixt the lessor and lessee , and there
fore the lessor might restrain the lessee from aliening or demising to
another , in whom perhaps the lessor had not such confidence . And
therefore it is reasonable that when he who has the inheritance makes a
lease for life or years , that he may restrain such particular tenants from
aliening or demising , for the benefit of his inheritance . But when a
man makes a gift in tail (which is an estate of inheritance and by possi
bility may continue for ever ) and thereby makes the donee chief owner
of the land , he cannot restrain him from making any lawful act or
estate which doth no wrong to any , and which by law he may do of
the same land . So it is, for the same reason , if a man makes a gift in
tail of a manor on condition that he shall not make any voluntary grant
of any lands by copy according to the custom of the manor , & c ., it is
not good ; but if he makes a lease for years or life with such condition
it is good causa qua supra . And by these differences you may better
understand your books in 21 Hen . 6 , 33b ſante - ] ; 8 Hen . 7, 10b ; 11
Hen . 7, 6b ſante - 1 ; 13 Hen . 7, 23a ſante - 7.
Lastly , the intent of the statute 27 Flen . VIII , c. 10 , [ante - 1 as
appears by the preamble , was to restore the ancient common law , and to
root out and extinguish a
ll
subtle inventions , imaginations , and practices
o
f
uses , which had introduced many mischiefs and inconveniences men
tioned in the preamble . And that was very good and necessary for the
commonwealth ; for the common law has certain rules to direct the es
tates and inheritances o
f
lands , and therefore it is without any com





the common law (which has been an ol
d , true , and faithful
servant to this commonwealth ) than b
y




these new inventors o
f





reason . Note , reader , this judgment agrees with the
former judgments , as well in Corbet ' s Case [above ] as the cases between
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Humble and Cholmley ( ante — ), and Germin v. Ascot [ ante - ] there
cited , and with the judgment in Dillon and Freine 's Case [ Chudleigh 's
Case , post – ] .
And in this case it was resolved that in the said proviso found at large
by the special verdict , there was more than a thousand words, whereas
in our books, when tenant in tail was restrained from alienation , there
were not twelve words , haec fuit candida illius ætatis fides & simplicitas
quæ pauciculis lineis omnia fidei firmamenta posuerunt . And so has this
case now been adjudged in both courts .
HARDY V. GALLOWAY, in N . Car. Sup . Ct., Oct, 19, 1892 . - 111 N. Car.




























Suit to foreclose & mortgage including an acre conveyed to the
mortgagor b
y
a deed stating that the grantors (Galloway ) “ retaining
for themselves , and their heirs and assigns , the right to repurchase
said land when sold , the said Jefferson Evans ( grantee ] conveying a
title for said lands , either by deed or mortgage , without first giving
J . B . Galloway and wife , and their heirs and assigns , the privilege of
repurchasing the same , renders this deed null and void , otherwise it
remains in full force . ” When Galloway learned o
f
the mortgage to
plaintiffs he took possession o
f
the lot , and was in possession when this
suit was brought . Judgment for plaintiffs and defendant appeals .
SHEPHERD , J . Considered either as a conditional sale or a contract to
reconvey , his honor was entirely correct in holding as void for uncer
tainty the provision in the deed respecting the right of the grantor to
repurchase the land when sold . No time is fixed for performance , nor is
there any stipulation whatever as to the price to be paid . The pro
vision , not being a limitation , can therefore only take effect , if at all ,
a
s
a condition subsequent ; and , viewed in this light , we cannot hesitate
in deciding that the restriction upon alienation , attempted to be imposed
after the grant o
f
the fee , is repugnant to the nature o
f
the estate
granted , contrary to the policy o
f
the law , and therefore inoperative .




n inseparable incident to an estate in fee , (Co . Litt .
436 ; Williams , Real Prop . 61 , 62 ; 1 Washb . Real Prop . 79 ; ) and except
in some cases , where the restriction is only partial , the law does not
recognize o
r
enforce any condition which would directly o
r indirectly
limit or destroy such a privilege ,miniquum est ingenuis hominibus non
esse liberam rerum suorum alienationem . Accordingly it has been held
b
y
this court that a condition that a devisee in fee shall not sell or in
cumber his land before attaining the age of 35 is void , “ because it is
inconsistent with the full and free enjoyment which the ownership of
such a
n
estate implies . ” Twitty v . Camp . Phil . E
q
. 61 . To the same
effect has it been ruled as to a condition that a devisee in fee shall make
oath " that he will not make any change during his life ” in the testator ' s



























he shall not offer to mortgage or suffer a fine o
r recovery , (Ware v . Cann ,
1
0 Barn . & C . 433 , ) o
r
that he shall contract in writing not to alienate
before the proceeds of certain realty are paid to him , (Mandlebaum v .
McDonnell , 29 Mich . 78 , ) or that land devised to a number of persons
shall not be divided , ( Smith v . Clark , 10 Md . 186 . ) Such conditions
are not sustained where they " infringe upon the essential enjoyment
and independent rights o
f property , and tend manifestly to public incon
venience . ” 4 Kent , Comm . 131 ; Bac . Abr . tit . “ Conditions ; ” Shep .
Touch . * 131 . “ A condition annexed to an estate given is a divided clause
from the grant , and therefore cannot frustrate the grant precedent ,
neither in anything expressed nor in anything implied , which is of it
s
nature incident and inseparable from the thing granted . ” Stukeley y .
Butler , Hob . 170 . While unable to find any decision exactly in point ,
we feel assured that our case falls within the principle stated and
illustrated b
y
the foregoing authorities . The restriction is certainly
inconsistent with the ownership o
f
the fee , as well , it would seem , as
against public policy . The right to repurchase is of indefinite extent
a
s
to time , ( it being reserved to the grantors , their heirs or assigns , )
and may be exercised whenever the property is sold , although no amount
is fixed upon a
s purchase money . In other words , we have an estate




incumber it , unless first offer
ing it for no definite price to the grantors , their heirs or assigns . The
condition is repugnant to the grant , and therefore void . Even if the
right to repurchase could be sustained , the defendant has no cause o
f
complaint , inasmuch as the court in decreeing foreclosure has ordered
that 30 day ' s notice of the sale shall be personally served on him . The
exception to the insufficiency of the description in the mortgage from
Evans to the plaintiffs is plainly untenable . Henley v . Wilson , 81 N . C .
405 ; Euliss v . McAdams , 108 N . C . 507 , 13 S . E . Rep . 162 , and the cases
cited . * * *
Judgment affirmed .
In a conveyance o
f
land to trustees for the benefit of persons named , a
provision that the trustees should not put the land to any use injurious to
the other land of the beneficiaries in the same neighborhood , nor sell it ,
without the consent of all the beneficiaries , was held void , as tending to a
perpetuity , though , the provision appeared to be beneficial and the land
could be sold if all should so agree . Winsor v . Mills ( 1892 ) , 157 Mass .




KENT' S COMMENTARIES , vol. 4 , p. * 197 .
A remainder is a remnant of an estate in land depending on a particular
prior estate , created at the same time, and by the same instrument and
limited to arise immediately on the determination of that estate , and not
in abridgement of it .
BRACTON , Book II , fol. 18b (as translated in Digby's Hist. Real Prop .
172 . ) - A . D. 1256 -60 ?
Further a gift may be made to more persons than one at one time to
follow in succession according to the limitations of the gift ; as if a
man has more sons than one and makes a gift to the eldest in the follow
ing terms : “ I give to A my eldest son so much land to have and to
hold to him and his heirs begotten of his body , and if he have no such
heirs or if he have had heirs and they have failed , then I give that land
to B my younger son , and I desire that the land should revert to B to
hold to him and the heirs begotten of his body , and if he have had no
such heirs or if he have had heirs and they have failed , then I desire
and grant for myself and my heirs that the aforesaid land should revert
to C my third son , to have and to hold to him and his heirs begotten
of his body , and so on ; and if the aforesaid A B C have died without
heirs begotten of their bodies , then I desire that the land aforesaid should
revert to me and to my other heirs ." This (reversion ) indeed would hap
pen without express words, by an implied condition , unless the donor
were to direct otherwise concerning the land . Further if the gift be
made in wider terms, as if it be said , " I give to you so much land , & c.,
to have and to hold to you and your heirs or to whomsoever you wish
to give or assign it in your lifetime or to leave it at your death ," the
gift is valid because of the intention and assent of the donor, although it
appears to be opposed to the law of the land .
See the discussion of the common law as to remainders after a fee in
Willion v. Berkley , ante p .
To begin in Future without Particular Estate .
HOGG V. CROSS , in Queen ' s Bench , Mich . 33 & 34 Eliz ., A . D. 1593 —
Abridged from Cro . Eliz . 254 .
Ejectione firmæ of a house and garden in London . J . Warren seised of
it by burgage in fee, devised it to his wife for life , and after his death she
married Rice, who leased to plaintiff . Before making the will, testator
(299 )
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made a deed of feoffment to G , his so
n , habendum after the death of
the feoffor to said G in tail , and made livery of seisin secundum formam
chartae . Whether anything passed b
y
this was the question .
G . Wray , for the plaintiff , argued that the feoffment was void , and
nothing passed , and then the will made afterwards was good : for when
no estate is expressed in the beginning of a deed , but only an implied
estate for life , as here , and b
y
the habendum an express estate is limited .
this controls the implied limitation ; and if this be void and repugnant
in law , as it is here , being after the death o
f
the feoffor , all is void .
But if there be an express limitation in the beginning , if the habendum
be repugnant , it is void , and the first is good . And though livery be





is void , and so all is void ; for it is but the execution of a void deed ,
citing Mayn ’ s Case .
Dalton , for the defendant , argued that an estate for life passed b
y
the
premises and the habendum was void .
ALL THE JUDGES resolved the contrary : for it appears to be the in
tent of the feoffor that no estate shall pass but in futuro , vi
z
. after his
death , which is against law ; and it being all the purport of the deed ,
nothing shall pass in any other manner ; for nothing shall pass by the
premises but according to his intent , which is nothing ; for he intended
not to pass the freehold immediately . But if one grant a term b
y
deed , habendum after his death , this passes by the premises ; for the
premises are sufficient to carry it , and the habendum shall not atterly





the party , which is void ; and the livery is also void to ex




, to hadade a leas
BUCKLER V . HARVY , in Common Bench , Mich . 37 , & 38 Eliz . - A . D . 1597 .
- Cro . Eliz . 450 , 2 Coke 55 , 2 And . 29 , Moore 423 — Abridged from Croke .
Ejectione firmae . Upon special verdict , the case was , tenant for life ,
remainder to Buckler in tail . The tenant for life made a lease for
four years , and afterwards granted the reversion , to have said tenement
after midsummer next ensuing for t life of the grantor . After mid
summer the lessee for years attorned , the term expired , the grantee
entered , the grantor levied a fine to him sur conusance de droit come
ceo , & c . ; the tenant in tail in remainder entered for the forfeiture ,
and let it to the plaintiff ; upon whom the defendant , being the grantee
in reversion , re - entered , the first tenant for life being yet alive . The
first question was whether by this grant o
f
the reversion , hahendum
after midsummer , and the attornment made , the grant was good or
void . Secondly , admitting it to be void , the grantee entering in dis




WALMSLEY , J . A grant of a reversion , habendum after the death o
f
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the tenant for life is good ; for so is the course of fines , for this limita
tion is as to the having the possession , and not as to having the re
version , for that is in the grantee presently. But when a reversion is
granted habendum after a future day, he is thereby excluded to have
the reversion until that time, and therefore it is utterly void . The
habendum shall not be void but where it is not requisite, as in release
of a right, or grant of a term ; but here the habendum is necessary to
show the estate . * th
e
ANDERSON , C . J . It is clear that it is a forfeiture . * * * For the
first point , I doubt ; but I conceive the grant to be void , and that he by
his entry is a disseizor .
BEAUMOND , J . The grant is void : for if the estate had passed by the
livery , it had been clearly void ; and the same is law here ; for the
habendum is not void otherwise but in regard that no estate is limited
in the premises . And because the habendum limits the estate , and all
the estate depends on that which is void ; and the grant being void ,
the grantee b
y
his entry is a disseisor . * * *
Upon these reasons it was adjudged to be a forfeiture , and the entry
o
f
him in reversion to be lawful .
Afterwards this case was argued in the Queen ' s Bench on another special
verdict , and the judges of that court were of the same opinion . Buckler v .
Hardy ( 1597 ) , Cro . Eliz . 585 , 5 Gray P . Cas . 44 .
BARWICK ' S CASE , in Exch . , Trinity , 39 Eliz . - A . D . 1600 . - Abridged from
5 Coke 93b .
Information o
f
intrusion into a house and lands in York County ,
against P . Barwick and others . Queen Elizabeth having the reversion
o
f lands in lease for years to H . Barwick , demised them to him b
y






f three others and the survivors o
f
them ; and under this
demise the defendant claimed . Whether the lease was valid was the
question . And after many arguments at bar and bench , judgment was
given b
y
PERIAM , C . J . , and the whole court o
f
exchequer , for the
queen ; and in this case these points were resolved .
OPINION O
F
COURT . 1 . When the queen demised the manor from
the day o
f making the letters patent , that day is without question ex
cluded .
2 . An estate of freehold could not b
y
the common law begin in
futuro but ought to take effect presently in possession , reversion or
remainder . The difference is between a lease for life and a lease fo
r
years : for a lease for years may begin in futuro , but not a lease for
life . A
s
if a man makes a lease for years to begin a
t
Michaelmas next
ensuing , it is good ; but if a man makes a lease for life to begin at
Michaelmas , it is void ; and the reasons and causes of this difference
are : ( 1 . ) Because a lease for years may be made without livery of
seisin , but so cannot an estate o
f
freehold without livery , either in fact o
r
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in law . And therefore when a man makes a lease for life to begin at a
future day he cannot make present livery to a future estate, and
therefore in such a case nothing passes. And it was said that letters
patent under the great seal amount to a livery in law ; and therefore ,
by letters patent a lease cannot be made for life to begin at a day to
come. ( 2 . ) If any freehold should pass presently by the letters patent
from a day to come, then the queen in the meantime would have a par
ticular interest and term without any donor or lessor , which would be
against the rules of the law . But no such consequence will follow in the
case of a lease for years ; and therefore it was resolved in the case at bar
that the lease for three lives was void , because it was to begin the next
day after the teste of the letters patent . And if the lease should be
good the queen would have an interest for the day , and although the
lease was to begin the next day after the teste of it , it is all one in
law as if it had been to begin twenty or forty days or years to come,
for the difference of the time doth not make an alteration of the law
in such case . And in this case it was agreed , that if a man makes a lease
for years to A & B , the remainder to C for life , in that case the lessor ought
to make livery to A & B before their entry , and by the livery to A &
B , C shall take a perfect estate for life by way of remainder, by force
of the livery made to the lessees for years .
SWYFT V. EYRES , in King 's Bench , Trinity , 15 Car. 1. - A . D. 1640 .
Abridged from Cro . Car. 546 .
Debt by Swyft, subchantor, and one of the vicars choral of Litchfield ,
against Eyres and others , lessees of Sir Edward Peto , to recover under
the statute of 2 Edw . 6 for not setting out tithes. On non debit pleaded ,
it was found by special verdict , that the subchantor and vicars choral ,
being seized in fee of the rectory on which the tithes are claimed , leased
them to John Peto for 42 years , and later, by indenture reciting that
Richard and John Woodward had bought that lease , granted the tithes
to them “ habendum from and after the said term and determination
thereof and the years in the said indenture comprised ,” & c , then to
Richard Woodward for one month , and after that month fully expired
then to John Woodward and his heirs and assigns forever , rendering
rent , & c . ; and later by another indenture misreciting the facts , granted
the same to Humphrey Peto and his heirs. Defendants' lessor claimed
under both indentures . The only questions were as to the validity of these
indentures .
As to the first , ALL the JUSTICES argued for the plaintiffs, that
they have a good title , notwithstanding this indenture ; for this in
denture is merely void , because it is to convey an inheritance in futuro ;
for the month is not to begin until the forty and two years be ex
pired ; and it is a grant of interesse termini, and no grant of a reversion ;
for the inheritance is granted therein , which was not in the lease before ;








estate ; and then , being





reversion to commence in futuro . And to
prove this see 2 Coke 55 , Buckler ' s Case [ reported herein ante p . On
the second indenture they held defendant had title notwithstanding the




Acceleration of Remainders .
RICKMAN V . GARDENER , in Common Pleas , Mich . 2 & 3 Phil . & Mary .
A . D . 1556 . - Dyer 122a .
A man seized o
f
land in fee had issue two sons and a daughter , and
made his last will and testament in writing after the statute , & c . , and
thereby devised his lands to his wife for the term of ten years after
his death , remainder to his youngest son and his heirs forever ; and
that if either of his two sons should die without issue of his body law
fully begotten , that then the land should remain to his daughter and
her heirs in fee . And afterwards , vi
z
. , in the life - time o
f
the testator ,
the said youngest son died without issue , and then the father died
without making any alteration o
f
his will . Whether the eldest son shall
have the land a
s
tenant in tail , o
r
in fee -simple by the intention o
f
the
devisor , or the daughter ? was the question . And it was demurred in law
in waste b
y





all the judges of C . B . this was a good remainder to the daughter ,
notwithstanding the death o
f
the devisee without issue in the life -time
o
f
the testator , and they would not argue the case . See Perkins , accord
ingly , in Devise , fol . 120 ( f . 246 , $ 568 ] where the case is a man de
vised his lands to one for life , remainder over in fee ; the devisee for life
died in the life -time o
f
the devisor , and then the devisor died : he in
the remainder may well enter and execute his remainder . But see
contra in this matter E . V Eliz . fol . 237 .
FULLER V . FULLER , in B . R . , Hilary , 36 Eliz . , A . D . 1595 . — Moore 353 ,
Cro . Eliz . 422 . - — Abridged from Cro . Eliz ,
Trespass for lands . Upon not guilty pleaded , a special verdict found ,
that " Henry Fuller , seized of socage lands in fee , had issue , John ,
Henry , Richard , and Edward ; and devised the land to Richard and the
heirs o
f
his body ; and after his death without issue , to Edward in tail ,
and then to John in tail , remainder to the right heirs of the devisor .
Richard died leaving issue , T , and W . Afterwards Henry , the devisor ,
said , “My will is that the sons of Richard , my deceased son shall have
the land devised to their father , as they should have had if their father
had lived , and had died after me . ' ” The devisor died and T . the son
o
f
Richard entered , on whom John , the eldest son o
f
the devisor en
tered . T . re -entered and John brings trespass .
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This case was argued by Towse fo
r
the plaintiff , and by Foster fo
r
the





new speech and declaration after the death o
f
Richard , Thomas his son
shall take as a devisee ; 2 , admitting that it is not a good devise to
Thomas , whether John , the eldest son , shall have it during the time that
any issue of the body o
f
Richard be alive , or whether Edward in re
mainder should enter presently , because it is not limited unto him until
the death o
f Richard without issue .
GAWDY [ J . ] held that Thomas should not take it ; and that there
was not any difference betwixt this and Brett ' s Case [ v . Rigden , Plowd .
Com . 345 , ante - ) . There the devise was in fee , here it is in tail , which
is all one : and this speech of the devisor is not o
f any effect ; for there
is such a speech in Brett ' s Case . But the devise of the manor of D , which




a devise to a
n infant in ventre sa mere with new publication after
it
s
birth , for there is his will written " that he should have it , " and it is
expressed by his words afterwards . But here there is not any written
will , that the son o
f
Richard should have it , and he cannot have it as his
heir . Wherefore , & c . As to the second point , there is no doubt but that
he in remainder shall have it presently ; for the devise being void to the
first , it is as if it never had been made ; so it is if the first devisee refuse ,
h
e
in the remainder shall have it presently ; as 37 Hen . 6 [ 36a , p
l
. 23 ,
cited in Newis v . Lark ante - - ) , Plowd . Com . 414 ; accord , Mary , Dyer
[ 126b , ante - ) , Jasper Warren ' s Case ſv . Lee ) . Wherefore the plaintiff
hath not any cause o
f
action , & c . And in this point al
l
the other justices
agreed with him ; and a
s
to the first point CLENCH agreed also ; but
FENNER and POPHAM , e contra . * * * But for the second point , in
regard they all agreed against the plaintiff , it was adjudged presently
for the defendant .
When All to Particular Tenant and So No Remainder .
ANONYMOUS , Mich . 29 Eliz . , 1587 . — Moor 247 .
Puckering , sergeant , moved that a lease was made to three , habendum
to them for 99 years , viz : to the first if he so long live , and if he die
to the second for the residue o
f
the term o
f years , and if he die within
the term then to the third for the residue of years . And he moved that
if the first die , what estate the second had . PERRIAM and WIND
HAM [JJ . ] held that he had a good estate for so many of the years as





many years in remainder , and the law may be applied to the intent
o
f









the first . ANDERSON ( C . J . ] , contra : for he said that
it might not inure by way o
f
remainder , because there was no estate in
being during the particular term ; and he would not allow the diversity
made b
y
PERRIAM , because the residue of the term is intended as a
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residue of years , fo
r
the term is not that continuance fo
r
years . PERRIAM
changed opinion on the diversity , but he held the law yet good for the
estate o
f
the second , as before , for this inured as a new grant . Roods
was o
f
the same opinion . Sed quaere , for they were all parties to the
deed , wherefore it would be better than b
y way o
f
remainder to one who
is not party , as the case in Dyer 150 .
GREEN V . EDWARDS , in the Common Pleas , Hilary , 33 Eliz . , A . D . 1592 .
- Cro . Eliz . 216 , Moor 297 .
Demurrer . Land was le
t
to J . S . for ninety years if he so long
live , and if he di
e
within the term , then his wife shall have it during
the whole residue of the term aforesaid , J . S . died within the term ,
and the question was whether his wife should have it during the residue .
By al
l
the Justices , resolved , that she shall not , for the term was
wholly determined , and the limitation to her was void ; for as a re
mainder it cannot inure , for a remainder must be created with a par
ticular estate , and is to be limited for a certain estate , viz . for years ,
life , in fee , & c . And here no certain estate is limited to her ; for a
l
though it is limited to her during the residue o
f
the term , and so
shall be intended a lease for years , yet for as much as every lease for
years is to have a certain commencement and ending , here it is un
certain whether she shall ever have it , for J . S . may outlive the ninety
years . And so a termor cannot grant the term after his death , and so
the remainder here is void . ANDERSON , C . J . , said that if the wife had
been a party to the deed this peradventure might have been good to
her , not b
y way of remainder , but b
y
immediate grant and demise for
so many years which shall be to come ; and durante termino shall not
b
e taken for the interest but for the time : which WALMSLEY and WIND
HAM [ JJ . , ] did expressly deny , for they held it is at first void for the
uncertainty when it shall commence , or whether it shall commence .
It was adjudged that the wife took nothing .
Cecil ' s Case ( 8 Eliz . , 1566 ) , 3 Dyer 253b , was so decided on a lease for
41 years to W if he so long live , and if he die within the term to E for the
residue , and if she die within the term to W ' s son for the residue . But the
reasons are not so fully stated .
When in Abridgment o
f
Prior Estate or on Condition .
COLTHIRST v . BEJUSHIN , in Common Bench , Easter , 4 Edw . 6 . - A . D .
1551 . — Abridged from Plowden Com . 21 to 3
5 .
Trespass quaere clausum . Defendant pleaded not guilty and further
that the prior of Bath , being seised in fee o
f
the close wherein the
trespass is alleged to have been committed , leased it b
y
deed indented
to Henry Bejushin and Eleanor his wife , for term of their lives , re
mainder to William , a son of said Henry and Eleanor , for life , if he
should always reside on the place ; and if he should die before said
Henry and Eleanor , then the said prior appointed it to Peter Bejushin .
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& the trespa
demurred.intiff,that
another son , who is the defendant herein , if he should likewise reside
on the place ; that by force of this lease said Henry and Eleanor entered
and were seised , and being so seised William died , and then Henry
and Eleanor died ; after which Peter , the defendant , entered and was
and still is seised and at all times since his entry has resided on the
place ; which is the trespass complained of. He gave color to the
plaintiff , and the plaintiff demurred .
Pollard , sergeant, argued for the pla tif , that the remainder is void .
1. Because the limitation of the remainder is here appointed during
the particular estate , and every remainder ought to be limited to take
effect after the particular estate , and if limited to take effect during
the particular estate it is repugnant to the first estate , and so utterly
void . So here this remainder is void , because it is limited to take effect
immediately after the first estate for life is determined ; and when the
first estate for life is determined , then the first remainder for life
commences ; and if it so commences , it follows that the second re
mainder cannot then begin , for it would avoid the first .
2. This remainder is void , because it is limited to commence upon
condition , which no remainder may do , for conditions always inure
in privity , so that none but privies shall take advantage of them ; for
none shall enter for a condition broken except the lessor, donor, and
feoffor , or their heirs . And as none but privies shall avoid an estate
before made for breach of condition , so none but privies shall take a
new estate by performance of a condition . If I make a lease for life,
upon condition that if the lessee do not pay me 20£ . at such a day
then it shall remain over to a stranger in fee , and he fails of payment ,
this is a void remainder , for the cause stated . ( M . 18 Henry 8, 3 b ,
arguendo . ) But if I make a lease for life , upon condition that if
the lessee do a certain act he shall have the fee , and he does it accord
ingly , there he shall have the fee ; because he is privy to the condition ,
and therefore he shall take the benefit of it. And so the diversity
appears where the estate upon condition is appointed to a privy , and
where it is to a stranger . In our case the remainder is limited to the
defendant if his brother first dies in the life of his parents, and if he
does not, then the defendant shall not have the remainder . So that
the remainder is to commence upon a contingent , and for this cause
it is not good . If an estate is made for life upon condition that if the
tenant for life die , then it shall remain over , this remainder is good
because it commences upon the termination of the particular estate ,
which is certain , and so no condition ; M . 27 Henry 8, 24 a , by Fitz
herbert , J . ; but in our case it is uncertain , and may be performed or
broken .
3. This remainder is void , because in every state it is necessary
that conveyances be certain , for certainty is the mother of repose , and
uncertainty is the mother of contention , which our law has ever guarded
against . For which reason it has ordained certain ceremonies to be
used in the transmutation of things from one to another (and especially
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of freeholds , which are of greater price and estimation in our law than
other things ) in order to know the certain times when things pass ;
and therefore in every feoffment the law has appointed that livery and
seisin shall be had , and in every grant of reversions or rents that at
tornment shall be made ; which are certain points , containing the time
when , and to whom such estates do pass . And for the same reason
the law has ordained and appointed that every remainder shall have
three things , besides those before mentioned , as rules whereby to know
when remainders are good , vi
z
. : a , an estate precedent , made at the
same time that the remainder commences ; b , that the particular estate







the livery . If any of these three fail ,
the remainder is void . And therefore as to the first point , if the lessor
confirms the estate of his tenant for years , the remainder in fee , this





the remainder , and he shall not take it as a grant
o
f
the reversion , because he is not a party to the deed . So if the lessor
disseizes his tenant for life , and afterwards makes a new lease to him
for life , remainder in fee , this remainder is void , for the same reason .
As to the second point , the precedent ought to continue when the re
mainder vests ; and therefore if a man makes a lease for life , and that
the day after the death o
f
the tenant for life it shall remain over , this
remainder is void , because the first estate is determined before the re
mainder is appointed . As to the third point , that the remainder ought
to pass out o
f





void , this is proved by the common case where a lease is made for
life , remainder to the right heirs o
f
a person living ; this remainder
passes out o
f
the lessor presently , though it does not vest presently .
But in our case the estate precedent was made long before the re
mainder , and therefore the remainder shall be void ; and also the re




the time of livery , but is appointed
to pass upon the performance o
f
a condition , for the words are , if the
son in the remainder di
e , then it shall remain to the defendant .
Coke , sergeant , to the contrary : The remainder here is good , for
first there is an estate on which the remainder may be built , and the re
mainder here is appointed upon it . The cause why the remainder
shall not be good is alleged in two grand points : a because the fee
does not pass presently out o
f
the lessor ; and b , because the re
mainder may not pass upon a condition . It seems to me that the re
mainder passes out o
f
the lessor presently , as in Littleton ' s case (Litt .
§ 350 ) , viz . if one makes a lease for 5 years , upon condition that if
h
e pay to him 20£ . within the first two years , that then he shall have
fee , the fee passes out o
f
the lessor presently . So shall it b
e here . And
si
r , a remainder may well commence upon condition , as if a lease is
made for life , upon condition that if J . S . marry my daughter during
the estate for life it shall remain to him , this is a good remainder ,
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and yet it commences on condition . That which I may give without
condition I may give on condition . If one makes a disseisin to the
use of a stranger , and the stranger afterwards agrees to it, he shall have
the land thereby . And if land may be transferred by such assent, al
l
the more may it pass upon a condition , especially with a freehold estate
precedent .
HALES , J . , said : It seems to me that the remainder is good . When
the lessor appoints the remainder to the defendant as above his intent
may be perceived herein , and it is reasonable that the same should be
fulfilled , viz . that the defendant should have it in such manner and
form a
s it is appointed . And this limitation is not against law , nor
against any principle thereof , as I shall prove hereafter ; neither is it
repugnant in itself , therefore it is good . And to prove that it is not
against law , I shall put some cases founded upon like reason , and
which will also answer the reason of that which has been alleged , vi
z
.
that the remainder ought to pass out o
f
the lessor presently , which I
utterly deny . And therefore if I made a lease for years , the remainder
for life , upon condition that if he in the remainder do not such an
act , the remainder shall be void , now before the condition is
broken the remainder is good , and in him to whom it is ap
pointed ; but if the condition is broken , then the remainder is out of
him , and in the person o
f
the lessor again , which proves that a freehold
by agreement had upon the livery may b
e transferred from one to
another by matter ex post facto . So if one grants a rent or reversion ,
and afterwards attornment is had , now the reversion shall pass thereby ,
and yet it did not pass presently b
y
the grant , which case proves that
upon the assent first had , and act done afterwards , a freehold may be
divested out o
f
one and vested in another . So if a man makes
a lease for life b
y
deed , remainder to the king , and makes livery o
f
seisin , the remainder does not pass presently , but if the deed is after
wards enrolled , then the remainder shall be in the king from the time
o
f
the first livery ( T . 1 Hen . 7 , 30b , 31a ) . So that b
y
the limitation




the time of the livery shall pass b
y
the act done after
wards . So in Plesington ' s Case ( H . 6 R . 2 ; Fitz . Abr . Quid Juris Clam .
2
0
) , one condition was that if the lessor died within the term , then
the lessee for years should have the land for life , and it was there held ,
that if the lessor died , his estate should be enlarged causa qua supra .
S
o if one makes disseisin to the use o
f
J . S . , now the freehold is not in
J . S . ; but if J . S . afterwards agrees to it , then the freehold is in him .
( P . 12 Ed . 4 , 12 p
l
. 23 ; Fitz . , Disseizin 3 ; Brooke Abr . 66 , Agree
ment 4 . ) Which cases prove that when livery is made , or when a man
first meddles with the possession o
f





such words and o
f
some act afterwards done , a free
hold may be transferred from one to another . So in the principal
case , livery is made , and thereupon the lessor hath declared and a
p
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pointed that if William die living the husband and wife , then it shall
remain to the defendant ; in which case I will readily agree that the re
mainder does not pass out of the lessor until William is dead , and when
he is dead, it shall well pass by force of the first words annexed to the
livery .
To make a difference where the fee is appointed upon condition to
& privy , and where to a stranger , is but an idle and insignificant con
ceit. As to what has been said touching the words if William
die living the husband and wife, then it shall remain to the defendant ,
which word then shall be intended presently during the lives of the
husband and wife, so as to defeat their estate ; sir , the sentence is not
to be so understood , but it shall have a beneficial construction , viz .
that then it shall remain as a remainder ought to do , and that is , to
vest , and be executed after the death o
f
the husband and wife . As if
a gift in tail is made to one upon condition that if he do such an act ,
then the land shall remain to his right heirs , this word then ' is not so
to b
e understood as to avoid the estate tail , and to be executed presently
upon the performance o
f
the act , but it must be taken in this manner ,
viz . that upon the performance o
f
the act the remainder shall vest , and
after the estate ended it shall be executed . So shall it be understood
here , and then there is no such repugnancy as has been alleged , nor
is there any prejudice to a stranger . But if any prejudice shall arise
to a stranger thereby , then the remainder shall not be good . As if it
was that if William die , then the defendant shall have the land during
the lives o
f
the husband and wife , this should be void in respect to the
prejudice to the particular estate , for things which are done in prej
udice o
f
others shall be void .
HINDE , [ J . ] The remainder is good . That the remainder com
mences upon condition , si
r , I deny that : fo
r
the remainder is limited
to the defendant if William die living the husband and wife , which
is not a condition , but a limitation when the remainder shall commence ;
for no words make a condition unless such as restrain the thing given ,
a
s upon condition that he shall not do such an act , or the like ; but
here these words limit the time when the remainder shall commence ,
and d
o not restrain the thing given , and therefore they may not be
called a condition , but rather a limitation . If I make a lease for life
upon condition that if the lessee di
e




f my entry ; which is void , because it is no more than
the law says ; and it is no condition because it does not restrain the
estate . So if I make a lease for life upon condition that if the lessee
does waste , and I recover the place wasted , I shall enter into it ,
this is n
o
condition because it does not restrain the estate . So if I make
a lease for life upon condition that if I recover in waste any parcel , that I
shall enter into the whole land , & c . , this is a condition for that part in
which no waste was done , for the condition is restrictive , and goes in de
1 On this point see Boraston ' s Case post -
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feasance of that part . The common case of fines are , where an estate
tail is that if it happen the donee die without issue , that then it shall
remain to a stranger , which is not a condition , but a limitation of the
time when the remainder shall commence . So in the principal case ,
it is but a limitation and an explanation of the time when the remainder
shall commence . And I do not see any cause or reason why I may not
make a remainder to commence and vest in the midst of a particular
estate , as well as I may at the beginning or end of a particular estate :
for there is no repugnancy , but that it may commence to vest at any
time during the particular estate ; for when the fee simple is in me
I may condition with it as I please , if it be not contrary to law , which
it is not in ours , or such like cases. But if I make a lease for life upon
condition that if J . S . pay me 20£ . then I shall enter upon the tenant
for life , and then it shall remain , & c ., this remainder is void ; because
by the entry the first livery is annulled and defeated , and then there
is no particular estate continuing upon which the remainder may de
pend : but here there is no such matter , for which reason the remainder
seems to me to be good . And if it be a condition , yet the remainder
may commence upon it well enough , seeing it is the will of the lessor
that it should be so . Wherefore it seems to me that the plaintiff shall
be barred .
Brown, J ., spoke to the same purpose , on another day ; and argued
that the remainder should be good upon condition . And if it should not
be good upon condition , he said it should be good to the defendant as
A grant of the reversion ; and therefore the plaintiff should be barred .
MONTAGUE , C . J . If it was a condition , yet the plaintiff has not
enabled himself to take benefit of it ; for, as been said , none
but privies shall take benefit of conditions by entry , by the common
law . And now by the statute of 32 Hen . 8, c. 34 , the grantees and
patentees of the king shall also take advantage of conditions . And
here the plaintiff has not conveyed to himself a capacity to take benefit
of the condition , as privy , nor as patentee or grantee of the king, nor
in any other manner . And further the remainder seems to be good ;
for in the first place , it appears to me that there is not any condition
here whereupon the remainder depends , but that it is a limitation and
appointment of the time when the remainder shall vest , and in this
point I agree with my brother Hinde. But even admitting it to be
& condition , or call it a limitation , or give it what other term you
please , yet it seems to me that the remainder is good ; for every man
who is lawful owner of any land, may give it to what person , in what
manner , and at what time he pleases , so that his gift be not contrary
to law , nor repugnant . Here it seems to me that his gift is not con
trary to law . In 10 Ed. 3, 30 pl. 33 , Fitz, Assize 161, a man made
a lease for years to J . S . and in surety of his term he made him a
charter of feoffment, upon condition that if the lessee was disturbed






remainder seems w on .
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heirs , and J . S . was disturbed and afterwards ousted , and he brought
an assize, and it was awarded that he should recover ; which proves
that a freehold may pass by a condition well enough , where the con
dition is expressed at the time of the livery . And by the reason of
this case a man may make as many remainders as he will to commence
upon the like condition ; and although he is in the one case immediately
privy , and not in the other case , this is no matter to stay the remainder ,
for his livery shall be taken most strongly against himself. When I
was at the bar I was counsel with one Mr. Melton ( M 27 Hen . 8, 24
pl. 2 ) , and the case was thus : a fine was levied sur grant & render ,
whereby the conusee granted and rendered to the conusor the tenements
in tail upon condition that the conusor and his heirs of , & c., should
bear the standard of the conusee when he went to battle , and if the
conusor or his heirs failed to do it, then the land should remain to a
stranger ; and I moved the case then to the court , and it was greatly
wondered that the fine upon condition was received . But Fitzherbert ,
J ., then held the remainder good , and they did not wonder at it, nor
held it any great question but that it might commence upon condition .
Adjudged for defendant .
COGAN v. COGAN , in C. B., Easter , 38 Eliz . - A . D . 1597.- -Abridged from
Cro . Eliz . 360 .
Trespass . Upon demurrer , the case was, that John, seised in fee,
le
t
to Robert for life , remainder to Catherine , the defendant , for life ,
" provided , that if John , the lessor , had issue a son during life , who
should live to the age o
f
five years , that the estate limited to the de
fendant , Catherine , should cease , and it should remain to the said son
in tail . ” The lessor had issue , the plaintiff , who attained his age o
f
five years . Whether the remainder limited to the defendant shall
cease and the remainder limited to the plaintiff were good , was the
question . THE COURT resolved fo
r
the defendant after the sergeants
had argued . ANDERSON , [ C . J . ] , said there are certain rules in law





the livery , and shall not take effect with a condition precedent , nor
shall begin upon such a condition ; and although Colthurst ' s Case [ v .
Bejushin ante - ] gives color thereto , and that the remainder in ques
tion shall be good , yet he held not that case to be law on this point ; for
a remainder depending upon a condition precedent is merely void . And
further in this case , an entry is requisite to avoid the remainder for life ;
for a freehold cannot determine without the ceremony o
f entry , but
otherwise it is o
f
a lease for years . Wherefore this remainder depend
ing upon a limitation which is against the rules o
f
law , is void . WALMS
LEY , [ J . ] , to the same intent : The remainder is void , b
y
Littleton , and
by the ancient grounds o
f
the law for , the remainder (by Littleton ) ought
to pass a
t
the time of the livery ; and the nature of a livery is a giving ,
and there cannot be a giving , but there ought to be one to take , in pre
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senti or in expectancy, so as the law shall preserve it in the interim ;
and there needs not be any deed of a remainder , which proves that it
passes by the livery . And by Richil 's Case the remainder shall take
effect when the particular estate takes his effect , and ought to pass pres
ently by the livery , or otherwise it shall never pass ; and although in
Colthurst 's Case the condition be precedent in words , yet it is subsequent
in reason ; wherefore it may be well maintained by law . And a remainder
cannot pass by contingency ; for then there would an absurdity follow , viz .,
there should , by the first livery , be an immediate reversion , expectant on
the remainder for life ; and afterwards this remainder shall be turned out,
and the reversion also ; and a new remainder and reversion should come
in place of them ; so as there should be turnings out and turnings in at
several times , by one livery which was made at one time. But as touch
ing the ceasing of the remainder , he conceived it might very well be
without any entry , by the operation of law , the particular estate remain
ing in being. Wherefore , & c . BEAUMOND, [ J . ], to the same intent:
For a remainder ought to begin and be created with the first livery , and
concurrent with the other estate ; and cannot afterwards begin upon 8
condition . And he said he never had heard or read that a proviso could
create a remainder , although it might determine & remainder ; but he
held that a remainder of an estate of freehold or inheritance cannot
cease without entry or claim , no more than an estate of freehold in pos
session . OWEN , [ J . ], agreed with BEAUMOND, [ J . ], in omnibus , for the
reasons before specified . Wherefore it was adjudged for the defendant.
Statute of New York , Mich ., & c. . " A remainder may be limited on a con
tingency , which , in case it should happen , will operate to abridge or deter
mine the precedent estate ; and every such remainder shall be construed &
conditional limitation , and shall have the same effect as such a limitation
would have by law . " N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) , pt. 2 , c. 1, t. 2, Art . 1, § 27 ; Wich .
R . S. ( 1846 ) c. 62, § 27 , c . L . ( 1897 ) $ 8809 ; Minn . St . (1866 ) , c. 45 , § 27 ,
R . L . (1905 ) , § 3216 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56 , § 27 , St . (1898 ) , $ 2051.
CHOMLEY V. HUMBLE , in Common Bench , Hilary , 85 Elz . - A . D . 1594 .
Cro . Eliz . 379 , 1 And . 346 . Abridged from Croke.
Trespass . On demurrer , the case was, a feoftment was made to the
use of one fo
r
life , remainder to Chomley in tail , remainder to another
in tail , remainder to the lord chamberlain , with this proviso , “ that
if any o
f
them in remainder g
o
about to levy a fine , o
r
d
o any act whereby
the uses limited shall not take effect according to the limitation , then
the estate o
f
him who so goeth about shall cease a
s if he were naturally
dead and n
o otherwise . ” Whether this were a good proviso , was the
question .
The Court , after argument on either side , delivered their opinion ,
that it was not good . ANDERSON , ( C . J . ] , said , a
t
the common law the





law cannot cease ; and the Statute o
f Uses does not help it ; for the
statute cannot help any use where there is not any person who is seised
to the use .
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WALMSLEY , [ J . ] : The proviso that it shall cease as if he were natur
ally dead is void and without sense ; for if he were dead , it should
descend to the son , and he should be in in the per by the father , and it
should come unto him quasi by degrees and steps ; but that cannot be
when the father is in esse and living : wherefore the words in the pro
viso to this purpose are void and without any signification , and they
are as if they had never been mentioned ; and so it is an estate tail
absolute and without condition . But in entry into religion the land
shall descend to the son , for the law reputes him dead . But if an act
of parliament had been made as above it should be good enough , and
should make a descent to the son without death ; but by conveyance
there cannot any such descent be made ; and an estate of inheritance
in land cannot be made to cease by any conveyance without some other
act doing .
BEAUMOND [ J . ], ad idem : An estate in tail cannot cease at the com
mon law ; no more cannot it in use at this day ; for it is an estate executed
at the common law ; and the issue cannot have a formedon , living the
father , and that feoffees at this day should be seized to his use is absurd .
Wherefore , & c .
Sed adjournantur and not adjudged at this time.
In the next term adjudged that the proviso was not good , and that
the issue could not have it for the forfeiture . 1 Coke, 86 [Corbet 's


















Alternative Remainders in Fee .
LODDINGTON V . KIME , in Common Bench , Mich . , 6 W . & M . - A . D . 1695 .
- 1 Salk . * 224 , 3 Lev . 431 , 1 Ld . Raym . 203 , 5 Gray P . Cas . 54 . From
Salk .
In replevin a special verdict was found , viz : That Sir Michael Armin ,
being seised in fee , devised a rent charge , and then devised the land to
A for life , without impeachment fo
r
waste , and in case he have any
issue male , then to such issue male and his heirs forever ; and if he die
without issue male , then to B and his heirs forever . A entered and
suffered a common recovery , and died without issue .
1 . Question was whether A was tenant in tail b
y
his devise ?
POWELL , J . , held the express estate for life not destroyed b
y
the impli
cation that arose on the latter words following , so that A was only





waste , and for life , must in that case be rejected , quod Treby , C . J . ,
concessit .
2 . The court held that issue was to be taken here as nomen singulare ,
because the inheritance was annexed and limited to the word issue ; so
that the inheritance was in the issue , and not in A , the father .
3 . That this limitation to the issue was not an executory devise , be
ing after a freehold , but a contingent remainder , so that a posthumous
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4 . That the remainder limited to the issue of A was a contingent
remainder in fee , and that the remainder to B was a fee also ; but those
fees are not like one fee mounted on another nor contrary to one another,
but two concurrent contingencies, of which either is to start according
as it happens ; so that these are remainders contemporary and not ex
pectant one after another .
5 . The court held that the remainder in fee to B was not vested ,
because the precedent limitation to the issue of A was a contingent
fee ; and they took this difference, vi
z
: where the mesne estates limited
are for life or in tail , the last remainder may , if it be to a person in
esse , vest ; but no remainder limited after a limitation in fee can be
vested .
6 . That the recovery suffered by A had barred the estate limited to
his issue , that being contingent , and likewise the remainder limited to
B and his heirs , because that was contingent , not vested , and now
never could vest ; and that A had gained a tortuous fee , which would
b
e good against B and his heirs , and likewise against all persons but
the right heirs of the devisor .
This case is cited in Hennessey v . Patterson , 85 N . Y . 91 , Finch R . P . Cas .
868 , recognizing that alternative limitations in fee are remainders .
DOE D . HERBERT V . SELBY , in B . R . , Easter , 1824 . — 2 Barn . & Cres . ( 9
E . O . L . ) 926 , 5 Gray ' s P . Cas . 1 .
Ejectment for houses and lands in Middlesex county . Plea , general
issue . A verdict was found for plaintiff , subject to the opinion o
f
the
court , as follows : Thomas Herbert , being seised o
f
the lands in fee ,
made his will duly executed , devising the lands to his son George “dur
ing the term o
f
his natural life ; and from and after his decease , I give
and devise the same estates unto all and every the child and children of
my said son George and their heirs for ever , to hold as tenants in
common . But if my son George should die without issue , or leaving
issue and such child or children should di
e
before attaining the age of
twenty -one years , or without lawful issue ; then I give and devise the
same estates unto my son Thomas , my daughter Ann , my son - in -law
William Duke , and their heirs fo
r
ever , to hold as tenants in common . ”
After the death of the testator , George suffered a common recovery to
his own use , conveyed the land to the defendant in fe
e , and died with
out having had issue . The plaintiff is the lessee of the said Thomas ,
Ann , and William , claiming under the gift over .
Chitty for the plaintiff . It will be contended on the other side that





the particular estate . But that is not so , for either the
estate given to G . ' s children was an estate tail , in which case the ultimate
remainder would be vested , or it was a contingent fee determinable ,
and the limitation over must take effect as an executory devise , accord




particular estate would not destroy the remainder . 1 . Even if G .
had died leaving a child , who had died under age without issue , the
devise over would take effect ; it could not therefore be a contingent
remainder , but must be an executory devise : Pells v . Brown , Cro .
590 [post p . 242 ] . Doe v . Webber , 1 B . & A . 713 . 2 George ' s
children would take an estate tail , for the gift over is on their death
without issue , which reduces their interest to an estate tail . Besides
the ultimate remainder is to persons who would be heirs general to
the children , so they would never die without heirs as long as those
persons lived . This case is therefore different from Loddington v . Kime ,
3 Lev . 431 [ ante p . ] ; and Goodright v . Dunham , 1 Doug . 264 .
(Bailey , J . But here you must read the devise , “ if the children should
die before twenty -one and without issue , ” otherwise the remainder over
will be too remote . )
BAILEY , J . * * * It is not contended that George took an estate tail ;
and , indeed , Goodright v . Dunham , 1 Doug . 264 , clearly shows that he
took for life only , and that the children would take as purchasers by way
o
f
remainder , and they would take in fee . It has been contended that the
ultimate devisees took either by way o
f executory devise o
r
vested re
mainder . But it is clear that where a devise may operate as a contingent





vested limitation , but determinable , a remainder after
that must be an executory devise ; but if a fee is limited in contingency ,
and upon failure of that the estate is given over , that is a contingency
in a double aspect ; and if the estate vests in the one , it cannot in the
other :Loddington v . Kime , 3 Lev . 421 [ante p . ] . But it may happen ,
that an estate may be devised over in either o
f
two events ; and that in
one event the devise may operate a
s
a contingent remainder , in the
other as an executory devise . Thus if George had left a child , a de
terminable fee would have vested in that child , and then the devise
over could only have operated as an executory devise . But George hav
ing died without having had a child , the first fee never vested , and
the remainder over continued a contingent remainder . Gulliver v .
Wickett , 1 Wil . 105 , was clearly a case of executory devise . The es
tate was given to testator ' s wife for life , and after her death to such
child a
s
she was then supposed to b
e
enceinte with , and to the heirs of
such child forever , provided , that if such child shall die before
twenty -one , leaving no issue o
f
it
s body , then the reversion over . The
description o
f
the child there was a clear designato persona , and as
a child in ventre sa mere , is for many purposes considered as in esse ,
the first remainder , a fe
e
determinable was vested in that child , and
the remainder over could only operate b
y way o
f executory devise .
The other cases which I have mentioned are not in substance dis
tinguishable from this . Doe v . Burnsell , 6 Term 30 , was a devise
to Mary Owstwhick , and the issue o
f
her body , as tenants in common ;
but in default o
f
such issue , or being such , if they should all die under
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twenty -one, and without leaving any lawful issue of their bodies , then
over. Mary Owstwhick suffered a recovery , and died without having
any issue , and it was held that all the limitations subsequent to that to
her were contingent , and destroyed by the recovery . No question was
raised as to ultimate remainder operating by way of executory devise ,
but that could not be raised , as Mary Owstwhick never had any issue
in whom the first remainder might vest. But Crump d . Wooley v. Nor
wood , y Taunton 362, is on all fours with the present case . There the
devise was to the testator 's wife for life, if she should so long remain
unmarried , and immediately after her decease or marriage , to testator's
three nephews , share and share alike , for life , as tenants in common ,
remainder to the heirs of their bodies respectively in fe
e ; if more than
one , then to al
l
equally , as tenants in common ; " and if any o
f
his said
nephews should die leaving no such issue , or leaving any such , they
should all die without attaining the age of twenty -one years , then over ; "
and it was held that the remainders subsequent to the devise to the





ticular estate . And one of the nephews having died without having
had issue , Gibbs , C . J . , considered that in that event the question o
f
executory devise did not arise ; although if there had been issue , the
ultimate devise over might have operated in that mode . These au
thorities satisfy me , that in the event which has happened , the devise to
the lessors o
f
the plaintiff in this case did not operate b
y way o
f ex
ecutory devise . It has been argued , that it might operate as a vested
remainder , for that the devise to George ' s children was only of an estate
tail , because they could never die without heirs as long as the lessors
o
f
the plaintiff lived , and therefore , " heirs ” must mean "heirs of the
body . ” But although it may be so where , after a devise to a man and
his heirs the estate is devised over simpliciter to a collateral heir , yet
it is not so where the limitation over depends upon the party dying
within a limited time . Upon the whole , I am of opinion that George
Herbert took an estate for life only , and that his children , if there
had been any , would have taken a fee ; but in the event of there not being









the particular estate . Our judgment must therefore be for the de
fendant .
HOLROYD , J . Under the will in question , George took an estate fo
r
life ,
and his children in fee . In the event o
f
his having no children , the de
vise over would operate as a contingent remainder ; but if he had chil
dren , then it could only take effect as an executory devise . That it was
not an executory devise , in the event that has happened , is clearly proved
b
y
the cases which my brother Bailey has cited ; and the language o
f
Gibbs , C . J . , in Crump v . Norwood , is peculiarly applicable . Here the
estate is given over on either o
f
two contingencies , one of them George ' s
dying without children ; that has happened , and upon that the re
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mainder over would , if at al
l
, take effect as a contingent remainder .
But the particular estate having been previously destroyed , the con
tingent remainder was thereby defeated .
LITTLEDALE , J . The principles applicable to this case were fully con
sidered in Crump v . Norwood , which cannot be distinguished from it .
Doe v . Burnsell is also in point . It is true , that in that case the words
were , " if al
l
such issue should di
e
under twenty -one and without issue ; "
but here the word or must be read and ; and although the point of the
executory devise was not there agitated yet Gibbs , C . J . , thought it
a
n express authority for his judgment in Crump v . Norwood , where
it was raised . Upon these authorities it seems to me clear that the lessors
o
f
the plaintiff cannot recover . Judgment for defendant .
WADDELL V . RATTEW , in Pa . Sup . Ct . , April 16 , 1835 ,45 Rawle 231 , 2
Shars . & B . 316 , Finch R . P . Cas . 932 .
Action b
y
Maris Waddell , claiming as a grand -child and heir of Mary
(daughter o
f
testator ) , against John and Eleanor ( son and daughter
o
f
testator ' s son John ) to recover land in Middleton Tp . , Montgomery
county . From judgment for defendants plaintiff bring error .
John Rattew , being seised in fe
e , devised the land in question to his
son Aaron “ during the term of his natural life , and if he shall hereafter
have issue o
f
his body lawfully begotten , then to hold to him and his
heirs and assigns forever ; but in case he shall die without leaving such
issue , then I give and devise the same to al
l
the rest o
f my children , their
heirs and assigns forever , as tenants in common . ” After testator ' s death
Aaron suffered a common recovery and died without issue .
KENNEDY , J . * * * The plaintiff ' s counsel contend that Aaron took
under the will a contingent fee , determinable upon his dying without
issue living at his death , and that the limitation over in that event to the
testator ' s other children , must therefore be considered an executory de
vise , and consequently not affected b
y
the common recovery suffered b
y
Aaron ; or in other words , they allege that Aaron , according to the terms
o
f
the will , in case he had had issue , would .thereupon have become im
mediately vested with a fee -simple estate in the land devised to him , de
feasible however upon his dying without issue living a
t
the time of his
death — that the birth of issue would have instantly determined his life
estate , b
y
enlarging it into a fee ; and again in the event of his surviving
such issue , and dying without any living at the time of his death , the
ulterior devise to the other children o
f




n executory devise ; because as a contingent remainder it
could not take effect after a determinable fee had become vested in
Aaron . I must confess that this view o
f
the devise in question , when
first presented b
y
counsel for the plaintiff , struck me forcibly as having
something in it ; and it was certainly maintained on their part with great
ingenuity . And if Aaron had not suffered the common recovery and had had
issue who had died during his life , and he had then died himself without
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any living at the time of his death , it may possibly be that the ulterior
devise of the land to the other children of the testator, would have op
erated and taken effect as an executory devise ; for it has been said , that
an estate may be devised over in either of two events , so that in one
event the devise may operate as a contingent remainder , and in the
other as an executory devise . Doe d . Herbert v. Selby , 2 Barn & Cress .
( 9 E . C . L . ) 926 . Be that however as it may , the event which
has occurred in this case , does not render it necessary to decide it under
such aspect ; but if it did , I see no objection that could be made to it,
unless it might possibly be thought by some, that to adopt such a prin
ciple, would be intrenching upon a rule that has been said to prevail
without even an exception to it ; which is , that when a devise is capable
according to the state of the objects at the death of the testator , of tak
effect as a remainder , it shall not be construed to be an executory devise .
Reeve v . Long , Carth . 310 [ post - ) ; Purefoy v . Rogers , 2 Saund . 380 ,
and cases cited in note 9. Besides this , there is said to be another rule
by which an executory devise is distinguishable from a contingent re
mainder , which seems to be opposed to the construction contended for
by the plaintiff's counsel ; it is this : that to constitute an ulterior lim
itation an executory devise , where there is a prior estate of freehold
devised , the latter must not be merely liable to be determined before the
former shall take effect , which only renders the remainder dependent
on it contingent , but it must be determined before the taking effect
of the ulterior devise ; as in the case of a devise to A for life , and after
his decease to the unborn children of B , this would be a contingent
remainder in such children ; but under a devise to A for life, and after
his decease and one day , to the children of B , the children of B in this
case would take an executory devise . 2. Pow . on Dev . by Jarman 238 .
And for the day undisposed of between the death of A and the time
fixed for the ulterior devise to the children of B to take effect , the estate
would belong to the heir or residuary devisee . Id . ; Stephens V.
Stephens, Cas. temp. Talbot 238 . Now it is obvious in the case under
consideration , that the prior estate devised to Aaron for life , could not
be said to be necessarily determinable before the time at which the ul
terior limitation over to the other children of the testator was to take
effect ; it was at most, even upon the construction contended for by the
counsel of the plaintiff only liable to be determined before that event
might happen ; and hence according to the rule just mentioned cannot ,
or at least in the event that has occurred, cannot be considered an execu
tory devise , but must be deemed a contingent remainder . This construc
tion seems to be requisite , also , for the purpose of carrying into effect
an intention pretty plainly manifested by the testator, that Aaron should
not have it in his power to dispose of the land beyond the period of his
own life ; so that by construing the prior devise to Aaron , for the term
of his natural life, an absolute vested estate in him for life , making it
neither more nor less, with a contingent remainder to him in fee upon
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his dying , leaving issue living at the time of his death ; we give full
effect to the letter of the will as well as the intent of the testator.
If the fee given to Aaron , which is admitted to be determinable ,
had vested in him during hi
s
life , the limitation over to the other chil
dren o
f
the testator could only have taken effect as an executory devise ,
but being ever in contingency , and the event having failed upon which it
is claimed b
y
the counsel for the plaintiff , that it would have become





a contingent remainder , and as such might and would have
taken effect , if the recovery had not been suffered , and therefore could
not have operated as an executory devise . The devise to the other chil
dren o
f
the testator , is not then the case of a limitation over to them ,
after a prior vested determinable fee given to Aaron , which would make it
a
n executory devise , but it is one o
f
two several fees , limited merely as
substitutes or alternatives , one for the other , that is the first to Aaron ,
if he should die leaving issue living at the time of his death , but if not ,
then to the other children of the testator in lieu thereof ; thus substituting
the latter in the room o
f
the former , if it should fail o
f
effect . This is
the principle which was decided in Luddington v . Kime , 3 Lev . 431 ,
1 Ld . Raym . 208 , where it was held that the first remainder was a con
tingent remainder in fe
e
to the issue o
f
A and the remainder to B was
also a contingent fee , not contrary to , or in any degree derogatory from
the effect o
f




substitution for it . And this
sort of alternative limitation was termed a contingency with a double
aspect . Fearne on Cont . Rem . 373 . So if the estate vested in the one ,
it never could in the other . Doe d . Herbert v . Selby , 2 Barn & Cress .
( 9 E . C . L . ) 926 , ſante p . 191 ] . The ulterior devise then to the other
children o
f
the testator , being considered in the event that has taken
place , a contingent remainder , and Aaron , b
y
suffering a common re
covery , having determined hi
s
life estate , the only prop of the remainder ,
before it became vested , it fell , and never could take effect afterwards .
The plaintiffs therefore have no right to recover the land , and the judg
ment is affirmed .




then be living , but if he leave no children him surviving , then to G and
others and their heirs , was held to give G and his companions a contingent
remainder , not an executory devise , because this and the prior limitation
are in the alternative , and nothing could vest in any but children surviving
A . This was declared in a suit to determine the power of G and his com
panions to sell during A ' s life . Their interest or possibility was held assign
able . Watson v . Smith ( 1892 ) , 110 N . Car . 6 , 14 S . W . 640 , 28 Am . St . Rep .
665 .
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29.
Limited on Remote Possibility.
ANON ., 40 Edw . 3.- A . D . 1367 . - Brooke Abr. t. Done & Rem . 6, Yearbooks
40 Edw . 3, 9.
There were father and two sons . The father levied a fine to N sur
grant & render to the father for life, remainder to the eldest son and
his wife in tail , remainder to the right heirs of the father ; the father
died , and afterward the tenant in tail and hi
s
wife died without issue ,
the younger son entered , and the lord avowed on him for relief as heir
o
f
the elder brother to the remainder in fee , and had return b
y
judgment
notwithstanding that the younger son would have to be adjudged in as
a purchaser by the name o
f right heir of the father , because b
y
his accept
ance the fee and the estate tail might not be at the same time in the elder
son ; which would seem contradictory , for he may have in him the pos
session and the other be in abeyance , and this may be given and for
feited ; and it is said that where a gift is made to N for life the re
mainder to the right heir of J who is living , the remainder is in sus
pense o
r abeyance during the life of J , and from this it was said that
if J die during the life of N the remainder is good , but if J survive N
the remainder is void , because there is nothing to sustain it so .
CHOLMLEY ' S CASE , in the Exchequer , 39 Eliz . - A . D . 1597 . - 2 Coke 50 ,
Moor 342 , 2 Roll Rep . 60 . Abridged from 2 Coke 50 .
Trespass quare clausum b
y
Hugh Cholmley against Randall Hanmer
and others . Plea not guilty . It was found b
y special verdict , that :
Thomas Holford , being seized o
f
the land in question , and having two
sons (Christopher and George ) , said Thomas , Jane his wife , and
Christopher the elder son , levied a fine of the land to John Warren
and T . Stanley , to the use o
f
Thomas for life , then to the use of
Christopher and the heirs male o
f
his body , then to the use of George
and the heirs male o
f
his body , then to the use of the right heirs of
Thomas . Later Thomas died , and still later George , b
y
indenture duly
enrolled , bargained and sold all his right , title , and interest in the
tenements to John Warren , to have to said John ' s use during the life
o
f Christopher , remainder to the queen her heirs and successors forever ,
upon condition that the estate should b
e
void upon tender o
f
20£ . to
Warren , or to the queen . Later Christopher enfeoffed the land to several
and their heirs , and later a common recovery was had against them ,
who vouched Christopher to warranty , who vouched the common vouchee ,
and execution was had accordingly , which was to the use of Christopher
and his heirs . Afterwards George paid 20£ . to Warren , who received
it . Afterwards the queen , reciting the grant b
y
George to Warren re





own motion granted it to Christopher in fee . Later George bargained
and sold the tenements to John Bruin , b
y
indenture duly inrolled , to
have and hold for the life o
f Christopher , remainder to the queen on
condition to cease on tender o
f









another recovery was suffered with double voucher , in which Christopher
was again vouched ; which recovery was to the use o
f Christopher and
his heirs . Later Christopher died without issue male . His daughter
Mary had married the plaintiff , who claims in her right . George paid






a commission under the great seal o
f England ;
and upon showing his right , it was awarded that the queen ' s claim be
released . Thereupon defendants entered by command of George , and
plaintiff brought trespass . Whether the entry was lawful was th
e
question .
Opinion of the Court . And after many arguments at the bar , case
was argued at the bench b
y
Ewen and CLARK , BB . , and PERIAM , C . B . ,
and it was unanimously agreed b
y
them , that the entry o
f George Hol
ford was not lawful ; wherefore judgment was given for the plaintiff .
And in this case divers points were unanimously resolved b
y
the court :
1 . That the remainder limited to the queen after the death of
Christopher was void for three reasons : ( A ) B cause Warren , who was
party to the first indenture , took nothing ; and b
y
consequence the queen ,





the habendum , the particular estate being void , shall take nothing ; for
the estate which is limited to Warren is for the life of Christopher . *
* * This grant is void , because it can never take effect in possession ,
nor can the grantee ever have any benefit thereof . And therefore a
difference was taken between such grant of a reversion and the said grant
o
f
a remainder , for the grant o
f
a reversion during the life o
f
a tenant in
tail is good because he shall have the service which the tenant in tail
ought to do during the life of the tenant in tail ; but such grant o
f
a
remainder can never to any purpose take effect , and therefore it is void .
Moreover , a manifest difference appears between this case a
t
bar and a
lease to Christopher for his life , the remainder to another for the life
o
f Christopher , for b
y
possibility the remainder may take effect ; e . g . ,
if the tenant for life makes a feoffment in fee , or commits any for
feiture , he in the remainder may enter for the forfeiture ; and that is
proved by the book in 41 Edw . 3 , Fitz . ti
t
. Waste 83 , and (remanere
dicitur quasi terra remanens ) that cannot be when a remainder cannot
by any possibility fall into possession ; for a remainder ought to vest in
estate during the particular estate , and ought to take effect in possession
when the particular estate ends , for vain is the possibility that may not
in any way come into action .
It was objected that Christopher might enter into religion , and then
might Warren enter during his natural life , for as much as Christopher
had no issue male . But as to that it was answered and resolved , that
such possibility shall not make the remainder good , because it is such
a remote possibility as shall not be intended b
y
a common intendment
to happen . A possibility which shall make a remainder good , ought to
b
e
a common possibility , and possibility proximate , as death , or death
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without issue , or coverture, or the like. And therefore , as the logician
saith , potentia est duplex , remota & propinqua . [ It was said in Faring
ton v. Darrel , reported herein under Powers ] 9 Hen . 6 , 24b, [ that ]
the remainder to a corporation which is not at the time of the limitation
of the remainder, is void , although such be erected during the particular
estate, for it is a possibility remote . And this difference plainly ap
pears in a common case in our books : if a lease be made for life,
the remainder to the right heirs of J . S., this is good ; for by common
possibility J . S. may die during the life of the tenant for life ; but if
at the time of the limitation of the remainder there is no such J . S . but
during the life of the tenant for life J . S . is born and dies , hi
s
heirs
shall never take , as it is agreed in [ Y . B . ) 2 Hen . 7 , [Hilary ) 13b ,
[ p
l
. 16 ] . And in 10 Edw . 3 [ 45 a & b , and ] 46a , the case was , that
upon a fine levied to R h
e granted and rendered the tenements to one
I and Florence his wife for their lives , the remainder to G ( son of I )
in tail , the remainder to the right heirs o
f
I ; and in truth at the time
o
f
the fine levied , I had not any son named G , but afterwards he had a
son named G and died ; and in a praecipe against Florence it was ad
judged that G should not take the remainder in tail ; because he was
not born at the time o
f
the fine levied , but long after ; wherefore an
other who was right heir to I , b
y judgment o
f
the court , was received ;
for when I had not any son named G at the time of the fine levied the
law will not suppose that he will afterwards have a son named G , for
that is a possibility remote . Note , reader , a difference between a re
1 " This rule , though professed to be founded on former precedents , is not
to be found in any o
f
the cases to which Lord Coke refers , in none of
which do either of the expressions possibility on a possibility , ' or 'double
possibility , ' occur . It appears to owe its origin to the mischievous scholastic
logic which was then rife in our courts of law , and of which Lord Coke
had so high an opinion that he deemed a knowledge of it necessary to a
complete lawyer . The doctrine is indeed expressly introduced on the author
ity of logic - 'as the logician saith , potentia est duplex , remota et propin
qua . ' This logic , so soon afterwards demolished by Lord Bacon , appears
to have left behind it many traces of its existence in our law ; and perhaps
it would be found that some of these artificial and technical rules which
have most annoyed the judges of modern times owe their origin to this
antiquated system o
f
endless distinctions without solid differences . To
show how little of practical benefit could ever be derived from the distinc
tion between a common and a double possibility , let us take one of Lord
Coke ' s examples of each . He tells us that the chance that a man and a
woman , both married to different persons , shall themselves marry one an
other , is but a common possibility . But the chance that a married man
shall have a son named Geoffrey is stated to be a double or remote possi
bility . Whereas , it is evident that the latter event is at least quite as likely
to happen as the former ; and if the son were to get an estate from being
named Geoffrey , as in the case put , there can be very little doubt but that
Geoffrey would be the name given to the first son who might be born .
Respect to the memory of Lord Coke has long kept on foot in our law
books the rule that a possibility on a possibility is not allowed by law in
the creation of contingent remainders . But the authority of this rule has
long been declining , and a very learned judge , now deceased , declared plainly
that it was abolished " (referring to Lord St . Leonards ) . Williams on Real
Property . ( 18th Am . ed . ) , 420 - 421 .
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mainder limited by a particular name, and by a general name; for a
remainder limited by general name may be good , although the person
be not in being at the time of the remainder limited ; as if a lease for
life be made, the remainder to the right heirs of J . S ., who is alive ,
this remainder may be good , and yet he has no heir at the time of the
remainder limited . The same law of a remainder to the first born son .
But a remainder limited in particular by name of baptism and sir name
is not good if the person be not in being . It is held in 7 Edw . 3 that




D . be granted to the parson o
f
D . and
his successors , it is void to the successor , because the successor who ought




( B . ) The second reason why the remainder to the queen is void was
because the law will never adjudge a grant good by reason o
f
a possi
bility or expectation o
f
a thing which is against law , for that is a possi
bility remote and vain , which by intendment o
f
law never can happen .
( C . ) The remainder to the queen is void , because George , having a
remainder in tail , hath granted al
l
his estate to Warren , habendum al
l
his estate during the life o
f Christopher , the remainder to the queen , in
which case , when he hath granted all his estate to Warren , he cannot









f George , when he having an estate in tail has
granted all his estate to Warren . And Littleton , $649 , saith that in
such case the estate tail is in abeyance . And 19 Hen . 6 , 60a , it is said
that if tenant in tail be attainted o
f felony , and the king after office
found seized , the estate tail is in suspense . And see 13 Hen . 7 , 10a , if
there be tenant for life , the remainder in tail , if he in remainder in tail
release to tenant for life a
ll
his right , it puts the estate tail so in abey
ance that no right remains in him who releases to have an action o
f
waste ; for in the same case , b
y
his release , he hath put all his estate out
o
f
him . It was agreed , Hilary 35 Eliz . , in Blitheman ' s Case [Cro . Eliz .
280 , 1 And . 291 ] , that if tenant in tail in consideration o
f parental
love , covenants b
y
deed to stand seised to the use of himself for his own
life and after his death to the use o
f
his eldest son in tail , and after
this covenant the covenantor marries and dies , the wife shall be endowed ;
for when tenant in tail hath limited the use to himself for the term o
f
his own life , he cannot limit any remainder over ; for an estate for his
own life is a
s long as he can limit b
y
the law , and therefore the limita
tion o
f the remainder is void . Wherefore it was concluded , that upon
consideration o
f
the first point Warren had nothing . And upon con
sideration o
f
this latter point , if he should take entirely he would take
too much , and by consequence the remainder to the queen is void which
? " The true ground o
f
the decision in the old case ( 10 Edw . III , 45 ) , to
which Lord Coke refers , was , no doubt , as suggested by Mr . Preston ( 1 Pres .
ton Abst . 128 ) , that the gift was made to Geoffrey the son as though he
were living when in fact there was then no such person . " Williams on
Real Property ( 18th Am . ed . ) , 421 , note g .
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ever way decided . And it was agreed that the limitation to Warren by
the habendum for the life of Christopher was void and repugnant .
2. Admitting the remainder to the queen was good , yet it was resolved
that the common recovery did bar the estate of Warren , and by conse
quence the condition also during his life . * * * It was resolved
that the recovery doth bar not only the estate tail , but also the estate
for life of Warren , although the remainder of the fe
e
was in the queen ;
for it is out of the statute 34 & 35 Hen . 8 , c . 20 , because the estate tail
was not o
f
the queen ' s gift , nor any of her ancestors , kings of England ,
a
s it hath been adjudged . [ Jackson v . Drury , Moor 115 , 3 Leon , 37 ;
Wiseman ' s Case , 2 Coke 15 , Moor 195 , 1 And . 140 . 1 * * *
This payment to Warren cannot devest the remainder out of the queen
for three reasons : 1 , because the condition during the life o
f
Warren was
discharged ; 2 because he who takes benefit of a condition ought to have
the whole estate given revested in him a
s
in his first estate , and that
cannot be here for the estate for the life of Warren was barred by the
recovery ; also , 3 , the tender to Warren was to the intent to revest his
estate , and that cannot be when his estate was barred , and cannot be
revested : for which cause this payment cannot devest the remainder out
of the queen . * * *
Statute o
f
New York , Mich . , & c . " No future estate , otherwise valid , shall




n which it is limited to take effect . ” N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) , p
t
. 2 , c . 1 , t . 2 ,
Art . 1 , $ 26 ; Mich . R . S . ( 1846 ) , c . 62 , § 26 , C . L . ( 1897 ) , § 8808 ; Minn . St .
( 1866 ) , c . 45 , 826 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , 8 3215 ; Wis . R . S . ( 1849 ) , c . 56 , § 26 , St .
( 1898 ) , $ 2050 .
Sufficient Particular Estate to Support .
NOTE BY DYER AND MANWOOD , JJ . , in Common Pleas , Mich . 19 Eliz .
- A . D . 1587 .44 Leonard 21 , Cas . 67 .
A leaseth to B for years , the remainder to the right heirs of the said B ,
ind makes livery . The remainder is void , because there is not any
person in esse who can take presently . But where a lease is made to B
fo
r
life , the remainder to his right heirs , there he hath a fee executed ;




GOODRIGHT v . CORNISH , in King ' s Bench , Hilary term , 5 Wm . & Mary ,
A . D . 1694 – 1 Salkeld 226 ; s . c . 1 L . Raym . 3 , 4 Mod . 255 .
In ejectment a special verdict was found , vi
z
. : Knowling had issue
two sons , John and Richard , and devised lands to John for 50 years
if he should so long live , “ and as for my inheritance after the said term ,
I devise the same to the heirs male of the body o
f
John , and for default
o
f
such issue , then to Richard . ” THE COURT resolved : 1s
t
. That John
had not an estate tail b
y implication upon the words " without issue , "
because the devisor had given him an estate for years by express words ,













and the court cannot make such a construction against express words ,
when thereby they would also drown the estate for years and make an
estate o





John to be void in it
s





f freehold to support it , it was void as a remainder ; and they
seemed not to think it an executory devise , because it was limited as a
remainder , and because it is limited per verba de praesenti . If one de
vise his estate to the heir o




n executory devise , and such a devise is therefore
void ; but if it were to the heir o
f
J . S . after the death of J . S . , that is
good as a
n executory devise . So note the diversity inter verba de pre
senti & verba de futuro . 3rdly . The court held the limitation to the
heirs male of John was become void b
y
event , whatever it was in its
creation , because John is now dead without issue . 4thly . The court held
that if the remainder to the heirs male of John was void in point of




New York . " A remainder o
f
a freehold o
r chattel real , either
contingent or vested , may be created expectant on the determination of a
term o
f years . " N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) , p
t




f Contingent Remainders by Discontinuance or Failure o
f Par
ticular Estates .
EARL OF BEDFORD ' S CASE , in Court of Wards , Hartford Term , 34 & 35
Eliz . , A . D . 1593 . — Abridged from Moore 718 . 8 . c . 2 And . 197 .
Francis , Earl of Bedford , having four sons , Edw . , John , Francis and




himself for 40 years , then to the use o
f
John and the heirs male
o
f
his body , and for want of such to the use o
f
the right heirs of the said
earl forever . Later Edw . died without issue and later John died without
issue male , leaving issue Elizabeth and Anne ; after which the earl by deed
indented , to provide jointure for his wife and to advance his heirs of his
body , covenated with several that from thenceforth he and his heirs
should stand seised o
f
the lands , & c . , to the use o
f
himself for life , then
to the use o
f
his son Francis and the heirs male o
f
his body , with re
mainders over . Afterwards Francis the son died leaving his son Edward
surviving , and shortly afterwards Francis the earl died . The question




heir of his father ought
to have the lands b
y
















The case was argued openly before WRAY and ANDERSON , chief jus .
tices , and the master and counsel of the court , b
y
Popham for the
daughters , and b
y





court was divided into points ; and the counsel on one side made objec
tions on these points , and the other made response in writing , that the
marrige
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court might see the difference. The objections and responses were as
follows :
1. We object that the earl over -living John Lord Russell his son , who
died without issue male , in the life of the earl, the remainder limited to
the right heir of the earl is void , for that the earl could not have an
heir in his lifetime, and every remainder must depend upon a particular
estate , and vest during the particular estate ; as if a man make an estate
in tail , remainder to the right heirs of J . S., and the tenant in tail die
living J . S. the remainder is void , for that J . S. cannot have an heir
during his life, and the remainder cannot vest during the estate in
tail. The answer was : We agree the law to be so in feoffments and
gifts executed in possession , and the reason for that there is no person
able to take the freehold in the mean time, and the freehold in that case
cannot be in abeyance or in no person , for then no stranger that hath
any right in the land can have any praecipe , or recover the land if the
freehold should be in no person . But in the case of feoffees to uses the
use may be in abeyance in no person for a time, for the feoffees in the
mean time are persons able to hold the land , and are liable to every
man 's praecipe, and no mischief at all. And this agreeth with the com
mon practice and experience , for who doth not upon establishment of his
lands limit uses to his first, second , third , sons , & c ., albeit he hath none
at that time , for the feoffees are persons able to hold the land to a future
use .
2. We object , that if the earl had limited an estate for life to himself ,
the remainder in tail, the remainder to his right heirs , the remainder had
been executed in him . The response was : We agree this , for it is a
principle of law , that wheresoever the ancestor takes an estate for life,
or any estate of freehold in any conveyance , and after in the same con
veyance an estate is limited to his right heirs , the law will conjoin the
estates in the ancestor , for the ancestor and his heirs be correlative ;
but otherwise it is where the ancestor takes but an estate for years ; and
therefore if a lease be made to A for years , remainder to B in tail, re
mainder to the right heirs of A , the right heir of A shall be a purchaser
without question , and the remainder doth not vest in A .
Lastly , we object that if a man maketh a lease for years , the remainder
in tail , the remainder to the right heirs of the lessor , the remainder is
void ; for a man cannot limit a remainder to his right heirs ; no more
in the case at bar . The response was : True it is that in acts executed
in possession a man cannot limit a remainder to his right heirs , for the
law prefers the descent before the remainder . No more can a man by
any conveyance in possession limit a remainder to himself ; and therefore ,
if A maketh a lease for life, the remainder in tail , the remainder to A
himself in tail or in fee , or the remainder to the right heirs of A , the
remainder is void ; for no more than he can limit a remainder to himself ,
no more can he limit it to his heirs , for the son is part of the parent . But
otherwise it is in case of uses , for without question a man may make a
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feoffment to the use of A for life, and after to the use of B in tail , and
after to the use of the feoffor himself in fe
e , or in tail , or for life , & c . , and
by consequence to his heirs .
On which matters and more , arguments were made at the Hartford
term with all the justices of England ; and the case was argued again
before them b
y serjeant Glanville and b
y
Coke . And afterwards it was
resolved b
y
the greater part o
f
them , and so ruled and decreed , that the
use limited to the right heirs b
y
the earl was the old use and not a new
use ; also , that the death o
f
John Russell without heir male had so d
e
termined the particular freehold on which the remainder to his right heirs
depended , that the remainder b
y
this reverted to the donor . And b
y
this
the now earl held the land .
"What operation the statute [ 27 Henry VII , c . 10 ) had upon contingent
uses has been the subject of much judicial controversy , and demands our
particular attention . Perhaps no question ever occurred on which the
judges were so divided in opinion ; some held that the estate vested in the
first cestuy que use , but subject to the contingent uses which should be exe
cuted out of his seizin as they arose ; * * * others held that the seizin
to serve them was , to use their own expressions , in nubibus , in mare , in
terra , or in custodia legis ; and they also seem to have been of opinion that
contingent uses could not be barred . Again , some thought that the trustees
were merely pipes through whom the estate was conveyed to the uses as
they arose , while others thought that so much of the inheritance as was
limited to the contingent uses remained actually ivested in the feoffees till
the uses arose . " Sugden on Powers , 12 , 13 .
" The establishment of shifting and contingent uses occasioned great diff
culties to the early lawyers , in consequence of the supposed necessity that
there should , at the time of the happening of the contingency on which
the use was to shift , be some person seized to the use then intended to take
effect . * * * But this doctrine , though strenuously maintained in theory ,
was never attended to in practice . And in modern times the opinion con
tended for by Lord St . Leonards [Mr . Sugden ) was generally adopted , that
in fact no scintilla whatever remained in B ( the feoffee to uses ) , but that he
was , by force o
f the statute , immediately divested of all estate , and that the
uses thenceforward took effect as legal estates according to their limitations ,
by relation to the original siezin momentarily vested in B . " Williams on
Real Property ( 18th Am . ed . ) , 437 .
CHUDLEIGH ' S CASE , or DILLON v . FREINE , argued in the Exchequer
Chamber before all the judges of England , Hilary , 36 Eliz . , A . D . 1594 - 1
Coke 120 - 140b , s . C . , 1 And . 309 , Popham 70 . Reported according to Coke .
Statement o
f
facts and argument o
f
counsel are abridged .
Trespass quare clausum b
y
William Dillon against John Freine in
king ' s bench . Plea not guilty . It was found by special verdict , that
Richard Chudleigh , seised in fee o
f
the place where the trespass is a
l
leged to have been committed , had issue four sons : Christopher his oldest ,
Thomas second , Oliver third , and Nicholas . Being so seised , the father
enfeoffed the manor b
y
indenture to several persons and their heirs ,
to the use o
f
the said Richard and the heirs of his body on certain persons
named and in default o
f
such issue to the use and performance o
f
his will
for ten years after his death and then to the use of the feoffees during
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the life of Christopher , and then to the first son of Christopher in tail,
and so on to the tenth , then to the use of Thomas in tail , then to the use
of Oliver in tail, then to the use of Nicholas in tail, and finally to the useof the feoffor 's heirs . The feoffor died , and then , before any issue born
to Christopher , the feoffees enfeoffed him , having notice of the former
uses . Afterwards Christopher had issue John , under whom defendant
claims. The question was whether the uses which before were in contingency , should vest in the son of Christopher , and be executed by the
statute of uses, 27 Hen . 8 , c. 10. In this case the point is no other, but
whether these contingent uses before their essense by the said feoffment
of the feoffees be destroyed and subverted , so that they shall never rise
out of the estate of the feoffees after the birth of the issues.
And this case was argued many times at the bar in the king's bench
on both sides ; and because the case was difficult and of great consequence
and importance , it was thought necessary that all the justices of Eng
land should openly , in the Exchequer Chamber upon solemn argument ,
show their opinion in this case . And afterwards , Hilary term , 36 Eliz .,
the case was argued in the Exchequer Chamber before all the justices
of England ,by Hugh Wiat, er parte Querenť (for the plaintiff ], and by
Coke, the queen 's solicitor general, ex parte defend [ for the defendant ).
And after in Easter term following , by Rob . Atkinson , for the plaintiff ,
and by Francis Bacon for the defendant ; but I did not hear their argu
ments . And yet it is necessary to report what matters were moved at the
bar , to the intent the state of the question should be better understood ,
and the arguments and reasons of the judges at the bench better appre
hended .
[ Argument by Coke for the defendant ) : For the argument of the principal point, four things are to be considered : 1. What an use is , and theseveral natures of uses , and of what esteem and account all manner of usesare in judgment of law . 2. If contingent uses (as well as uses in esse )might have been discontinued or tolled at the common law before the
statute of 27 Hen . 8, c. 10 . 3. If our contingent use had been discontinued
or destroyed , if the said statute of 27 Hen . 8 had not been made , inasmuch
as the feoffee had notice of the uses. 4. If the said statute of 27 Hen . 8preserves any contingent use , which had been destroyed by the common
law , and in that to consider the mischiefs which were before the said act,
and the remedy which the makers of the act have provided by the purview
thereof.
What an use is , and the several natures of uses, and of what estimation
all uses are in law . An use is a trust or confidence which is not issuing out
of land , but as a thing collateral annexed in privity to the estate , and to the
person , touching the land , scil., that cestuy que use shall take the profits ,
and that the tertenant shall make estates according to his direction . So
that, he who hath an use hath not jus neque in re, neque ad rem , but only
a confidence and trust , for which he hath no remedy by the common law ,
but his remedy was only by subpoena in chancery . If the feoffees would
not perform the order of chancery , then their persons for the breach of
the confidence were to be imprisoned till they did perform it ; and therefore
the case of an use is not like unto commons , rents , conditions, & c ., which
are hereditaments in judgment of law , and which cannot be taken away or
discontinued by the alienation of the tertenant, or by disselsins , or by
escheats , & c ., as uses may , as shall after be said . There were two inventors
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of uses , fear and fraud : fear in times of troubles and civil wars , to save
their inheritances from being forfeited ; and fraud to defeat due debts ,
lawful actions, wards, escheats , mortmains , & c . There are two manners
of uses : 1, In esse - in possession , reversion , remainder ; 2, in contingency ,
which by possibility may fall into possession , reversion , or remainder . To
every of these uses there are two inseparable incidents , confidence in the
person , and privity in estate , as appears in ( Y . B . ] 14 Hen . 8, 6a . And this
confidence in the person is either expressed by the party , or implied by the
law ; and so in privity in estate either expressed or implied , as shall be
after shewed . These uses and confidences to some respect were reputed
as chattels , and therefore were devisable ; and to other respects they were
esteemed as hereditaments of which there should be possessio fratris [ 1. e.,
by descent to a brother ) , & c., as [ Y . B . ) 5 Edw . 4, 7b , is ; but yet in law ,
neither chattel, nor hereditament, for they were not assets to executors , nor
assets to the heir .
2. Whether a contingent use might be discontinued before the statute :
And it seems clearly , that before the statute , uses in contingency might
have been taken away and destroyed as well a
if there be feoffee at the common law to the use of me for life , and after
to the use of him who shall be my first son in tail, & c ., and such feoffee
before the birth of my son had been disseised or made a feoffment upon
good consideration to him who had no notice of the use ;' the contingent
use in the one case was suspended , and in the other case utterly destroyed .
For if uses in esse which were of greater value and estimation than uses
in contingency (which were but possibilities of an use ) might be discon
tinued or destroyed as above , as the books are (24 Hen . 8 [ Brooke 's Abr. ] ,
Feoffment al uses [ 40 ] ; [ Y . B . ] 14 Hen . 8, 6, 7, 24 ; & [ Y . B . ] 28 Hen .
8, fol. 8, 9, 10 ) , a multo fortiori uses in contingency and future might be
discontinued and taken away . Also a contingent use was but a trust and
confidence ; and therefore , if confidence in the person or privity in estate
fail , the use was also either suspended or destroyed ; and therefore without
question a feoffee upon good consideration , without notice , disseisor , or
lord by escheat , lord of a villain , corporation , an alien born , [or ] a person
attainted , shall not stand seised to a contingent use , no more than to an
use in esse before the statute of 27 Hen . 8. And therefore it is agreed
in [ Y . B . ) 33 Hen . 6, 14b , and 31 Edw . 3 [ Fitzherbert ' s Abr . ) , tit. Collusion
29, if the father makes a feoffment to his eldest son upon collusion , now by
the statute of Marlebridge the lord had a possibility to have the ward , if the
father died , his heir within age, but if the feoffee made a feoffment over
bona fide, and afterwards the father died , his son within age , there that
possibility was destroyed , because the stranger who had no notice hath
gotten the land bona fide . So if A grants a reversion or seigniory to B
now he hath a possibility to have the seigniory or reversion ; but if A
grants the reversion or seigniory to another and he gets attornment , now
the first possibility to B is destroyed , as Littleton saith , fol. 126a ; but more
shall be said to this point after , in answer to certain objections of the other
side . And although in our case the feoffee had notice , yet because he was
in of another estate , so that the privity of estate failed , for that reason
he shall not stand seised to the use , for the use is a confidence annexed in
privity to the estate of the land . And therefore there is a difference between
things annexed in privity to the estate of the land , and things annexed
to the possession of the land without respect of any privity : And therefore
disseisor , abator , or intruder shall not be seised to an use ; although he hath
notice, for the use was not annexed to the possession of the land which
each of them hath , but to the privity of the estate which is denied to
them all ; for they are not in in privity of the estate to which the use was
annexed , but in the post . Also forasmuch as cestuy que use had no remedy
but in chancery , and the chancellor hath no power to determine the right
of inheritances, for that reason they can stand seised to no use . *
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So if there be privity in estate , yet if confidence either expressed or im
plied fail in the person , the use is suspended or destroyed ; [as ] if the feof
fee to an use upon good consideration infeoffeth another who hath no notice ,
here is privity in estate , but here is no confidence in the person either
expressed or implied , and therefore the use is gone . But if a feoffment
be made without consideration to one who hath no notice , there is privity
in estate , and the law implies notice of the trust , and therefore there the
use remains, but not as a thing annexed to the land , but to the privity of
the estate , 5 Edw . 4, 7b . If the husband makes a feoffment in fee of the
land of his wife upon consideration , and without expressing any use , the
wife shall not have the subpoena ; for the feoffment doth disaffrm the
wife ' s right , and the feoffee is not in privity of the estate of the wife .
So in the case at bar ; tenant for life , the remainder in fee to the use of
s a feoffment in fee to one who hath notice ; he
cannot stand seised to the first use , because the use is annexed to one estate ,
and the feoffee is in of another estate . It is agreed in ( Y . B . ] 45 Edw . 3,
18b , that if donee in tail with warranty makes a lease for life , and afterwards
in a precipe brought against the lessee for life , he is received upon the de
fault of the lessee , he shall not vouch by force of the warranty , for the war
ranty is annexed to one , and he is in of another estate , and always the war
ranty as to voucher requires privity of estate to which it was annexed . And
the same law of an use . So it is held in 10 Eliz . Plow . Com . 351 , that ces
tuy que use for life or in tail, remainder in tail , with divers remainders over
in use , makes a feoffment to one who hath notice , he shall not stand seised
to the first uses , causa qua supra . But of things annexed to land it is other
wise , as of commons , advowsons , and the like appendants or appurtenances.
And therefore if tenant in tail , or the husband seised in the right of his wife ,
makes a feoffment of a manor or part thereof with the advowson , the
advowson at least after presentment shall pass as appendant to the manor
or to part of the manor (as the books are in 23 Assize 8; 34 Edw . 1 [ Fitz
herbert's Abr. ] Quare Impedit 179 ; [ Y . B . ) 43 Edw . 3, 25 , 26 ; and ( Y . B . ]
17 Edw . 3, 5a , 19b ) , and not to the estate of the land , for the estate of
the land is discontinued by the feoffment . So disseisor , abator , intruder ,
or the lord by escheat , & c., shall have them as things annexed to the land .
So note a diversity between an use or warranty , and the like things an
nexed to the estate of the land in privity , and commons , advowsons and
other hereditaments annexed to the possession of the land .
Then , 3, forasmuch as if the statute of 27 Hen . 8 had not been made ,
the contingent use in the case at bar had been taken away ; let us now
see whether the statute of 27 Hen . 8 hath provided for the preservation
and maintenance of contingent uses against the rule of law before ; for if
the statute doth not support the contingent use in the case at bar , without
doubt the same is taken away . And therefore two things are necessary
to be considered for the better discussion of this point : First, The mischiefs
which were before this act, and which the makers of the act did intend to
remedy , and , secondly , What manner of remedy they have provided for
it; and from thence will arise the true interpretation of the letter and
meaning of the act .
And for the better apprehension of the mischiefs which were before
the act, certain former statutes made against the abuses of uses in par
ticular cases ( for the [ this ] treaty [ treatise ] shall be only of uses ) are
to be considered . And thereby the abuses of such uses will fully appear ,
and that fraud was the principal cause of the invention of them in sub
version of law and justice . By the statute of 1 Rich . 2, c . 9, it is provided ,
that because disseisors make feoffments to great men and others , for main
tenance , and to other men unknown , to the intent to delay or defraud the
disseisees , in such cases the disseisee shall have his action against the
pernor of the profits (which was cestuy que use ) , notwithstanding such
feoffment by fraud and collusion within the year . The statute of 4 Hen .
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4, c. 7, inlarges the statute of 1 Rich . 2 in the time and in the actions
also . The statute of 11 Hen . 6, c. 4, explains it . The statute of 1 Hen .
7, c. 1, gives a formedon against cestuy que use who is called pernor of
the profits. And by those acts it appears , that fraud and deceit to defeat
him who had good title and right to the land of his lawful remedy , was
the inventor of these feoffments to uses . It was provided by the statute
de religiosis , 7 Edw . 1 (ante — ] , in enlargement of the statute of Magna
Charta , 36 , which had provided , “ quod non liceat alicui dare terram alicui
domui religiosae ," that they should not acquire to them lands or tene
ments ante vel ingenio , & c ., but to defraud both those laws it was invented ,
that a feoffment should be made to the use of religious men , or common
alties , and therefore was the statute of 15 Rich . 2, c. 5, made to remedy that
fraud . By feoffment to uses , lords were defrauded of their wards, until
the statute of 4 Hen . 7, c. 17 . The statute of 19 Hen . 7, c. 15 , recites , that
men were defrauded of their executions , the lords of their reliefs and
heriots , and the lords of villeins of the purchases of their villeins by feoff
ments to their uses, and that statute doth remedy those mischiefs . The
statute of 1 Rich . 3, c. 1, which is more general than the other statutes ,
intends to remedy four great mischiefs by reason of secret feoffments to
uses : 1, Danger to purchasers and other the king 's subjects ; 2, trouble ; 3,
costs ; 4, grievous vexations . So that it was not only danger , but danger
with trouble ; and not danger with trouble only , but danger with trouble
and costs ; and not danger with trouble and costs only , but with great
vexation . Also examples thereof are expressed in the preamble of the act ;
no purchaser of lands in perfect surety , no wife of dower , no lessee of his
lease , no servant of any annuity granted to him for his service , & c . ; by
reason of these privy and unknown uses . This statute intended to provide
for these mischiefs in establishing all feoffments , grants , & c., made by
cestuy que use , & c . But so mischevious and sinister is the invention and
continuance of uses , that they also over -reached the policy and providence
of the makers of this act also : For, for example , the purchaser was not
in a better case than he was before , for if the feoffor limit to himself
but an estate for life or in tail, or to his wife , or to his son , & c ., or if the
feoffees made secret leases or estates, the purchaser could not have a sure
estate , by any estate that cestuy que use could make , so that danger , trouble ,
costs , and great vexation remained in the realm by these covenous and
fraudulent uses , notwithstanding the said statute of 1 Rich . 3 [ c. 1 ] .
For the remedy of which , and many other mischiefs , was the statute of
27 Hen . 8, c . 10 , made for the general remedy of all mischiefs and abuses
of uses , which act was divided into two general branches, viz ., the preamble
which expresses the mischiefs , and the body of the act which provides
the remedy . [Here the statute is reviewed at length . )
So the makers of the said statute of 27 Hen . 8 did not intend to provide
a remedy and reformation by the continuance or preservation , but by the
extinction and extirpation of uses ; and because uses were so subtle and
ungovernable , as hath been said , they have with an undissoluble knot
coupled and married them to the land , which of all the elements is the
most ponderous and immovable . It would be then against the express
intent of the makers of the act to preserve uses otherwise than they were
by the common law , for they intended sum modo to extirpate and extinguish
them . And if by any construction out of this act contingent uses should
be preserved : 1, Greater inconveniences would follow than were before ;
2, great absurdities would from thence likewise ensue . For : 1. Land would
pass against the rule of the common law from one to another so easily , and
upon such secret conditions and limitations , that no person could know in
whom the estate of the land did remain . 2. Land would pass and be trans
ferred by nuncupative will from one to another ; as if a feoffment in fee
be made to [ the use of ] such persons as he shall name by his last will ,
& c ., he might limit the uses by will nuncupative. 3. Heirs would thereby
332 FUTURE ESTATES .
be disinherited ; for if these perpetuities should be adjudged of force , it is
impossible ( if they be not wrote on the walls of their houses , and if the
parties which are bound by them have not counsel learned in the law
always with them ) for them to observe the nice and precise points of the
usual provisoes , and clauses of restraint contained in perpetuities . 4. Lords
would lose their wards and the fruits of their seigniories . 5 . No purchaser
would be assured of his purchase , and where the statute intends to pro
vide that the king nor none of his subjects shall be deceived by these
uses ; now the purchaser will be in worse case than he was before , for
before the statute if he had purchased it bona fide without notice, as hath
been said , he should not stand seised to the use ; now it is said , that the
land shall be bound with the use in whose hands soever it shall come , so
that where the preamble says , that the subject shall not be damaged by
these uses, he by such construction will be more damnified than he was
before. 6. Greater mischief would follow for strangers actions than was
before , for upon a secret limitation of uses the land itself would be trans
ferred from one to the other, so that no man in the world can know in
whom the estate of the land is ; but before this statute , although they
might change the use , yet they could not convey the land upon (without )
livery , fine , or recovery ; but now the land itself would pass by performance
of a secret condition in his chamber . 7. No person shall be tenant by the
curtesy , nor tenant in dower , for they do not know in whom the estate of
the land remaineth . 8. Of necessity perjuries by reason of them will
abound , for now the secret imagination and intent of men , and attempts
and goings about shall be put in trial upon these clauses of restraint . 9.
The king and lords shall lose their wards and escheats ; for such devise
may be made if the statute shall be construed for the preservation of con
tingent uses , that neither the king nor any other lord shall ever have es
cheats , or wards, or in effect any profit or fruit of their seigniories . 10 . It
would be absurd to say, that the makers of this act intended to preserve
uses, when they expressly say , that they intend to extirpate and extinguish
uses. Also it is absurd to think , that the makers of the act intended to
preserve and quodam modo to revive the ancient common law , and yet
intended to preserve or continue any such abuse and fraud which tendeth
to the overthrowing of the common law ; for they have declared , that the
invention of these uses was subtle , fraudulent and crafty in disinherison of
heirs , in defrauding the lords, of those who had right of their lawful ac
tions , of purchasers , of tenant in dower , of tenant by the curtesy , causes
of manifest perjury in defrauding the king and lords of their escheats ,
& c., in subversion of the ancient common laws, and the cause of many
other inconveniences , and the occasion of great trouble and disturbance
in the commonwealth . I say , it would be absurd to think that the makers
of the act intended not only to continue , but to increase and preserve such
wickedness, mischiefs , and inconveniences . It appears also by divers
branches of the body of the act, that the makers of the act did not expect
that any land after the statute should pass by limitation of uses , unless
only uses upon bargain and sale which they thought convenient to continue .
And therefore they did at the same parliament add to this inrollment of
record , which is agreeable to the preamble , scil., matter of record ; but other
uses they did not expect would after the act have been put in use , but
that lands should pass by solemn livery , record , & c ., as is contained in the
preamble . And they thought , also , that little land would pass by bargain
and sale inrolled , because such bargainee being in the post , shall never
vouch by force of any warranty annexed to the estate of the land . And
therefore it is to be observed , that there is not in the whole body of the act
any saving for any cestuy que use, or of any use . • . And so I con
ceive upon the whole matter , that the future uses in the case at bar by
the said feoffment of the feoffees were utterly destroyed , and by conse
quence judgment ought to be given for the defendant .
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England and the barons o
f
the exchequer , in the exchequer chamber ,
a
t
six several days : 1 B
y
Baron EWENS and Justice OWEN ; 2 , b
y
Justice BEAUMOND and Justice FENNER ; 3 , b
y
Justice WALMESLEY and
Justice GAWDY ; 4 , by Baron CLARK and Justice CLENCH ; 5 , b
y
Sir
W . PERIAM , chief baron of the exchequer , and b
y
Sir ED . ANDERSON , chief
justice o
f
the common pleas ; and 6 , by Sir J . POPHAM , chief justice of
England . All of which arguments of the judges and barons I heard , ex
cept only that o
f
Justice BEAUMOND , and therefore what I shall say of




others ; but my intent is not to re
port any of their arguments at large , and in the same form as they were
delivered b
y
them , but to make such a summary collection of the effect
and substance of them all , a
s
the matter ( it being the first case which
was adjudged , and being of great importance ) will permit . And b
e
cause Justice WALMESLEY and the Chief Baron [PERRIAM ] only ar
gued that judgment should b
e given for the plaintiff , and all the other
judges and barons concluded against the plaintiff , I begin with the
effect o
f
their two arguments , viz . :
WALMESLEY [ J . ] : Before the statute o
f
1 R . 3 , the feoffees had not
only the whole estate in the land , but also the whole power to give and
dispose o
f
it , for cestuy que use was a trespasser if he entered upon the
land against their will ; and after the statute of 1 R . 3 cestuy que use
had power to make a disposition o
f
the land itself , and yet notwithstand
ing that , the whole estate of the land did remain in the feoffee until
cestuy que use had made such a disposition , for which reason the said
act intending to provide for cestuy que use had not made a sufficient
provision for him . For the estate of the land remaining in the feoffees ,
they many times contrary to the trust reposed in them , b
y
secret feoff
ment , estates , and other covenous acts had defrauded cestuy que use ,
and had prevented such disposition o
f
the land which the said act o
f
1 R . 3 gave him ; and as WALMESLEY said , there was sometimes fraud in







1 Rich . 3 [ c . 1 ] and the feoffees b
y
themselves without
cestuy que use , b
y
the common law , had both severally absolute power
to make disposition o
f
one and the same land ; sometimes cestuy que use
b
y
his secret estates prevented the feoffees , and sometimes the feoffees by
the like secret estates prevented cestuy que use ; so that , as he said , they
played a
t
double hand , and thereby frustrated the true intent of the
act . And the CHIEF BARON and WALMESLEY said , that the statute
o
f
27 Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ] was not made to extinguish or eradicate any uses ,
but the statute o
f
27 Hen . 8 [ c . 107 hath advanced uses , and hath now
established safety and assurance for cestuy que use against his feoffees ;
for before the statute the feoffees were owners o
f
the land , and now the
statute hath made cestuy que use owner of the land ; before the statute
the possession governed and ruled the use , but now since the statute
the use governs and rules the possession ; for b
y
the said act of 27 Hen .
8 the possession is a subject and follower o
f
the use . And no word in
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the preamble doth condemn uses , but fo
r
the extirpating and extinguish
ing o
f
all such subtle practiced feoffments , fines , recoveries , abuses , & c . ,
so that the uses are not guilty of the inconveniences mentioned in the
preamble , but the feoffments , fines , and recoveries , subtilly and craftily
practiced ; so that the intent o
f
the act was to extirpate and extinguish
( which are both significant words ) all such feoffments , fines , recoveries .
But how ? By destroying of uses ? No , truly , but b
y
devesting the
whole estate out of the feoffees , conusees , and recoverers , and vesting
it in cestuy que use , so that it would be against the meaning and the
letter o
f
the law also to say that any estate o
r right , or scintilla juris ,
should remain in the feoffees after the statute of 27 Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ) , for
it appears b
y
the preamble , that the makers of the act intended to ex
tirpate and eradicate the whole estate o
f
the feoffees , and the letter
o
f
the body of the act is that the estate , right , title , and possession that






any lands to the use o
f
such person be from thenceforth clearly adjudged
and deemed in him or them , & c . , so that b
y
a judgment given b
y
the
whole parliament the estate shall be out of the feoffees . And the CHIEF
BARON said that scintilla juris which is mentioned in 17 Eliz . [ Dver
310 , p
l
. 49 ] is like Sir Thomas Moore ' s Eutopia . And they said , that
since this statute n
o trust o
r
confidence was reposed in the feoffees ; for
now , as WALMESLEY said , the feoffees non possunt agere aut permittere
aliquid in prejudice o
f
cestuy que use .
Before the statute the office o
f
the feoffee was to execute the estate
according to the use , but now the statute hath taken away al
l
the office
of the feoffees , and now the act executes the possession to the use , and
takes away a
ll






7 Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ] is , “ where any person o
r persons
stand or be seised , or a
t any time hereafter shall happen to be seised ; "
and they relied much upon these words at any time ; for it seemed to
them b
y
these words , that the seisin which the feoffees had at the begin
ning by the feoffment , would be sufficient within this act , to serve all
the uses as well future , when they come in esse , as present , for there
need not many seisins , nor a continued seisin , but a seisin at any time ;
so a seisin a
t
one time would suffice , for the statute saith seisin a
t any
time ; and it would be hard , when the statute requires but one seisin a
t
one time only , that many seisins and at several times , against the intent
and letter o
f
the act , should be required . The statute of 27 Hen . 8
[ c . 10 ] extends to all lawful and good uses as well future as in esse , and
no such use is destroyed but advanced and extolled , as hath been said
before . And WALMESLEY said , that if such construction should be
made to destroy these future uses , the usual pleading in practice ever
since the statute ought to be altered ; for the pleading of a feoffment
in fee to future uses after that they come in esse , is virtute cujus &
vigore actus parliamenti , & c . , de usibus in possessionem transferend
cestuy que use was seised , & c . ; so that one seisin is sufficient , as is proved
b
y
the usual form o
f pleading , but now the pleading of it must be a
l
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tered , if many seisins should be requisite , and then more seisins than
one ought to be alleged . And he said , as a fountain gives to every one
which comes in his turn to it his just measure of water , so the first
seisin and estate in fe
e , given b
y
the first feoffment to the feoffees , is
sufficient to yield to all persons , to whom any use present or future
is limited , a competent measure of estate in their time , proportionable
to their estates which they shall have in the use . So that it seems to
them , that the first seisin by force of the feoffment by which the fee
simple is given to the feoffees would be sufficient to serve all the particu
lar uses as well future as present in their several times , and nothing
should remain in the feoffees . But WALMESLEY said , that the whole
estate shall be first vested in those who are in rerum natura , and the
possession shall be vested in him who hath the future use , when it




the first livery , and shall divide the estates
which were conjoined before . And he agreed that an alien , o
r
a person
attainted , or a corporation , could not at this day be originally infeoffed







e created out o
f
their seisin .
J . S . makes a feoffment in fee to divers natural persons to certain uses ,
some present and some future , so that the uses are well created and
raised , although a corporation be afterwards infeoffed o
f
the land , yet the




the first livery , and the first seisin o
f





the act , as he conceived . And WALMESLEY further said , that the
future uses in our case cannot be suspended , for a thing which never
was in esse cannot b
e suspended , but the whole estate vests first in them
who have the present uses , or the uses in esse , and when the future
uses come in esse , then they shall come in between the other estates
which were conjoined before . And in proof thereof they cited the
case o
f
Cranmer in 14 Eliz . , reported by the Lord Dyer , fol . 309 ; and
the case de seniori puero in 16 Eliz . , reported also b
y
the Lord Dyer ,





1 Rich . 3 [ c . 1 ] makes a feoffment in fee upon condi
tion , and after enters for the condition broken , the feoffees should never
have the land again , because al
l





the feoffment taken out o
f
them . So the case in 19 Hen ,
6 , fol . 76 ; and 2 Edw . 4 , 2 ; if a man makes a feoffment in fee upon
condition that he shall make a feoffment over in fee , in that
case , if the second feoffee refuses , the feoffor shall enter , for it
was the intent o
f
both parties , that the feoffee should depart with his
whole estate , and nothing should remain in him . Otherwise it is if the
condition was that he should make a gift in tail . And he said , if a feoff
ment be made o
f
land to the use o
f
A , and there is also a rent issuing
out o
f
the same land to the use o
f






disseisin , yet the use of the rent is not disturbed thereby ,
because the disturbance is done to another seisin , that is to say , to the
land , and not to the seisin of the rent out of which the use is limited .
S
o
in the case a
t












id , ' if is
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by the feoffment, out of which al
l
the uses , as out o
f
a fountain flow ,














devested ; for it hath not any essence until




the statute shall draw
a sufficient estate to it , but when the future use is come in esse , now
b
y




7 Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ) . And in proof thereof he cited Brace
bridge ' s Case , 15 Eliz . , [ 1 And . 113 ] which in effect was : A man made
a feoffment of a manor to several persons to certain uses , upon condi
tion that if certain money was not paid within a certain time , that then
they should stand seised to other uses ; the money was not paid , and after
attornment was had to the feoffees , when the possession of the demesnes
was executed before b
y
the statute ; in that case after the condition







livery ; and yet there was not any continuance o
f
seisin in the feoffees ,
neither were the feoffees seised o
f





the possession to the use .
And the case of 13 Eliz . , Dyer , fol . 298b ; [Ryghly ' s Case ] 22 Eliz .
[ Dyer ) 369a ; tenant in capite infeoffs one and his heirs , provided that
when the feoffor shall pay 1001 . to him or his heirs , that then it shall
b
e
to the use o
f
the feoffor and his heirs ; the feoffee dies , his heir within




the first livery , and b
y
relation to that , shall defeat the ward
ship o
f
the body and land . And he said , if a man makes a feoffment




life , and after to the use of another in
tail , with divers remainders over with power to the lessee for life to
make leases for 21 years , or 3 lives , in that case , if the tenant for life










determined by the death o
f
the lessee for life , and in the same case
there is not any seisin continuing in the feoffees , but the first seisin is





7 Hen . 8
[ c . 10 ) , for it saith , that the estate that was in the feoffee shall be ad
judged in cestuy que use .
But PERIAM , chief baron , conceived , that these future uses before
their births are not preserved in the bowels and belly o
f
the land , but
that they were in nubibus , and in the preservation o
f
the law ; for he




the act the whole estate
shall be out of the feoffees , and then o
f
necessity , he said , it ought to
be in some person , or in abeyance and consideration of the law . And
it would be absurd to say that the feoffees should have a less estate
than they took b
y
the first livery . And therefore because nothing re
mains in the feoffees , and this future use , cannot be executed until the





meantime in the preservation o
f
the law . And if any case be doubtful
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upon a statute it is good to construe it according to the reason of the
common law , as it is said in Dalamer 's Case in Plow . Com . 351.
And if the estate in our case had been limited in possession by livery
and seisin , the remainder to the eldest son , & c ., till his birth it would
be by the rule of the common law in the consideration of the law ;
and by the same reason the use shall be in our case ; and as the use shall
be , so shall be the possession by force of the statute , for be the use in
esse , or in the consideration of the law , the possession shall be transferred
to it by force of the statute. And he took a difference between feoffees
before the statute and feoffees since the statute , for if feoffees to an use
were disseised before the statute , no use could be executed after the
statute without regress of the feoffees , for the statute saith , which be
or at any time hereafter shall be seised , & c . And those who were dis
seised before the statute were not seised at the time of the act , nor
at any time after until regress ; otherwise it is when the feoffment is
made after the statute causa qua supra . And where the statute saith ,
to the use of any person or persons, the statute doth not say, to the use
of any person or persons in esse , but to the use of another person , and
that shall be intended when his time shall come; and it would be a hard
construction to destroy these future uses in our case which were limited
upon good cause and consideration , and especially when the sons, who
then were not in esse , were not parties to any wrong , covin or practice .
But he said , that the use by the common law was in abeyance and cus
tody of the law ; and the possession accordingly by force of the statute ,
for no other person can take it , and a thing which is committed to the
custody of the law , the law will lawfully preserve without any violence
or destruction . And therefore , 32 Hen . 6, if there be tenant for life
the remainder to the right heirs of J . S . and tenant for life is disseised ,
and a descent cast , and after J . S. dies , and then the lessee for life
dies , the entry of the right heir of J . S. is lawful , and he put also the
case of the parson as to this purpose . And to prove that as well the
possession as the use are in the custody of the law , he cited Cranmer ' s
Case ( 14 Eliz., Dver 309 ) , that the remainder limited to the executors
was in abeyance ; and the Earl of Bedford 's Case [Moore 718 , 2 And .
197, ante - ), in which case he said it was agreed , that the remainder
to his right heirs was in the custody of the law until the death of John
Lord Russel ; and Brent's Case , 17 Eliz ., Dyer 340 , that the remainder
limited to the wife that shall be , was in abevance ; and the like , Bray ' s
Case , 2 Eliz., Dyer, 190 , 191 , where it was held , that the remainder lim
ited to the wife that shall be, should be in abeyance ; if the particular
estate had not been but a term , which cannot by the rule of law support
a remainder in abeyance . And he cited the cases in Brooke 's Abr . Feoff
ments al Uses 30, (Hen . 8 ) , and 50 pl. 3, M . pl. 59 , when Brooke was
chief justice . And he said , that these uses have extended themselves
into many branches ; and are to be resembled to Nebuchadnezzar 's tree ,
for in this tree the fowls of the air build their nests , and the nobles of
this realm erect and establish their houses , and under this tree lie
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infinita pecora campi , and great part of the copyholders and farmers
of the land for shelter and safety , and he said , if this tree should be
felled or subverted , it would make a great print and impression in the
land . And therefore it was convenient to repress the mischief after by
parliament , and not to have any retrospect to cases before .
And he and WALMESLEY also agreed in their argument , that the uses
in this case should follow the rules of estates at the common law . And
therefore in this case if tenant for life dies before the birth of the son ,
the remainder in use shall be void ; for such remainder would be void
by the rule of the common law , if it had been made in possession , if the
remainder do not vest during the particular estate , or at least when the
particular estate determines , and no difference between uses and estates
made in possession as to this purpose .
And so they concluded , that judgment ought to be given for the
plaintiff .
And on the other side it was argued by BARON EWENS , Justice OWEN ,
Justice BEAMOND, Justice FENNER , Justice GAWDY , Baron CLARK ,
Justice CLENCH , the Lord ANDERSON ( C . J . of the Common Pleas ), and
POPHAM , Lord Chief Justice [of the Queen 's Bench ], to the contrary .
And it was agreed by them a
ll
that the feoffment made b
y
the said
feoffees who had an estate for life by limitation of the use devested all
the estates , and the future uses also . And although Richard Chudleigh
their feoffee had notice o
f
the first use , yet it is not material , because al
l
the ancient estates were devested b
y
the said feoffment , and this new
estate cannot b
e subject to the ancient uses which rise out o
f
the ancient
estate which was devested b
y
the feoffment .
And GAWDY , justice , conceived that the uses limited to the eldest
son , & c . , were in abeyance ; and he said , that the estates o
f the land
sufficient to serve these future uses were in abevance also . But he agreed
it was not b
y





the said statute , for he said , the letter of the
statute is , to the use of any person o
r persons , and here wanteth person ;
also in every case such person shall be adjudged in lawful seisin , & c . ,
also , that the estate , & c . , shall be adjudged in him o
r
them that shall





the statute did draw sufficient estate to serve them in abeyance also ,
and that for the saving and the maintenance of future uses , and that they
should not be defeated and destroyed . And he agreed also that all
the present uses a
s
well precedent a
s subsequent were executed immedi
ately ; and he agreed with the other justices , that the statute of 27 Hen .
8 [ c . 107 did not extend to subvert and destroy uses in other manner than
by the executing and transferring of the possession of the land to them .
And Gawdy cited the opinion o
f
Fitzherbert in [ Y . B . ] 28 Hen . 8 , fol .





Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ) that two men should have several powers
to make a disposition o
f
the same land , scil . the feoffees b
y
the common




1 Rich . 3 [ c . 1 ] , and that
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inconvenience was intended to be remedied by this act of 27 Hen . 8
[ c . 10 ], and he conceived that the whole estate should be out of the
feoffees , for no right of the feoffees is saved which they have to another
use , as it is said ( 7 Edw . 6 ) in Stephen Davies's Case , Dyer , 88b .
And if a feoffment in fee be made to the use of one for life, and
after to the use of the right heirs of J. S ., the fee - simple of the land
shall be in abeyance ; and before the statute if a man had made a feoff
ment to the use of one for years , and after to the use of the right heirs
of J . S., this limitation had been good , for the feoffees remain tenants
of the freehold ; but such limitation after the statute is void , for then
the freehold would be in suspense , for nothing can remain in the feoffees .
But he said that these remainders in future were devested and destroyed
by the feoffment of the tenants for life. And although the remainders
be in custody of the law , yet they ought to be subject to the rules of the
law , for the law will never preserve anything against the rule of law ;
and because the rule of law is, that he in the remainder must take the
land when the particular estate determines, or else the remainder shall
be void [ Archer ' s Case , post – ] ; and in this case , forasmuch as by the
feoffment of the tenants for life their estate was determined and title
of entry given for the forfeiture , and then those in the future remainder
were not in esse to take it , for this reason these remainders in futuro
by this matter ex post facto were utterly destroyed and made void . And
there is no difference when the estate of the tenant for life determines
by the death of the tenant for life, and when it determines in right by his
forfeiture , for in both cases entry is given to him in the next remainder ,
and then if he cannot take the land when the particular estate deter
mines, the remainder is void . And if Strachley Chudleigh at the time
of the forfeiture had been born , he might have entered for the forfeiture .
If there be tenant for life , the remainder to the right heirs of J . S ., if in
that case tenant for life makes a feoffment in fee during the life of
J. S . the remainder is destroyed , for otherwise there would be a re
mainder without a particular estate , which cannot be, no more in the
case of an use than in the case of an estate made in possession . And
upon that he cited Bray 's Case, 3 Eliz ., [ Dyer 189b ? ].
And of the same opinion was POPHAM , chief justice , Baron CLARKE
and OWEN , as to the said point of forfeiture , admitting that no disturb
ance or alteration of the estate had been made . And the chief justice
denied the opinion of Gascoigne in ♡ Hen . 4 , 23b , who thought that
such remainder should not be defeated by the feoffment of tenant for life.
And Baron CLARK put the case in 11 Rich . 2 [ Fitzherbert 's Abr. ] , Deti
nue 46 : A gift in tail was made to A . C ., the remainder to the right
heirs of A . S ., the donee made a feoffment to B . in fee , and afterwards A .
S . died ; his right heir shall never have the remainder nor any charter that
concerns it, for the estate of the land was by the feoffment of the tenant
in tail devested and discontinued , and al
l
estates vested in the feoffee ,
and there was not any particular estate neither in esse , nor in right
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the tenant in tail his right was utterly gone, as Littleton says, and then
at the time the remainder fell, scil ., at the time of the death of A . S .,
there was not any particular estate to support the remainder , neither
in esse nor in right. And in the same case nota dictum by CHARLETON ,
chief justice and judicium : But if tenant in tail was disseised and
died , that will not toll the remainder , for there a right of the particular
estate remains to support the right of the remainder , but when the
tenant in tail makes a feoffment no right remains in him . And OWEN ,
justice , said , if tenant for life had made a feoffment in our case before
the birth of the son , he in the next remainder in esse should enter for
the forfeiture . And GawDY, justice , said , that in divers cases a thing
in abeyance may be barred and destroyed ; as if tenant in tail be disseised ,
and releases to the disseisor, now Littleton [ Tenure , $619 ] says, the
estate -tail is in abevance , yet it may be barred by a common recovery in
which the tenant in tail is vouched . So if there be tenant in tail ,
the remainder to the right heirs of J . S., if tenant in tail suffers a com
mon recovery , the remainder is barred . So he said upon the [ Brent ' s ? )
Case in 17 Eliz ., Dyer 34 [ 0 , in which it was held that if a man makes
a feoffment to the use of him and the wife he may marry ], if the hus
band makes a feoffment in fee before the taking wife , the wife shall
never take, for the possession and estate of the land is altered , changed ,
and transferred to the possession of another , before the title of the wife
doth accrue ; but if no devesting or alteration had been , then the use
shall vest in the wife . And he resembled it to the cases in ] 22 Assize ,
pl. 37 ; 26 Assize , pl. 8 ; and 29 Assize , pl. 34 , (which prove that ] if
a warranty be made to the possession of a villein , if the ancestor dieth ,
so long as it continues in his possession it shall bind ; but if the lord
of the vellein enters before the warranty doth attach , then the warranty
shall not bind, for the lord of the villein is in by force of his title of
villeinage , and the estate and the possession of the land doth not con
tinue , but by the entry of the lord is altered and changed .
And it was held by Baron EWENS , OWEN, BEAMONT , FENNER , CLARK ,
CLENCHI , the Lord ANDERSON , and POPHAM , lord chief justice , that at
the common law , by disseisin or by such feoffment as in the case at bar,
as well all future uses or uses in contingency are devested and discon
tinued , as uses in esse , till the first estate out of which the uses rise be
recontinued . And the statute of 27 Ilen . 8 [ c. 10 ] doth not transfer
any possession to any use but only to uses in esse , and not to any use in
future or in contingency till they come in esse ; and this appears by
the eypress letter of the act, for, as there ought to be a person in esse
seised to the use , so there ought to be an use in esse which should rise
out of the estate , and there ought to be a person in esse who should
take the use , before any possession can be transferred and executed to
the use . For if the person who should take the use be not in esse , or if
the person be in esse and no use be in esse but only possibility (as the
Lord ANDERSON said ) of an use , there can be no execution of the posses
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if there be no seisin out of which such use shall rise ; so no use can be
executed by the statute of 27 Hen . 8 [ c. 10 ] unless there be seisin in
some person subject to such use at the time of the execution thereof ;
for the express letter of the act is , where any person or persons stand
or be seised , or hereafter , & c., shall stand or be seised , & c ., to the use
of any other person or persons . So that there ought to be a person
in esse on both parts ( sc. who shall be seised to the use , and who shall
take the use ) , so that it is necessary not only to have an use limited ,
but a person capable of the use when the statute transfers the possession
to it ; and therefore if the person fail it is not possible to have the pos
session executed by this statute to one who is not in rerum natura ; for
the statute says , To the use of any person or persons : In every such
case, all and every such person and persons that have any such use in
fee - simple , fee tail, for term of life or years , or otherwise , or any use in
reversion or remainder , & c. In which words note the word such is
iterated three times ; so that uses in esse , that is to say , in possession ,
reversion , or remainder , for there is no word of any possibility or con
tingency . And persons in esse are only within this act : shall
from henceforth be deemed and adjudged in lawful seisin , estate ,
and possession ; and that cannot be any person who is not in
esse , nor any person who is in esse and who hath but a possi
bility of an use , who perhaps will never have an use in esse. And by
these words it fully appears, that no estate by this statute can be trans
ferred to the possibility of an use . And that the estate that was in such
person or persons that were or hereafter shall be seised to the use of any
such person or persons, be from henceforth clearly deemed and adjudged
to be in him or them , that have or hereafter shall have such use . So
that this clause doth not devest any estate out of the feoffees , but when
it can be executed in the cestuy que use, (that is to say ) in him or them
that have or hereafter shall have such use , which one can 't have who
is not in esse ; for he is not a person who can have an use , and by conse
quence cannot have any possession by this act. And it was further held
by POPHAM and ANDERSON , the two chief justices, CLENCH , CLARKE ,
FENNER , BEAMOND, OWEN , and EWENS , that those who had argued on
the other side had taken but the first part of the sentence , that is to say ,
that the estate shall be out of the feoffees , but they had forgot the latter
part of the sentence , scil., that the estate shall be in such person who hath
the use, and that cannot be till the person and the use also be in esse .
And by this clause it also appears , that no estate of the feoffees shall be
transferred in abeyance out of the feoffees , and vested in no body , or
be transferred to a possibility of an use which hath not any being ; for
then an estate in esse would be transferred to the possibility of an use
which hath not any being , which would be against reason , and against
the letter and meaning of the act . For the words are , and shall be
adjudged in him or them that shall have such use ; therefore the estate
of the feoffees shall not be in abeyance . And the two chief justices,
FENNER , BEAMOND, OWEN , and EWENS , said , that if the estate should
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be utterly out of the feoffees, and all vested in those who have the present
uses ( as some have held before ) , then the future use would never rise ,
for it is not possible that it should be raised out of the possession of
cestuy que use ; for an use cannot be raised out of an use, as is [ Brooke 's
Abr . ] 36 Hen . 8, Feoffments al Uses , 54 ; [ Tyrrel 's Case ], 5 Mary ,
Dyer 155 . And if A enfeoff B in fee to the use of C and his heirs , with
proviso that if D pay C 1001 , that C and his heirs shall stand seised to
the use of D and his heirs , this is utterly void ; fo
r
the future use ought
to b
e
raised out of the estate of the feoffee , and not out of the estate o
f
cestuy que use . And it was held b
y
them , that the feoffees since the
statute had a possibility to serve the future use when it came in esse ,
and that in the meantime a
ll
the uses in esse shall be vested , and when
the future use comes in esse , then the feoffees ( if the possession be not
disturbed b
y
disseisin or other means ) shall have sufficient estate and
seisin to serve the future use when it comes in esse to be executed by
force o
f




ought to concur at one and the same time . 1
And this case is not to be resembled to cases a
t
the common law , for
a
n act o
f parliament may make division of estates ; and forasmuch as
this division is made by act of parliament , it is not necessary that the
feoffees should have their ancient estates . And they said that this con
struction was just , and consonant to reason and equity ; for by this con
struction the interest and power that every one hath , will be preserved
b
y
the act ; for if the possession be disturbed b
y
disseisin or otherwise ,
the feoffees will have power to enter to revive the future uses accord
ing to the trust reposed in them ; and if they b
y
any act bar themselves
o
f
their entry , then this case (not being remedied b
y
the act ) doth re
main as it was a
t
the common law . And the CHIEF JUSTICE and FEN
NER said , that if a man makes a feoffment in fee to the use o
f
one
for life , and after to the use o
f
the feoffee [ feoffor ] in tail upon con
1 " This case (Manning and Andrews ' Case ( 18 Eliz . , A . D . 1586 ) , 1 Leon .
256 ) is very important . It appears clearly that the doctrine of scintilla
juris was not then received as law ; and , indeed that no fixed or settled
notions were formed respecting the operation of the statute on contingent
uses . Geoffries thought with Manwood and Dyer (according to Leonard ' s
report of Brent ' s Case , 2 Leon . 14 ) that a sufficient actual estate remained
in the feoffees to support the uses , while Southcote and Wray were of
opinion that the feoffees were by the statute mere conduit - pipes , and were
divested of all estate . About eighteen years after Manning and Andrews
case the famous case arose which is constantly referred to as having de
cided the doctrine of scintilla juris . I allude to Chudleigh ' s Case .
When Chudleigh ' s Case is attentively considered our surprise cannot fail
to be excited at its ever having been considered as a decisive authority
for the doctrine in question . The opinion of the six judges on this point ,
as stated by Coke , was mérely an obiter dictum ; and there even appears to
be reason to doubt whether any such opinion was ever delivered . In Lord
Chief Justice Popham ' s report of the same case , this opinion is given as
coming from himself only . And Lord Chief Justice Anderson , who is made
by Coke to concur in this opinion , reports no such matter in his book . "
Sugden on Powers , 18 , 19 , 24 , 25 .
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tingency , and after the contingency happens ; in that case the feoffee is
the donor , as it is proved by Brooke 's Abr. ( 2 Edw . 6 ) Br. Formedon 41 ;
( 7 . E . 6 ), Ibid . 46 ; Plow . Com . 59 ; 20 Eliz ., Dyer 362., but it would
be absurd , that the feoffee should be donor , and yet should have nothing ,
but be only as an instrument , or as the wind out of an organ -pipe. And
FENNER put the cases in 7 Hen . 6 , 3a ; [ Fitzherbert 's Abr .] (13 Rich .
2 ) , Dower 55 ; 29 Assize , pl. 64 : If tenant for life makes a lease to him
in reversion for the life of him in the reversion , although the lessee had
but a freehold and departed with a freehold , yet the lessee hath a possi
bility which by the death of him in the reversion may come in estate .
So although the estate of the feoffees be transferred to the uses in esse ,
yet a possibility doth remain in the feoffees , which may be reduced to an
estate sufficient to serve the future uses. And he said , it was not strange
that an act in law should alter the original estate, but then the new
estate ought to be as near the ancient estate as may be, so that al
l
inter
ests may be served and saved according to the intent and meaning o
f
the parties ; a
s
in the case o
f
Littleton [ Tenure $ 252 ] , and 2 Hen . 4 , 5b ,
[ that ] if a man makes a feoffment in fee upon condition to make an
estate to husband and wife in special tail , and , before any gift made ,
the husband dies without issue ; now b
y
this act in law , the estate shall
b
e




n act in law the original estate was altered .
And Baron CLARKE said , some have supposed these future uses were
preserved in the bowels of the land , and that the land should be charged
with them in whose hands soever it should come ; and some have sup
posed they were preserved in nubibus , and in the custody o
f
the law .
But he said in our case be they below in the land , there they should
b
e perpetually buried , and should never rise again ; and be they above
in nubibus ( in the clouds ) , there they should always remain , and should
never descend ; for he said that the sons o
f Christopher Chudleigh in
our case were not born in due time ; and as this case is ; they should never




t and due time should not take . And upon that he put the case
of ravishment , in 5 Eliz . 4 , 6a : when the son is born after the entry
o
f
the daughter ; and 9 Hen . 7 , 25a ; and 30 Assize , p
l
. 47 ; when the
remainder limited to the right heirs o
f J . S . first vests in the daughter ,
and after the son is born ; and many good cases were put b
y
him to the
same purpose . And further he said , as in the Case of Kidwelly , Plow .
Com . 69b , the lessor b
y
the original agreement o
f
the parties may come
upon the land , to demand his rent , although the estate of the land be









revived ; and in such cases he said , that when the future uses shall
come in esse , the feoffees shall have b
y
force of the act a qualified estate
sufficient to serve the future uses . And ſhe ] resembled it to the case
in 2
1




f England ; in that case the grantee had a quali
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fied inheritance ; for inasmuch as the Black Prince died in the life of
his father , and his son Richard was not then king , the land did revert .
So all the justices and barons of the exchequer except PERIAM ,
WALMESLEY , and GAWDY did conclude, that forasmuch as the statute
of 27 Hen . 8 [ c. 10 ] doth not extend but to uses in esse , and to persons
in esse , and not to any uses which depend only in possibility ; for that
reason the contingent uses in the case at bar remain so long as they de
pend in possibility , only at the common law , and by consequence they
might be destroyed or discontinued before they came in esse , by all such
means as uses might have been discontinued or destroyed by the common
law .
And all the justices and barons of the exchequer did agree with the
CHIEF BARON ( PERIAM ] and WALMESLEY in this point, scil ., that these
remainders limited in use in the case at bar should follow the rule and
reason of estates executed in possession by the common law , and there
fore they a
ll unanimously agreed , that if the estate for life in the case
a




the feoffees before the
birth o
f
the eldest son , that the said remainders in futuro were void ,
and should never take effect although the sons were born after ; for




o instante when the particular estate ends , as well as an estate in pos
session . And it was held b
y
all the justices that if the contingent use in
the case at bar had come in esse without any alteration of the estate of
the land , that it should be executed b
y
the statute o
f 27 Hen . 8 ; but the
alteration o
f
the estate before it came in esse had destroyed it , as it hath
been said . But if any such alteration of estate be before the essence of
the future use , then the use should not be transferred into possession
before the impediment removed , and the estate recontinued .
It was also held by the eight justices and barons who argued against
the contingent use , that the statute o
f
27 Hen . 8 c . 101 should not
(against the express letter of it ) be construed b
y
equity for the main
tenance and preservation o
f
these contingent uses ; forasmuch a
s by such










PoPHAM , chief justice , as to this point appears .
And POPIIAM , Chief Justice , in hi
s








7 Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ] some uses are executed immediately , some uses
are executed b
y
matter ex post facto , and some uses are extirpated and





the act ; uses in futuro , limited agreeable to the rule o
f
the common law , are also , if they come in esse in due time , within
the purview o
f
this statute , but uses invented and limited in a new man
ner not agreeable to the ancient common laws of the land , such uses
are utterly extirpated and extinguished b
y
this act ; for it appears
by the express letter of the act , that it was the intent of the parliament
to extirpate and extinguish them , and to restore the ancient common
law o
f
the land . And therefore he said if a feoffment be made to the
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use of A for life, and after to the use of every person who should be his
heir , one after another, for the term of the life of every such heir
only ; in this case , if this limitation should be good , the inheritance
would be in nobody ; but this limitation is merely void , for the limita
tion of an use to have a perpetual freehold is not agreeable with the
rule of law in estates in possession .
So if a man makes a feoffment to the use of one in tail with divers
remainders over, with a proviso that if any shall attempt to purchase
any præcipe against any tenant of the freehold , & c., that his estate shall
cease , and that then the feoffees shall stand seised to the use of an
other , & c ., such proviso or limitation is against the rule of the law ,
if it had been conveyed in possession , for he cannot limit new remain
ders upon such conditions ; and at this day , an estate -tail in land cannot
cease till entry , and no entry or re -entry is given to any but only to the
feoffor or his heirs , and not to any in remainder. And he agreed the
case, which was put before , with the proviso , that the estate in tail
by limitation of an use shall cease as if tenant in tail was naturally dead ,
and not otherwise ; for he said that such limitation would be void if it
was limited in possession . And he said , there was no difference at this
day between estates conveyed in use and estates conveyed in possession ,
for the estate and limitation of an use ought to be known to the common
law , and governed and directed by the rules thereof . But he said
the limitation of the uses in this case , as well future as in esse , were
good and lawful, for such estates executed in possession were good ;
but the future uses were destroyed by subsequent matter , as hath been
said .
And he said , if such a construction upon the statute of 27 Hen . 8
[ c. 10 ] by equity or otherwise should be made for the maintenance
and preservation of future uses , as hath been made by those who have
argued on the other side , greater inconveniences would be introduced
than were before the making of the statute of 27 Hen . 8 . For he said the
said construction did tend to the subversion of noble and great fam
ilies , and to the disinherison of their heirs , so that no land subject
to such perpetuities could continue four descents ; for if he who is so
restrained and bound with the provisoes of perpetuities should sell
any part of the land fo
r
payment o
f any debts or legacies , or if he be
taken prisoner in the war for his ransom , o
r
for the preferment o
f
his
younger sons , or for advancement o
f
his daughters in marriage , o
r
for
any cause , or upon any necessity whatsoever , he would forfeit his estate .
Also when the eldest son knows he shall have the lands and possessions
o
f
his father , whether he will or no , it makes the son become dissolute
and disobedient , so that he will not depend upon the government o
f
his
father , but refuse to be ruled and directed by him . It would likewise
occasion variance and discord in the same blood , and in effect tear the
bowels o
f
nature ; for it would stir u
p





the provisoes ) to put his father out o
f
the land ; from
whence great suits and troubles would arise , to the wasting and subver
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sion of the families , and so of the brother and brother ; and of the
cousin and cousin . And he who hath such perpetuity ought always to
have a counsellor at la
w
a
t his elbow , for he cannot do an act
concerning his land , but his son , o
r
h
e who is next to the land , watches
for a forfeiture . Also he who hath an estate subject to such perpetuity ,
if he hath two several farms , out o
f
which two several rents have been
reserved , and peradventure where the several usual rents amount but to
40s . per annum , and he joins both in one lease for life , and reserves one
rent of 4 marks per annum , it is a forfeiture o
f
his estate . For upon
this lease the usual and accustomed rent is not reserved ; so in many
other cases if he do not observe the precise form of power which is
given him , it will amount to a forfeiture of his estate , and within two
o
r three descents the provisoes and limitations will not be so fresh in
memory , that every gentleman can , in every lease which he shall make ,
follow the precise form o
f
the provisoes . Also if the wives of such
persons become incontinent , and have issue b
y
other men than b
y
their
husbands , this adulterous generation shall inherit the husband ' s lands ,
whether they will or no . And this would be a great occasion for women
to offend , when they know their issues shall inherit , and many other
inconveniences would ensue upon such a construction in maintenance
o
f
these perpetuities . And so men who intend to over -reach the provi
dence o
f
God , and covet to establish their lands in their blood b
y
these
ways , are in truth thereby the cause o
f
the wasting and subversion of
their houses . Also no purchaser would be sure of his purchase without
a
n act o
f parliament , and where at the common law , if he had pur
chased the land bona fide without notice of the use , he had been free
o
f
the use , he will be now in a worse case , for the construction which
hath been made , his lands shall be subject to these future uses .
Also farmers and lessees cannot have any certain and full assurance .
For suppose a feoffment in fee be made to the use of one for life , and
after to the use o
f
another in tail , with remainder over , with power
to the lessees for life to make leases , so that he reserves the accustomed
rent payable to all those who shall have the reversion : if tenant for life
makes leases according to his power , the lessees derive their interest
out o
f
the first feoffment , how then can the reservation of the rent be
good , and how can his heir , or he in the remainder come at it ? And
if a proviso be added in the original assurance , that the lessees shall
pay the rent , or that they shall enjoy it so long as they pay the rent ,
then forasmuch a
s
it is no rent , it ought to be paid without any demand ,
and if he do not pay it , his interest shall immediately cease by the limita
tion of the use .
Also those who have cause of action will be in a worse case than
they were before ; for before this statute they might have an action
against the pernor o
f





are taken away , as appears 28 Hen . 8 , Dyer 32a , p
l
. 3 , and in Manzel ' s
Case , Plow . Com . , and then b
y
such subtle devices as in the case before
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put, he who hath cause of action will never find one who shall be tenant
to his præcipe , and so by such construction he will be without remedy .
Also perjury will be increased in respect of the secrecy more than
it was before the statute, for no use could have been raised before this
act but upon a transmutation of possession or upon a covenant or full
contract by apt words upon good consideration concluded between the
parties ; but now uses will be determined and raised by words without
any consideration upon a bare imagination and intention only without
any conclusion , covenant , or contract . For if one intends, goes about
or attempts , & c., he will lose his land , although he does nothing , or
concludes nothing .
Also the king and other lords will lose their wards, escheats , and other
profits of their seigniories ; for if the said case before put of a perpetual
freehold should be maintained , that no heir shall have but an estate
for life, and that the inheritance shall be in nobody , what escheat , or
ward, or heriot , or other profit will accrue to the king or other lords ?
And he said it was not the intent of him and the other justices to over
throw the tree of uses, but to lop the rotten and unprofitable boughs
and branches dangerous to the estate of the commonwealth and men 's
assurances , so that the rest of the tree , which is profitable for the use of
men , might the better prosper . And he said , the reason why the lord
by escheat , or the lord of a villain should not stand seised to an use ,
is , because the title of the lord is by reason of his elder title , and that
grows, either by reason of the seigniory of the land , or of the villein ,
which title is higher and elder than the use or confidence is , and there
fore should not be subject to it . And the reason why a disseisor should
not stand seised to an use was, because cestuy que use had no remedy
by the common law for any use, but his remedy was only in chancery :
And because the right of a freehold or inheritance could not be deter
mined in chancery, his title should not be drawn into examination there ;
and for this reason a disseisor shall not be compelled in the chancery to
execute an estate to cestuy que use , but cestuy que use shall compel his
feoffees in the court of chancery to enter upon the disseisor , or to re
cover the land against him at the common law , and then the chancery
will compel the feoffees to execute the estate according to the use ; and
the chancellor ought to direct uses according to the rules of the com
mon law . And he said , before Richard the second 's time, no act of
parliament or other record , nor no book , nor any writing made any
mention of uses of lands, having regard to the very words of the statute
And therefore he said , that uses in such sense as we now take them ,
were not at the common law , but were invented in times of trouble for
fear , or in times of peace by fraud ; but he said , that confidence was at
the common law , but not that which we now call use .
PERIAM , chief baron , held , uses were at the common law ; but the
Lord ANDERSON said , uses were neither by the common law , nor by any
statute . For he said , uses were but imaginations , and nothing in the
consideration of law , or for which the law hath given any remedy , and
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that cestuy que use had nothing in the land , for if he came upon the
land, he was by the law of the land a trespasser to the feoffees .
And afterwards the same Michaelmas term judgment was given for
the defendant . * * *
" Pollaxfen , in his able argument on Hales v. Risley (Polex . 389 ) , against
the necessity of the feoffees entering to revest contingent uses , says , that
at the time Chudleigh 's Case was adjudged it was not taken for law that the
destruction of the particular estate by feoffment or conveyance before the
contingent remainder came in esse was a destruction of the contingent re
mainder . * * * We should never have heard of this fiction had it then been
settled as I apprehend it now is : 1st, that where such a construction can be
put upon a limitation that it may take effect by way of remainder , it shall
never take place as a springing use (and it even seems to be law , that
where a limitation was intended to take effect as a remainder and cannot
it shall not be supported as a springing use ) ; 2dly , that a contingent use
or remainder [ i. e., by way of remainder ] must take effectif at all eo
instanti that the preceding estate ceases ; and 3dly , that springing uses
must be so limited as to take effect, if at all, within the period of a life
or lives in being , and 21 years afterwards , and a few months allowing for
gestation .” Sugden on Powers , 26 , 28 , 29 .
In speaking on this case , Chancellor Kent says ( 4 Com . 238 - 243 ) : " The
doctrine of scintilla juris , Mr. Sugden says, was first started in Brent ' s
Case ( Dyer 340a ) in 16 Eliz . ; and the judges had great difficulty in settling
the construction of contingent uses . One opinion was that the feoffees
had a fee simple determinable to continue until the future use arose .
and that they were not divested of their whole interest until the execution
of ( * 239 ) all the uses limited upon the feoffment , but a sufficient portion
or the fee - simple to serve the contingent uses remained vested in the feof .
fees . It was also held that the estate in the interim resulted to the feoffor .
A majority of the court agreed that the statute devested the feoffees of
all the estate when the contingency arose by a person being in esse to
take . In Manning and Andrews ' Case ( 1 Leon . 256 ) the judges were equally
unsettled in their notions respecting the operation of the statute on contin
gent uses . * * * In a few years Chudleigh 's Case arose and has ever
been regarded as a great and leading case on the doctrine of contingent
uses . * * * Chudleigh ' s Case was argued several times before all the
judges of England , and we find the great names of Bacon and Coke among
the counsel who argued the cause . The case is replete with desultory
and curious discussions ; and some of it Lord Hardwicke admitted to be
so refined and speculative as not to be easily understood . The disposition
and policy of the judges was to check contingent uses , which they deemed
to be productive of mischiefs and tending to perpetuities . They regarded
the statute of uses as intending to extirpate uses , which were often found
to be subtle and fraudulent contrivances ; and their evident object was to
restore the simplicity and integrity of the common law . Notwithstanding
the scholastic and mysterious learning with which the case abounds , it
carries with it a decisive evidence of the acuteness , industry , and patriotic
views of the sages of the law at that day . * * *
" The decision in Chudleigh ' s Case settled the doctrine that contingent
remainders even by way of use were destroyed by the destruction of the
particular estate . The judges gave the same operation to a feoffment in
regard to contingent uses as they did in respect to contingent remainders .
The fiction of a scintilla juris or possibility of entry in the feoffees , or
releasees to uses , sufficient to feed the contingent uses when they came
into existence , and thereby to enable the statute to execute them , has been
deduced from these ancient cases . Such a particle of right or interest
( * 242 ) has been supposed to be indispensable to sustain the contingent
use . . . . ( * 243 ) This view of the subject has been met and opposed
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by some of the most distinguished writers on real property at the present
day . Mr . Fearne (Remainders , 377 - 380 ) questions the existence and appli
cation of the doctrine of scintilla juris to that extent , and denies the neces
sity of actual entry any more in the case of contingent uses than in the
case of contingent remainders in order to regain the requisite seizin to
serve the contingent uses . He denies the necessity of actual entry by any
person to restore a contingent use so long as the right of entry subsists
in the cestui que use ; and the scintilla juris , if of any real efficacy , must
be competent to serve contingent uses without the necessity of actual entry .
* * * Mr. Sugden takes a higher and bolder stand , and , by a critical re
view of all the cases, puts to flight this ignis fatuus of a scintilla , and shows
that it never had any foundation in judicial decisions , but was deduced
from extra - judicial dicta ."
This ignis fatuus was more effectually annihilated in England by the
statute of 23 & 24 Vic . (1860 ) , c. 38 , 97 ; which declares that where by
any instrument an inheritance is limited to uses , expressed or implied ,
immediate or future, contingent or executory , or to be declared by virtue
of any power , such uses shall take effect when and as they arise , by force
of and relation to the estate and seizin originally vested in the person
seized to the uses ;and the continued existence in him or elsewhere of any
seizin to uses or scintilla juris shall not be necessary .
ARCHER 'S CASE , In Common Pleas , Mich . 39 & 40 Eliz . - A . D . 1598 —
1 Coke 66b . Also reported as BALDWIN V. SMITH , Croke. Eliz . 437 , 2
Aud . 37.
Between Baldwin and Smith in the common pleas, in a replevin ; upon
a special verdict, the case was such : Francis Archer was seized of land
in a fe
e , and held in socage , and by his will in writing devised the land to
Robert Archer the father for his life , and afterwards to the next heir
male of Robert , and to the heirs males of the body of such next heir
male ; Robert had issue John , Francis died , Robert enfeoffed Kent with
warranty , upon whom John entered , and Kent re - entered , and after
wards Robert died , & c .
And first it was agreed b
y
ANDERSON , WALMSLEY & Totam Cur ' . that
Robert had but an estate for life , because Robert had an express estate
for life devised to him , and the remainder is limited to the next heir
male o
f
Robert in the singular number ; and the right heir male o
f
Rob
ert cannot enter for the forfeiture in the life o
f
Robert , for he cannot be
heir , as long as Robert lives : Secondly , that the remainder , to the right
heir male of Robert is good , altho ' he cannot have a right heir dur
ing his life , but it is sufficient that the remainder vests eo instante that
the particular estate determines . And so it is agreed in 7 Hen . 4 , 6 b .
and Cranmer ' s Case ( 14 Eliz . ) , Dyer 309 a . Thirdly , which was the
principal point o
f





the tenant for life the remainder was destroyed , for every
contingent remainder ought to vest , either during the particular estate , or
a
t least eo instante that it determines : for if the particular estate be
ended , o
r
determined in fact , o
r
in law before the contingency falls , the




Robert , his estate for life was determined b
y
a condition in law annexed
to it , and cannot be revived afterwards by any possibility ; for this reason






























9 icont of th
e
the contingent remainder is destroyed , against the opinion of Gascoigne
in Henry 4 . 23 b . But if the tenant for life had been disseised , and
died , yet the remainder is good , for there the particular estate doth re
main in right , and might have been revested , as it is said in 32 H . 6 .




his feoffment no right
o
f
the particular estate doth remain . And it was said it was so agreed
by POPHAM , chief justice , and divers justices in the argument o
f
the
case between Dillon and Freine [Pop . 70 , And . 309 , 1 C ke 120 a ,
Jenk . Cent . 276 , ante and denied b
y
none . See 11 R . 2 , ( Fitz . Abr .
Tit . Detinue 46 . And note the judgment of the book , and the reason
thereof , which case there adjudged is a stronger case than the case a
t
the bar . But note reader , that after the feoffment , the estate fo
r
life to
some purpose had continuance ; for all leases , charges , & c . , made b
y
the
tenant for life shall stand during his life , but the estate is supposed to
continue a
s
to those only who claim b
y
the tenant for life before the for
feiture ; but as to all others who do not claim b
y
the tenant for life him
self , the particular estate is determined : And b
y
the better opinion the
warranty shall bind the remainder , altho ' the warranty was created
before the remainder attached or vested , and altho ’ the remainder was
in the consideration o
f
the law , and he who shall be bound b
y
it , never




otherwise . * * *
POWLE v . VEERE , in Chancery , 41 Eliz . - A . D . 1599 . - Moor 554 .
The case referred to WALMSLEY & KINGSMILL [ JJ . ] , was that John ,
Count of Oxford ,made a lease b
y
indenture to Robert Veere , his brother ,
o
f
a manor in Berks , for his life , which was executed b
y livery with
these words , that if Robert should marry and his wife should out - live




r his last will declare he wished her to have it . Before taking any wife
Robert made a feoffment to Tho . Nooke , the father , to whom the Count
o
f
Oxford levied a fine after the feoffment , and bargained and sold the
land and suffered a common recovery a
s
vouchee . Afterwards Robert
took the defendant to wife and made declaration that she should have
the remainder ; and afterward he and his wife levied a fine come ceo , & c .
with warranty o
f
Robert and Nooke and their heirs . Later Robert made
another declaration that his wife should have the remainder , and died ,
and she entered . And the question was if her entry on Powle the pur
chaser from Nooke was lawful . And the justices certified that it was
not ; but that the remainder , if it was ever good , was destroyed b
y
the
feoffment , because the freehold was supplanted before the vesting o
f
the
remainder ; and also that the possibility in the wife was included in the
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WELLS v. FENTON , in C. B ., Hilary , 43 Eliz ., A . D . 1600 . - Cro. Eliz . 826 .
Ejectione Firmae. R . seized in fee, levied a fine to the use of him
self fo
r
life , and after to the use o
f
his wife who should be at the time
o
f
his death , for life , remainder to E in tail . R takes to wife A ; he
and A his wife , b
y
fine , reciting that he is tenant for life , remainder to
said A for life , give it to a stranger in fee , who renders it to the hus
band for life , remainder to F for 60 years , remainder to the right heirs
of the husband . The husband dies , the said A being his feme , survives ,
and disclaims to have anything in the land . E enters , lets to the de
fendant ; she [ A ] takes another husband , and they make a lease to the
plaintiff . Upon all these matters disclosed these points were moved : 1 .
Whether this contingent remainder to the wife who should be , was good .









land in esse , yet it cannot be o
f any use ; for the statute o
f
27
Hen , 8 , c . 10 , doth not execute uses , but those only which are in esse .
and preserves not any contingent uses , for no seisin continues to pre
serve them . And o
f
that opinion was ANDERSON [ C . J . ] . But WALMS
LEY and WARBURTON (JJ . ] e contra ; for it was good at the time of
limitation , and stood with the rules o
f





the commonwealth , that such limitations or jointures should be good ;
and therefore the law preserves and regards them , unless there be some
mean act afterwards done to destroy them . But an use limited to J . S .
until a præcipe be brought , and then to the use of J . D . , this con
tingent use of J . D . is against law and justice to defraud a præcipe , and
therefore is void .
2 . Whether b
y
the joinder in this fine the feme hath given her pos
sibility , so as she cannot afterwards claim it . WALMSLEY [ J . ] held that
she had not , for she hath not any estate , nor was there any certain per





death , and it is not known who that shall be . But where the
person is certain , although the estate be but in possibility , there per
adventure she might have excluded herself thereof . * * * Adjudged
for the plaintiff .
ANONYMOUS , in Common Bench , Mich . 5 Jac . 1 , A . D . 1608 . — 4 Leon . 236 .





B who shall survive ; it was held that if A release to B ,
that the remainder was destroyed . And if land be given to one in tail ,
and if J comes to Westminster such a day , the remainder to J in fee ,
if the estate tail descends to two coparceners , who make partition ; now
if J come to Westminster the fee shall not accrue , because the particular
estate is not in the same plight as it was before .
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REEVE v. LONG , in King 's Bench , Easter , 6 W . & M . - A . D . 1695 . - 1 Salk .
227 , Carth . 309 , 3 Lev . 408 , 4 Mod . 282 , Skin . 430 , Comb. 252 , Holt 228 ,
286 , 5 Gray P . Cas. 53 . From Salk .
honch in hi
Longife.I
Error of a judgment in common be in ejectment, wherein a
special verdict was found , and the case was : Jo n Long being seised
in fee devised the lands to his nephew Henry Long for life, remainder
to the first son in tail male, and so on to the second , third , & c . And
for default of such issue , remainder to his nephew Richard Long , lessor
of the plaintiff , fo
r
life , remainder to the first son in tail , and so on to
the second , third , & c . , with divers remainders over . The devisor died ,
Henry married , and died without issue , leaving his wife enceinte with
a son . Richard entered as in his remainder , and afterwards the post
humous son ( the defendant ) was born , and his guardian entered upon
the lessor ; whereupon he brought this ejectment and judgment was
given for the plaintiff in the common bench b
y
the whole court . And
now that judgment was affirmed b
y
this court ; and resolved : 1 . That
the remainder to the first son o
f Henry is a contingent remainder , and
must take effect during the particular estate o
f Henry or the instant





the tenant for life before he had a first son .
2 . That this was such a default of issue , or dying without issue ,
that instantly the remainder limited over to Richard vested in him , and
he became seised in possession ; and this cannot be defeated , nor the
estate fetched back again , though Henry has a son born afterwards .
But note : this judgment was afterwards reversed in the house o
f
lords , against the opinion of all the judges , who were very much dissat
isfied , and blamed the judge who tried the cause , fo
r
suffering a special
verdict to be found .




1 Wm . III , c . 16 , ( 1699 ) — An Act to Enable Posthumous Children
to take Estates as if Born in the Father ' s Lifetime . Whereas it often hap
pens , that by marriage and other settlements , estates are limited in re
mainder to the use of the sons and daughters , the issue of such marriage ,
with remainders over , without limiting an estate to trustees to preserve
the contingent remainders limited to such sons and daughters , by which
means such sons and daughters , if they happen to be born after the decease
of their father , are in danger to be defeated of their remainder by the next
remainder after them , and left unprovided for by such settlements : Be it
enacted by the king ' s most excellent majesty , by and with the advice and
consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and commons , in this present
parliament assembled , and by the authority of the same , That where any
estate already is or shall hereafter , by any marriage or other settlement ,
be limited in remainder to or to the use of the first or other son or sons
of the body of any person , lawfully begotten , with any remainder or re
mainders over to or to the use of any other person or persons , or in re
mainder to or to the use of a daughter or daughters lawfully begotten ,
with any remainder or remainders over to any other person or persons ,
that any son or sons , or daughter o
r daughters , of such person or persons ,
lawfully begotten or to be begotten , that shall be born after the decease of
his , her , or their father , shall , and may , by virtue of such settlement , take
such estate so limited to the first and other sons , o
r
to the daughter o
r
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daughters , in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of his , her ,
or their father, although there shall happen no estate to be limited to
trustees , after the decease of the father , to preserve the contingent re
mainder to such afterborn son or sons , daughter or daughters , until he, she,
or they came in esse , or are born , to take the same , any law or usage to
the contrary in anywise notwithstanding
Statute of New York , Mich , & c. "When a future estate shall be limited to
heirs or issue or children , posthumous children shall be entitled to take in
the same manner as if living at the death of their parent.” N . Y . R . S.
( 1828 ) , pt . 2, c . 1, t. 2, Art. 1, § 30 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c . 62 , § 30 , C . L .
( 1897 ) , § 8812 ; Minn . St . ( 1866 ) , c . 45 , 8 30 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , 8 3219 ; Wis . R . S.
( 1849 ) , c. 56 , 8 30 , St . ( 1898 ) , $ 2054 .
“ A future estate depending on the contingency of the death of any per
son without heirs or issue or children , shall be defeated by the birth of a
posthumous child of such person , capable of taking by descent ." N . Y .
R . S. ( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c . 1, t. 2, Art. 1, 831 ;Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62 , 831 , C. L .
( 1897 ) , $8813 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c . 45 , $31 , R . L . (1905 ) , 83220 ; Wis . R . S.
( 1849 ) , c . 56 , 831 , St . ( 1898 ) , 82055 .
ADAMS V. SAVAGE ’6 tenants , in King ' s Bench , Easter , 2 Anne , A . D . 1703
- 2 Lord Raym . 854 , 2 Salk . 679 , 5 Gray 's P . C . 119 . Given accordings tenants in Long Bench ; Saster; 2 Annen .cording
to L . Raym .
A scire facias was sued by the plaintiff as administrator , to J . S .,
upon administration granted to him by the arch -deacon of Dorset , upon
& judgment recovered by the intestate against Savage in this court .
The issue after pleading , was , whether Savage was seised of the lands,
& c ., in fee ? Upon which the jury found a special verdict , that Savage ,
being seised in fe
e , conveyed the lands b
y
lease and release to trustees
and their heirs , to the use of himself for 99 years , if he should so long
live , remainder to the trustees for 25 years , remainder to the heirs male
o
f
his body , remainder to his own right heirs . The question was , if
Savage , during his life , not having heirs male o
f
his body , should have
a use result to him for his life , and so become tenant in tail in pos
session ; o
r if no use could result , and then , there being no freehold to




the said remainder would be void , and Savage seised in fee as before .
THE COURT HELD , that no use could result to Savage during his
life , and therefore the remainder to the heirs male was void , and Savage
seised in fe
e
. And their reasons were , because the limitations to himself
for 99 years and to the trustees for 25 years , and the heirs male were
new uses , and new estates . As if a man , b
y
lease and release , or b
y
covenant to stand seised , limit the use to himself for life , or in tail ,
these are new estates and not parcel of the old estate , according to
Englefield ' s Case , y Coke 13b . And where in such case upon a con
veyance such uses are limited , as ( supposing the limitations to be good ) ,
would pass the whole estate , there no use will result contrary to the
express limitations o
f
the party . But if the limitations are void , the
conveyance o
f necessity will fail . If a man seised in fee convey his
estate b
y
lease and release to the use o
f
himself for life , remainder
to trustees for lives , remainder to the heirs o
f
h
is body , he hath an estate
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tail in him ; but he is but tenant for life in possession ; otherwise if
there had been no intermediate estate in the trustees for their lives .
And in the former case , if a man makes a feoffment, it is no discon
tinuance, but only divests the estate . And for the same reason in this
case , where the first limitation is only for years , the remainder to the
heirs of the body of the tenant for years is a contingent remainder , and
void . These are the reasons of Chief Justice HOLT.
POWELL , justice , said , that there was a difference , where the limita
tion was upon a covenant to stand seised , and where upon a lease and
release . For where the limitations are to take effect out of the estate
of the covenantor , there if the limitations were such as could not take
effect immediately , or not till after the death of the covenator , as in
the case of Pybus v. Midford , 2 Lev. 75 , there the law may mould the
estate remaining in the covenantor into an estate for life ; but that
cannot be where the limitations are to take effect out of the estate of
the trustees , for want of a limitation , much less against an express
limitation . And therefore (by him ) if there had been an express limit
ation in the case of Pybus v. Midford , limited to the convenantor , the
judgment would have been otherwise . And for these reasons , the whole
court ordered last hilary term , that judgment should be entered for
the plaintiff , unless cause should be shown to the contrary by the first
day of this term . * * *
In accord with this decision is Rawley v. Holland ( 1712 ) , 22 Vin . Abr .
187 , pl. 11 . These cases have been doubted by Mr. Sergeant Hill and Mr.
Sanders ( 1 Sanders Uses 142, 143 ; 148 , 5th ed . ) , and denied by Mr. Butler
to be law (note y to Fearne Cont . Rem . p. 41 ) , and Mr. Preston lays down
a doctrine opposed to these cases ( 1 Prest. Abst . 114 , 130 , 131 ) . Sir Edward
Sugden defends these decisions (Sugden 's Gilbert on Uses and Trusts 35 ,
note ) ; and , in the opinion of Mr. Williams, has sufficiently answered Mr.
Butler 's objections (Williams on Real Prop . 17th ed . p . 457 , note i ) . Prof.
Gray considers these cases substantially overruled by Gore v . Gore , post 263,
and believes that if brought directly in question they would be expressly
overruled . See Gray on Perpetuities $$ 59, 60.
" It is well settled that if a future limitation can be a remainder it must
be so construed , and not as a springing use ; but it is a very different thing
to say that a good springing use must be construed into a bad remainder
because it is preceded by an estate which is insufficient to support a re
mainder . To construe a limitation as a remainder if it can be a remainder
is one thing ; but to insist upon construing it as a remainder when it cannot
be a remainder , seems to be the very wantonness of destruction . " Gray's
Rule against Perpetuities , $59 .
FABER v. POLICE in S. Car . S . Ct., 1877 — 10 S . Car . 376 , Tied . R . C. 367.
Action by John L . Faber against J . G . Police to recover damages for




The defense was that the plaintiff ' s title was defective . Plaintiff ' s
father devised the land to trustees " in trust to and for the use , benefit ,
and behoof of my so




life , and then “ in trust to and
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for the lawful issue of my said son living at the time of his death :
* * * and should my said son die without leaving lawfully begotten
issue , living at the time of hi
s
death , * * * then unto my residu
ary devisees and legatees , their heirs and assigns forever . ” After the
death o
f







seisin to another who deeded it back the next day , after
which plaintiff deeded it to his mother , through whom he claims title
a
s her sole heir .
McIVER , A . J . * * * The appellant contends that the estate lim
ited to the issue o
f
John Lewis Faber is vested and not a contingent re




feoffment and livery o
f
seisin * * * It is very clear , from the lan
guage used , that the testator did not intend that the issue should take
the estate in remainder absolutely and a
t
all events , but only on a con
tingency — that of their surviving their father ; and it is equally clear
that he did not intend that the residuary legatees and devisees should
take the estate in remainder absolutely and a
t all events , but only on a
contingency — that of the son dying without issue living at the time
o
f
his death . * * * A vested remainder is one which is limited
to an ascertained person in being , whose right to the estate is fixed
and certain , and does not depend upon the happening o
f any future
event , but whose enjoyment in possession is postponed to some future
time . A contingent remainder on the other hand is one which is limited
to a person not in being or not ascertained ; or if limited to an ascer
tained person , it is so limited that his right to the estate depends upon
some contingency in the future ; so that the most marked difference be
tween the two kinds o
f
remainders is that in the one case the right to the
estate is fixed , though the right to the possession is deferred to some
future period ; while in the other the right to the estate as well as the
right to the possession o
f
such estate is not only deferred to a future
period , but is dependent upon the happening of some future contingency .
* * * These estates , as well the particular estate for the life of John
Lewis Faber as the estate in remainder to his issue , and in default o
f
such issue to the residuary legatees and devisees , passed out of the
testator at the time of his death - the time when his will , the instru
ment b
y
which the estates were created , speaks . Then it was that these
estates were created , and to that point of time must we look to determine
their character . It is very clear that a
t
that time it was wholly uncertain
who would be the persons to take at the termination o
f
the particular
estate . The life tenant then had no issue , and it was o
f
course uncertain
whether he would ever have any ; and a
s
to the issue which he has subse
quently had it is yet uncertain whether any o
f
them will be living a
t
his
death ; and the same uncertainty exists a
s
to whether the residuary lega
tees and devisees will ever have a right to take . * * *
Hence the remainders are contingent . If so , then it necessarily fol
lows , upon the authority of Redfern v . Middleton , Rice ( S . Car . ) 459 ,
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in which the court of errors adopted the reasoning of Chancellor Harper
in his decree in Dehon v. Redfern , Dud . 115 , that the contingent remain
ders to the issue of John Lewis Faber , and in default of such issue to
the residuary legatees and devisees , were barred by the deed of feoff
ment and livery of seisin to Folker. * * *
But, second , it is argued by the appellant that, even if the remainders
be construed to be contingent and not vested , yet the deed of feoffment
and livery of seisin could not bar such remainders, because the legal
estate was vested in the trustees. This proposition might be admitted
if it were true that the legal estate was in the trustees . It becomes
necessary , therefore , to consider that question . The rule undoubtedly ,
is that where there is a conveyance to one for the use of another , and
the trustee is charged with no duty which renders it necessary that the
legal estate should remain in him to enable him properly to perform
such duty , the statute of uses executes the use and carries the legal title
to the cestui que use. By the terms of the will under consideration it
does not appear that the trustees are charged with any duty whatever .
* The other justices concurred .
Affirmed .
Statute of New York , Mich ., & c . "No expectant estate can be defeated or
barred by any alienation , or other act of the owner of the intermediate or
precedent estate , nor by any destruction of such precedent estate by disseizin ,
forfeiture , surrender, merger , or otherwise .” N . Y . R . S. ( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c . 1,
t . 2, Art . 1, 8 32; Mich . R . S . ( 1838 ) , pt. 2, t. 1, § 84 , C. L . (1897 ) , § 8814 ;
Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $ 32 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , § 3221 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c . 56 ,
$ 32, St. (1898 ) , § 2056 .
" No remainder , valid in its creation , shall be defeated by the determina
tion of the precedent estate , before the happening of the contingency on
which the remainder is limited to take effect ; but should such contingency
afterwards happen , the remainder shall take effect , in the same manner
and to the same extent , as if the precedent estate had continued to the
same period . " N . Y . R . S. (1828 ) , pt. 2, c. 1, t. 2, Art . 1, $34 ; Mich . R . S.
(1846 ) , c. 62 , $34, C . L . ( 1897 ) , $8816 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , 834 , R . L .
(1905 ) , 83223 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c . 56, 834 , St . ( 1898 ) , $2058 .
What are Contingent ?
BORASTON 'S CASE , in Queen 's Bench , Hilary , 29 Eliz ., A . D. 1587 ,43
Coke 19a , 25 Eng . Rul. Cas. 579 . Abridged from Coke .
Ejectione firmæ by Richard Hynde against William Ambrye . Plea,
not guilty . The jury gave a special verdict finding that Thos . Boraston ,
seised of the lands in fee , and having issue two sons, Humphrey the
elder having a daughter Constance , and Henry the younger (who had a
son Hugh ) , made his will in writing, Aug. 12 , 1559, by which he de
vised the lands in these words : “ Item , I give to Thomas Amery and
Amphillis his wife, all that my upper part of my close called Reading ,
for eight years next after my decease ; * * * And after the said
term of eight years , the said upper part to remain to my executors until
such time as Hugh Boraston shall accomplish his full age of 21 years ,
and the mean profits to be employed by my executors towards the per
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formance of this my last will and testament ; and when the said Hugh
shall accomplish his age of 21 years , then I will he shall enjoy the said
upper part , to him and his heirs for ever.” The testator died Aug . 14 ,
1559 . Hugh died when nine years old . After the expiration of the
terms of Thomas Amery and wife and to the executors , Philip Boraston
entered on the lands as brother and heir of Hugh , and leased them to
William Ambrye , defendant herein ; on whom Thomas Brand and Con
stance his wife, and William Davies and Margaret his wife , claiming
in right of their wives as daughters and heirs of Humphrey , testator 's
oldest son , entered and leased the lands to the plaintiff herein , by force
whereof he was possessed , till the defendant by command of Philip re
entered . The question referred to the court was whether the entry of
the defendant was lawful .
Counsel for Plaintiff argued that no remainder vested in Hugh till
he attained 21 years of age, and that in the mean time the lands de
scended to the daughters of the eldest son , as general heirs of the devisor ;
and because Hugh never attained his age of 21, the land never vested in
him , but remained in the general heirs ; for by the words of the will he
should not have it till his said age . So it appears that the devise to
Hugh depends on the contingency of his attaining his age, and whether
he would ever attain it no man could know .
It was also said , that when a particular estate which doth support a re
mainder may determine before the remainder can begin , there the
remainder shall not presently vest , but shall depend in contingency ; as if
one makes a lease to J . S. for his life , and after the death of J . D. to re
main to another in fee , this remainder doth depend in contingency ; for
if J . S. dies before J . D . the particular estate is determined before the
remainder can begin . So and on the same reason it was adjudged in
Colthirst v. Bejushin [ reported ante p. - ] A lease is made to one
for life , remainder to the right heirs of J . S., this remainder is good
upon a contingent , that is to say if the lessee survives J . S., otherwise
not. So, and for the like reason , if a man having a son of the age of nine
years, makes a lease until his son shall attain his full age, and after
he shall attain his full age , that it shall remain over to another in fee ,
nothing presently vests in him in remainder , which was granted by the
whole court. And it was said by the plaintiff 's counsel , that such re
mainder is utterly void , and ye
t
it may take effect ; for , in as much as
the remainder ought to pass out o
f
the lessor presently , either to him
in remainder , or to be in abeyance and custody of the law , and a free
hold cannot in such case be in abeyance , for this cause the remainder is
utterly void ; as if a man makes a lease to A for 21 years if B shall live
so long , and after the death of B that it shall remain over in fe
e , this
remainder over is void . So if a lease for years be made , the remainder
to the right heirs o
f
J . S . , this remainder is void ; which was granted
b
y
the whole court . Also it was said , that when a remainder is limited





ct , which act will be the determination
o
f
the particular estate , yet if the act depends on a casualty and mere
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uncertainty whether it will ever happen or not, there also the remainder
doth depend in contingency , and shall not presently vest : as if A
makes a feoffment to the use of B till C come from Rome to England ,
and after such return to remain over in fee , this remainder doth depend
in contingency , for it is uncertain whether C will ever return ; which
was granted by the whole court . And so it was concluded by plaintiff 's
counsel , that for al
l
these causes judgment ought to be given for the
plaintiff .
Defendant ' s Counsel conceived the remainder vested in Hugh presently




death without issue , the land de
scended to Philip his brother , who leased to the defendant . It was said
that although Hugh died before his full age , yet the interest and term
o
f
the executors did not cease ; and their reason was , because in wills the
intent o
f
the devisor is to be considered , and when he deviseth his lands
to his executors till Hugh his son shall come to his full age , for pay
ments o
f
his debts , and to perform his will , it is to be intended that he
hath computed that the profits to be taken of his lands during the
minority o
f
his son , would suffice to pay his debts and perform his will ,





for then the means which he had prescribed to satisfy his debts and
perform his will would be defeated , and b
y consequence his debts would
remain unsatisfied and his will unperformed ; and therefore this case o
f
a devise doth differ from a lease o
r
a grant made in like manner . For
the devisor is intended to be without counsel , and therefore the law will
b





f good advice , makes his will in a disordered manner , and in barbarous
and unfit words , the law in such case will reduce his words which want
order into good order , and sentence his unfit words to words sufficient
in law , according to his intent which appears b
y
his own words , as
was adjudged in Wellock v . Hammond , [ reported ante p . , which
Coke here states at considerable length . ] Upon which it was concluded
b
y
defendant ' s counsel , that the executors had a good term for 12 years ,
which was not determined b
y
the death of Hugh ; which was granted b
y





side was well agreed , that the remainder ought to commence in pos
session when the particular estate ends , as well in wills as in grants ;
but that doth not concern the case a
t
bar ; for here , in as much a
s
the
term did not end b
y
the death o





the term . As to the uncertainty , it was said , that
the case a
t
bar is no other in effect , but that a man devises his lands
to his executors for the payment o
f
his debts , until his son shall or
should have come to his age o
f
2
1 years , the remainder to his son in
fe
e
: for although these are adverbs of time , when , & c . , and then , & c . ,
yet they d
o not amount to make anything precede the settling o
f
the
remainder . A man leases land for life or years , and after the decease
o
f
the lessee , or the term ended , the remainder to another , yet it shall
remain presently ; for when these adverbs refer to a thing , which must
to h
is
eneve to his age o
f
1 . 9 ti , ,
& c . ,and then the
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of necessity happen , there they make no contingency : and it is certain
that every man must die, and every term end . So that these adverbs
then and when in our case , are demonstrations of the time when the re
mainder to Hugh shall take effect, in possession , as in the said cases of a
lease for life and a lease for years, and not when the remainder shall
vest ; which was granted by the whole court. And judgment was given





















NAPPER V . SANDERS , in Common Bench , 7 Car . 1 , A . D . 1632 . — Hutton
118 , 5 Gray ' s P . C . 48 . - - Abridged .
Ejectione firmae against Henry Sanders , by Robert Napper , as lessee
by indenture o
f
Francis Sanders , John Napper , and Elizabeth , John ' s
wife . · Plea , not guilty . On special verdict the case was , that , one seised
in fee of the land in question , made feoffment of it to the use of herself
for life , then to the use o
f
the feoffees for 80 years if Nicholas Sanders
and Elizabeth his wife should so long live , and if Elizabeth survive
Nicholas , then to her use for life , and after her death to the use o
f
Posthumous Sanders her son in tail , and for default o
f
such issue to the
use o
f
Francis and John ' s wife in tail , remainder to the heirs of the
feoffor . The feoffor died , the feoffees entered , Elizabeth Sanders died
(Nicholas yet living ) , Posthumus died without issue , Francis and
John ' s wife entered and were possessed , and defendant entered as son
and heir of the feoffor , and ejected them and the plaintiff ; whence this
action . The sole question was whether the remainders to Posthumus
and plaintiff ' s lessors were vested or contingent .
It was resolved by all the COURT , that the remainders were not con
tingent in the estate for life which was to come to Elizabeth Sanders ,
the wife o
f
said Nicholas , but were vested presently . And it was agreed ,
that the estate for life , if she survive her husband was contingent ; and




limitation of an use , it shall
b
e interposed when the contingent happen ; as in Chudleigh ' s Case
[ante - ] , a feoffment to the use o
f
the feoffor , for life , and after his
death to his first son which shall be afterwards born , for his life , and
so to divers , and afterwards to the use o
f
J . D . in tail , it is resolved that
all the uses limited to persons not in esse are contingent , but the uses to
persons in esse vest presently , and yet these contingent uses when they .
happen vest by interposition , if the first estate for life which ought to
support them b
e
not disturbed . And in this case it was a good estate
for life in Margaret [ the feoffor ] , and then gives the remain in the
feoffees for eighty years , if Nicholas and Elizabeth Sanders so long
should live , and if Elizabeth survive Nicholas , then to Elizabeth for her
life , and after her decease to Posthumus in tail , and after his decease
to the said three daughters in tail , so that there the estate for years de
termines upon the death of Elizabeth , and so also the estate for the
life of Elizabeth , which was contingent , determines b
y
her death . [After
citing and admitting Lord Derby ' s Case Litt . Rep . 370 ; Boraston ' s Case ,
feoffees
fö
r Margaret [ th
e
f dt .And in t
i
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ante — , and others , and distinguishing Colthirst v. Bejushin , ante — ,
the report proceeds . ) And after argument at bar, this term ( it being
before that the LORD RICHARDSON was there , who was of the same
opinion ) we all concurred , and judgment was entered for the plaintiff .
EDWARDS v. HAMMOND , in Common Pleas , 35 Car . 2. - A . D . 1683 . - 3
Lev . 132 , 1 B . & P . N. R . 324n ., 2 Danv. 16 , pl. 12 , 5 Gray P . C. 52.
Ejectment, upon not guilty and special verdict , the case was ; a copy
holder of lands, borough English , surrendered to the use of his eldest
son and his heirs , if he live to the age of 21 years , provided and upon
condition , that if he die before 21 , that then it shall remain to the
surrenderer and his heirs . The surrenderer died, the youngest son en
tered , and the eldest son being 17 brought ejectment. And the sole
question was whether the devise to the eldest son be upon condition
precedent, or if the condition be subsequent, viz ., that the estate in fee
shall vest immediately upon the death of the father , to be divested if
he die before 21 . For the defendant it was argued , that the con
dition was precedent , and that the estate should descend to the youngest
son in the mean time ; and so the eldest son has no title now , being
no more than 17 . On the other side it was argued , and so agreed by the
COURT , that though by the first words this may seem to be a condition
precedent, yet , taking al
l
the words together , this was not a condition
precedent , but a present devise to the eldest son , subject to and defeasible
b
y




they resembled this to the case o
f Springe v . Caesar , reported b
y
W .
Jones 389 , and abridged b
y
Rolle , 1 Abr . 415 , nu . 12 : A fine to the
use o
f
B and his heirs if C pays him 20s . upon Sept . 10 ; and , if C pays ,
to the use o
f
B for life , remainder to C and his heirs , where the word
si does not create a condition precedent , but the estate in fee vests pres
ently in C , to be divested b
y payment afterwards . So here . Accord
ingly this case was adjudged in Mich . term next following .
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Without Prior Particular Estate .
ANON . , 30 Hen . VIII , A . D . 1540 . — Brooke Abr . t . Feoffments a
l
Uses 50 .











A in S shall be seized o
f
it to the use o
f
the said B and
his heirs , then if A make a feoffment o
f his land in S , and then B
enfeoff A o
f
the said three acres o





seized to the use o
f




the use ; for the land is and was bound b
y
the aforesaid use , into
whosesoever hands it might come , and it is not like the case where the
feoffee to uses sells the land to one who has no notice o
f
the first use ;
for in the first -mentioned case the use had no existence until the feoff
ment o
f
the three acres was made , and then the use commenced .








ASSABY v . LADY ANNE MANNERS , in King ' s Bench , 32 Henry VIII , 1541
- 2 Dyer , 235a .
Memorandum that before the statute of 27 Hen . 8 [ c . 10 ) , A was
seized o
f land in fee , and in consideration of a marriage to be had
between his daughter (and heir apparent ) and B , the son and heir
apparent o
f
C , he covenanted and agreed by indenture with C , that he
himself would have , hold , and retain , the land to himself and the
profits of it during his life , and that after his decease the said son and
daughter should have the land , to them and the heirs o
f
their two bodies ,
and that a




the land should stand
and be seized immediately after the marriage solemnized to the use o
f
said A for term o
f
his life , and after his death to use o
f
said son and
daughter in tail as above , and covenanted further to make an assurance
o
f
the land before a certain , accordingly , & c . And then the mar
riage took effect ; and afterwards A bargained and sold the land for 200
marks ( of which not a penny is paid ) to a stranger , who has notice
o
f
the first covenants and use , and enfeoffed divers persons to this last
use , against whom a common recovery was had to this last use ; and
also A levied a fine to the recoverers before any execution had ; and
notwithstanding al
l
these things A continued in possession in taking
the profits during life , and afterwards died . And the son and daughter
entered and made a feoffment to their use . And all this matter was
found in assize b
y Assaby and others against Lady Anne Manners in
the eighth year o
f Henry 8 b
y
a special verdict . And judgment was
given upon great deliberation in the exchequer chamber , b
y
FINEUX and
MOORE , then justices o
f
assize in Surrey , that the entry and feoffment
were good , and the use changed b
y
the first indenture and agreement .
Yet , 32 Henry 8 , error was brought in the king ' s bench upon this judg
ment , and the error assigned in point o
f judgment , s . because no use
was changed out o
f
A by the first indenture and agreement . But noth
ing came o
f
it ; yet the case was well argued there again ; and BROMLEY
and HALES were o
f
counsel with the plaintiff in error , and divers defects
were moved to the form o
f














MUTTON ' S CASE , in Common Pleas , Hilary , 14 Eliz . , A . D . 1572 . - Moor
9
6 , 1 And . C . P . 42 , p
l
. 106 , Dyer 274 .
Jane Mutton brought a writ o
f entry against Anne Mutton , who
pleaded in bar that John Mutton , the father of the said Jane , was
seised o
f
the lands in question , and 1 & 2 Phil . & Mary , levied a fine of
them to the use o
f
himself and the woman he should afterwards marry ,
and after their death to the use o
f
said Jane and the heirs o
f
her body ;





descent , without any right in possession , entered
o
n said Anne , who re -entered , for which re -entry Jane conceived this
action . Jane demurred to the plea . The case was argued b
y
Jeoffreys
for the plaintiff and Mead for the defendant ; and the only question in
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the case was whether by the limitation of the use to the woman he
should afterwards marry , Anne obtained a jointure with John , or was the
limitation of the use and estate on this void , for want of a woman in being
at the time of the limitation . It was argued on both parts that such an
estate limited in possession would be wholly void . But by the limitation
of the use in the present case , MANWOOD, MOUNSON , and HARPER , JJ.,
in their arguments held clearly that the law is otherwise , and that the




7 Eliz . in the common bench openly .
With this agree the opinions o
f
three justices in 6 Edw . 6 , Brooke ,
feoffments to uses 30 ; and 38 Hen . 8 , Brooke Assurances ; and the case
between Newis and Lark in Plowden ' s Com . [ante p - ) and the case
o
f petition by Basset v . the Queen , 4 Mary , Dyer ( 133a , 136al ; and
1
5 Eliz . , in ejectione firmæ b
y Huddy v . Gilbert .
Before this time the estate was in several cases held not to be joint . A
feoffment was made to the use of a man and woman and the heirs of their
two bodies , afterwards they inter -married , then the statute of uses was
passed , vesting the estate in them as they had the use ; and held that they
were not joint - tenants , and the wife surviving was entitled to a moiety only ;
though the statute vested the possession in them at the same time , when
they were husband and wife . Bedyll v . Holstoke ( T . 3 & 4 Ph . & Mary ,
A . D . 1556 ) ; Fuljambe v . Lyndacre ( 4 & 5 Ph . & Mary ) ; and Morgan v .
Wharton ( E . 8 Eliz . , A . D . 1566 , in Com . Bench ) ; all reported in 2 Dyer
149b , and one in 1 And . 303 .
ANONYMOUS , in Common Pleas , Mich . 24 Eliz . , A . D . 1582 . - Moor 177 .
MEAD and PERRIAM , JJ . , affirmed that it was adjudged in the time
o
f
Lord Dyer , that if lands are devised to two men and to the child
with which the wife o
f
the devisor is enceinte that this devise is good ;
and the child shall take b
y
the devise ; but if he should take in common
o
r
in jointure the LORD DYER doubted .
HINDE & LYON ' S CASE , in Common Pleas , Mich . , 19 Eliz . , A . D . 1587 .
3 Leonard 64 .
In debt b
y
Hinde against one as the son and heir o
f Sir John Lyon ;
who pleaded : nothing b
y
descent but the third part if the manor o
f
D . The plaintiff replied : assets ; and showed for assets that the defend




descent ; upon which they were a
t
issue . And it was given in evidence to the jury , that the said manor
was holden b
y knight -service , and that the said Sir John , the ancestor ,
o
f
& c . , b
y
his will in writing [ * 65 ] devised the whole manor to his wife ,











4 years his wife should have
the third part o
f
the said manor for her life , and his son should have
the residue ; and if that his said son d
o
die before h




4 years without heir o
f
his body , that the land should remain




4 years . The question was if the son had a
n
estate in tail , for then
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for two parts he was not in by descent. And it seemed to DYER [ C . J . ]
and ManWOOD J . ] that here was not any estate tail ; for no tail shall
arise if not that the son die before his said age, and therefore the tail
shall never take effect ; and the fee simple doth descend and remain in
the son , unless that he dieth before the age of 24 years ; and then the
estate vests with the remainder over. But now , having attained to the
said age, he hath the fee , and that by descent, of the entire manor ;
and then his plea is false , that but the third part descended . And that
a general judgment shall be given against him as of his own debt. *
YELVERTON v. YELVERTON , in Queen 's Bench , Trinity term , 37 Eliz .,
A . D. 1595 . - Cro . Eliz . 401.
Upon demurrer the case was , the father covenanted by indenture in
consideration of natural affection , to stand seized of all his lands which
he afterwards should purchase , to the use of himself for life , and after
to his youngest son and his heirs ; afterwards he purchased land and
died ; and whether the eldest or youngest son should have it was the
question . Bacon argued for the youngest son , that he should have it,
for this covenant shows his intent expressly , and is to work in futuro ;
and therefore good enough : as if a man deviseth lands which he hath
not , and after purchaseth them . So if one covenants that he will pur
chase lands before Michaelmas , and that before Easter following he will
levy a fine of these lands which shall be to such uses, and he levies a fine ,
and doth not limit any uses , it shall be according to the covenant before
the purchase : quod fuit concessum per CURIAM , for they shall be as
uses declared upon that fine whereof he showed his intent before . But
in the principal case the court held , that this covenant vests nothing in
the younger son ; and is not sufficient to vest any use in him of this
land ; for a man cannot by a covenant raise an use out of land which
he hath not ; for no more than a man may charge, let, or grant a thing
which he hath not, no more may he limit an use out of land which he
hath not. Also , upon every feoffment or purchase , the feoffor or donor ,
from whom the land passeth , is to limit the uses to the feoffee or pur
chaser ; then before the purchase one cannot limit how the use shall be ,
v
iz . , that it shall be to his youngest son , where the feoffor hath limited
it to the use o
f





use , which the law will not suffer . Therefore judgment was given
accordingly for the eldest son . And here a case was cited in 20 Eliz . ;
but neither the name nor in what court was mentioned , that a mortgagor
entreated a stranger to redeem the land a
t
the day , and covenanted b
y
indenture that after such redemption the stranger should have the land
to him and his heirs and that he in consideration o
f
such a sum would
stand seized to the use o
f
him and his heirs ; the stranger redeems the
land a
t
the day , the mortgagor enters , the deed is enrolled within the
six months ; yet ruled that nothing passed , because he had not any estate
o
r
interest therein at that time to contract for it .
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WOODLIFF v. DRURY , in B . R ., 37 & 38 Eliz ., A . D . 1597 . - Cro . Eliz . 439 .
Trespass. After verdict , Coke , Att . Gen ., moved in arrest of judg
ment. The case on the pleadings was , that one made a feoffment, and it
was declared in the indenture that it was to the use of himself and
A , his feme that should be , after their marriage , and of the heirs of
their bodies ; and he took A to feme. Whether she should take by the
limitation of this use was the question . And he moved that she
should not : for presently by this feoffment the fee is in the baron by
the possession , executed to the use which he had before the marriage ;
which cannot after the marriage be divided and made an estate tail in
him ; for he had the fee in him until the marriage ; for it might have
been that the marriage had never taken effect, and that would have con
founded the other use ; and uses in futuro shall not rise on such
future acts ; for then an use should rise out of an use . [ Tyrrels Case ]
Dyer 155 .
But All the Justices held , that although he be seised in fee in the
meantime , as in truth he is ; yet by the marriage the new use shall
arise and vest, if there be no act in the meantime to destroy that future
use (as it was in Chudleigh 's Case ,) according to the limitation of the
use . And judgment was given accordingly for the plaintiff .
PAY 'S CASE , in Queen 's Bench , Easter, 44 Eliz ., A . D . 1602. - Cro . Eliz . 878 .
Upon a special verdict the case was , that one devised his land to J .
S . from Michaelmas following for five years , remainder after to the
plaintiff and his heirs . He ſtestator ] died before Michaelmas : The
question was whether this were a good remainder, because it could not
enure instantly by his death . For it may not begin until the par
ticular estate , which is not to begin till after Michaelmas , and a free
hold cannot be in expectancy . But ALL THE COURT held , that it very
well might expect ; for in case of a devise , the freehold in the mean
time shall descend to the heir , and vest in him . Wherefore , without
argument , it was adjudged accordingly , and that the remainder was
good .
HOPKINS v. HOPKINS , in Court of Chancery , 1734 . Cas. Tem . Talb . 44 ,
5 Gray ' s P . C . 168, Gate 's Cas . R . P . 221 .
The testator, Mr. Hopkins, by his will, devises his real estate to trus
tees and their heirs, to the use of them and their heirs, in trust for
Samuel Hopkins ( the plaintiff 's only son , which plaintiff is heir at law
to the testator ) for life ; and from and after his decease , in trust for the
first and every other son of the body of the said Samuel , lawfully to be
begotten , and the heirs male of the body of every such son ; and for want
of such issue , in case the said John Hopkins , the plaintiff , should have
any other son or sons of his body lawfully begotten , then in trust for
all and every such son and sons respectively and successively , fo
r
their
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respective lives , with remainders over , then in trust for the first and every
other son of his cousin Anne Dare (wife of Francis Dare ) lawfully to
be begotten , with like remainders to the heirs male of the body of
every such son of the said Anne Dare ; and for default of such issue ,
then in trust for his own right heirs forever .
Samuel Hopkins died in the testator 's lifetime, without issue ; and
some time after , the testator died without any alteration made of his
will ; nor had John Hopkins any other son ; nor were any of the other
remaindermen in esse at the testator' s death , except Dare , son of
Anne Dare .
The cause was first heard at the rolls , and there decreed to be an
executory devise .
TALBOT, Lord Ch . Two questions have been made upon this will :
The first is, whether this limitation to the first and every other son of
John Hopkins can now take effect as an executory devise ? or whether it
shall be taken as a contingent remainder , and consequently void for
want of a particular estate to support it, by reason of Samuel 's death in
the testator 's lifetime, and that John Hopkins had no son in esse at
the testator's death , in whom the remainder might vest ? The next
question is , in case the limitation be taken as an executory devise , what
is to become of the rents and profits of this estate until John Hopkins
has a son ? As to the first, I think it impossible to cite any authorities
in point. None have been cited . It seems to be allowed , that if things
had stood at the testator 's death as they did at the time of the making
of the will , the limitation in question would have been a remainder ,
by reason of Samuel's estate , which would have supported it . So is
the case of Purefoy v . Rogers , 2 Saund . 380 , 388 , and limitations of this
kind are never construed to be executory devises but where they cannot
take effect as remainders . So on the other hand , it is likewise clear , that
had there been no such limitation to Samuel and his sons , the limitation
must have been a good executory devise , there being no antecedent estate
to support it ; and consequently not able to inure as a remainder ; so
that it must be the intervening accident of Samuel 's death in the testa
tor 's lifetime, upon which this point must depend. And as to that , I
am of opinion that the time of making the will is principally to be re
garded in respect to the testator's intent . If an infant or feme covert make
a will , and do not act either at full age or after the coverture determined ,
to revoke this will, yet the will is void , because the time of making is
principally to be considered ; and the law judges them incapable of dispos
ing by will at those times. The same reason holds in the case of a devise
of a
ll






his death , no
after -purchased lands shall pass without a republication , which was the
case o
f Bunter v . Cook , 1 Salk . 237 , because the time of the will made
is chiefly to b
e regarded . Indeed it is possible that subsequent things
may happen to alter the testator ' s intent ; but unless that alteration be




his private intent , not manifested








y any revocation o
f
the former ; though these subsequent accidents may
and must , in many cases , have an operation upon the will ; as in the case
o
f
Fuller v . Fuller , Cro . Eliz . 422 , [ante – ] , and Hutton v . Simp
son , 2 Vern . 722 . And in the Lord Landsdown ' s Case , 10 Mod . 96 , the




time , but b
y
the inter
vening alteration of things between the time o
f
the will made and the
testator ' s death ; and the words there , for want of such issue , were not
construed to create another estate tail to postpone the limitation , but
only to convert the second estate to the precedent limitation . So we
see , that in these cases the method o
f
the courts is not to set aside the
intent because it cannot take effect so fully as the testator desired ; but
to le
t
it work as far as it can . And if , in this case , we consider it as an
executory devise , the intent will be served in case John Hopkins has
a second son ; but if it is taken as a remainder , the intent plainly ap
pearing that a second son of John Hopkins should take , is quite de
stroyed ; there being no precedent estate to support it a
s
a remainder .
The very being o
f executory devises shows a strong inclination , both in
the courts of law and equity , to support the testator ' s intent (Doe v .
Fonnereau , 2 Doug . 487 ) as far as possible ; and though they be not
o
f
ancient date , yet they are of the same nature with springing uses ,
which are as old a
s
uses themselves . I can see no difference between
this case and the others o
f
like nature , that have been adjudged . And
if such a construction may be made consistently with the rules of law ,
and agreeable to the testator ' s intent , it would be very hard not to suffer
it to prevail . In Pay ' s Case , Cro . Eliz . 878 [ante p . ) , had the testator
lived to Michaelmas , the limitation had been a remainder ; and if a re
mainder in its first creation does , b
y
any subsequent accident , become
a
n executory devise , why should it not be good here , upon the authority
o
f
that case , where by the testator ' s death before Michaelmas , what
would otherwise have been a remainder , was held to be good by way of
executory devise ? I think , that in this case the limitation would
operate as an executory devise , if it was of a legal estate ; and therefore
shall do so as a trust , the rules being the same .
The next question is , what is to become of the rents and profits , in
case this be taken to be an executory devise , until the birth o
f
a son
to John Hopkins ? * * * Until somebody is in esse to take under this
executory devise , the rents and profits must be looked upon as a residue
undisposed o
f , and consequently must descend upon the heir - at -law ;
the case being the same where the whole legal estate is given to the
trustees , and but part o
f
the trust disposed o
f , as in this case ; and where
but part of the legal estate is given away , and so the residue undisposed
o
f , the legal estate descends upon the heir - a
t
- law . So it was held by
the Lord King in the case o
f
Lord and Lady Hertford v . Lord Weymouth
— which shows that equity follows the law .
One objection indeed has been made , which is , that the testator hav
ing in this case devised another estate to John Hopkins , his heir - at -law ,
can never b
e supposed to have intended him this surplus . And to war
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rant that objection , the case of North v. Crompton , 1 Ch . Cas . 196 ,
has been cited . I answer , that in these cases the heir does not take
by reason of the testator 's intent being one way or the other ; but the
law throws it upon him : and wherever the testator has not disposed
(be his intent that the heir should take or not take ) , yet still he shall
take, for somebody must take ; and none being appointed by the testator,
the law , throws it upon the heir . * * * Decree affirmed .
GORHAM v. DANIELS , in Vermont Sup . Ct. June, 1851. - 23 Vt. 600 .
Trespass quare clausum fregit. Amaziah Richmond , being well seised
in fee of the land in dispute, made a deed "meaning to convey one half
of the above described land , * * * and the other half not to come
into possession of it not till after my decease, Amaziah Richmond ' s and
Sarah Richmond ' s decease ; it is meant to convey the whole of the above
land after the decease of Amaziah Richmond and Sarah Richmond .”
The consideration expressed was $ 750 . The grantee was the son of
Amaziah and Sarah , went into possession on execution of the deed , and
later borrowed money and gave a mortgage on the land , which was fore
closed on default , and plaintiff claims under the foreclosure decree .
Plaintiff being in possession , defendants entered , claiming under Sarah ,
widow of the grantor . It was agreed that if Sarah then had title or
right of entry , defendant should recover costs ; otherwise judgment
should be for plaintiff for $ 8 .00 damages and costs . The county court
gave judgment fo
r plaintiff and defendant excepts .
REDFIELD , J . This case has been twice argued , and mainly upon
the question how far the statute of Henry 8 of England , called the
Statute o
f
Uses , is to be considered in force in this state . It seems to
me very much to be regretted , that so important a question should have
come to a final determination in a case so utterly insignificant in
pecuniary consequence . But I have given my best attention to the
subject , during the two arguments , and notwithstanding , it seems to be
conceded , that the Statute o
f
Uses is considered in force in most o
f
the other American states , and would answer a good purpose , in many
cases , in effecting , at law , the real intention of the parties , without the
necessity o
f
a resort to a court o
f
equity , and the farther consideration ,
that it is known , that the late Mr . Justice Thompson of the United
States supreme court , while presiding in the circuit court , in this state ,
upon argument , and after a deliberate consideration , in a written opinion
o
f
considerable labor , decided that it was in force here , still I cannot
bring my mind to that conclusion . See 1 Greenlief ' s Cruise , 349 , and
the learned editor ' s elaborate note upon the subject , where the matter
is fully discussed .
But so far as the conveyance o
f
lands , in this state , is concerned , it
seems to me , that our statutes are fully adequate to all the ordinary in
cidents o
f
the subject ; and that in those extraordinary occasions where
the statute o
f uses might answer a good end , it will be safer and better
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every way, to have resort to a court of equity , than to introduce a portion
of the ancient common law system of conveying real estate , most of the
incidents of which have been materially modified , even in England .
Since the separation of this country from that, it would become necessary
immediately to resort to very extensive legislation , in order to render
this addition to our present laws even tolerable. [ *610 ]
This view is certainly confirmed by the history of our jurisprudence
on this subject. Nothing ever existed in the history of this state , calling ,
in the slighest degree , for the use of such a statute , except in those cases ,
where , by some mistake , the parties have failed fully to effect their inten
tion in the prescribed mode . The Statute of Uses would no doubt aid
somewhat this class of cases. But it
s original purpose and design had not




f laws , which will in its train , very likely , draw in the
whole , for the mere purpose of effecting some collateral purpose in a par
ticular cause , seems almost absurd .
We entertain no doubt , that our system o
f conveyancing , so different
from the English , so simple and intelligable to all , and so intended to be ,
by means o
f
a thorough system o
f registry , from the very first , was
designed to be entire in itself . And although most o
f
it
s terms , and
many of its forms of deeds even , like that of bargain and sale , derived
their meaning and operation to some extent , from the common law and
the English statutes , and that o
f
uses among others , yet it was no doubt
the purpose o
f
the framers of our laws upon conveyancing to have them
" understanded ” o
f
the people , without the necessity of resorting to the
study o
f





all , professional or unprofessional , ever since .
With rare exceptions the profession in this state have never supposed
any o
f
the common law modes o
f conveyancing to be regarded as in




r the rights of a married woman b
y
a fine would , I think , strike





estate in fee , to take effect after a particular
estate reserved , as an estate for life , or lives , is not inconsistent with
the law of England . And if it were , it could have no application here ;
for under our statute o
f
conveyancing , there being no livery of seisin
in fact necessary to invest the grantee with the title , but only the seisin
resulting from the due execution and recording o
f
the deed , there is no
objection whatever to the creating o
f
a freehold estate , in terms , to take
effect in future . This has been expressly decided in some of the American
states and we see no valid objection to holding the same under our statute .
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WARDWELL V. BASSETT, in Rhode Island Supreme Ct., March , 1866 . - 8
R . I. 302 .
Trespass and ejectment for possession of land and buildings in Provi
dence . Defendants claim under the deed of Chloe Bassett , habendum
to Amey Bassett and her heirs to her and their sole use and benefit
“ from and after the day of my decease .” Plaintiff claims under the
grantor's will .
BRADLEY , C . J . The question in this case arises upon the con
struction of a quitclaim deed made in the common form under our
practice , with the habendum providing that it shall not take effect till
after the decease of the grantor . This is not an unusual mode of con
veyance in this and other New England states , and is , upon the face of
it, open to the objection of attempting to create an estate in fee in futuro .
It is a duty of the court, of course , to sustain the intention of the parties
if upon any legal grounds it can be sustained . [ * 305 ]
The language of the instrument may be construed as a covenant to
stand seised , as the intention is clear, and as, upon inquiry , we find
that the relations of the parties to this deed are such as to furnish a
sufficient consideration ; for it is admitted in the case , though not upon
the face of the deed , that the grantor was the mother of the husband of
the grantee, by whom he had children . The case of Wallis v. Wallis ,
4 Mass . 135 ; Gale v . Coburn , 18 Pick . 397 ; Bell v . Scammon , 15 N . H .
381 , 41 Am . Dec . 706 , are strictly analogous to this case , upon the
point here decided . See also Byron v . Bradley , 16 Conn . 473 . It is
unnecessary to consider whether the deed could be sustained upon other
grounds . Judgment for the defendant .
FERGUSON v. MASON , in Wisconsin Sup . Ct., April 15 , 1884 , - 60 Wis. 377,
19 N . W . 420 .
Ejectment to recover undivided third interest in land . John Fer
guson , Sr., conveyed the land to defendant by deed “ in consideration
of one dollar and love and affection .” The deed contains the clause :
“ The party of the first part reserves the sole , free , and absolute use and
control of all the above described lands so long as he and his wife , or
either of them , may live.” The grantor and his wife are dead, and the
parties and one Margaret are the only heirs . On the death of her
father , defendant went into possession and entirely excluded the plaintiff .
From judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals.
LYON , J. Laying aside the question of homestead for the present,
it is necessary first to determine whether a conveyance of land by the
owner thereof in fee is valid in which it is stipulated that the grantor
shall have the possession and absolute use and control of the land during
his life .
In very many of the older cases the courts, out of tender regard to the
subtle and technical distinctions and niceties of the common law rules
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respecting the tenure and alienation of real estate , seem to have held
that if such a conveyance be regarded as a feoffment , or bargain and
sale , it could not be upheld . The reason given was that the effect of the
exception or reservation therein contained was to retain the whole
estate in the grantor during his life , and to uphold the conveyance
would be to violate the rule that a freehold cannot thus be created
to commence in futuro . So those sourts upheld such conveyances on
the ground that a covenant might be implied from their terms , on the
part of each grantor , to stand seised of the lands to his own use during
his life , and , after his decease , to the use of the grantee and his heirs .
Hence upon the execution of the deed , the grantor was tenant for life,
and a remainder in fee was vested in the grantee . Thus , those courts
were strictly loyal to the common law rules which grew out of tenures
that never obtained in this country to any great extent , and at the same
time gave judgments which are clearly reasonable and just. Many of
the cases above referred to are cited in the briefs of the respective counsel.
Such conveyances cannot , however, be upheld in this state on any implied
convenant , or on the doctrine that the grantor stands seised to the use
of the grantee , for our statutes long since abolished both implied
covenants and such uses. Rev . St. 1858 , c . 84 , § 1 ; Id . c. 86 , § 5 ; Rev .
St. S $ 2071 , 2204 . But we think they may be upheld on other grounds.
The statutes recognize and define future estates in expectancy as fol
lows : “ A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession
at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate ,
or on the determination , by lapse of time or otherwise of a precedent es
tate created at the same time .” Rev. St. 1858 , c. 83 , § 10 ; Rev . St. 1878 ,
p. 614 , § 2034 . At common law the intervention of a precedent estate ,
created at the same time, was essential to the validity of a conveyance
of an estate of freehold , to commence at a future time, which is an
estate in remainder . It was said that without such precedent estate there
could be no valid remainder . The reason was (and it was conclusive to
the minds of our English ancestors ) that unless a precedent estate was
created there could be no livery of seisin to support the remainder ; and
without livery of seisin , no estate of freehold could be created . After lay
ing down the rule and giving the reasons therefore above suggested ,
Blackstone informs us how the future expectant estate, that is , the
remainder , may be created . He says : “ So , when it is intended to grant
an estate of freehold , whereof the enjoyment shall be deferred till a
future time , it is necessary to create a previous particular estate , which
may subsist till that period of time is completed ; and for the grantor
to deliver immediate possession of the land to the tenant of the particular
estate , which is construed to be giving possession to him in remainder ,
since his estate and that of the particular tenant are one and the same
estate in law . * * * The whole estate passes at once from the grantor
to the grantees , and the remainder man is seised of his remainder at the
same time that the termor is possessed of his term . The enjoyment of
it must, indeed , be deferred till hereafter ; but it is, to al
l
intents and
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purposes , an estate commencing in presenti , though to be occupied and
enjoyed in futuro .” 2 Bl. Com . 165 . But this refined doctrine of the
necessity to create a particular estate to support a freehold estate to
commence at a future time, has been overturned by the statute above
quoted . Similar statutes prevail in a large number of the states of
the Union . These are referred to in 2 Washb . Real Prop . 265 (4th ed .
592 ) .
Conveyances of land containing exceptions or reservations , similar
to that in the conveyance under consideration in the present case , are
very common , and always have been in general use in this country , as
reports of judicial decisions abundantly show . Because of this fact,
some courts, in the absence of statutory provisions on the subject, have
held such conveyances valid , without much regard to any other ground
upon which their judgments might have been placed . This is notably
true of the supreme court of Connecticut . Barrett v . French , 1 Conn .
362 ; Fish v. Sawyer , 11 Conn . 545 ; Bissell v . Grant, 35 Conn . 288 .
Our constitution thus ordains : “ All lands within this state are de
clared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited .” Art. 1, § 14 .
That is to say , the owner of land in this state holds the same of no
superior . He has absolute dominion over it, owing no rent, service , or
fealty to any, on account thereof. His obligation of fealty to the govern .
ment is an obligation arising out of his citizenship , and is no greater or
different because he is a proprietor also . Even the government may not
condemn his land to the public use without paying him a just com
pensation therefor . Why has not the owner of land, held by a tenure
so absolute , the right to convey it on such terms and under such re
strictions as he chooses to impose , so long as he contravenes no public
policy or positive rule of law ? And what policy or rule of law is con
travened , if , instead of making his conveyance take effect immediately ,
he stipulates that it shall take effect at the end of a month , or a year ,
or on the happening of some future event ? We should be strongly in
clined to uphold that right as a necessary incident to allodial tenure ,
were there no statute expressly conferring it . The conclusion is in
evitably , that, if otherwise sufficient , a conveyance of land in fee, to
take effect at a future time, is valid , and will vest the fee in the grantee
according to the terms of the conveyance . * * *
In conclusion it is but just to say that the case was argued by learned
counsel for both parties with great ability , and their learning and re
search have been of much value to us in determining it . The judgment
of the circuit court must be affirmed .
Statute of New York , Mich ., & c. “ A freehold estate as well as a chat
tel real may be created to commence at a future day . " N . Y . R . S.
( 1828 ) , pt . 2, c. 1, t . 2 , Art. 1, § 24 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62 , § 24 , C . L .
( 1897 ) , § 8806 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $ 24 , R . L . (1905 ) , § 3213 ; Wis .
R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56 , § 24 , St . ( 1898 ) , $ 2048 .
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A Fee After A Fee .
ANON ., in Common Bench , Easter , 28 and 29 Hen. 8 . - A. D . 1538. — 1 Dyer
33a .
The custom of London is that a man may devise his purchased lands
in mortmain . And a purchaser devised by his will , that the prior and
convent of St. Bartholomew in West Smithfield and their successors
should have the lands, so as they paid annually to the dean and chapter
of St. Paul sixteen marks ; and if they should fail of payment , that
their estate should cease , and that the said dean and chapter and their
successors should have it. And for a breach of the condition , they of
St. Paul entered . And to FITZHERBERT [ J . ] and BALDWIN ( C . J . ] it
seemed clear, that the condition is void ; for it cannot continue after
the fee -simple given , for the feoffor has determined his right and in
terest , and then the stranger cannot enter for the condition broken , but
the heir may .
In speaking of this case in Gardner v. Sheldon , Vaughn 271, Judge
Vaughn said Baldwin and Fitzherbert were the greatest lawyers of their
age . Fitzherbert was the author of the Abridgment .
In Trinity , 19 Hen . 8, A . D. 1529 , Fitzherbert , J . said : " If a man devise
land to H in fee , and if he die without heir that M shall have the land , this
devise is void as to M ; for a fee-simple cannot depend upon another fee
simple by the law . "
This point was made a question in 2 & 3 Ph . & Mary , A . D. 1553, on a de
vise in fee by a debtor to his sons on condition to pay his debts , devise over
to an uncle on like condition ; and the first devisees failed to pay , and the
second died without payment , and whether his heir could enter for the con
dition broken and make payment ? But no decision reported . Wilford v.
Wilford , Dyer 128a .
ANON ., 6 Edw . 6, A. D. 1553 . — Brooke Abr. t. Feoffments to Uses , pl. 30 .
Note , if a man made a feoffment in fee before the Statute of Tses ,
27 Hen . 8, c. 10 ( or after this statute ), to the use of W and his heirs
till A pav 40£ to W , and then to the use of A and his heirs ; and after
wards the Statute of Uses is passed and executes the estate in W , and
later A pays to W the 40€ ; by the majority , A is seized in fee if he en
ters . It was held by others that A should not be seized in fee by the
said payment unless the feoffees enter. Quære . And the same would
seem to be his right to enter in name of the feoffees and in his own
name; and then one way or the other the entry would be good , and A
would be seized in fe
e
. And also it would seem that a man at this
day may make a feoffment to use , and that the use may change from
one to another by act ex post facto by circumstances as well as before the
Statute o
f
Uses , 27 Hen . 8 , c . 10 .
HARWELL v . LUCAS , Hilary , 14 Eliz . , A . D . 1572 . — Moor 99 , 1 Leon . 264 .
Replevin b
y
Thomas Harwell against William Lucas . Thomas
Bracebridge , seised of the manor o
f
K in Warwick county , made a lease
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for 21 years of six acres of the manor to Thos . Moore without rent , and




acres to John Curtes for 26
years to commence after the first lease expired , rendering certain rent ;
and afterwards he made a feoffment o
f
the manor and all other his lands ,
to the use o
f
the feoffees and their heirs , on condition that if they do not
pay 10 ,000£ . within fifteen days to Thomas Bracebridge or his assigns ,
then they shall b
e
seised to the use o
f
said Thomas and Joyce his wife ,
remainder to Thomas their second son in tail , with divers remainders
over , remainder to the right heirs o
f
said Thomas the father . Livery
was made o
f
the land in possession only , and nothing in the si
x
acres ;
the money was not paid ; and afterwards the first lessee for years at
torned , Thomas S
r
. and wife died , the first lease expired , the second
lessee died , his wife being executor married Lucas , and Harwell the
plaintiff distrained the cattle of Lucas for rent arrear , as bailiff o
f
Thomas Bracebridge the son . The case was argued at bar and bench ,
and at last adjudged for the defendant .
For although they held that the reversion o
f





the manor without attornment , yet they held that
the attornment of the first lessee was sufficient ; and also that although
the use limited to the feoffees and their heirs was determined before the
attornment , yet the attornment was good so as to pass the reversion
to the subsequent contingent use ; and so the title o
f
Thomas Brace
bridge the son to the rent was good , and the conusance o
f
the defendant
his bailiff was sufficient .
This is given by Cruise as the second case o
f
a shifting use decided after
the passage of the Statute of Uses , the first being reported in Brooke Abr .
feoff . al Use pl . 30 , and he adds : “ It is observable that these cases were
prior to that of Chudleigh ( ante - ] so that the doctrine of a possi
bility of entry or scintilla juris was not then established . But since
Chudleigh ' s Case it is settled that all contingent uses must arise out of




f any prior cestui que use . ” 2 Cruise ' s Digest * 356 .
HOE V . GERILS , in B . R . 33 & 34 Eliz . , A . D . 1592 - as stated by Cham
berlaine in argument in Palmer 136 .
One devised to A and his heirs ; proviso that if h
e
die within age that
the remainder to another : Adjudged a good remainder ; for a
s he had
only a limited fee , a contingent fee may depend on it ; but this b
y way o
f
executory devise , not remainder .
SOULLE V . GERRARD , in C . B . , Mich . 38 & 39 Eliz . — A . D . 1597 , Cro . Eliz .
525 . Abridged from Croke .
Ejectione firmae . Upon not guilty pleaded , a special verdict found ,
that Richard Baker seised in fee o
f land held in socage , devised it to his
son Richard and his heirs for ever , and if he died within age o
f
21 or
without issue , then the land should b
e divided equally amongst his three
other sons . The devisor died ; Richard the son had issue Mary , and died
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within age ; the other sons entered , and le
t
it to the plaintiff ; and the
defendant , b
y Mary ' s command , ousted him . Glanville , for the plaintiff ,
argued that o
r
cannot be taken for and ; and that while a remainder
limited after a fee is held void at common law , as in 19 Hen . 8 , p
l
. 8 , and
2
9 Hen . 8 , 1 Dyer 33 , [ ante — ] it might well be under the statute
o







his will and pleasure ; and as a re
mainder may be limited to depend on a fee b
y
act o
f parliament , so it
may by will , which is to be so construed . And this is the opinion of
Monson in [Newis v . Lark & Hunt 2 ] Plowden 413 [ante - ] .
ANDERSON , [ C . J . ) The words of the act of parliament , that " he may
dispose at his will and pleasure , " are not to be construed so largely as has
been said ; but he may dispose a
t
his will and pleasure , so as it be accord
ing to the rules o
f
law , otherwise it is a vain will . And if other con
struction should be made thereof , there would be many absurdities ensue
thereupon . In this case if the limitation had been single , viz . , if he
died without issue , then , & c . , it were plain that it was an estate
tail ; for that shows what heir ought to have it , and explains the former
limitations and is not repugnant thereto . And I conceive that this part
o
f the limitation , “ If he die within age , ” is utterly void ; for a remainder
cannot depend upon a fe
e ; and then it is a
ll
one a
s if the limitation
had been single , " if he die without issue , ” so Richard had an estate
tail , which descended to his daughter , and so the defendant ' s entry was
lawful . Wherefore , & c . [ The opinions of WALMSLEY , BEAUMOND , and
OWEN , JJ . , agreeing with ANDERSON , C . J . , are omitted . ] And it was
adjudged for the defendant .
A fee o
n
a fee by devise was held valid in Wellock v . Hammond ( 1591 ) ,
Cro . Eliz . 204 , ante , , under conditions .
A marginal note in 2 Dyer 127a o
f
an anonymous case in 2
3 Eliz . ( 1581 )
has been cited as the first case of an executory devise . This marginal
note is as follows : " A devises land to his mother for life , and after her
death to B in fee ; provided that if his wife (who was then enceinte ) should
be delivered o
f
a son , that then the lands should remain to him in fee . The
testator died , and a son was born . It was held that this proviso does not
destroy the mother ' s estate but only B ' s . " The student is requested to
compare this with the case of Loddington v . Kime , ante - and Cogan v .
Cogan , ante - , to determine whether it really involves an executory devise
or two alternative remainders in fee . It is further worth observation that
the validity of the gift over against B ' s estate appears not to have been the
question before the court .
Soulle v . Gerrard was effectually and permanently overruled by Pells v .
Brown ( 1620 ) , post –
PLUNKET v . HOLMES , in King ' s Bench , 13 Car . 2 , A . D . 1661 . – 1 Lev . 11 ,
2 , L . Raym . 28 , 1 Sid . 47 , 1 Keb . 29 , 119 , 5 Gray P . C . 50 . Given according
to Levin .
In ejectment , not guilty was pleaded and a special verdict found , o
n
which the case was , a man seised in fee devised the land to his eldest
son Thomas for life , and if h
e
dies without issue living a
t
the time of
his death , to Leonard , another son , and h
is
heirs ; but if Thomas had
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issue living at his death , that then the fee should remain to the right heirs
of Thomas forever . Thomas enters after the devisor 's death , and suffers
a common recovery , under which the defendant claims , and dies without
issue . Two questions were made ; 1, if by the will Thomas had only
a life estate , with a contingent remainder to Leonard , or whether the
fee was vested in Thomas , with an executory devise to Leonard ; 2 , if
it be an executory devise to Leonard , if the common recovery has barred
it. For the plaintiff it was argued , that Thomas had the fe
e , for though
only an estate for life be devised to him , yet b
y
descent the whole fe
e
was in him , which merged his estate for life , and this is executed in him ;
and then the estate to Leonard cannot be any other than an executory
devise ; for when the whole fee is given o
r
vested in one person , with
a limitation o
f
a fee to another upon a contingency , this cannot be a
remainder , for one fee cannot remain ( * 12 ) upon another , but o
f
ne
cessity must take effect a
s
a




estate is disposed o
f , as for life or in tail , and the residue given to an
other on a contingency , as to the right heirs of J . S . who is in life , or
to such a person as shall be living in the house a
t
such a time , this is
a contingent remainder . But here the whole estate is in Thomas , either
b
y
the devise or b
y
descent , and then the devise to Leonard must o
f
necessity be an executory devise , which being to happen within the com
pass o
f
a life , has been allowed , as in Pell and Brown ' s Case , 2 Cro .
(post — ) . And as to the second question they also relied on Pell and
Brown ' s Case , where it was adjudged that a recovery shall not bar in
such a case . But on the other side it was argued , and so resolved by the
WHOLE COURT in Michaelmas term , 13 Car . 2 , that Thomas took
but an estate for life b
y
the will , and the remainder to his heirs not
executed ; and though he be the heir , to whom the reversion descends ,
that shall not drown the estate for life contrary to the express devise
and intent o
f
the will , but shall leave an opening , as they termed it , for
the interposing of the remainders when they happen to interpose between
the estate for life and the fee ; and they compared it to Archer ' s Case ,
1 Coke 66 ſante - 1 ; where though Robert the devisee for life was heir ,
yet the remainder to his next heir male was contingent , and so not an




the reversion . And so the
estate o
f
Thomas here being only for life , b
y
this devise the remainder
to Leonard was a contingent remainder , and barred b
y
the recovery .
And then the second point will not come in question , whether an ex
ecutory devise shall be barred b
y
a common recovery . But on the first
point , they al
l
gave judgment for the defendant .
JONES V . ROE , in King ' s Bench , Hilary term , 29 Geo . III , A . D . 1790 . - 3
Term 88 .
On special verdict in ejectment the question was whether the right
o
f Joseph T . Lockyer b
y
virtue of an executory devise in the will o
f
his





kind soever , whether in possession , remainder ,
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or reversion, that I shall die seized or possessed of, interested in , or enti
tled to ," & c.
The court of common pleas , after two arguments at the bar , gave
judgment for the plaintiff ; on which the defendant removed the record
into this court by writ of error . Jekyll , for the plaintiffs in error ,
made two points : 1, that this was not a vested interest in Joseph , which
the other side conceded ; and , 2, that if it was contingent it was not
devisable . The court of common pleas determined the case on the au
thority of Selwin v. Selwin , 2 Burrow 1131 , and Moor v. Hawkins, in
chancery in 1765 before Lord Northington ; and Mr. Jekyll contended
that these cases will not be found on examination to warrant the conclu
sion in opposition to all the older authorities .
LORD KENYON , C . J . : It is high time that this question should be
understood to be completely at rest : It affects a great deal of the real
property in this country ; and miserable indeed would be the state of
property , if such a question as this still remained unsettled . If we
consider the statute of wills , which first gave a power of disposing of real
property by devise , it is a matter of astonishment that this question
should ever have arisen . For it enables persons having any manors , lands ,
& c ., to devise ; which must mean having an interest in the lands . There
are two kinds of possibilities ; the one, a bare possibility ; that which
the heir has from the curtesy of his ancestor, and which is nothing more
than a mere hope of succession . Such a possibility undoubtedly is not
the object of disposition ; for if the heir were to dispose of it during the
life of the ancestor , though it afterwards devolved on him from his
ancestor, such disposition would be void . The other, a possibility , or
contingency , like the present , and which is widely different from the
former . Now in order to see whether this sort of contingency be or be
not devisable , let us consider some of the analogous cases. Suppose an
estate be limited to A . for life , remainder to B . for life , and that the
ultimate reversion in fee was given to another ; it never was doubted but
that such a reversion was devisable . That was not doubted by Lord
Chief Justice Holt, in Broncker v . Coke , 2 Eq. Cas. Abr . 296 , 3, nor
in Brett and Rigden , Plowd. Com . 341 [ante - ) . But it is said that
this, which depended on an executory springing use , is not the subject of
a devise . Undoubtedly the statute of wills had been passed some time
hefore any questions arose on executory devises ; for they took rise in
Queen Elizabeth 's time, and arose very rarely for some time afterwards .
When they did , it was decided by degrees that they were descendible ,
releasable , and assignable ; but it is contended that they were not de
visable . But it is difficult to assign any reason why they should be
capable of disposition by [ * 94 ] one mode of conveyance and not by an
other . It is said that a chose in action is only assignable in equity ;
but equity will only interfere when a person claims for a valuable consid
eration paid , and not between volunteers : And in those cases equitas
sequitur legem . This question , however , does not depend upon reason
by analogy to other cases , or on abstract reasoning. I will not cite all
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the cases that may be mentioned upon the subject , but will confine myself
to two or three which have been determined by great authorities after
much consideration . The first I take from the argument in Selwyn v .
Selwyn , 1 Wm . Black . 225 , by Mr. Norton, is that of Goodtitle d. Gurnel
v .Wood , Tr . 14 Geo . 2, C . B . In that case there was a devise to A . and
if he dies before 21, then to B . and his heirs : B . died , and then the
contingency happened by the death of A . before 21. WILLES , C . J ., said :
“ The question is , whether an executory devise be transmissible . Most
of the old cases, which hold that they are not devisable , were before
executory devises were well established : but that doctrine is now ex
ploded . Executory devises are not naked possibilities , but are in the
nature of contingent remainders ; and there is no doubt but that such es
tates are transmissible , and consequently devisable ." Here then the chief
justice gave a clear opinion that a possibility was devisable . That it
is also transmissible appears from the cases of King y . Withers , Cas.
Temp. Talb . 117, and Marks v. Marks, 1 Str . 132 . And the case of
Selwin v. Selwin , 1 Wm . Black . 225 , is a very strong authority on the
question in this case . I have a much fuller note of that case than that
in Burrow or Blackstone , and the grounds of the opinion of the court ,
as supposed by Sir J . Burrow , are those which Lord Mansfield actually
declared in court . The case of Moore v. Hawkins is also a pointed and
strong authority on this subject ; a manuscript note of which I lent to
the court of common pleas when this very case was before them . And
it is to be remembered that all further argument of the case of Moor v .
Hawkins was given up by the solicitor general (De Grey ) , who would
not have given up the point if he had thought it tenable . On the au
thority therefore of these cases, I think the judgment of the court of
common pleas must be affirmed ; and I sincerely hope that this point
will be now understood to be perfectly at rest .
[ * 957 ASHHURST , J . : The court of common pleas considered this as
a decided case ; and therefore they did not think it necessary to go at
large into the grounds on which their opinion was formed . It is now
too late to raise any doubt upon this question , it having been expressly
determined in the cases of Selwin v. Selwin , and Moor V. Hawkins .
Were it necessary to go fully into this point, there would be no difficulty
in shewing that it was decided in those two cases on sound and legal
principles . And there are also several other cases , which , though not
on the same point, go the length of supporting the doctrine , that con
tingencies like the present are devisable. It was held in some of the
cases that an interest of this kind is assignable , in others that it is trans
missible , and that it is an hereditament ; and if so , it follows that it is
also devisable. The doubt appears to have arisen on the word “having ”
in the statute of wills : and the old cases determined that a contingency
like the present was not the subject of a devise . But that doctrine has
been exploded in all the modern cases. And it is strange that in former
times the courts should have been governed by such narrow reasoning ,
when they were construing this act of parliament . For the plain mean
h
a
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ing of the statute is , that every person who has a valuable interest in
lands shall have the power of disposing of it by his will . However , on
the authority of those cases in which it has been decided that a contin
gent interest like the present is assignable , and transmissible , and of
Selwin v . Selwin , 2 Burr . 1131 , and Moor v . Hawkins, in which this
very point was expressly determined , I am of opinion that the judgment
must be affirmed .
BULLER , J . : The short question is, whether the interest which a
person takes by virtue of an executory devise , be or be not devisable .
From the time when executory devises were first known in the law ,
they have been attacked in every possible shape : and yet it is observable
that the attack has , as often as it has been made , in modern times at
least , always failed . The true reason why they have been thus attacked
is to be found in every modern case which treats of the subject , namely ,
that in early times when the question was first discussed , the nature
of an executory devise was not understood . It was first contended , that
an executory devise was not transmissible ; then , that it was not assign
able ; then , that it was not descendible ; and , lastly , that it was not de
visable . But if it be such an interest as is descendible , it seems strange
to say that * 96 ) it is not also devisable . They must both be governed
by the same principle . It was held to be descendible , because the person
taking it has an interest in the lands which is known to the law , and
will descend if the ancestor does not dispose of it : then if he has that
interest , he has a right to dispose of it by will . It is a sound distinction ,
which has been taken by my Lord Chief Justice, between a bare possibil
ity , and a possibility coupled with an interest. The cases on this subject
have been uniformly determined the same way for nearly fifty years
past. The case of Goodtitle d. Gurnell v. Wood , was 49 years ago in
the common pleas . The next in order was that of Selwin v. Selwin , 2
Burr . 1131, in this court ; and I am not inclined to give so little credit as
the counsel fo
r





case . It was not the opinion of Sir James Burrow himself , but of the
court . It has been openly acknowledged b
y
Lord Mansfield , and I have
had repeated opportunities o
f hearing it from him in private , that he
has given to Sir J . Burrow his own note and opinion of a case , which





this court to give their opinions here in cases which came
from the court o
f chancery . This note a
t
the end of that case shews
decidedly what was the opinion o
f
the court : But even if there were
any doubt about it , we find that in Roe d . Noden v . Griffiths , 1 Wm . Bl .
605 , Lord Mansfield declared that he was prepared ( in the former case )
to have shown , with the concurrence o
f
the whole court , that contingent ,
springing , and executory uses were descendible , and also devisable . The
last case upon this subject is that of Moor v . Hawkins , which is another
direct authority . Then the counsel for the plaintiffs in error endeavored
to show , on the forms of pleading , that this was not a devisable interest .
The general rule of pleading is , that , if you show a particular estate ,
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you must show the commencement of it, and a seisin in fee of the person
last seised . In this case the mode would be this , that the devisor was
seised in his demesne as of fe
e
: that he devised (prout the will ) , by
which it appears that J . Lockyer took an interest in the estate by an
executory devise ; that h
e , being so entitled by virtue o
f
the will , devised
a
ll
his right and interest , & c . , that the mesne estate has failed , and
that the second devisee became entitled , & c . This mode of pleading is






] GROSE , J . : This question depends on the statutes of wills ;
and I have no doubt but that this , which is now claimed , was a devisable
interest . The fourth section o
f
the 34 & 35 H . 8 , c . 5 , which is ex
planatory o
f
the 32 H . 8 , c . 1 , declares that all persons having a sole
estate o
r
interest in lands , & c . , may devise : This does not include a
bare possibility , or hope of succession , but a possibility , accompanied
with an interest . The idea which has been entertained b
y
some persons
of the profession , that such a contingency as the present was not devis
able , may be traced from the case o
f Bishop v . Fountain ( 3 Lev . 427 ) ;
there lands were devised to Fountain in fee in trust to pay an annuity
to the devisor ' s daughter Mary , and , if she had children , to convey suc
cessively to those children ; for want o
f
such issue the lands were d
i
rected to b
e conveyed to the eldest son o
f
his nephew J . Cater , and the
heirs of such eldest son ; and an annuity was given to such eldest son till
the estate should come to him : but if he claimed anything during the
life o
f Mary , or any of her issue , then both the father and son were to
b
e
excluded from having anything out o
f
his estate . The eldest son of
J . Cater was Anthony , who had two sisters , the defendants . Anthony
died , and left issue John his son , who in the lifetime of Mary devised
to the plaintiff , and died without issue . Mary afterwards died without
issue . The Court held that John had no estate devisable , but a mere
possibility , during the life of Mary or any of her issue . But the reasons
are not mentioned why it was to be considered as a mere possibility ,
unless b
y
recurring to the above clause , which might be considered as




his nephew depending upon
the condition o
f his not claiming during the life o
f Mary or any o
f
her issue , and consequently contingent until that condition was per
formed , which could not be till the death of Mary without issue . He
would rather have taken an equitable remainder in fee expectant on the
death of Mary , and the failure of issue o
f
her body , which would have











the court ; and the only
way in which I can account for this doctrine having been afterwards
adopted b
y
Lord Chief Justice Parker , and Lord Hardwicke , was
because they considered it a
s
a point already determined , and therefore
did not enter into the reasons on which it could be supported . Now
if the case in Levinz cannot [ * 98 ] be considered as law , the foundation ,
o
n which the other cases were built , is destroyed . And the modern cases
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have decided the other way ; on the authority of which I think the point
is now settled . And even if it were not already so decided , I think it
should be so on the words of the statutes .
Judgment affirmed .
An alternative contingent remainder in fee does not lapse by the death of
the devisee in fee before the vesting of the estate , but descends to his
heirs (or might be devised by his will , dictum ) . Hennessy V. Patterson
( 1881 ) , 85 N . Y . 91, Finch ' s R . P . Cas . 868 .
SMITH V . BRISSON , in N . Car. Sup . Ct., Feb ., 1884 .— 90 N . Car. 284 .
Ejectment. Both parties claim under a deed containing these words :
“ For and in consideration of the natural love and affection I have for my
son , Rowland Mercer, and the further sum of one dollar to him in hand
paid , the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged , has given , granted ,
bargained , sold , and conveyed , and do hereby give , bargain , sell and con
vey , to the said Roland Mercer and the heirs of his body , and if the said
Roland Mercer should have no heirs, the said land shall go to the heirs
of my son James A . Mercer , all that tract of land," & c.
ASHE , J . Both parties to this action claim title to the land de
scribed in the complaint under the deed executed by Roland Mercer, Sr.,
to Roland Mercer, Jr., on the 30th day of August, 1859 . The plaintiffs
contend that the deed conveyed an absolute estate in fee simple in the
land to Rowland Mercer , Jr., and by his will the fee simple title to the
same was devised to the feme plaintiff . The defendants , on the other
hand , insist that the deed conveyed only a determinable fee to Rowland
Mercer , Jr . , which terminated by his death without children , and vested
a
n
absolute fee simple , b
y
the limitation in said deed , in the children
o
f James A . Mercer . * * *
At common law a fee simple could not be limited after a fee simple .
There was no way known to that law b
y
which a vested fee simple
could be put an end to and another estate put in its place ; and the reason
is , because no freehold could pass without livery o
f
seisin , which must
operate immediately or not at all . But after the Statute of Uses , 27
Hen . 8 , when the possession o
f
the legal estate was transferred to the
use , vesting the legal estate in the cestui que use in the same quality ,
manner , form , and condition that he held the use , and the courts of
law assumed jurisdiction of uses , it was held that an estate created b
y
deed operating under the statute might be made to commence in futuro ,
without any immediate transmutation of possession ; as by bargain and
sale , o
r
a covenant to stand seised to uses . Cessante ratione cessat et lez .
And consequently it was held that , b
y
such conveyances , inheritances
might be made to shift from one to another upon a supervening contin
gency ; which to avoid perpetuities , was required to be such as must hap
pen within a life or lives in being , and the period o
f
gestation and twenty
one years thereafter . * * *
Thence arose the doctrine o
f springing and shifting uses , or condi
tional limitations . * * * It was under this doctrine of a shifting use
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that it has been (* 289 ) held since very early after the Statute of Uses,
that a fee simple may be limited after a fe






deed , it is a conditional limitation ; if b
y
will , it is an executory
devise . “And in both these cases a fee may be limited after a fee . ” 2
Bl . Com . 334 . * * *
The Statute o
f
Uses is in force in this state . Code § 1330 . And
the deed , under which both parties to the action claim title to the
land in controversy , has it
s operation under the statute , and a
s
the con
sideration mentioned in it is both pecuniary and natural affection , it




a covenant to stand seised ,
a
s
to both parties , for they are al
l
the blood relations o
f
the grantor .
Our conclusion is that the limitation over to the children of James
A . Mercer was good , and that there was error in the court below in not






s in it is
ALLEN V . FOGLER , in S . Car . C
t
. of App . , Dec . 1852 . — 6 Rich . Law 54 .
Trespass to try title , b
y
W . H . Allen and others , claiming as th
e
heirs of Josiah Gillett Allen , against John J . Folgar , claiming under
a deed made b
y
Harriet Allen , who has died without issue . All parties
claim through a deed in these words : “ Know all men b
y
these presents ,
that , I , Elijah Gillett , of state and district aforesaid , do , for the love
and affection I bear towards Harriet Allen and Joseph Gillett Allen ,
give and bequesth to Harriet Allen , and to the heirs o
f
her body , and
in case o
f
her death before she has an heir , I desire whatever I may
give to her , may be the right and property of Josiah Gillett Allen , and
in case o
f
his death before he has an heir , " & c .
O 'NEALL , J . * * * That the limitation over would be good by
way of executory devise , I do not entertain a doubt ; for it would be
within a life or lives in being and twenty -one years after . But the
misfortune to the plaintiffs is that the question arises under a deed ,
and not under a will . It is a case of remainder . Mr . Fearne , in his
book on Remainders . c . 6 § 8 , p . 371 , says , “ A fee at common law cannot
b
e mounted on a fee ; a
s
if lands are limited to one and his heirs , and if he
dies without heirs , then to another , this last is void . ” In this case the
first estate is a fee conditional at common law , and upon that is
mounted a fee eventually to Elijah Gillett Allen and his heirs . The
latter is void under the rule cited from Mr . Fearne . The motion to re




















st i law , at his heirs .
PALMER V . COOK , in ni . Sup . Ct . , Jan . 17 , 1896 . - 159 n . 300 , 42 N . E .
796 , 50 Am . St . Rep . 165 .
Bill for dower and partition by the surviving husband of Emily Cook .
Her title was b
y
the following deed : “ The grantor , Thomas Stewart ,
1 Because the Statute De Donis was not in force in South Carolina .
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of, [& c. ] , for and in consideration of one dollar in hand paid , doth
hereby grant, bargain , sell, convey , and warrant to Mary A . Stewart
and Emily C . Stewart , of Macoupin county, the following real estate
[describing it ]. And I, Thomas Stewart , as for myself , retain pos
session and reserve the use, profits , and full control , during my life ;
and further , in case either of the grantees dies without a heir , her in
terest to revert to the survivor . Dated this 10th day of March , 1883 .
Thomas Stewart .” The trial court held the fee vested in the grantees ,
and decreed dower and partition . Mary , the other grantee , appeals ,
and contents that the grantees took simply a life estate, with a con
tingent remainder to the survivor in fee.
PHILLIPS , J . * * * By the thirteenth section of chapter 30 of the
Revised Statutes it is provided : " Every estate in lands which shall be
granted , conveyed , or devised although other words heretofore necessary
to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added , shall be deemed a
fee simple estate of inheritance , if a less estate be not limited by ex
press words , or do not appear to have been granted , conveyed , or de
vised by construction or operation of law ." By § 9 of the same chapter
the words " convey and warrant” to the grantee are declared to be a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee , and his heirs and assigns ,
with certain covenants , & c .
This deed is clearly within the letter and spirit of $ 9 , and , by
the two sections above named , a fee simple estate was vested in the
grantees . It is an established principle of construction of contingent
remainders , that an estate cannot , by deed , be limited to another
after a fee already granted . The term " remainder " necessarily implies
what is left , and , if the entire estate is granted , there can be no re
mainder . This deed affected an absolute fee simple conveyance by the
first clause of the deed and vested the estate . By the last clause an
attempt is made to mount a fee upon a fee , which can only be done
by executory devise : Smith v . Kimbell , 153 Ill. 368 , 38 N . E . 1029 ;
Fowler v . Black , 136 Il
l
. 363 , 26 N . E . 596 ; Griswold , v . Hicks . 132
Ill . 494 , 24 N . E . 63 , 22 Am . St . Rep . 549 . * * * Under these prin
ciples this deed reserved to the grantor a life estate , and vested the fee
in the grantees ; and the clause , “ and further , in case either o
f
the
grantees dies without a heir , her interest to revert to the survivor , "
must be held to be inoperative as a limitation of a fee .
Decree affirmed .
The case above was cited and distinguished in Cover v . James (1905 ) , 217
Ill . 309 , 75 N . E . 490 , ; in which it was held that , " convey and warrant
to A . Fred Cover and Bessie Cover * * * . In case of the death of either
* * * the other to have the whole of said property without litigation , "
gave them an estate for their joint lives , with remainder to the survivor .
By the Statute of Uses a fee might be limited after a fee , and that statute
is expressly re -enacted in Illinois . Does that fact affect this case ?
Statute o
f
New York , Mich . , & c . " A contingent remainder in fee may be
created on a prior remainder in fee , to take effect in the event that the per
sons to whom the first remainder is limited . shall die under the age of 21
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years , or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such persons
may be determined before they attain their full age .” N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) ,
pt. 2, c. 1, t . 2, Art . 1, § 16 ; Mich . R . S. (1846 ) , c. 62 , § 16 , C . L . (1897 ) ,
§ 8798 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $ 16, R . L . ( 1905 ) , § 3205 ; Wis. R . S. ( 1849) ,
c . 56 , § 16 , St. ( 1898 ) , § 2040 .
After Life Estate out of Term for Years .
ANON ., in Common Bench , Easter term , 28 Hen . VIII , A . D . 1537 . - 1
Dyer 7.
A man possessed of a term for forty years makes hi
s
will ; and thereby
wills “ that A , his eldest daughter , shall have the term to her and to the
heirs o
f
her body begotten , the remainder if she di
e
without issue within
the term to C , his second daughter , in tail , ” & c . ; and the oldest daughter
marries and dies without issue within the term , and after her death the
husband sold the term ; and the question was , What remedy hath the
younger daughter ? And BALDWIN ( C . J . ] and SHELLEY [ J . ] held
that she hath none . For it is contrary to law that a term may be limited
in remainder any more than other chattel personal , as a cup or other
chattel ; as a remainder of books in 34 or 35 Hen . 6 [ 37 Hen . 6 , 307
is void . So it appeared to them that the sale b
y
the husband is good
enough and indefeasible . ENGLEFIELD [ J . ] thought it might remain ,
for that it is b
y
will , and the intention of the maker should be con
strued ; and that was no more than if it should happen that the eldest
daughter die without issue within the term that the second daughter
should have it , and he thought it might remain immediately after her
death and that the second daughter might enter , & c . BALDWIN ( C . J . ] :
This is not like your case ; for I readily agree , that if a man devise his
term to one upon such condition , that if he die within the term a stranger
should have it , in that case he does not give all his term and interest to
him , but so much o
f
the term as runs during his life , and the residue
the stranger shall have . But in our case he devises all the term entire
to his eldest daughter ; wherefore it does not resemble , & c . And he said
that he had moved this very question when he was a sergeant and the
court were of his present opinion , & c .
ANON . , 33 Hen . 8 . - A . D . 1541 . — Brooke ' s New Cases p
l
. 209 , Marsh ' s Trans
lation , Chattels . Bro . Abr . Chattels 23 .
If a lessee fo
r
years devise his term , or other his chattel o
r goods , by
testament , to one for term of his life , the remainder over to another ,
and dies , and the devisee enters and aliens not the term , nor gives nor
sells the chattel , and dies , there he in remainder shall have it . But if
the first devisee had aliened , given , o
r
sold it , there he in remainder had
been without remedy for it . And so , it seems , if they be forfeit in
his life , he in remainder hath no remedy .
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ANON ., in King 's Bench , Mich . 6 Edw . 6. - A . D . 1553 . — Dyer 74a .
A termor of a parsonage devised his entire lease , term , and interest ,
to another , provided , if it should happen that the devisee die in the
life- time of I. S ., that then the said lease, term , and [ * 74b ] interest ,
should remain entire to the said I . S. during the residue of the term
of the lease . The devisee sold the term entire , and died in the life- time
of I. S. Whether I . S . hath any remedy for the term or not ? And LORD
MONTAGUE [ C . J . ] and Justice HALES thought not. And it was said
by MONTAGUE , that the case was ruled by the opinion of all the justices
in the time of Lord Rich , when he was chancellor .
See the comment on this and the other cases of this kind by Lord Chan
cellor Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk 's Case . post -
FITZ - JAMES ' S CASE , in Common Pleas of England , 7 Eliz ., A . D. 1565.
Owen 33 , 5 Gray ' s Cases on Property , 130 .
Note by Dyer, that the Lord Fitz - James , late lord chief justice of
England, did devise his land to Nicholas Fitz - James in tail , with divers





. , the use of them to the said Nicholas Fitz - James
and the heirs males o
f
his body . In this case it was the opinion o
f
the
court that the said Nicholas had no property in the said plate , but only
the use and occupation . And the same law where the devise was that
his wife should inherit one o
f
his houses (which he had for term o
f
years ) during her life , because the wife takes no interest in the term , but
only a
n occupation and usage , out o
f
which the executors cannot eject
her during her life ; but Walsh held the contrary .
AMNER and LUDDINGTON ' S CASE , in the King ' s Bench , Mich . , 26 Eliz . ,
A . D . 1584 . — 2 Leon . 92 , 3 Leon , 89 .
A writ of error was brought in the king ' s bench by . Amner against
Luddington , Mich . 26 Eliz . Rot . 495 . And the case was that one Weldon
was seised , and leased to one Peerepoint for 99 years , who devised the
same b
y
his will in this manner , vi
z
. : “ I bequeath to my wife the lease
o
f my house during her life ; and after her death , I will it to go amongst
my children unpreferred . ” Peerepoint died , his wife entered , and was
possessed b
y
virtue of the legacy aforesaid , and took to husband one
Fulshurst , against whom Beswick recovered in an action o
f
debt 1401 . ,
upon which recovery issued a scire facias , and upon that a renditioni
exponas , upon which the sheriff sold the term so devised to one Revnolds .
Fulshurst died , his executor brought error , and reversed the judgment




Beswick . The wife re -entered ,
sold the term , and died . Alice , a daughter of Peerepoint unpreferred ,
entered ; and upon this matter found b
y special verdict in the common
pleas , the entry o
f
Alice was adjudged lawful . Upon which judgment
error was brought in the king ' s bench ; and it was argued upon the
words of the devise , because here the lease is not devised but all his
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interest in the thing devised : and it is not like to the case between
Weldon and Elkington , 20 Eliz ., Plowd . Com . 519 , where the case was,
that Davies being lessee for years devised that his wife should have and
occupy his land demised for so many years as she should live ; nor unto
the case betwixt Paramour and Yardley, 21 Eliz., Plowd . Com . 539 ,
for there the lessee devised , that his wife should have the occupation
and profits of the lands until the full age of his son ; for in those cases ,
the land itself is quodam modo devised ; but in our case all the estate
is devised , i. e ., the lease itself . And also in those two devises a certain
person is named in the will , who should take the residue of the term
which should expire after the death of the wife, but in the case at bar
no person in certain is appointed , & c ., but the devise as to that is con
ceived in general words — children unpreferred ; ergo , neither any possi
bility , nor any remainder is in any person certain , therefore al
l
the
whole term is entirely in the wife , and then she may well dispose of the
whole . But the whole court was to the contrary , and that in this case
the possibility should rise well enough upon the death o
f
the wife , to
the daughter Alice unpreferred . Another matter was moved , if the said








the execution aforesaid , if now , the judgment being reversed , the sale
o
f




had lost . And it was argued b
y
Coke , that notwithstand
ing the reversal o
f
the judgment the sale did stand good ; * * * and
the court , as to that point , al
l
agreed ; but that point did not fall in
judgment ; for b
y
the sale nothing shall pass but the interest in presenti
which was in the wife of the devisor ; but the possibility to the children
unpreferred was not touched thereby ; and afterwards the judgment was
affirmed .
STANLEY v . BAKER , in Queen ' s Bench , Mich . , 27 & 28 Eliz . , A . D . 1586 .
Moore 220 .
Hitchcock , possessed of a lease for years , devised it to his oldest son
and the heirs o
f
his body , and if he die without issue to his younger son
and the heirs o
f
his body , and on default of such issue that the term
remain to his daughters . He died leaving two daughters and another was
afterwards born . The eldest son sold the term and died without issue ;
the younger also died without issue ; and the three daughters entered .
And the term was adjudged to the three , although the younger was not
born till after the death of the devisor . Otherwise , if the two daughters
had been named in the devise b
y
their proper names .
RAYMAN v . GOLD , in Common Bench , Hilary , 34 Eliz . , A . D . 1592 . - Moore
635 .
Ejectione firmae . It was found by verdict that Soper , possessing a
term for 80 years , devised that after the death of his wife , whom he
made sole executor , his sons John and Edw . shall have the whole profit
o
f my farm , and the longest liver o
f
them shall appoint who shall have
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the residue of the years which shall be remaining at the time . The
points moved were three : 1. If the widow had any estate by implication
for her life , as she would have in land of inheritance ; and they agreed





a term . 2 . If the devise of the profits was a de
vise o
f
the term itself , and it was so agreed . 3 . If the termor may de
vise to one for life , with remainder of the years to others who






the first devisee , o
r
the
same land after the death o
f
the tenant for life . As to this the court
held that he could not , yet that a termor may demise the land for certain
years if the lessee so long live , and may demise the same land
to another to commence after the death o
f
the first devisee , and it will be
good . But note that in the principal case the widow all her life held
the term a
s
executor , and not by implication of the devise ; and the
estate o
f
the sons is not appointed to commence till after the death o
f
the widow ; b
y
which it seemed to the court that it may well be as a
devise to the sons after the death of the widow , she having taken nothing
by the devise ; and this inured as if the termor devise that after the
death o
f
a stranger J . S . should have the land for such years as then
should be to come ; and this is good b
y
devise , because he might so have
done b
y
demise in his life .
FOSTER v . BROWN , in Trinity 2 Jac . 1 , A . D . 1605 . — Moore 758 .




term to his wife for life ,
remainder to Agnes Hast for her life if Gabriel Mermion , his son - in -law ,
within two years after devisor ' s death should not bind himself in 100£ .
General allowed that a devise o
f
the profits is a devise o
f
the term itself ;
and he held the remainder good and not interrupted b
y
what had hap
pened ; and for this he cited Palmer ' s Case in the exchequer chamber ,
3
3 Eliz . ; and Almer and Lodington ' s Case in the common bench , 35
Eliz . (above ? ] ; and ( the same case ? ] Pierpoint ' s Case , 27 Eliz . , ad
judged in the common bench and affirmed on error in the queen ' s
bench ; which cases prove the remainder good after an estate for life of a
term . But a remainder in tail , or an estate in tail o
f
a term is void ,
a
s adjudged Trinity 27 Eliz . in the queen ’ s bench in Miller ' s Case .
Brooke , to the contrary ; and he cited the Rector of Chedington ' s Case ,
1 Coke 153 ; 37 Hen . 6 [ 30 ] ; 28 Hen . 8 , Dver 7 [ante – ] ; 33 Hen .
8 , Brooke [Abr . t . ] done and remainder [ 57 ? ) in time o
f
Hen . 8 ;
Brooke [Abr . ] , Hoe ' s Case , 334 ; Brooke [ Abr . t . ) devise 13 , 2 . Ed . 6 ;
Brooke [ Abr . ] 168 ; 10 Eliz . , Dver 277 [ b p
l
. 59 ) ; 13 Eliz . , [Welcden v .
Elkington , 3 Dver ] 358 ; and Trin . 29 Eliz . , rot . 1874 , Hamington ' s
Case : that the devise of the profits to the woman during her widowhood
with the remainder over was good . The second point was if the re
mainder limited to Gabriel on a condition precedent of entering into
bond within the year after the death o
f
the devisor was good , as he did
not enter into bond . They agreed that it was good notwithstanding ,
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because the time he was to have was a year , and the woman died within
two months, so that the condition was discharged by the act of God .
Note that the case was adjudged with Brooke , but with a special entry
by the court in the roll that they did not give judgment on the re
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MATTHEW MANNING ' S CASE , in the Common Pleas , Trinity , 7 Jac . 1 ,
A . D . 1610 . – 8 Coke 94b .
In debt for 200 marks b
y
William Clark , plaintiff , and Matthew
Manning , administrator o
f
Edward Manning , deceased , upon plene ad
ministravit pleaded the jury gave a special verdict to the effect follow
ing , which plea began Mich . 4 Jacobi , Rot . 1829 : Edward Manning ,
the intestate , anno 30 Eliz . , was possessed of the moiety o
f
a mill in
Clifton , in the county of Oxford , for the term o
f
fifty years , o
f
the clear
yearly value of 401 . ; and afterwards the said Edw . Manning , 30 Eliz . ,
made his will in writing , and thereby devised his indenture and lease of
the farm and mill in Clifton and all the years therein to come to Matthew
Manning after the death o
f Mary Manning , my wife , (which farm
and mill my will is that Mary Manning my wife shall enjoy during
her life ) conditionally that the said Matthew shall not demise , sell , o
r
give , the said lease , but to leave it wholly to John his son , & c . “ In
meantime my will and meaning is that Mary Manning my wife shall
have the use and occupation both o
f
the farm and mill , & c . , during her
natural life , yielding and paying therefor yearly to the said Matthew
Manning , & c . , during her natural life 71 , at the feasts of S
t
. Michael
the archangel and the Annunciation o
f
our Lady , " and made Mary
his wife his sole executrix and died . Mary took upon her the charge
o
f
the will , and had not sufficient to pay the debts of the said Ed . Man
ning above the said term , but she entered unto the said farm and mill ,
and paid to Mat . Manning the yearly sum of 71 . according to the said
will ; and said that if she died the said Mat . Manning should have the
farm and mill aforesaid . And afterwards the said Mary , 16 years after
the death o
f
her husband , died intestate , after whose death the said
Mat . Manning entered into the said farm and mill and was thereof pog
sessed prout lex postulat ; and afterwards administration of the goods
o
f
the said Edw . b
y
the said Mary not administered was committed to
the said Matthew and that none o
f
the said profits o
f
the said farm
and mill which accrued in the life o
f
the said Mary came to the hands
o
f
the said Matthew besides the said 71 . yearly as aforesaid . And the
doubt o
f
the jury was if the residue of the said term in the said farm
and mill should be assets in the hands of the said Matthew . But I
conceived on the trial of the issue at Guild -hall in London , that the
devise to Matthew was good , and that there was sufficient assent to the





1 . But yet upon the motion
o
f
the plaintiff ' s counsel , I was contented that the whole special matter
should b
e
found as is aforesaid .
And the case was argued a
t
the bar and a
t
divers several days debated











t the bench . And , prima facie , WALMSLEY , Just . , conceived that the
devise to Matthew Manning after the death o
f
the wife was void : for
the wife , having it devised to her during her life , she had the whole
term , and the devisor could not devise the possibility over , no more than
a man can d
o by grant in his life ; for that which the testator cannot d
o
by no advice o
f
counsel in his life , the testator , who is intended to b
e
inops consilii , shall not do b
y
his will . But b
y grant in his life he
could not grant the land unto the wife for her life , the remainder over
to another , for by the grant the wife had the whole term at least if




mainder . And although the later opinions in the case where a man
possessed o
f
a lease for years devises it to one for life the remainder
to another have been that the remainder was good , yet he said that the
old opinion (which hath more reason , a
s he conceived ) was that the re
mainder in such case was void : 28 Hen . 8 , Dyer ante - , Baldwin
and Shelley that the remainder is void , Englefield contrary ; 6 Edw . 6 ,
Dyer 74 [ante - ) , accord by Hales and Montague ; 2 Edw . 6 , Brooke
Abr . t . Devise 13 , that the remainder is void , for the devise of a chattel
for one hour is good forever .
But COKE , C . J . , WARBURTON , DANIEL , and FOSTER [JJ . ] , contrary ,
that the devise was good to Matthew Manning ; and five points were b
y
them resolved :
1 . That Matthew Manning took it not b
y way o
f





n executory devise ; and one may devise an estate b
y
his last
will in such manner as he cannot do b
y
any grant o
r conveyance in his
life , as if a man is seized o
f
lands in fee held in socage , and devises that
if A pays such a sum to his executors , that he shall have the land to him
and his heirs (or in tail , or for life , & c . ) and dies , and afterwards A
pays the money , he shall have the land b
y
this executory devise , and
yet he could not have it b
y
any grant or conveyance executory at the
common law ; but it stands well with the nature of a devise . So in
the case at bar when the wife does it shall vest in Matthew Manning
a
s by an executory devise , as if he has devised that after his son has
paid such a sum to his executors , that he shall have the term , or that
after the death of A that B shall have the term , o
r
that after his son
shall return from beyond the seas ( o
r
that A dies ) that he shall have
it - in a
ll
these cases and other like , upon the condition or contingent
performed , the devise is good , and in the meantime the testator may
dispose o
f
it ; and therefore in judgment of law , u
t
res magis valeat ,
the executory devise shall precede , and the disposition of the lease till
the contingent happen shall b
e subsequent , as in the case at bar it was ,
and so all shall well stand together . For when he made the executory
devise he had a lawful power , and might well make it ; and afterwards
in the same will he had lawful power , and might well devise the lease
till the contingent happened , and therefore it is as much as if the tes
tator had devised that if his wife died within the term , that then Mat
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thew Manning should have the residue of the term , and further devised
it to his wife for her life .
2 . The case is more strong because this devise is but a chattel,
whereof no præcipe lies, and which may vest and revest at the pleasure
of the devisor without any prejudice to any. And therefore if a man
makes a lease for years , on condition that if he do not such a thing
the lease shall be void , and afterwards he grants the reversion over
[ and ] the condition is broken , the grantee shall take benefit of this
condition by the common law , for the lease is thereby absolutely void ;
but in such case if the lease had been for life with such condition ,
the grantee should not take benefit of the breach of the condition ; for
a freehold (of which a præcipe lies ) cannot so easily cease , but is void
able by entry after the condition broken , which cannot by the common
law be transferred to a stranger ; and therewith agrees 11 Hen . VII, 17a ;
and Brooke Abr., Conditions 245 , 2 Mary , by Bromley , the same dif
ference .
3 . There is no difference when one devises his term for life , the re
mainder over , and when a man devises the land or his lease, or farm , or
the use , or occupation , or profits of his land ; for in a will the intent and
meaning of the devisor is to be observed , and the law will make construc
tion of the words to satisfy his intent , and to put them into such order
and course that his will shall take effect . And always the intention
of the devisor expressed in his will is the best expositor , director , and
disposer of his words ; and when a man devises his lease to one for
life, it is as much as to say he shall have so many of the years as he
shall live , and that if he dies within the term , that another shall have
it for the residue of the years ; and although at the beginning it be un
certain how many years he shall live, yet when he dies it is certain
how many years he has lived and how many years the other shall have
it, and so by a subsequent act al
l
is made certain .
4 . That , after the executor has assented to the first devise , it lies
not in the power o
f
the first devise to bar him who has the future devise ,
for h
e
cannot transfer more to another than h
e
has himself .
5 . In many cases a man b
y
his will may create an interest which
by grant or conveyance at the common law he cannot create in his life .
And therefore when Sir William Cordell , master o
f
the rolls , devised
his manor o
f
Melford , & c . , in the county o
f
Suffolk , to his executors
for payment of his debts and until his debts should be paid , the re
mainder to his brother , & c . , and made George Carey and others his
executors and died , and after his death the debts were paid , and his
wife demanded dower , and one question amongst others was moved ,
what interest or estate the executors had (for if they had a freehold ,
then the wife should not have dower , and if they had but a chattel de
terminable upon the payment o
f
the debts , then she should be endowed ) ,
and this case was referred to Anderson , chief justice o
f
the common
pleas , and Francis Gawdie , justice o
f
the king ' s bench , before whom
the case was a
t
several days debated , Pasch . 30 Eliz . (and I was o
f




w .But if tons
o
f th it a
counsel with the executors ) , and it was resolved b
y
them that the ex
ecutors had but a chattel and no freehold ; for if they should have a





to the executors o
f
the executors , and so the debts would
remain unpaid ; but the law adjudges it a particular interest in the land
which shall g
o
to the executors o
f
the executors , as assets for the pay
ment o
f





the common law , the law will adjudge it an estate of freehold ; and
so a more favorable interpretation is made o
f
a will in point of interest
o
r









his pleasure . And so was it resolved in the begin
ning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth , that where a man had issue a
daughter , and devised his lands to his executors for the payment o
f
his
debts and until his debts were paid , and made his executors and died ,
the executors entered , the daughter married , had issue , and died , and
after the debts were paid , and it was resolved in the case of one Guavarra
that he should be tenant by the curtesy . Vide : 3 Hen . VII , 13 ; 27
Hen . VIII , 5 ; 21 Assize , p . 8 ; 14 Hen . VIII , 13 .
Note , READER , it has been o
f
late often adjudged according to these
resolutions : scil . in Weldon ' s Case , Plow . Com . 516 , in the common
bench ; in Paramour ' s Case , Plow . Com . [539 ) , in the king ' s bench ;
Mich . 26 & 27 Eliz . , in a writ of error in the king ' s bench , on a judg
ment given b
y
the common pleas , the case was such [here stating the
facts o
f
Amner v . Luddington substantially as reported above ) . And




the sergeants in the common pleas ,
and a
t
last by the judges ; and in this case three points were by them
resolved : 1 . That the said executory devise o
f
the lease after the death o
f
the wife to the daughter unpreferred was good ; and there is no difference
when the term or lease , or houses , and when the use , o
r occupation ,
& c . , is devised , and that in all these cases the executory devise is good .
2 . That the sale either b
y
Alice the wife or b
y
the sheriff on the fieri
facias after the wife was possessed as legatory should not destroy the
executory devise , although the person to whom the executory devise
was made was then uncertain a
s long a
s Alice the wife lived ; for the
said Alice the daughter might have been preferred in her life , and then
she should take nothing , so that such executory devise which has de
pendence on the first devise may be made to a person uncertain , and
this possibility cannot be defeated b
y any sale made b
y
the first de







should stand , although the judgment was after reversed , and the plaintiff
in the writ o
f
error restored to the value , for the sheriff who made the
sale had lawful authority to sell , and by the sale the vendee had an
absolute property in the term during the life o
f
Alice the wife ; and
although the judgment which was the warrant of the fieri facias be




f the fieri facias shall not be avoided ; for the judg
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ment was that the plaintiff should recover his debt, and the fieri facias
is to levy it of the defendant 's goods and chattels, by force of which
the sheriff sold the term which the defendant had in the right of his
wife, as he well might, and the vendee paid money to the value of it ;
and if the sale of the term should be avoided the vendee would lose his
term and his money too , and thereupon great inconvenience would fol
low that none would buy of the sheriff goods or chattels in such cases ,
and so execution of judgments (which is the life of the law in such
case ) would not be done .
And according to these resolutions judgment was given in the common
pleas for the plaintiff ; and in the king 's bench upon a writ of error
the case was often argued at the bar before Sir Christopher Wray, and
the court there , and at length the judgment was affirmed , and so the said
three points were adjudged by both courts . And by these latter judg
ments you will better understand the law in the books, in which there
are variety of opinions : 37 Hen . VI, 30 ; 33 Hen . VIII , Brooke Abr.
t . Chattels 33 [ante - ) ; 2 Edw . VI, Brooke Abr. t. Devise 13 ; 28 Hen .
VIII, Dyer 277 , Plow . Com . [516 , 539 ], in Weldon 's and Paramour 's
Case , & c. Quia justicia posteriora sunt in lege fortiora .0
;[ 516 , 00 ke A
b
r . t . ise Brooke A
b
r .
PRICE v . ALMORY , in King ' s Bench , Trinity , 10 Jac . 1 , A . D . 1613 . — Moore
831 .
In ejectione firmae , it was found specially that Tho . Moore , possessing
a term for 40 years , devised it to his wife for life if so long a widow , re
mainder to his son and the heirs o
f
his body . The wife being executor
entered and claimed the term as a legacy . John the son died in the
life of the wife , the wife died , John ' s executor entered , and the court
was of opinion that the entry o
f
the executors was not lawful , because
John had only a possibility and no interest . See Chedington ' s Case 1
Coke 153 , where such possibility did not pass to the administrator ; and
Manning ' s Case , 8 Coke 96 , where such devise was good as an executory
devise ; but the case did not say that if the devisee of such possibility
die before the event happened , if the possibility would pass to the ex




COTTON V . HEATH , in King ' s Bench , 1638 . — 1 Roll . Abr . 612 , p
l
. 3 , 5
Gray ' s Cases on Property , 135 .
If A , possessed of a term of years , devises it to B , his wife , for 18
years , then to C , hi
s
eldest son , for life , and then to the eldest issue





devise and death of the devisor , yet if he has issue male before his death ,
such issue male will have it as an executory devise ; because , although
it be a contingency upon a contingency , and the issue not in esse a
t
the
time of the devise , yet as it is limited to him but for life , it is good , and
all one with Manning ' s Case [ante — ] . On a reference out of chancery
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to the Justices JONES, CROKE , and BERKELEY , by them resolved without
question .
WRIGHT ex d. PLOWDEN v. CARTWRIGHT , in King ' s Bench of England ,
Easter term , 30 Geo . II , A . D. 1757 . - 1 Burrows 282 .
On case stated from the assizes . Edmund Plowden , being seized in
fee , demised by deed indented between him and Elizabeth Cartwright
only , Oct . 5, 1676 , to her fo
r
9
9 years if she so long live , and after her
death if she happen to die within the said term or other end or termina
tion o
f
the said term , the remainder to Rowland Cartwright (her eldest
son then within age ) fo
r
and during the residue of said term from
thence ensuing and fully to be complete and ended ; yielding and paying ,
& c . , and doing suit at a mill , & c . , with penalty for every time that she
o
r
Rowland shall grind a
t
another mill , and paying a heriot on the
death o
f
either . And it was covenanted that both of them shall repair ,
& c . , and the lessor on his part covenants that both shall quietly enjoy .
Elizabeth entered , was possessed , and died Sept . 4 , 1694 ; whereon Row
land entered and was possessed till he died Nov . 5 , 1753 . Plaintiff ' s
lessor is heir o
f




Aston argued for the plaintiff that the term was expired on the death of
Elizabeth , the limitation over being void ; and he cited Dyer 253b , pl . 102 ;
Green V . Edwards , Cro . Eliz . 216 [ante - ] as exactly this case ; Rector
o
f Chedlington ' s Case , 1 Coke 153b ; Coke Lit . 45b ; and Sheppards ' Touch
stone 274 .
Nares , when beginning to speak for the defendant , was stopped b
y
the
chief justice , who proceeded thus :
LORD MANSFIELD : The distinction just cited from Sheppard (which
h
e
takes from the Rector o
f Chedington ' s Case ) makes no difference
if the word term may signify the time as well as the interest , for then
it becomes merely a question o
f
construction which sense the word ought
to be understood in . So Anderson argued in Green v . Edwards . He
said : “ If the wife had been a party to the deed , durante termino
should not b
e
taken for the interest but for the time . ” He said : “ The
word term cannot be taken to mean the interest which the husband had
for the 90 years ; " for if it is so understood , b
y
his death the whole
would be determined , and the wife could have nothing ; and therefore
it could not be used in this sense , but the lessor b
y
the word term must
mean the time o
f
9










remainder to be void from the uncertainty o
f
commence
ment , and denied that the wife ' s being a party would have made any
alteration .
The old cases held that there could be no remainder or substitution o
f





will . It was a mere possi
bility . It was void from the uncertainty o
f
commencement . There
was no particular estate . The gift o
f
a term (like any other chattel )
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for an hour was good forever . The objections were subtle and arti
ficial . When long and beneficial terms came in use the convenience of
families required that they might be settled upon a child after the
death of a parent. Such limitations were soon allowed to be created by
will , and the old objections were removed b
y
changing the name , from
remainders to executory devices . The same reasons required that such
limitations might be created b
y
deed ; as , for instance , marriage settle
ments to answer the agreements o
f parties and exigencies o
f
families .
Therefore , to get out o
f
the literal authority of ol
d
cases , an ingenious
distinction was invented , a remainder might be limited for the residue
o
f
the term . Now in this case , upon the true construction of the lease ,











There are many maxims of law that deeds , especially such as execute
mutual agreements for valuable consideration , should be construed lib
erally , u
t
res magis valeat according to the intent , which ought always
to prevail unless it be contrary to law .
The passage from Coke Littleton 45b , cited by Mr . Aston , defines
the word term to signify in understanding o
f
law " not only the limits
and limitations of time , but also the estate and interest which passes
for that time . ” If in this lease the word be taken in the latter sense ,





she should live ,
and the son have nothing afterwards . But it is manifest that an interest
was understood to continue after her death , to be enjoyed b
y
her son .
From the course o
f
nature it could not be supposed that she would out
live the 99 years . Rowland is to pay a penalty for grinding at another
mill . He is to pay a heriot on the death of hi
s
mother . He is to repair .
The lessor covenants that Rowland shall quietly enjoy , i . e . , for so many
years a
s
should not be run at the death o
f
his mother . The first sense
o
f
the word makes everything consistent and effectual ; the second sense
destroys one -half o
f
the lease as repugnant and contradictory to the other .
There ought to be no doubt , therefore , in which sense the word should
b
e understood .
Mr . Aston has laid no stress upon the only objection which weighed
with Anderson , so long ago as 33d Elizabeth , vi
z
. , that Rowland was no
party to the lease ; and rightly . The reason why he was no party appears
from the lease : he was an infant ; the mother contracts and procures
this limitation for him . A grant may be made to a person b
y
a deed
to which he is no party . Rowland accepted and actually enjoyed after
his mother ' s death , from the 4th of September , 1694 , to his own death ,
the 5th o
f November , 1753 . The lease was so intelligible to every un
learned eye that nobody doubted of his title for 60 years . Limitations
o
f
terms are now of general use . Their bounds are settled . The rules




declaration of trust the substantial reason was the same for
allowing them b
y
deed . A strained construction should not be made to
overturn the lawful intent o
f
the parties . It was lawful to secure this
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lease for the benefit of the mother during her life, and afterwards by way
of provision for her son . All the parties undoubtedly intended it. The
covenant here , that Rowland should enjoy from the death of his mother ,
is sufficiently certain , and might of itself amount to a lease .
MR. JUSTICE DENISON : This must be taken that she should hold it for
so much of the term of years as she should live , and Rowland during
the remainder. The intention of the deed is obvious, and it certainly
shows , upon the whole tenor of it, that the intention of the parties was
that both should enjoy during the whole term and number of years .
And if we can support the intention by any construction we will do it .
MR. JUSTICE FOSTER was clear that the intention was that both should





she should live , and Rowland during the remainder .
All the circumstances show this ; and the reserving a heriot upon the
death o
f
Rowland proves the intention to have been that the term should
continue to Rowland after the death o
f
his mother . And the covenants
all along run , “that Rowland shall quietly enjoy . " Therefore he con
curred .
Per Curiam , unanimously (Mr . Justice WILMOT , absent ) : RULE :
That the plaintiff be nonsuited .
CULBRETH v . SMITH , in Maryland Court of Appeals , Nov . 23 , 1888 — 69
Md . 450 , 16 Atl . 112 , 1 L . R . A . 538 .
Bill of Culbreth as administrator cum testamento annexo of John
Girard , against Chas . Smith and others children o
f
Wm . Smith . Plaint
if
f appeals from decree dismissing the bill .






9 years , renewable forever , executed
a deed granting and assigning that estate to her grand -nephew James
Coburn Smith and her grandson John Gerard Coburn , “ subject to the
reservations and conditions hereinafter , " in the deed , " expressed . ” The
deed , after describing the property , proceeds : “ Reserving , however , to
Susan Coburn , the use and enjoyment o
f
the said property fo
r
and dur
ing the term o
f
her natural life , so that she may have , hold , use , occupy ,
and enjoy the same , and collect and apply the rents , issues , and profits
thereof , as fully and completely as though these presents had not been
executed , and , from and immediately after the death of said Susan
Coburn , then to have and hold the same * * * unto the said James
Coburn Smith and John Gerard Coburn , in the manner following , that
is to say : * * * As to one undivided moiety or half part thereof ,
to the said James Coburn Smith , his personal representatives and as
signs , and as to the other moiety to the said John Gerard Coburn fo
r
and during the term o
f
his natural life , and after his death then to his
children and descendants per sterpes ; but should he die without issue
and leaving said Susan Knight surviving him , then to said Susan Knight
for and during the term o
f
her natural life ; * * * and after the
death o
f
said Susan Knight , or upon the death of the said John Gerard
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Coburn , should he survive her and die without issue , then to the children
and descendants (other than said James Coburn Smith ) of William
Smith , nephew of said Susan Coburn , per sterpes .” She subsequently
made a will wherein she names the said John Gerard Coburn residuary
devisee and legatee . Shortly thereafter she and the said James Coburn
Smith executed a deed to John Gerard Coburn , conveying to him the
moiety of said leasehold estate granted to Smith in the first mentioned
deed , and declaring that this conveyance of said moiety was “ subject to
a life-estate therein of said Susan Coburn , and to the limitations and
conditions set forth in ” the first-mentioned deed , and also " to the re
mainder and remainders therein provided , and in all respects in the
same manner and upon the same terms as though both moieties of said
property had passed to said John G . Coburn in and by the deed afore
said .” Susan Coburn died in 1882. John Gerard Coburn died in 1887
without ever having had any issue . Susan Knight died after the bill
of complaint was filed in this cause ; and now the children of William
Smith (other than James Coburn Smith ) claim the leasehold estate
under the limitations to them in the deeds we have quoted from . The
appellant, who is the administrator c. t. a . of the estate of John Gerard
Coburn , filed a bill in the circuit court of Baltimore city , insisting that
these deeds are void ; that they did not convey the term out of Susan
Coburn ; and that, consequently , that property passed under the residuary
clause of her will to John Gerard Coburn , and belongs to his personal
representatives . The ground upon which this claim is founded is thus
stated in the bill of complaint , viz . : “ Your orator is advised that no
interest passed from the said Susan Coburn by the said deeds , because
said deeds are void , it being apparent that she did not mean to part
with her interest in the term during her own life , and her life interest
being deemed in law of greater value and longer duration than any term
of years ; so that the interest of the said Susan Coburn in said property
was the same after the execution of said deeds as before , and she was
possessed of the same interest in the same manner at the time of her
death .” Some of the defendants answered the bill , one demurred , and
one pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. The circuit court , upon
hearing , dismissed the bill ; hence this appeal.
It is obvious that this claim of the appellant is based upon the nar
rowest technical grounds , and rests solely upon the assumption that
the reservation of a life - estate by deed in a chattel real defeats every lim
itation in remainder . The particular regard which the common law
showed to the tenant of a freehold , and the preference given to him
above a tenant fo
r
years , depended upon feudal principles which have no
application to the condition o
f society under our form of government .
In feudal times this estate was , perhaps , more valuable and permanent
than an estate for years , a
s long terms were then unknown ; o
r more
honorable , as proof o
f military tenure , which embraced privileges only
allowed to tenants o
f
the king , who took the oath of fealty — an oath
which was never permitted to b
e
taken b
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than for life : 1 Taylor , Landlord and Tenant (8th ed. ), $14 note . But
this undoubted doctrine for the common law , that an estate in land for
life is superior to an estate for years , no matter how long its duration
may be, has no relation whatever to a case like this ; and any attempt
to apply it here would lead to the most erroneous and anomalous re
sults, as a brief consideration will clearly demonstrate . A leasehold
has always been considered personal estate , subject to all the rules
governing that species of property , save in so far as those rules have
been modified by express legislation : Arthur v. Cole , 56 Md. 107 ; Tay
lor v. Taylor , 47 Md . 295 . Blackstone , in his Commentaries (book 2, c.
9, * 144 ) , observes that “ because no livery of seizin is necessary to a
lease for years , such lessee is not said to be seized or to have legal seizin
of the lands. Nor , indeed , does the bare lease vest any estate in the
lessee , but only gives him a right of entry on the tenement, which right
is called his interest in the term , or interesse termini ; but when he has
actually so entered , and thereby accepted the grant, the estate is then ,
and not before , vested in him , and he is possessed , not properly of the
land , but of the term of years — the possession or seizin of the land re
maining still in him who had the freehold .” The reversionary freehold
estate is subject exclusively to the law that governs real property , while
the leasehold estate is mainly controlled by the law that governs per
sonalty ; the one estate passing by descent , and being subject to the law
of partition among heirs , while the other is the subject of administra
tion , and is governed by the law that directs distribution of personal
estate : Myers v. Sill jacks, 58 Md . 330 .
It is apparent therefore that the estate held by Susan Coburn before
she executed the deeds to John G . Coburn was merely personal property ,
because only an interest in the residue of a term of years renewable for
ever . But she conveyed this personal property to John G . Coburn
for his life, with remainders over , reserving to herself a life -estate therein .
This reservation , being for her life, converted , it is insisted , a purely
personal estate into a freehold , and changed what was only an interest
in a term into a freehold interest in land . Thus by her own act , if this
be true, she enlarged her estate from personal to real, and, by force
of the reservation , vested in herself an estate of a quality and character
totally different from and superior to the one she in fact originally
possessed . This she certainly could not do, because a life -estate in
personal property can never , from the nature of the thing , become a
freehold estate - can never become real estate . The anomaly becomes
more striking if we suppose the case of a conveyance of a leasehold
estate for life to one grantee , and for the residue of the term to an
other . The grantor having but an interest in the term conveys that in
terest to one for life , who thereupon takes at once , not what the grantor
could confer , but a freehold — an estate in the land — which the grantor
not only never had or possessed , and consequently could not convey ,
but which in fact belonged to another person , the lessor. The result
would be that the grantee would succeed to an estate greater than that
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which his grantor enjoyed . As no one can grant that which he does
not have, it is difficult to perceive how the owner of a chattel real can
possibly , by any form of conveyance or by any act of his own , enlarge
that chattel into a freehold estate , either in himself or in his alienee .
Whatever may have been the doctrine asserted in some very old cases
on this subject, the strong tendency of the courts has been to discard
such subtle and artificial rules, and even sometimes to invent the most
refined distinctions to accomplish that end . The case of Wright v.
Cartwright, 1 Burrow 282 [above ], differing from this case rather in
form than in substance , not only illustrates this but sustains our con
clusions here that these deeds are perfectly valid . [Here his honor states
the facts and quotes at length from the opinion in that case , and then
proceeds : ]
It is clear that had Susan Coburn made the same disposition by will
which she did by these deeds , it would now be held valid and effective ,
even though the same early cases invoked here to defeat these deeds
equally decided against any such limitation by will . But, as stated by
Lord MANSFIELD , the literal authority of these cases was voided by
ingenious distinctions , and by merely changing the name of a remainder ,
and calling it an executory devise ; and when these remainders " came to
be allowed by will or by declaration of trust , the substantial reason was
the same for allowing them by deed .” By the ancient common law
there could be no future property , to take place in expectancy , created
in goods and chattels ; yet in last wills and testaments such limitations
of personal goods and chattels in remainder after a bequest fo
r
life
were permitted , though originally that indulgence was only shown when
merely the use o
f
the goods , and not the goods themselves , was given
to the first legatee . But long before Sir William Blackstone wrote his




r will , limited his books or furniture to A for life , with
remainder over to B , this remainder was good ; unless , indeed , the
property was such that its use was its consumption : 2 Bl . Com . * 398 ;
1 Broom & II . Com . * 593 ; 2 Kent Com . * 352 . In Clarges v . Albemarle
(1691 ) , 2 Vern . 245 , and Hyde v . Perrat , 1 P . Wms . 1 , this distinction
between a gift of the personal chattel itself to one for life with remainder
to another , and the gift o
f
the use thereof to one for life with re
mainder over , was exploded , and it was held that it amounted to the
same thing whether the gift was the one way o
r
the other ; for the tes
tator ' s intention appeared to be the same in both cases , and ought
equally in both cases to prevail : Westcott v . Cady , 5 Johns . C
h . ( N .
Y . ) 334 , 9 Am . Doc . 306 . In Langworthy v . Chadwick , 13 Conn . 42 , it
was held that a remainder in personal chattels , dependent on an estate
for life , may be created b
y
grant or devise , and the interest so created
will be protected in chancery . In Hope v . Hutchins , 9 Gill & J . (Md . )
7
7 , the donor of personal property reserved in the deed o
f gift the use
o
f
the property during her life , and it was held to be valid . Now , a
leasehold interest , though it be a chattel real , is still personal estate , and
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there is no substantial reason why this particular species of personal
property should be excluded from the operation of the rule just stated ,
and now recognized as governing personal property generally . We know
of no principle which will or ought to prevent the application to lease
hold estates of the settled doctrine which sustains the creation by deed
of a life-estate in personal chattels with a remainder over ; and we hold
that this may be done whether the property be given for life with re
mainder over , or whether the property be given and a mere use for
the donor 's benefit during life be reserved — there being , as stated in
Westcott v . Cady , supra , no substantial difference between these two
modes of doing the same thing.
But there is another reason why the very old cases spoken of by
Lord MANSFIELD should not be followed in this state , and that is this :
Leases with covenants for perpetual renewal were never generally used
in England. Lord Chancellor LIFFORD , in Boyle v. Lysaght , Vern . & S.
135 , quoted by this court in Banks v . II askie, 15 Md . 223 , expressly
stated that this kind of tenure was not known in England. “ They had ,"
he said , “ no such tenure there .” Originally in that country leases were
created for very limited periods , not exceeding 40 years ; though as early
as the reign of Edward III , longer fixed terms were in use , but these
latter terms were not extensively introduced until after the adoption
of the statute of 21 Hen . VIII, c. 15 ſante - 1 : 2 Bl. Com . * 112 .
Nearly all these leases were for fixed and limited terms. On the other
hand, in Ireland, leases for a definite term , renewable forever , were in
almost universal use . “ This character of tenure is , so far as we know
among the states , peculiar to Maryland . It was introduced here in
colonial times , and has been a favorite system of tenure from a very early
period .” Banks v . Haskie , supra . It is co -extensive with the fee itself in
duration , and though personal estate , it can only be conveyed as real
estate is : Bratt v. Bratt , 21 Md. 583 . This form of tenure being so
wholly unlike that which prevailed in England , it would be unwise and
highly impolitic , even if we had the power , to strike down these and all
similar leases by rigidly bringing them , in this state , within the scope
of a rule of the ancient common law never heretofore applied to them .
We are not required by any provision of the organic law of the state to
adopt such a rule here , and to subject to its operation and control a
species of tenures unknown to the common law , but borrowed by the
early settlers of the colony from a different system of jurisprudence .
A long-established and well -understood usage has sanctioned such a
convevance , and a departure from it now would unsettle , and probably
overthrow , many titles hitherto believed to be perfectly good . No ques
tion has ever been heretofore raised in this court in respect to the right
to convey hy deed such terms for life with remainders and limitations
over . Doubtless many titles, involving vast amounts of money , are now
held under just such leases as these. Cases have been before this court
involving the construction of leases of this character, but the point now
raised against their validity was not even suggested , though in at least
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one of those cases such an objection , if made and sustained , would have
been decisive against the remainders (Winter v. Gorsuch , 51 Md. 180 ) ;
where the court held the limitation over a life-estate void , but because
such a limitation could not lawfully be made by deed , but because the
premises of the deed granted the whole term , and the habendum , which
restricted the grant to a life -estate , and created the remainders , could
not be allowed to abridge or cut down the estate given by the premises .
Had it been supposed that the deed was void because repugnant to the
common law , no doubt the point would have been made and passed upon .
See also Arthur v . Cole , 56 Md. 107. The learned judge of the circuit
court based his decree upon the construction which he placed on article




the appellant as the doctrine o
f
the common law , had been abrogated
b
y
this legislation . We concur with his reasoning on this point , and
would b
e
content to rest our affirmance o
f
his decree thereon if the other
considerations assigned b
y
use were not also amply sufficient . The
decree appealed from will be affirmed .
Statute o
f
New York , Mich . , & c . “ An estate for life may be created in a
term for years and a remainder limited thereon . " N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) , pt . 2 ,
c . 1 , t . 2 , Art . 1 , § 24 ; Mich . R . S . ( 1846 ) , c . 62 , § 24 ( 1897 ) , § 8806 ; Minn .
S
t
. ( 1866 ) , c . 45 , § 24 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , § 3213 ; Wis . R . S . ( 1849 ) , c . 56 , § 24 ,
St . ( 1898 ) , $ 2048 .
" A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term of years unless
the nature of the contingency on which it is limited be such that the re
mainder must vest in interest during the continuance of not more than
two lives in being at the creation of such remainder , or upon the termination
thereof . " N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) , pt . 2 , c . 1 , t . 2 , Art . 1 , $ 20 ; Mich . R . S . ( 1846 ) ,
c . 62 , $ 20 , C . L . (1897 ) , 88802 ; Minn . St . 1866 ) , c . 45 , 820 , R . L . (1905 ) ,
$ 3209 ; Wis . R . S . ( 1849 ) , c . 56 , 820 , St . (1898 ) , $ 2044 .
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ANON . , Hilary , 22 Hen . 7 , A . D . 1507 — Keilwey 88b .
The opinion was that if one make a feoffment of land in fee to the
use o
f
himself and his heirs , if the feoffor make a lease for a term of
years to a man rendering rent , and die , that the lease is good by the
statute ( 1 Rich . 3 , c . 1 ) . If the heir in this case should bring an action
o
f
debt generally and show the lease made by his father , and though the
reversion descended to him , and by rent becoming in arrear after the
death o
f
his father an action accrued to him , by all the court such a count
would not b
e good , but he ought to show the feoffment made b
y
his
father to the use o
f
himself and his heirs , and so to make a special
count . And it was also said , that although the rent was reserved only
to the lessor and not to his heirs , yet his heir should have it during
the term , for the rent is parcel of the reversion ; and as the reversion
descended to the heir , so the rent though not thus limited expressly in
the lease .
400 FUTURE ESTATES .
ANON ., 3 Mary , A . D . 1556 - Brooke' s New Cases , pl. 470 , Marsh ' s trans
lation t. Feoffments to Uses , Bro. Abr . t. Feoftments to Uses 59 .
If a covenant by indenture be that the son of A shall marry the
daughter of C , for which C . gives A 100£ ., and for this A covenants
with C . that if the marriage takes not effect, that A and his heirs shall
be seised of 150 acres of land in D to the use of C and his heirs until
A his heirs or executors repay the 100£ ., and afterwards C has issue
within age and dies, and afterwards the marriage takes not effect , by
which the estate is executed in the heir of C by the statute of uses made
27 Hen . 8 , notwithstanding that C died before the refusal of the mar
riage, for now the use and possession vests in the heirs of C , for that
the indentures and covenants shall have relation to the making of the in
dentures, for these indentures bind the land with the use, which in
dentures were made in the life of C . But by Brooke query whether the
heir of C shall be in ward to the lord , for be is heir , and yet a pur
chaser , as it seems.
BULLEN V. GRANT, in Queen 's Bench , Mich . 81 & 32 Eliz., A . D . 1501 .
- Cro . Eliz . 148 .
Trespass . The case upon evidence was, Hugh Bullen , father of the
plaintiff , being a copyholder in fee, surrenders the land to the use of his
last will , and devises it to his wife for life, remainder to G , his son in
tail , remainder to T , his son , in tail . The lord admits M and afterwards
admits G . The wife dies. G dies without issue . T is admitted and sur
renders to the use of the defendant and dies without issue . The plaint
if
f , before admittance , being the heir of Hugh B , enters , and upon an
ouster brings trespass . It was held PER CURIAM that the heir may enter
without admittance ; for WRAY said when the surrender is to the use of
his last will , this is at first o
f
all the whole fee ; but when he deviseth
the land for life or in tail , and doth not meddle with the reversion , b
y
this the reversion never passed out o
f
him , to the lord , but descends to
his heir , and he shall have it without any admittance . * * *
MILFORD v . FENWIKE , in the King ' s Bench , Mich . , 32 & 33 Eliz . , A . D .
1591 . - 1 And . 288 . Same case sub nom . Fenwike v . Mitforth , Moor 284 ,













Ejectione firmae was brought in the king ' s bench b
y Margery and
Mary Milford against Fenwike , in which the case was that Anthony
Milford , being seised o
f
land in fee , levied a fine o
f it to divers per
sons to the use of his wife for life , and after to the use o
f Jasper his
son in tail , and after to the use of his right heirs ; after which the
said Anthony leased t land for 1000 years to said Fenwike and died ,
later the wife died , and the son also without issue ; on which matter
the doubt was if the lease was good o
r not . And those who argued
against the lease claimed that this was a remainder to the right heirs
o
f Anthony , and that they took the land as purchasers , and so now the
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lease is determined by the death of the lessor , and on this an action would
not lie . On the other side it was said that it should be a reversion ;
the cause of which , as it was said , was , fo
r
this , that what the said
Anthony had limited in remainder in fee to his right heirs he should
have in himself , and if he limit such a thing in use or possession to his
heirs the limitation is void ; for it may not take effect in the heir of
him who limits it if not b
y
descent . And other arguments were made
o
n
uses express and implied , * * * . And a
t
last it was adjudged b
y
the court , Mich . 32 , 33 Eliz . , that the lease was good , for this that the
fee simple remained in the lessor , and was as a reversion , and they gave
their reason on the cause above .
ANON . , in King ' s Bench , uncertain tima . — 1 And . 256 , p
l
. 264 .
If one make a feoffment in fee to the use of himself for life , re
mainder over to a stranger for life in use , and after this to the use of
the right heirs o
f
the feoffor ; the question was if this fee simple was to
this day in the feoffor or not ; and this in the nature of a reversion
in him o
r not , o
r if it should be in the nature of a remainder to the heirs
o
f
the feoffor ; and it was agreed b
y
the COURT o
f king ' s bench ( as
the chief justice said to me ) , that the fee is in the feoffor , and the use
limited to the heirs o
f
the feoffor is a use o
f
the fee in himself in the
nature o
f
a reversion ; fo
r
this that it came from himself and b
y
his
own act , and not from any other ; which being the law , it follows that
the feoffor may sell the land , & c . , and if he should die without heir
o
f
age it shall be in ward ; and so here it is accounted in all cases as a
reversion ; see before [ 1 And . ] case 3 , but it is better , reported by Dyer
in his book .
That limitation to heirs o
f
feoffer is reversion . Jordan v . McClure (1877 ) ,
85 Pa . St . 495 .
BEDINGFIELD V ONSLOW , in Common Pleas , Easter , 1 Jac . 2 , A . D .
1685 . - 3 Lev . 209 . Abridged .
Case , and declares that plaintiff was seised in fee o
f
a close , and de
fendant possessed o
f
the adjoining one , between which closes ran a
rivulet , and that defendant stopped it , and so that plaintiff ' s trees were
drowned , and perished . Defendant pleads that the tenant holding under
lease b
y plaintiff ' s father had accepted satisfaction for said trespass ,
to which plaintiff demurs . And after arguments at the bar , and con
sideration of the books of 19 Hen . 6 , 12 ; 12 Hen . 6 , 4 ; 2 Roll Abr . 551 ;
Love v . Piggot , Cro . Eliz . 55 ; it was resolved b
y
CHARLTON , LEVINZ ,
and STREET , who only were in court , that this was no plea ; for the
plaintiff , in respect of the prejudice done to the reversion , may maintain
a
n action ; * * * and satisfaction given to one is no bar to the other .
But trespass during the plaintiff ' s term could not be had , it being
founded merely on the possession .
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METHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH v. YOUNG , in N . Car . Sup . Ct., Feb .
18, 1902 . — 130 N . Car . 8, 40 S. E . 691 .
Action by the Methodist Protestant Church of Henderson and
others against J . R . Young and others , to quiet title . From a judgment
in favor of plaintiffs . Defendants appeal .
FURCHES , C . J . On the 21st of September, 1880, in consideration
of $ 1. W . A . Harris conveyed the land in controversy to “ D . E . Young ,
Geo . A . Harris , and John F . Harris ,” trustees of the plaintiff church ,
" and to their successors in office , upon which to build a church for
the worship of Almighty God ,” with full warranty against the right
and claim of all other persons whatsoever. But he provided that if
said church " discontinue the occupancy of said lot in manner as
aforesaid , then this deed shall be null and void , and the said lot or
parcel of ground shall revert to the said W . A . Harris and his heirs
and assigns forever .” The plaintiffs erected a church building on
said lo
t
soon thereafter , and continued to occupy and use the same as
a place o
f worship until December , 1900 , a
t
which time , their church
having increased until the building could not afford suitable accomoda
tion for the congregation , the plaintiffs decided to build a new church ;
and for the reason that the location had become undesirable for a
church , and for the reason that the plaintiffs thought the lot would
be more valuable to sell it with the building on it than it would be to
tear down the building , which they would have to do to build on the
same lot , they purchased another lot near by , and built a church on
that lo
t
. In December , 1882 , the said W . A . Harris died , leaving a
last will and testament , and one son , W . C . Harris , and one daughter ,
Pattie Young , his only children , and heirs a
t
law . By his said will he
devised and bequeathed his property to his two children , in which
he used the following language : To Pattie Young , “ one -half of all
my real and personal estate , of every kind and description , not here
inbefore disposed o
f
. ” Walter C . Harris is still living , but Pattie
died in October , 1892 , without issue , leaving a last will and testament ,
in which , after making numerous other dispositions of her property .
she willed in item 19 as follows : “ It is my will and desire that all the
rest and residue o
f my property , real , personal , and mixed , o
f
which I
may die seised and possessed , shall be sold and collected b
y my exec
utor hereinafter named , upon such terms as to time as he may deem
best . ” She then named the defendant Young as her executor , and he
claims one -half o
f
the property in controversy , under this nineteenth
item o
f
Pattie Young ' s will ; and the plaintiffs for the purpose of
removing this cloud upon the title , brought this action .
It will be observed that the deed from W . A . Harris to the plaintiff
is a
n
absolute fee , which may have continued forever . But it con
tains a condition b
y
which this absolute estate may b
e
defeated , which
makes it an estate in fee upon condition , o
r , as it is called in the old
books , a base o
r qualified fee and is sometimes called a conditional
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limitation , - a condition by which the estate may be defeated or is limited .
It is admitted that the condition had been broken by the plaintiff , and
that W . A . Harris , if living , might enter and revest himself of the
estate , and, as he is dead , that his heirs might do so . But it is con
tended that no one else can do so , and that at the time of the breach
both W . A . Harris ( the grantor ) and Pattie Young being dead , Walter
C . Harris being the only heir of said W . A . Harris and of Pattie Young ,
is the only one who could enter , - Gray, Perp ., p . 6 , § 12 ( 2 ) , — and that
since the breach of the condition , and before the commencement of
this action , the plaintiff has received a quitclaim deed of conveyance
from said Walter C . Harris , and is now the absolute owner of said
property in fee simple ; while the defendant contends that, although
the breach did not take place until after the death of both W . A . Harris
and Pattie Young , the said W . A . had a right or interest in said property
which he could will and did will to Pattie , and that the will of W . A .
gave her an interest which she could and did will to the defendant , and
that the deed from Walter C . to the plaintiff only conveys a one un
divided half interest therein , and that this defendant is entitled to the
other half thereof . Until the breach of the condition , neither said W .
A . Harris nor said Pattie Young had any interest or estate in this
property . The absolute estate was in the plaintiff , and therefore could
not be in any one else . Neither W . A . nor Pattie ever had an estate , an
interest nor even an expectancy in this property , as an heir may have
in the estate of his ancestor , as by reason of natural causes the ancestor
must die , and the law declares his heirs , to whom his estate will descend .
But in this case there was nothing to limit the estate of the plaintiff , and
until the breach the grantee had the same rights as if it was a fee simple .
2 Chit. Bl. * 109 , * 110 , note 15 ; Id . * 155 -* 157 ; Gray, Perp ., supra . And
the grantor having nothing, he could convey nothing by his will, and
Pattie had nothing to convey by her will . Suppose that A . is the next
of kin and heir at law of B ., and A . should die . His children would be
the next of kin and heirs at law of B . A . dies in the lifetime of B .
leaving a last will and testament, in which he willed to C . (item 19 )
as follows : “ It is my will and desire that all the rest and residue of
my property , real, personal, and mixed , of which I may die seised and
possessed , shall be sold and collected by my executor hereinafter named . ”
— and named Y . as his executor. After the death of A ., B . dies in
testate . Would it be contended that the estate coming to A .'s children
from B .'s estate passed to C . by A .'s will ? It most certainly would not ,
for the reason that A . had no interest in Bi' s estate at the time of his
death . And for the same reason the will of W . A . Harris passed no
title , estate , or interest to Pattie in the property in controversy , because
he had no interest in it to convey , and Pattie 's will passed nothing to
the defendant .
It seems that it is hardly denied by the defendant but what at the
common law the estate in the land in controversy would have reverted
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to the heir at law , Walter C . Harris, upon condition broken . But be
contends that this is changed by the act of 1844 (Code, $ 2141) , which
makes the will speak from the death of the testator, and by the pro
visions of section 2140 of the Code. Other clauses are relied upon by the
defendant to sustain his contention , but the following paragraph seems
to be most nearly in point, and controls the others, if any of them bear
upon the question , and that is as follows : " And also to all rights of
entry for conditions broken , and other rights of entry ; and also to such
of the same estate , interest and rights respectively , and other real and
personal estate as the testator may be entitled to at the time of his death .”
This evidently means rights of entry for conditions broken in the life
time of the testator, and where he had the right of entry while living .
This seems to us manifestly the proper construction of this statute ,
such rights as he has “ at the time of his death .” And besides this be
ing manifestly the proper construction of the statute , it puts the statute
in harmony with the plainest principles of law governing the rights of
property , as it cannot be supposed that the legislature intended to au
thorize a testator to will what he did not have .
Our opinion , then , is that at the death of W . A . Harris he had no
interest in the property in controversy , and no interest therein passed
to Pattie Young by his will. And of course , if W . A . Harris had no
interest, none passed to her under the will of W . A . Harris , nor could
she inherit what her father did not have ; and she had nothing to will
to the defendant Young , and he has no interest in the same. Our
opinion , further , is that upon the breach of the condition in 1900 the
right of entry and the estate in the land in controversy reverted to Walter
C . Harris , the only heir at law of the grantee , W . A . Harris , at the time
of the breach , and that , as plaintiff has acquired the title of W . C . Har
ris in and to said land , it is the absolute owner thereof in fee simple
The judgment below is affirmed.
MONTGOMERY , J., did not sit on the hearing of this appeal.
DOUGLAS , J . (concurring only in the result ) . I cannot agree with the
opinion of the court that until the breach of condition “ the absolute
estate was in the plaintiff , and therefore could not be in any one else .”
The deed of W . A . Harris to the plaintiff conveved a determinable fee,
having the incidents of a fee simple , except that of alienation , but liable
to be entirely defeated . By it
s very terms it could never b
e enlarged







his heirs . It contained no inherent power o
f enlargement . It is true ,
such a
n
estate is sometimes called a fe
e
simple limited or conditional ,





solute fee . If it were , nothing would remain in the grantor , and hence
no one could take advantage o
f
the possible defeasance . There must re
main in the grantor a
t least a possibility o
f
reverter , which , while not
a
n
estate , is in itself a right , coupled with the contingent right o
f
entry .
This right may be in abeyance , but if it exists a











t ' s cooung , 89 vamay b
e
tentially , it must exist in the grantor . It seems to me that the pos
sibility of reverter is also an interest in the land , and thereby , b
y
a double
title , comes within the provisions of section 2140 of the Code . The
word has been thus defined : “ Interest means concern ; also , advantage ;
good ; share ; portion ; part ; participation ; any right in the nature o
f
property , but less than title . It
s
chief use seems to designate some right
attaching to property which either cannot or need not be defined with
precision . ” 16 Am . & Eng . Enc . Law ( 2d Ed . ) 1102 . Coke says :
" Interest , ex v
i
termini , in legal understanding , extended to estates ,
rights , and titles that a man hath of , in , to , or out o
f
lands ; for he is truly
said to have an interest in them . ” Co . Litt . 345a . Interests may be
vested , executory , or contingent . In Young V . Young , 89 Va . 675 ,
1
7
S . E . 470 , 23 L R . A . 642 , it was held that a conti ent remainder
was an interest or claim to real state , and might be disposed of by deed
o
r will under a statute using those terms . In fact , the word seems to
be one of extreme elasticity , which may be used to include nearly every
thing legally connecting the claimant with the subject -matter . Section
2140 o
f










his death ; * * * and the power hereby given shall extend to all
contingent , executory or other future interest in any real or personal
estate , whether the testator may or may not be the person or one o
f
the
persons , in whom the same may become vested , or whether he may be
entitled thereto under the instrument b
y
which the same was created ,
o
r
under any disposition thereof b
y
deed o
r will ; and also to a
ll rights
o
f entry for condition broken , and other rights of entry , " etc . It would
be difficult for one to make the language o
f
the statute any broader ; and
I cannot doubt that it includes , and was intended to include , al
l
contin
gent , executory , or other future interests , as well as all rights o
f
entry ,
whether vested or contingent . The possibility of reverter is a contin
gent interest , which becomes vested upon condition broken . Upon entry
the grantor or his heir is remitted to his former estate , and the reversion ,
o
f
course , becomes merged into the fee . I see no reason of public policy
why the statute should exclude a possibility o
f
reverter , with its contin
gent right o
f entry , from the power of testamentary disposition , but a
very strong reason why it should be included . In England , the home o
f
the common law , the rule of primogeniture made the entry of the heir a
very simple matter , as there was practically but one heir ; but here it is
different . Determinable fees may last for a very long time , and the grantor
may have a large number o
f
descendants scattered over the country .
Must they a
ll
enter upon condition broken , or can one enter for all and




f application , which may be avoided b
y
testamentary dis
position . I am therefore forced to the conclusion that the possibility of
reverter could have been devised by either the grantor or his daughter ,





latter is a different question . I am not prepared to say that a person
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"may die seised and possessed ” of a possibility of reverter . If it did not
pass by Pattie 's will , it went to Walter , as Pattie 's heir , and was by his
deed conveyed to the plaintiff . I am thus brought to the conclusion of
the court .
Accord : 4 Kent Com . * 511 ; Deas v. Horry (1835 ) , 2 Hill ( S. Car .) 244 , 249 .
In Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish ( 1838 ) , 38 Mass. ( 21 Pick . ) 215 , the in
terest of the grantor under a deed conveying land in fee subject to a con
dition subsequent was held to be a devisable interest before breach , and the
devisee 's action to recover was sustained .
D conveyed a strip of land to a railway company for its tracks, on express
condition that the road should be built by a time named . Before the time
expired D conveyed all the land to Nicoll including by general terms the strip
previously conveyed , but subject to the right of the railway company . The
road not having been built by the time specified , Nicoll brought ejectment
to recover the strip . The court held that D parted with all his interest,
having only a possibility of reverter , not transferable ; and that therefore he
could not by deed made before condition broken pass any right to the
plaintiff . Various statutes claimed to enable such transfers were held not
to have that effect . Nicoll v. New York & E . Ry . Co . ( 1854 ) , 12 N . Y . 121 ,
Pattee Cas . 471. Finch Cas . 527 .
Mrs. Davey conveyed land to Bishop Hughes on condition that he con
secrate the property or cause it to be consecrated , and cause a church to be
built upon it within a reasonable time. Mrs . D died later leaving her will ,
by which she gave to a residuary devisee all property and estate real and
personal not previously effectively disposed of . Her heir brought ejectment
against Hughes ' successor , Corrigan , for breach of the condition , 29 years
having passed and no church built . The defense was that the possibility of
reverter passed by Mrs. D ' s will, but the court held that she had no devisa
ble interest , and judgment for plaintiff was affirmed . Upington v . Corri
gan ( 1896 ) , 151 N . Y . 143, 45 N . E . 358, 37 L . R . A . 704 , Finch . 533.
H . Venable conveyed land to trustees to be conveyed by them to a cor
poration in fee for an academy as soon as the corporation should be formed .
The corporation was formed and deed to it made by the trustees . Later
H . V . died devising all his estate to his wife . Later the corporation lost
its charter on quo warranto ; and the plaintiff , claiming under quit claim
deed from the widow devisee , sued in ejectment, claiming that the possibil
ity of reverter passed by the will. The court cited Nicoll v . New York & E .
Ry . Co ., above , and held that at the death of the testator he had no interest
but a mere possibility of reverter , a thing not devisable . Judgment for
plaintiff , reversed . Trustees of Presbyterian Church v. Venable ( 1896 ) ,
159 Ill. 215 , 42 N . E . 836 .
CHAPTER IX .
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES .
EDWARD PELLS v. WILLIAM BROWN , in B. R ., Hilary , 17 Jac. 1, A . D .
1620 . - Cro. Jac . 590 , 2 Roll 196 , 216 , 5 Gray 's P . C . 163 . Given according
to Croke .
Replevin for the taking of three cows at Rowdham . The defendant
justifies for damage fesant as in his freehold . The plaintiff traverseth
the freehold ; and , thereupon , being at issue , a special verdict was found ,
in which the case appeared to be , that one William Brown , father of the
defendant , being seised of this land in fe
e , having issue the defendant ,
his son and heir , and Thomas Brown his second son , and Richard Brown
a third son , b
y
his will in writing devised this land to " Thomas his
son and his heirs forever , paying to his brother Richard twenty pounds
at the age of twenty -one years ; and if Thomas died without issue , liv
ing William his brother , that then William his brother should have
those lands to him and his heirs and assigns forever , paying the said
sum a
s Thomas should have paid . ” Thomas enters and suffers a common
recovery , with a single voucher , to the use of himself and his heirs ;
and afterwards devises it to the use o
f
Edward Pells , the plaintiff , and
his heirs ; and dies without issue , living the said William Brown , who
entered upon Edward Pells , and took the distress .
This case was twice argued a
t
the bar and afterward a
t
the bench ;
and the matter was divided into three points ; 1 , whether Thomas had
a
n
estate in fee , or in fee - tail only ; 2 , admitting he had a fee , whether
this limitation o
f
the fee to William be good to limit a fee upon a fe
e ;
3 , if Thomas hath a fee , and William only a possibility to have a fee ,
whether this recovery shall bar William , or that it be such an estate
a
s cannot be extirpated by recovery or otherwise .
As to the first , al
l
the justices resolved , that it is not an estate tail
in Thomas , but an estate in fee ; for it is devised to him and his heirs
forever , and also paying to Richard twenty pounds ; both which clauses
show that he intended a fee to him . And the clause " if he died without
issue , ” is not absolute and indefinite whensoever he died without
issue , but it is with a contingency , " if he died without issue , living
William ; " fo
r
h
e might survive William , or have issue alive at the time
o
f
his death , living William ; in which cases William should never have
it , but is only to have it if Thomas died without issue living William ,
See 19 Hen . 6 , p
l
. 74 ; 12 Edw . 3 , p
l
. 8 ; Berisford ' s Case , Ÿ Coke 41 ;
Lam pet ' s Case , 10 Coke 50 . And therefore it is not like to the cases
cited on the other part : 5 Hen . 5 , p
l
. 6 . 37 Assize , p
l
. 15 & 16 ; and
Dyer 330 , Clactey ' s Case : for it is an exposition of his intent what issue
should have it , viz . of his body ; and whensoever he died without issue ,
(407 )
408 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES .
the land should remain , & c . But here it is a conditional limitation
to another , if such a thing happen ; and therefore they a
ll
relied upon
the book , Dyer , 124 , and Dyer 354 ; which are a
ll
one with this case .
Secondly , they a











mainder ( For they a
ll agreed it cannot be a remainder : as if one de
viseth land to one and his heirs , and if he die without heir , that it
shall remain to another , it is void and repugnant to the estate ; for
one fee cannot b
e
in remainder after another ; for the law doth not ex






his dying without heirs , and there
fore cannot appoint a remainder to begin upon determination thereof , a
s
1
9 Hen . 8 , p
l
. 8 ; 29 Hen . 8 , Dyer 33 a [ante p . — ] , but b
y way o
f con
tingency , and by way of executory devise to another , to determine the
one estate , and limit it to another , upon an act to b
e performed , or in
failure o
f performance thereof , & c . ; for the one may be and hath always








such a sum a
t
such a day , this is an executory de
vise . So the case cited in Boraston ' s Case , 3 Coke 20 [ reported ante p .
- ] , of Wellock v . Hammond ( reported ante p . - ] , where the devise
was to the eldest son and heirs , paying such a sum to the younger sons ,
otherwise that the land should b
e
to him and his heirs , is a good ex
ecutory devise . And a precedent was shown , Trinity term , 3
8 Eliz . Roll
867 , Fulmerston v . Steward ; where upon special verdict it was adjudged ,
that whereas Sir Richard Fulmerston devised to Sir Edward Cleere and
Frances his wife , daughter and heir o
f
the said Sir Richard Fulmerston ,
certain lands in Elden in the county o
f
Norfolk , to them and the heirs
o
f
Sir Edward Cleere , upon the condition that they should assure lands
in such places to his executors and their heirs , to perform his will ; and
if h
e fail , then he devised the said lands in Elden to his executors and
their heirs . It was adjudged to be a good limitation and no condition ;
fo
r




the heir ; but it is a limitation , and as an executory devise to his ex
ecutors , who for the non -performance o
f
the said acts entered and sold ,
and adjudged good . S
o
here , & c . For it is a good executory devise
upon this limitation , and DODERIDGE said the opinion 2
9
Hen . 8 , Dyer
3
3
a [ante p . - ) , was , that such limitation in fee upon a
n estate in
fee cannot b
e , and it had been oftentimes adjudged contrary thereto .
To the third point DODERIDGE held that this recovery should bar Wil
liam ; for h
e
had but a possibility to have a fee , a
s if a contingent estate
which is destroyed b
y
this recovery before it came in esse ; for other
wise it would b
e
a mischievous kind o
f perpetuity , which could not by
any means b
e destroyed . And although it was objected that a recovery
shall not bar , but where a recovery in value extends thereto , a
s appears
by Capel ' s Case , 1 Coke 62 a , where a rent charge granted b
y
him in
remainder was bound ; yet he held that this recovery
destroying the
immediate estate , all contingencies and dependencies thereupon are
bound , and a recovery shall bind everyone who cannot

































who hath this possibility cannot falsify , therefore he shall be
bound thereby . But all the other justices were herein against him ,
that this recovery shall not bind ; for he who suffered the recovery had a
fee , and William Brown had but a possibility if he survived Thomas ; and
Thomas dying without issue , in his life , no recovery in value shall extend
thereto , unless he had been party b
y
way of vouchee , and then it should ;
for b




is possibility ; therefore
they agreed to the case which Damport at the bar cited to be adjudged ,
3
4 Eliz . , where a mortgagee suffers a recovery it shall not bind the




voucher it had been
otherwise . And here is not any estate depending upon the estate of
Thomas Bray , but a collateral and mere possibility , which shall not be
touched b
y
a recovery ; and if such recovery should be allowed , then if
a man should devise that his heir should make such a payment to his
younger sons , o
r
to his executors , otherwise the land should be to them ;
if the heir by recovery might avoid it , it would be very mischievous , and
might frustrate al
l
devises ; and there is no such mischief that it should
maintain perpetuities , for it is but a particular case , and upon a mere
contingency , which peradventure never may happen , and may be avoided
b
y joining him in the recovery who hath such a contingency ; and on the
other part it would be far more and a greater mischief that all executory
devises should b
y
such means be destroyed .
HOUGHTON , J . , in his argument , put this case : if a man give or de
vise lands to one and his heirs as long as J . S . hath issue o
f
his body ,
he shall not b
y
recovery bind him who made this gift without making




vouchee ; for a recovery against tenant in fee
simple never shall bind a collateral interest , title o





covenant , or the like . Wherefore they all (except DODERIDGE )
held that this recovery was no bar .
Then DODERIDGE took exception to the verdict that the lands were
not found to be holden in socage ; for otherwise it might be intended to
b
e
holden in knight - service , and so it shall be intended , and then the
devise is void for a third part . And so it was resolved 24 Eliz . , Dyer ,
that it ought to be shown that the land was holden in socage , otherwise
the devise was not good for the entire ; but al
l
the judges held it not
to b
e material , as this case is , for the issue is whether it was the free
hold o
f
William Brown , who is found to be the heir o
f
the devisor ; then
although it were admitted that the land was held b
y knight -service ,
yet h
e
hath the entire : vi
z . two parts by the devise and a third part
b
y
descent . Wherefore the tenure is not material as this case is . And it
was adjudged for th
e
defendant .
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CHILD v. BAYLIE , in Exchequer Chamber , Hilary , 20 Jac. 1, A . D . 1623 ,
on error from judgment of King 's Bench , Hilary , 15 Jac. 1. - Cro . Jac. 459 ,
Palmer 333 , 2 Rolle 119 , W . Jones 15 , 5 Gray P . C . 495 .
EJECTMENT of a lease of Thomas Heath of lands in Alchurch .
Upon not guilty pleaded , a special verdict was found upon the case ;





the land in question , le
t
it to one Blunt from the day o
f
his death
until the first of May , 1629 (which was three months before the end
o
f
the lease ) , if Dorothy his wife lived so long . Afterwards he devised ,
that William Heath his son and his assigns should have the said tene
ments , and the reversion o
f
them , and all his title and interest in the
said tenements , for al
l
the others of the said seventy -six years which
should be unexpired at the time of his wife ' s death , " provided , that if
the said William die without issue living at the time of his death , that
Thomas his son ( the now lessor ) should have it for all the residue o
f
the seventy - si
x
years unexpired from the death of his said wife , and o
f
William without issue ; and if he died without issue , then to his
daughters ; ” and made his wife his executrix , and died . The wife as
sented to the legacies ; William assigned a
ll
this lease and his interest
thereto to the said Dorothy , who assigned it to Mr . Comb , under whom
the defendant claims ; afterwards Dorothy died , and then William died
without issue . Thomas the devisee enters , and makes this lease to the
plaintiff .
After divers arguments a
t
the bar , it was adjudged for the defendant .
First , it was resolved , where a lessee for years let it after his death
until the first of May , 1629 , that it was a good lease , which began im
mediately by his death , he dying within that time .
Secondly , that the lease being made to begin after his death unto the
first o
f May , 1629 , the lease being made ( 12 August , 1553 ) , if Dorothy
his wife should so long live , he did not thereby convey the interest and
remainder o
f
the term , viz . from the first of May , 1629 , to 12 August ,
1629 , and the possibility o
f
a long term if Dorothy died before the first
o
f May , 1629 , which interest and possibility together he might devise to
William Heath his son .
The third and main question was , whether this devise being to Will
iam Heath and his assigns , with a proviso , that if h
e died without issue
living , that Thomas Heath should have it , and h
e aliens it , and after
wards dies without issue , whether this alienation shall bind Thomas
Heath , or that he may avoid it ?
It was resolved , that this alienation shall bind ; for when h
e limited
to him and his assigns , all the estate was vested in him , and he had a
n
absolute power to dispose thereof ; for the law doth not expect his dying
without issue . The difference therefore is , where a lease is devised to
one if he live so long , and afterwards to another , the first hath but a
qualified estate , and the other hath the absolute interest , and therefore
this alienation shall not prejudice him who hath the absolute estate ;
but when it is limited to him and his assigns , then the proviso thereto




dependable to 10 C
o .
added , is void to restrain the alienation : and the limitation to the heirs
o
f
the body , and the proviso , are al
l
one ; for all long leases would be
more dangerous than perpetuities : and therefore this case differs from
the cases in 8 C
o . 96 , and 10 Co . 46 , Lam pet ' s Case , that a devisee for life
could not bar him in remainder : and Lewknor ' s Case [ easter term , 14
Jac . 1 , 1 Roll . Rep . 356 ] , the exchequer chamber , was cited . Where
fore it was adjudged for the defendant .
Note . — Upon this judgment a writ of error was brought in the Ex
chequer Chamber ; and the error assigned in point o
f
law , that the re
mainder o
f
this term limited to Thomas Heath after the death o
f Will
iam without issue then living , was good , and the alienation of William
shall not bind him in remainder .
It was argued b
y
Bridgman , and afterward by Humphrey Davenport ,





the term to William and his assigns , with the proviso , that if he died
without issue then living , the then remainder should be to Thomas , & c . ,
and that it is no more in effect than after his death ; and therefore it
differs from Lewknor ' s Case , adjudged in the Exchequer , where a de
vise o
f
a term to one , and the heirs of his body , and if he die without
issue , that it shall remain to another , was held to be a void remainder ;
for he cannot limit a remainder upon a term after the death o
f
another
without issue , but here it is but a remainder after the death o
f
one
without issue , viz . William dying without issue then living ; so upon
the matter it depended upon is death , and therefore not like to the said
case ; but it is agreeable to the reasons put in the cases o
f
8 Co . 94 ,
Matth . Manning ' s Case , and 10 Co . 46 .
But it was now argued on the other part b
y
Thomas Crew and George
Croke , that the judgment was well given in the King ' s Bench ; for here
the limitation being to William after the death o
f
the devisor ' s wife , of
all his estate and interest to him and his assigns , it is but a remainder ;
for the wife may outlive all the term , and then this devise o
f
the re
mainder of the term is given to him in particular , and William hath
but a possibility ; and then to limit it to Thomas after the death o
f
William then living , is to limit a possibility upon a possibility , which is
against the rules of law , as it is held in the Rector of Chedington ' s Case ,
1 C
o . 156 , and Lord Stafford ' s Case , 8 Co . 73 .
Secondly , that this limitation to Thomas after the death o
f
William
without issue then living , is al
l
one a
s if it had been limited upon his
death without issue : and the addition “ then living , " doth not alter the
case ; for at the first limitation , non constat that he should die without
issue ; and the law shall not expect his death without issue ; and it is not
like to the case when it is limited after the death of one ; for it is
certain that one must die , and it may be that he may die during the term ,
and the law may well expect it ; but that one should die without issue ,
the law will never expect such a possibility , nor regard it : and it would
b
e very dangerous to have a perpetuity o
f
a term in that manner ; for
it would be more mischievous than the common cases o
f perpetuities
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which the law hath sought to suppress : and therefore it was said , that
this case was like to some of the cases which had been adjudged , that
the remainder of a term after the death of one person is good, and should
not be destroyed by the alienation of the first devisee . Vide 8 Co . 94 ,
Manning 's Case ; 10 Coke , Lam pet's Case ; [Welcden v. Elkington ],
Plowd . Com . 520 and 510 ; Dyer 74 , 277 .
After divers arguments , all the judges of the Common Pleas , vi
z
.
HOBART , WINCH , HUTTON , and JONES , and al
l
the Barons (except TAN
FIELD , Chief Baron ) agreed with the first judgment : for they said : that
the first grant or devise o
f
a term made to one for life , remainder to
another , hath been much controverted , whether such a remainder might
be good , and whether all may not be destroyed , by the alienation of the
first party ; and if it were not first disputed , it would be hard to maintain ;
but being so often adjudged , they would not now dispute it . — But for
the case in question , where there was a devise to one and his assigns , and
if he died without issue then living , that it would remain to another ,
it is a void devise ; and it is all one as the devise of a term to one and his
heirs of his body , and if he die without issue , that then it shall remain
to another , it is merely void ; for such an entail o
f
a term is not allowable
in law , for the mischief which otherwise would ensue , if there be such
a perpetuity o
f
a term . And although TANFIELD , Chief Baron , doubted




a judgment given before in the King ' s
Bench in Rethorick v . Chappel , Hil . 9 Jac . 1 , 2 Bulst . 28 , Godol . 149 ,
where “William Cary possessed o
f
a term for years devised it to his wife
for her life , and afterwards that John his son should have the occupa
tion thereof as long as he had issue ; and if he died without issue un
married , that then Jasper his younger son should have the occupation
thereof a
s long as he had issue of his body ; and if he died without issue
unmarried , he devised the moiety to Dorothy his daughter , the other
moiety to Robert and William his sons , and made his wife executrix ,
who assented to the legacies and died . John and Jasper died without
issue , unmarried ; and afterward Robert and William entered upon the
defendant , claiming the moiety , and let to the plaintiff . Upon a special
verdict , all this matter being discovered , it was adjudged for the plaint
if
f , that he should recover the moiety , which is all one case with the
case in question . But the defendant ' s counsel in the writ of error
showed , that there was a difference betwixt the said cases : for , First , in
that there is a devise but of the occupation only ; but here , o
f
the term
itself . Secondly , it is a devise here of his estate and term to him and his
assigns , wherein is authority given that h
e may assign . Thirdly , the
limitation is there , if he die without issue unmarried , which is upon the
matter , that if he die within the term ; for if he be not married he can
not have issue ” — but in the case here , h
e might have issue ; and yet if
that issue should die without issue in his life -time , it should remain ;
which the law will neither expect nor will suffer : yet the JUSTICES AND
BARONS , by the assent o
f
TANFIELD , all agreed , that judgment should
b
e affirmed : and in Hilary Term , 20 Jac . I . , it was affirmed .
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DUKE OF NORFOLK 'S CASE , in Chancery , High Court of Chancery, and
House of Lords , - reported in 3 Chancery Cases 1-54 , and partially re
ported in 5 Gray ' s P . C. 498 . Abridged from 3 Ch . Cas.
This case was argued by counsel in the court of chancery , Dec . 26 ,
1677, and at other times afterwards ; the opinions of the judges and
the first opinion of the Lord Chancellor were delivered March 24th ,
1682 ; the opinion of the Lord Chancellor on re -hearing was delivered
and final decree entered June 17th , 1682 ; which decree was reversed
in the High Court of Chancery by the Lord Keeper of the great seal
of England, on bill for review , May 15th , 1683 ; and this last decree
was reversed and the decree of the Lord Chancellor affirmed by the
House of Lords, after argument , on petition and appeal, June 19th ,
1685 .
This is a bill in chancery by Charles Howard against his brother Henry
Howard , Duke of Norfolk , and others , to establish and have execution
of trusts created by two deeds executed by their father (Henry Fred
erick , Earl of Arundel and Surrey ) , March 20 & 21, 1647. Being
seised of the baronies of Grostock and Burgh in fee , after a term for
years, and having sons as follows — Thomas Lord Maltravers (non com
pos mentis ), Henry (now Duke of Norfolk and defendant herein ) ,
Charles (plaintiff herein ) , Edward , Francis , and Bernard , and having
a daughter , Lady Katharine — the father made the deeds above men
tioned , to provide settlement for his estates and family . By the first
of these deeds he granted the reversion of these baronies to the Duke of
Richmond , Marquis of Dorcester , and others, and their heirs , to the use
of the father for life , then to the use of hi
s
wife for her life , remainder
to these trustees for 200 years , for the trusts created b
y
the other deed ,
remainder to the use o
f Henry and the heirs male o
f
his body , with like
remainders in tail to Charles , Edward , and the other brothers , success
ively . The other deed was made to declare the trusts of the term for
200 years ; and that declares that it was intended this term should attend
the inheritance , and that the profits thereunder should be received by
Henry and the heirs o
f
his body so long a
s
Thomas o
r any issue male
o
f
his body should live , and if he should die without issue , in the life
o
f Henry , and not leave his wife pregnant with a son , o
r if after his
death the dignity o
f
Earl of Arundel should descend on Henry ; then
Henry o
r
his issue should have n





200 years , but then the terms shall b
e
in trust for Charles and the heirs
male of his body , remainder to Francis and the heirs male o
f
his body , re
mainder to Bernard and the heirs male o
f
his body , remainder to Henry
and the heirs male o
f his body , remainder to the heirs of the father mak
ing the deed .
The father died in 1652 ; his wife died in 1673 ; the Marquis o
f
Dorcester , surviving trustee , assigned his estate to Marriot , in 1675 ;
later Marriot assigned it to Henry now Duke o
f Norfolk , and Henry
by bargain and sale enrolled sold to Marriot to make him tenant to a
præcipe , Oct . 24 , 1675 , and next day a deed was made declaring the
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each side , and
recovery to b
e
to the use o
f Henry and his heirs , the recovery was suffered
accordingly ; later Thomas died without issue and unmarried , in Nov .
1677 ; by whose death the earldom of Arundel as well as the dukedom
o
f
Norfolk descended to Henry ; and thereupon this bill was filed b
y
Charles to have execution o
f
the t t in his favor .
The case was argued by several eminent counsel on each side , and
these arguments are reported a
t
some length in 3 Ch . Cas . 1 - 13 . LORD
CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM was assisted at the hearing by LORD CHIEF
BARON MONTAGUE o
f
the exchequer , LORD CHIEF JUSTICE NORTH of the
common pleas , and LORD CHIEF JUSTICE PEMBERTON o
f
the king ' s
bench . The better parts o
f
their several opinions delivered when they
met , March 24 , 1681 , the day appointed for judgment in the cause , are
given below .
MONTAGUE , C . B . * 157 * * * The plaintiff ' s bill is to have
execution o
f
the trust of the term of the barony of — to the
use o
f
himself and the heirs male o
f




the counsel for the defendant upon these grounds : 1 . That
b
y
the assignment made b
y
Marriot to my Lord Duke Henry , the term
was surrendered and quite gone . 2 . The second ground was the com
mon recovery suffered , which they say barred the remainders which
the other brothers had , and so also would be a bar to the trust of this
term . 3 . And the other ground was , that the trust of a term to Henry
and the heirs male o
f













Marriot to Henry Howard ,
the whole term was surrendered , and being so surrendered , hath no
existence a
t all ; that I find was barely mentioned , and I think cannot
b
e
stood upon . For this , the term b
y
surrender is gone indeed and
merged in the inheritance ; yet the trust o
f
that term remains in equity ;
and if this trust be destroyed by him that had it assigned to him , this
court has full power to set it up again , and to decree the term to him
to whom it did belong , or a recompense for it . Therefore , I think that
stands not a
t all as a point in the case , or as an objection in the way .
[ On this point the chancellor and other judges agreed with Montague . ]
[ * 16 ] As to the next thing , the common recovery now suffered by
the now duke , that doth bar the remainders to the other brothers , and
also the trust o
f
this term ? That I conceive to be so in case this can
be interpreted to be a term to attend the inheritance ; and indeed in
the reciting part the deed doth seem to say that it was intended to




the deed which followeth
after now this indenture witnesseth , there it is limited that the term
should be to Henry Howard and the heirs male of his body until such




Arundel , by his elder brother ' s death
without issue , should come to him ; then to the plaintiff , which doth
convey the estate o
f
the term in a different channel from that in which
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the inheritance is settled ; and taking this deed a
ll together , it doth
limit this term in such various estates , that it can no way be con
strued to be a term attending the inheritance ; and then , I conceive ,
the recovery doth not bar the trust . For the recovery would bar the
incident to any estate , as this would do here , if it attended the inherit
ance ; but being only a term in gross and a collateral thing , I conceive
the recovery has no operation to bar the trust in the term . [On this
point the other judges agreed with Montague .
Then the case singly depends upon the third point : Whether the
trust o
f
a term thus limited to Henry Howard and the heirs males of his
body until his brother die without issue , whereby the honor came to him ,
with such contingent remainders over , be a good limitation — this is the
question . * * * I am o
f pinion that these limitations to the young
e
r brothers upon this contingency are absolutely void in the first crea
tion , and are gone without the surrender ; and that upon this recovery
Henry Howard , now Duke o
f
Norfolk , ought to have the trust of the




terms , or the dispositions o
f
the trusts of terms , have proceeded b




f by the makers . Itwould be too long to give a
distinct history o
f it ; but it is so plain that it is now a resolved and
decreed thing and settled , therefore , it were in vain to tell you the steps
taken towards it . That the devise of a term and the limitation o
f
a trust
of a term to one and the heirs of his body is good , though Burgess ' s
Case was only for life , the cases are very full in it . On the other side ,
where there is a limitation o
f
a term to one and the heirs o
f
his body ,
there a positive limitation o
f
the estate over , after his death without is
sue , that I think also is as fully declared to be void . [Here his honor
reviewed the cases o
f
Jenkins v . Kennish , in the exchequer ; Leventhorp
v . Ashby ( 11 Car . 1 , in King ' s Bench ) , 1 Rolls Abr . 611 ; Sanders v .
Cornish , Cro . Car . 230 ] [ * 18 ] . But now the doubt in this case that
is made ariseth upon this point , that this limitation over to the brothers
is upon a mere contingency , and whether that b
e good , I think , is the
main question . And truly , upon the reasons o
f Child and Bailie ' s
Case [ ante p ] , I cannot think it is a good limitation . [Here
h
is honor reviewed Child v . Bailie ; Rhetorick v . Chappell , noted in
Child v . Bailie ; Gibson v . Sanders ; Jay v . Jay , Stiles 258 , 274 ; and
Pells v . Brown , ante - 1 . * * * If you admit a limitation of a
term after an estate tail , where shall it end ? For if after one , it may
a
s
well be after two ; and if after two , then as well after twenty . For
it may be said if he die within twenty years without issue ; and so if
within 100 years ; and there will be no end , and so a perpetuity will fol
low . It was said at the bar , it will b
e hard to frustrate the intention o
f
the parties . To that I answer , intentions o
f parties not according
to law are not to be regarded . It was the intention in Child and Bailie ' s
Case , that the younger son should have it ; and so in Burgess ' s Case it was
the intention the daughter should have it . * * * [ * 20 ] It has also
been objected , but then here is a contingency that has actually happened ,
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upon Thomas's death without issue and so the honor is come to Henry .
I say the happening of the contingency is no ground to judge . * * *
So then for that I think these expositions have gone as far already as
they can ; for my part I cannot extend it any further . And therefore
I conceive in this case , the plaintiff has no right to this term , but the
decree ought to be made for the defendants .
NORTH , C . J ., * * * I conceive the rules of law to prevent per
petuities are the policy of the kingdom , and ought to take place in this
court as well as any other court. So I take it then , that the trust of a
term is as much a chattel , and under consideration of this court , as
the term itself . And , therefore , I cannot see why the trust of a term
upon a voluntary settlement should be carried further in a court of
equity than the devise of a term in the courts of [ * 21 ] common law .
* * * Now let us see , and a little consider what those rules are , and
how they are applicable to this case . * * * It is clear there can be
no direct remainder of the trust of a term upon an estate - tail . The
question then is, whether there can be any contingent remainder, for
this case depends upon that consideration ; that is , it is limited upon
a contingency , if such a thing should happen in the life of a man , and
so it is a springing trust and good that way . My lord , I take it in
this case , where there can be no direct remainder there can be no con
tingent remainder , though it happen never so soon . Therefore , if
term be limited to one and his heirs of his body , and he die without
issue of his body within two years the remainder over, there can be no








n entail , and that is so remote a consideration , that as the law
will not suffer a direct remainder upon it , so upon a contingency neither .
* * * [ * 2
2
] * * * The rule in Child and Bailie ' s Case (ante




a term in tail
without the life of a man will not make good a limitation of the re
mainder over ; which I hold to be a good rule ; and the reason o
f
it ,
I conceive , will reach to this case . * * * So that I think the whole






it , no executory devise , nor any springing trust
to Charles upon this contingency . And , my lord , upon that reason , I
think this settlement fails , and is disappointed as to the younger brothers .
* * *
5 * 2
3 ) PEMBERTON , C . J . * * * I do first think that the Earl of
Arundel did certainly design , that if my Lord Maltravers should die
without issue male , whereby the honor o
f
the family should come to
my lord duke that now is , Charles should have this estate ; and his
intentions are manifest b
y creating this term , which could be of no
other use but to carry over this estate to Charles a younger son , upon
the elder son ' s dying without issue . And I d
o think truly that this was
but a reasonable intention of the father . For there being to come with
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the earldom a great estate that would well support it, it was but
reason , and the younger sons might expect it, that their fortunes might
be somewhat advanced by their father in case it should so happen . It
was a reasonable expectation in them ; and truly I think it was the plain
intention of the earl . And there is no great question but it might
have been made good and effectual by the limitation of two terms ;
for if one term had been limited to determine upon the death of Thomas
without issue , and that to be for the now Duke of Norfolk , and another
term then to commence and go over to Charles , that would certainly
have been good and carried the estate to Charles upon that contingency .
But as this case now is, I do think that this way that is now taken is not
a good way nor a right way ; for I take this limitation to Charles to
be void in law . And as to that I know there is a famous difference of
limiting terms that are in gross , and terms that attend the inheritance .
As to terms that are in gross , I think it will be granted (because it hath
been settled so often ) they are not capable of limitation to one after
the death of one without issue. * * * This term here doth partake
somewhat of a term in gross , and somewhat of a term attendant upon
an inheritance ; and if there should be such a limitation admitted such
a foreign limitation as this is ( I call it foreign , because [ * 257 it is
not that which goes along with the inheritance ) - if that be allowed ,
we know not what inventions may grow upon this . For I know men 's
brains are fruitful in inventions , as we may see in Matthew Manning 's
Case [ ante p. ] . It was not foreseen nor thought when that
judgment was given , what would be the consequence , when once there
was an allowance of the limitation of a term after the death of a person .
Presently it was discerned , there was the same reason for after twenty
men 's lives as after one ; and so then it was held and agreed , that so
long as the limitation exceeded not lives in being at the creation of the
estate it should extend so far. That came to grow upon them then ; and
now if this be admitted , no man can foresee what an ill effect such an
ill allowance might have . There might such limitations come in as
would encumber estates , and mightily entangle lands . This is certain ,
such a
n allowed limitation would add a greater check to estates than ever
was made b
y
limitations of inheritance ; for when an estate of in
heritance was limited to a man and his heirs males o
f
his body , with
remainders over , and a term was limited accordingly to wait upon the
inheritance ; in that case , he that had the first estate -tail , had full power
over the term , to alienate it if he pleased . * * * But now if this limit
ation in question were good , then Henry could not part with it ; b
e
cause it is to him and his heirs males of his body under a collateral
limitation of his brother ' s dying without issue . * * *
LORD CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM . * * * These indentures are both
sealed and delivered in the presence o
f Sir Orlando Bridgman , Mr .
Edward Alehorn , and Mr . John Alehorn , both of them by Lord Keeper
Bridgman ' s clerks ; I knew them to be so . This attestation of these
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deeds is a demonstration to me they were drawn by Sir Orlando Bridg
man . * * *
The whole contention in the case is to make the estate limited to
Charles void — void in the original creation ; if not so , void by the common
recovery suffered by the now duke , and the assignment of Marriot . If
the estate be originally void , which is limited to Charles , there is no
harm done. But if it only be avoided by the assignment of Marriot ,
with the concurrence of the Duke of Norfolk , he having notice of the
trusts , then most certainly they must make it good to Charles in equity ;
for a palpable breach of trust of which they had notice . [* 28 ] So that
the question is reduced to this main single point, whether al
l
this care
that was taken to settle this estate and family , be void and insignificant ;
and all this provision made for Charles and the younger children to
have no effect .




advice as I know how to repose myself upon ; and I have the fairest op
portunity , if I concur with them , and so should mistake , to excuse myself ,
that I did errare cum patribus . But I dare not at any time deliver
any opinion in this place , without I concur with myself and my con
science too . * * * Whether this limitation to Charles be void or no




what is plain and clear , we shall come to see what is
doubtful : 1 . That the term in question , though it were attendant upon
the inheritance a
t first ; vet upon the happening o
f
the contingency ,
it is become a term in gross to Charles . 2 That the trust of a term in
gross can be limited no otherwise in equity than the estate o
f
a term in




in chancery other than that which is the rule o
f property a
t
law . 3 . It
is clear that the legal estate o
f




short term , cannot be limited to any man in tail , with the re
mainder over to another after his death without issue : that is flat and
plain , for that is a direct perpetuity . 1 4 . If a term be limited to a man
and his issue , and if he die without issue the remainder over , the issue
o
f
that issue takes no estate ; and vet because the remainder over cannot
take place [ * 297 till the issue of that issue fail , that remainder is void
too , which was Reeve ' s Case , and the reason is because that looks towards
a perpetuity . 5 . If a term be limited to a man for life , and after to his
first , second , third , & c . , and other sons in tail successively , and for default
o
f
such issue the remainder over ; though the contingency never happen ,
vet that remainder is void , though there were never a son then born to
him , for that looks like a perpetuity ; and this was Sir William Back
hurst his Case [ 16 Jac . 1 , 1 Mod . 115 ) . 6 . Yet one step further than
this , and that is Burgess ' s Case ( 1 Mod . 115 ] ; a term was limited to
one for life with contingent remainders to his sons in tail , with remain
der over to his daughter , though he had n
o
son ; yet because it is foreign
But see such an executory devise in Stanley v . Baker , ante p . 232 .
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and distant to expect a remainder after the death without issue of a
son to be born , that having a prospect of a perpetuity also was adjudged
to be void . These things having been settled , and by these rules has
this court always governed itself , but one step more there is in this case ;
7. If a term be devised or the trust of a term limited to one for life ,
with twenty remainders for life successively , and all the persons in esse
and alive at the time of the limitation of their estates ; these , though they
look like a possibility upon a possibility , are all good , because they
produce no inconvenience , they wear out in a little time with an easy
interpretation ; and so was Alford 's Case . I will yet go further . 8
In the case cited by Mr. Holt, Cotton and Heath 's Case [Roll. Abr.,
Devise, 612 ante — ] , a term is devised to one for 18 years , after to
C his son for life, and then to the eldest issue male of C for life ;
though C had not any issue male at the time of the devise or the
death of the devisor , but before the death of C , it was resolved by
Mr. Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Croke, and Mr. Justice Berkley , to
whom it was referred by the Lord Keeper Coventry , that it only
being a contingency upon a life that would be speedily worn out , it was
very good ; for that there may be a possibility upon a possibility , and that
there may be a contingency upon a contingency is neither unnatural
nor absurd in itself . But the contrary rule given as a reason by my
Lord Popham in the Rector of Chedington ' s Case ( 1 Coke 156 ], looks
like a reason of art ; but in truth , has no kind of reason in it ; and I have
known that rule often denied in Westminster -hall. In truth every ex
ecutory devise is so , and you will find that rule not allowed in Blanford
and Blanford ( 13 Jac. 1) , 1 Rolls Abr . 318 ; where he says ; if that
rule take place it will shake several common assurances ; and he
cites Paramour and Yardley 's Case in the Commentaries [ 2 Plowd .
Com . 539 ], where it was adjudged a good devise , though it were a pos
sibility upon a possibility .
[ * 30 ] The conclusions which I have thus laid down are but prelimi
naries to the main debate . It is now fit we should come to speak of
the main question in the case , as it stands upon its own reason , dis
tinguished from the reasons of these preliminaries ; and so the case is
this : The trust o
f
a term for 200 years is limited to Henry in tail ,
provided if Thomas die without issue in the life o
f Henry , so that the
earldom shall descend upon Henry , then to g
o
to Charles in tail ; and
whether this be a good limitation to Charles in tail is the question .
For most certainly it is a void limitation to Edward in tail , and a void
limitation to the other brothers in tail . But whether it be good to
Charles is the doubt , who is the first taker o
f
this term in gross . For so
it is ( I take it ) now become , and I do , under favor , liker from my
Lord Chief Justice on that point ; for if Charles die it will not return
to Henry ; for that is my Lord Coke ' s error in Leonard Lovies ' s Case ,
1
0 Coke 7
8 , 87 ; for he says , that if a term be devised to one and the
heirs males of his body , it shall g
o
to him o
r his executors no longer
than h
e has heirs males of his body ; but it was resolved otherwise in
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amount to so . " 2 .
Another
Leventhrop and Ashby ' s Case ( 11 Car . I ( 1635 ) , B . R . , Rolls Abr . t .
Devise , fol . 611 , for these words are not the limitation o
f
the time but
the absolute disposition of the term .
But now let us , I say , consider whether this limitation be good to
Charles or n
o . It has been said : 1 . It is not good by any means ;
for it is a possibility upon a possibility . That is a weak reason , and
there is nothing o
f argument in it ; for there never was yet any devise
o
f
a term with remainder over , but did amount to a possibility upon a
possibility , and executory remainders will make it so . 2 . Another thing
was said : It is void , because it doth not determine the whole estate ,
and so they compare it to Sir Anthony Mildmay ' s Case [ante p . ,
6 Coke 40 ) , where it is laid down as a rule , that every limitation o
r
con
dition ought to defeat the entire estate , and not to defeat part and
leave part not defeated ; and it cannot make an estate to cease as to
one person , and not as to the other . But I do not think that any case
o
r rule was ever worse applied than that to this ; for if you do observe
this case , here is no proviso at all annexed to the legal estate o
f
the
term , but to the equitable estate that is built upon the legal estate unto
the estate to Henry and the heirs males o
f
his body , to attend the in
heritance , with a proviso if Thomas die without issue in Henry ' s life
and the earldom come to Henry , then to Charles ; which doth determine
the estate to Henry and his issue . But the other estate given to Charles
doth arise upon this proviso ; which makes it an absurdity to say , that
the same proviso upon which the estate ariseth should determine that
estate too . [ * 31 ] 3 . The great matter objected is , it is against all
the rules o
f
law , and tends to a perpetuity . If it tends to a perpetuity ,
there needs n
o more to be said ; for the law has so long labored against
perpetuities , that it is an undeniable reason against any settlement
if it can be found to tend to a perpetuity . Therefore let us examine




see what a perpetuity is , and whether any
rule of law is broken in this case .






n interest in tail




sort in the power o
f
the tenant in tail in possession to dock by any recovery or assignment ,
but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs upon the estate .
Such do fight against God ; for they pretend to such a stability in human
affairs as the nature o
f
them admits not of ; and they are against the
reason and the policy o
f
the law , and therefore not to be endured . But
o
n the other side , future interests , springing trusts , or trusts executory ,
remainders that are to emerge and arise upon contingencies , are quite
out o
f
the rules and reasons o
f perpetuities , nay , out of the reason
upon which the policy of the law is founded in those cases , especially ,
if they be not of remote or long consideration , but such as b
y
a natural
As to the rule that a condition cannot operate to determine part only o
f
the estate , but must determine all or none , see further in Colthurst v . Bejush
in , ante p . ; Scolastica ' s Case or Newes v . Lark , ante p .
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and easy interpretation will speedily wear out, and so things come to
their right channel again .
Let us examine this rule with respect to freehold estates , and see
whether there it will amount to the same issue . There is not in the
law a clearer rule than this, that there can be no remainders limited
after a fee simple ; so is the express book , case, 29 Hen . 8, 33 , in my
Lord Dyer [ante p . ) But yet the nature of things , and the
necessity of commerce between man and man , have found a way to
pass by that rule , and that is thus : either by way of use or by way of
devise. Therefore , if a devise be to a man and hi
s
heirs , and if he die
without issue in the life o
f
B , then to B and his heirs ; this is a fee
simple upon a fee -simple , and yet it has been held to be good . My lord
chief baron did seem to think that this resolution did take it
s original
from Pells and Brown ' s Case [ante p . ] ; but it did not so , the
law was settled before . You may find it expressly resolved 19 Eliz . in
a case between Hinde and Lyon , 3 Leonard [ 64 ] (which , o
f
the books
that have lately come out , is one o
f
the best ) ; and it was there ad
judged to be so good a limitation that the heir who pleaded reins per
descent [nothing b
y
descent ] was forced to pay the debt . And it had
the concurrance o
f
a judgment in 38 Eliz . , grounded upon the reason
o
f
Wellock and Hammond ' s Case [ante - cited in Boraston ' s
Case [ante - ] where it is said , Croke Eliz . 204 , in a devise it
may well be that an estate in fee shall cease in one and be transferred
to another . All this was before Pells and Brown ' s Case (ante p . ] ,
which was in 18 Jac . [ I ] . It is true , it was made a question afterwards
in the sergeants ’ case . [ * 32 ] But what then ? We all know that is
n
o
rule to judge b
y ; for what is used to exercise the wits of the ser
geants is not a governing opinion to decide the law . It was also ad
judged in Hil . 1649 , when my Lord Rolls was chief justice , and again
in 1650 ; and after that , indeed , in 1651 , it was resolved otherwise in
Jay and Jay ' s Case [Stiles 258 ) . But it has been often agreed that
where it is within the compass o
f
one life , that the contingency is to
happen , there is no danger of a perpetuity . And I oppose it to that








o contingent remainders can be limited , which
I utterly deny ; for there can be no remainder limited after a fee -simple ;
yet there may a contingent fee -simple arise out o
f
the first fee , as hath
been shown .
Thus it is agreed to be b
y
all sides in the case of an inheritance . But
now , say they , a lease for years , which is a chattel , will not bear a con
tingent limitation in regard of the poverty and meanness o
f
a chattel
estate . Now as to this point . The difference between a chattel and an





the thing ; for the owner o
f
a lease , has as abso
lute a power over his lease , a
s he that hath an inheritance has over that .
And therefore where no perpetuity is introduced , nor any inconvenience
doth appear , there no rule o
f
law is broken .
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The reasons that do support the springing trust of a term , as well
as the springing use of an inheritance , are these :
1. Because it hath happened sometimes , and doth frequently , that
men have no estates at all but what consist in leases for years . Now it
were not only very severe , but (under favor ) very absurd , to say that
he who has no other estate but what consists in leases for years shall
be incapable to provide for the contingencies of his own family , though
these are directly within his view and immediate prospect . And yet if
that be the rule , so it must be ; for I will put the case : A man that
hath no other estate but leases for years , chattels real, treats for the
marriage of his son , and thereupon it comes to this agreement : these
leases shall be settled as a jointure for the wife, and provision for the
children . Says he, I am content, but how shall it be done ? Why, thus :
You shall assign all these terms to John A . Stiles , in trust for yourself
and your executors if the marriage take no effect ; but then , if it takes
effect , to your son while he lives , to his wife after while she lives , with
remainders over . I would have anyone tell me whether this were a void
limitation upon a marriage settlement, or if it be , what a strange ab
surdity is it , that a man shall settle it if the marriage take no effect ,
and shall not settle it if the marriage happen .
2. Suppose the estate had been limited to Henry Howard and the
heirs males of his body till the death of Thomas without issue , then
to Charles : there it had been a void limitation to Charles . If then the
addition of these words : If Thomas die without issue in the life of
Henry , & c . have not mended the matter , then al
l
that addition [ * 33 ]
o
f
words goes for nothing , which it is unreasonable and absurd to think
it should .
3 . Another thing there is , which I take to be unanswerable , and gather
it from what fell from my Lord Chief Justice PEMBERTON ; and when
I can answer that case , I shall be able to answer myself very much for
that which I am doing . Suppose the proviso had been thus penned :
and if Thomas die without issue male , living Henry , then the term
o
f
200 years limited to him and his issue shall utterly cease and de
termine , but then a new term of 200 years shall arise and be limited
to the same trustees , for the benefit of Charles in tail . This he thinks
might have been well enough , and attained the end and intention of the
family : because then this would not be a remainder in tail upon a tail ,
but a new term created . Pray let us so resolve causes here , that they
may stand with the reason o
f
mankind , when they are debated abroad .
Shall that be reason here that is not reason in any part o
f
the world
besides ? I would fain know the difference , why I may not raise a new
springing trust out o
f
the same term , as well as a new springing term
out of the same trust . That is such a chicanery o
f
law a
s will be laughed
a
t
all over the Christian world .
4 . Another reason I g
o
o





a term for years , and o
f
a chattel interest , is not to b
e
re
garded . For whereas this will be no reason any where else ; so I shall
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show you , that this reason , as to the remainder of a chattel interest ,
is a reason that has been exploded out of Westminster -hall. There
was a time, indeed , that this reason did so far prevail , that all the judges ,
in the time of my Lord Chancellor Rich , did , 6 Edward 6 , deliver their
opinions , that if a term for years be devised to one , provided that if
the devisee die living J . S ., then to go to J . S . ; that remainder to
J . S . is absolutely void , because such a chattel interest of a term for
years is less than a term for life , and the law will endure no limitation
over ( 1 Dyer 74b, ante - ) . Now this being a reason against sense
and nature , the world was not long governed by it ; but in 10 Eliz ., in
Dyer [ fol. 277 ], they began to hold that the remainder was good by de
vise ; and so 15 Eliz . seems to [Dyer 328 ] , and 19 Eliz . [ Dyer 358 ]
it was by the judges held to be a good remainder ; and that was the
first time that an executory remainder of a term was held to be good .
When the chancery did begin to see that the judges of the law did
govern themselves by the reason of the thing , this court followed their
opinion . The better to fix them in it , they allowed of bills by the re
mainder man to compel the devisee of the particular estate to put
in security that he should enjoy it according to the limitation . And for
a great while so the practice stood , as they thought it might well , be
cause of the resolution of the judges , as we have shown ; but after this
was seen to multiply chancery suits, then they began to resolve that
there was no need of that [ * 34 ] way , but the executory remainder man
should enjoy it, and the devisee of the particular estate should have no
power to bar it . Men began to presume upon the judges then , and
thought if it were good as to remainders after estates for lives , it would
be good also as to remainders upon estates tail. That the judges would
not endure ; and that is so fixed a resolution , that no court of law or
equity ever attempted to break in the world .
Now then we come to this case , and if so be where it does not tend
to a perpetuity , a chattel interest will bear a remainder over, upon the
same reason it will bear a remainder over upon a contingency , where
that contingency doth wear out within the compass of a life ; otherwise
it is only to say it shall not because it shall not, for there is no more
inconvenience in the one than in the other .
Come we then at last to that which seems most to choke the plaintiff 's
title to this term , and that is the resolution in Child and Bailie 's Case
[ante , p. ) ; for it is upon that judgment it seems al
l
conveyances
must stand or be shaken , and our decrees made . Now , therefore , I
will take the liberty to see what that case is , and how the opinion of it
ought to prevail in our case . 1 . If Child and Bailie ' s Case be no more
than as it is reported b
y
Rolls , part 2 , fol . 119 , then it is nothing to
the purpose : A devise o
f
a term to Dorothy for life , the remainder
to William , and if he die without issue , to Thomas (without saying in
the life o
f





a term in tail with remainder over , which cannot be good . But if
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go , an authority ; for it is there said to be living Thomas. But the case
(under favor ) is not altogether as Mr. Justice Jones hath reported it
neither ; for I have seen a copy of the record upon this account ; and ,
by the way , no book of law is so ill corrected or so ill printed as that .
The true case is as it is reported b
y Mr . Justice Croke (Cro . Hilary 15 ,
Jac . 459 ) ; and with Mr . Justice Croke ' s report of it doth my Lord
Rolls agree in his Abridgment , title Devise 612 . There it is a term o
f
7
6 years is devised to Dorothy for life , then to William and his assigns
all the rest o
f
the term ; provided if William die without issue then
living , then to Thomas ; and this is in effect our present case ; I agree
it . But that which I have to say of this case is : First , It must be
observed that the resolution there did g
o
upon several reasons which
are not to be found in this case : ( 1 ) One reason was touched on , b
y my
Lord Chief Baron , that William having the term to him and his assigns ,
there could b
e no remainder over to Thomas , of which words there is
n
o notice taken b
y Mr . Justice Jones . ( 2 ) Dorothy the devisee for
life was executrix , and did assent and grant the lease to William , both
which reasons my Lord Rolls doth lay hold upon , as material to govern
the case . [ * 35 ] ( 3 ) William might have assigned his interest , and then
n
o remainder could take place , for the term was gone . ( 4 ) He might have
had issue , and that issue might have assigned , and then it had put all
out o
f
doubt . ( 5 ) But the main reason of al
l
that makes me oppose it
ariseth out o
f
the record , and is not taken notice o
f
in either of the re
ports o
f
Rolls or Jones or in Rolls ' s Abridgment . The record of that
case goes farther : for the record says there was a farther limitation
upon the death o
f
Thomas without issue to g
o
to the daughter , which
was a plain affectation of a perpetuity to multiply contingencies . It
further appears by the record , that the father ' s will was made the 10th
o
f Eliz . Dorothy , the devisce for life , held it to the 24th , and then
she granted and assigned the term to William ; he under the grant held
it till the 31st of Eliz . , and then re -granted it to his mother and died ;
the mother held it till the 1st of K . James , and then she died ; the as
signees o
f
the mother held it till 14 Jac . ; and then , and not till then ,
did Thomas , the younger son , set u
p
a title to that estate ; and before
that time , it appears by the record , there had been six several alienations
o
f
the term to purchasers for a valuable consideration , and the term
renewed for a valuable fine paid to the lord . And we d
o wander now ,
that after so long an acquiescence as from 10 Eliz . ( 1568 ] to 14 Jac .
[ 1617 ] , and after such successive assignments and transactions , that
the judges began to li
e
hard upon Thomas a
s
to his interest in law in
the term , especially when the reasons given in the reports o
f
the case
were legal inducements to guide our judgments , o
f which there are none
in our case .
But then , Secondly , at last , allowing this case to be a
s full and direct
a
n authority as is possible , and as they would wish that rely upon it ;
then I say : ( 1 ) The resolution in Child and Bailie ' s Case is a resolu
tion that never had any resolution like it before nor since . ( 2 ) I
t is a
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resolution contradicted by some resolutions ; and to show that that resolu
tion has been contradicted , there is the case of Cotton v. Heath (Rolls
Abr . t. Devise 612 [ ante — ]) , which looks very like a contrary resolution ;
there is a term limited to A for 18 years , the remainder to B for life, the
remainder to the first issue of B for life — this contingent upon a contin
case , 21 Car. 2 , in July 1669 , between Wood and Saunders [ i Cases in Ch .
gent was allowed to be good because it would wear out in a short time.
But to come up more fully and closely to it, and to show you that I am
bound up by the resolutions of this court , there was a fuller and flatter
131 ]. The trust of a long lease is limited and declared thus : to the father
for sixty years if he lived so long , then to the mother fo
r
sixty years if
she lived so long , then to John and his executors if he survived his father
and mother , and if he died in their lifetime having issue , then to his
issue , but if he die without issue living the father or mother , then the
remainder to Edward in tail . [ * 36 ] John did die without issue in the
lifetime o
f
the father and mother , and the question was , whether Ed
ward should take this remainder after their death ; and it was re
solved by my Lord Keeper Bridgman , being assisted by Judge Twisden
and Judge Rainford , that the remainder to Edward was good ; for
the whole term had vested in John if he had survived ; yet the con
tingency never happening , and so wearing out in the compass of two
lives in being , the remainder over to Edward might well be limited
upon it . Thus we see , that the same opinion which Sir Orlando
Bridgman held when he was a practicer and drew these conveyances
upon which the question now ariseth , remained with him when he was
the judge in this court , and kept the seals . And , b
y
the way , I think
it is due to the memory o
f
so great a man , whenever we speak o
f
him ,
to mention him with great reverence and veneration for his learning and
integrity .
They will perhaps say : Where will you stop if not at Child and
Bailie ' s Case ? Where ? Why everywhere where there is any inconven
ience , any danger of a perpetuity . And wherever you stop at a limita
tion o
f




f years . No man ever yet said a devise to a man and his heirs , and if
h
e
die without issue living B , then to B , is a naughty remainder ; that
is Pells and Brown ' s Case . Now the ultimum quod sit , or the utmost
limitation of a fee upon a fee , is not yet plainly determined ; but it will
b
e
soon found out if men shall set their wits on work to contrive by








Therefore my present thoughts are that the trust of this term was
well limited to Charles , who ought to have the trust o
f
the whole
term decreed to him , and an account o
f
the mean profits for the time
past , and a recompense made to him from the duke and Marriot for
the time to come . But I do not pay so little reverence to the company
I am in , as to run down their solemn arguments and opinions upon
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any decree in this case as yet. But I will give myself some time to
consider before I take any final resolution , seeing the lords, the judges ,
do differ from me in their opinions .
[ On the day appointed by the chancellor for final judgment May
13th , 1682 , counsel for the Duke of Norfolk begged permission to be
heard further , and by grace of the chancellor , the case was continued
from time to time till June 17th , 1682, at which time it was argued at
some length , and then the following opinion and decree given by the
lord chancellor. ]
LORD CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM . I am not sorry fo
r
the liberty
that was taken a
t
the bar to argue this over again , because I desired it
should be so ; for in truth I am not in love with my own opinion . * * *
It will be good for the satisfaction of the public in this case , to take
notice how far the court is agreed in this case , and then see where
they differ , and upon what grounds they differ , and whether anything
that hath been said be a ground for the changing this opinion . The







a term , or the limitation of the estate o
f
a
term , all depends upon one and the same reason . The court is like
wise agreed (which I should have said first , to dispatch it out of the
case , that it may not trouble the case a
t
all ) that the surrender of
Marriot to the Duke o
f
Norfolk , and the common recovery suffered b
y
the duke , are of no use a
t all in this case . For if this limitation to
Charles be good , then is this surrender and the recovery a breach of





this cause agreed . If the limitation be not good ,




a surrender to bar it , nor of the common
recovery to extinguish it . But then we come to consider the limitation ,
and there it [ is ] agreed all along in point o
f
law , that the measures
o
f
the limitations of the trust o
f







a term , are all one and uniform , here
and in other cases , and there is no difference at chancery and at common
law , between the rules o
f
the one and the rules of the other . What is
good in one case is good in the other . And therefore in this case the
court is agreed too , that the limitations made in this settlement to
Edward , & c . , are al
l
void ; for they tend directly and plainly to per
petuities , for they are limitations o
f
remainders of a term in gross after
a
n estate - tail in a term , which commenceth to be a term in gross when
the contingency for Charles happens .
Thus far there is no difference o
f opinion ; but whether the limita
tion to Charles if Thomas die without issue living Henry , whereby
the honor of the earldom of Arundel descends upon Henry — I say ,
whether that be void too is the great question o
f
this case , wherein we
differ in our opinions .
It is said that is void too . And ye
t
( sever it from the authority o
f
Child and Bailie ' s Case , which I will speak to by and by ) I would be
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glad to se
e
some tolerable reason given why it should be so ; for I agree
it is a question in law upon a trust , as it would be elsewhere upon an
estate ; and so the questions here are both questions o
f
law and equity .
It was well said , and well allowed by all the judges , when they did allow
the remainders o
f
terms after estates - tail in these terms to be void . I
shall not devise a term to a man in tail with remainders over . The
judges have admirably well resolved in it ; and the law is settled ; and
Matthew Manning ' s Case [ante p . ] did not stretch so far , because
this would tend to a perpetuity . Now , on the other side , I should
fain know , when there is a case before the court , where the limitation
doth not tend to a perpetuity , nor introduceth any visible inconvenience ,
what should hinder that from being good . For though if there be a
tendency to a perpetuity , o
r
a visible inconvenience , that shall be void
for that reason ; yet the bare limitation o
f
the remainder after an estate
tail which doth not tend to a perpetuity , that is not void . Why ? Be
cause it is not ? I dare not say so . See then the reasons why it is so .
[ * 4
9
] The reasons that I lie under the load o
f , and cannot shake
off , are these : The law doth in many cases allow of a future con
tingent estate to be limited , where it will not allow a present remainder
to b
e limited ; and that rule , well understood , goeth through the whole
case . How do you make that out ? Thus : If a man have an estate
limited to him his heirs and assigns for ever (which is a fee -simple ) ,
but if he die without issue , living J . S . , or in such a short time , then
to J . D . , though it be impossible to limit a remainder of a fee upon a
fee , yet it is not impossible to limit a contingent fee upon a fee . And
they that speak against this rule , do endeavor a
s
much as they can to
set aside the resolutions o
f
Pells and Brown ' s Case [ante p . ] ,
which ( under favor ) was not the first case that was resolved ; for , as
I said before , when I first delivered my opinion , it was resolved to be
a good limitation , 19 Eliz . , in the case of Hinde and Lyon , 3 Leonard
6
4 ; which , b
y
the way , is the best book of reports of the later ones
that hath come out without authority . If that be so , then where a
present remainder will not be allowed a contingent one will . If a lease
for years come to be limited in tail , the law allows not a present re
mainder to be limited thereupon , yet it will allow a future estate arising
upon a contingency only , and that to wear out in a short time . But
what time , and where are the bounds of that contingency ? You may
limit , it seems , upon a contingency to happen in a life . What if it
b





while Westminster -hall stands ? Where will you stop if you do not
stop here ? I will tell you where I will stop . I will stop wherever any





upon a fee - simple are not yet determined ; but the first inconvenience
that ariseth upon it will regulate that .
First o
f
all then , I would fain have anyone answer me , where there
is n
o
inconvenience in this settlement , no tendency to a perpetuity in
this limitation , and no rule of law broken by the conveyance , what
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should make this void ? And no man can say that it doth break any
rule of law , unless there be a tendency to a perpetuity , or a palpable
inconvenience . Oh , yes, terms are mere chattels, and are not in con
sideration of law so great as freeholds or inheritances. These are words,
and but words ; there is not any real difference at al
l
, but the reason
o
f
mankind will laugh at it . Shall not a man have as much power over
his lease as he has over his inheritance ? If he have not , he shall be
disabled to provide for the contingencies o
f
his own family that are
within his view and prospect , because it is but a lease for vears and
not an inheritance or a freehold . There is that absurdity in it which
is to me insuperable ; nor is the case that was put , answered in any
degree . * * * [ * 501 * * *
But I expect to hear it said from the bar , and it has been said often :
The case o
f Child and Bailie is a great authority . So it is . But this
I have to say to it : First , the point resolved in Child and Bailie ' s Case
was never so resolved before , nor ever was such a resolution since . Pells
and Brown ' s Case was otherwise resolved , and has often been adjudged
so since . In the next place , I will not take much pains to distinguish





the mother who was executrix , are things
which Rolls lays hold on as reasons for the judgment . But I know not
why I may not , with reverence to the authority of that case and the
learning o
f
those that adjudged it , take the same liberty as the judges
in Westminster -hall sometimes do , to deny a case that stands single
and alone o
f
itself . And I am o
f opinion the resolution in that case
is not law , though there it came to be resolved upon very strange cir
cumstances to support such a resolution ; for the remainder o
f
a term
of 76 years is called in question when but 15 years of it remained , and
after possession had shifted hands several times , and therefore I do not
wonder that the consideration of equity swayed that case . But I put
it upon this point , pray consider , there is nothing in Child and Bailie ' s
Case that doth tend to a perpetuity , nor anything in the settlement o
f





the conveyance ; but it is absolutely a resolution
quia volumus ; for it disagrees with all the other cases before and since ,
all which have been otherwise resolved . [ * 51 ] But it is a resolution , I
say , merely because it is a resolution . And it is expressly contrary to
Wood and Sanders ' s Case ſi Ch . Cas . 131 ] , which no art or reason
can distinguish from our case or that . For here is that case which was
clipped and minced at the bar , but never answered . Wood and
Sander ' s Case is this : to the husband for 60 years if he lived so long ,





the father and mother , then to John , but if he
die without issue living father or mother , then to Edward . Suppose
these words living father or mother had been out of the case , and it
had been to John , and if he die without issue , then to Edward . will
any man doubt but then the remainder over had been void , because it
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES . 429
Rected
":800d,contin
is a limitation after an express entail ? How came it then to be ad
judged good ? Because it was a remainder upon a contingency that
was to happen during two lives, which was but a short contingency ,
and the law might very well expect the happening of it. Now that is
this case, nay ours is much stronger ; for here it is only during one life,
there were two . The case of Cotton and Heath [Rolls Abr. t. Devise
612 ] in Rolls comes up to this : A term is devised to A for 18 years ,
the remainder to B for life , the remainder to the first issue male of B ;
which is a contingent estate after a contingency , and yet it was ad
judged good , because the happening of the contingency was to be ex
pected in so short a time. Now that case was adjudged by my Lord
K ep r Coventry , Mr. Justice Jones , Mr. Justice Croke, and Mr.
Justice Berkley , as Wood and Sanders's Case was by my Lord Keeper
Bridgman , Mr. Justice Twisden , and Mr. Justice Reinford . So that
however I may seem to be single in my opinion , having the misfortune
to differ from the three learned judges who assisted me, yet I take my
self to be supported by seven opinions in these two cases I have cited .
If then this be so , that here is a conveyance made which breaks no
rules of law , introduces no visible inconvenience, savors not of a per
petuity , tends to no ill example , why this should be void , only because
it is a lease for years , there is no sense in that .
Now if Charles Howard ' s estate be good in law it is ten times better
in equity . For it is worth the considering , that this limitation upon
this contingency happening ( as it hath , God be thanked ) , was the con
siderate desire o
f
the family , the circumstances whereof required con
sideration , and this settlement was the result of it , made with the best
advice they could procure , and is as prudent a provision as could be
made . For the son now to tell his father that the provision that he
had made for his younger brother is void , is hard in any case at law ;
but it is much harder in chancery ; for there no conveyance is ever to
b
e
set aside where it can b
e supported b
y
a reasonable construction , and
here must be an unreasonable one to overthrow it . [ * 52 ] I take it then
to b
e good both in law and equity ; and if I could alter my opinion ,
I would not be ashamed to retract it ; for I am as other men are , and
have my partialities as other men have . When all this is done , I am
a
t the bar desired to consider further o
f
this case . I would do so if I




s justice is , and I am bound b
y Magna Charta , nulli negari , nulli
differre justitiam . I have taken as much pains and time as I could to
b
e informed . I cannot help it if wiser men than I be of another opinion ;
but every man must be saved b
y
his own faith , and , I must discharge
my own conscience . * * * I must decree for the plaintiff in this case ,





200 years ; the defendant shall make him
a conveyance accordingly , because he extinguished the trust in the other
and the term , contrary to both law and reason , b
y
the merger and
surrender and common recovery ; and that the defendants do account
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with the plaintiff for the profits of the premises by them or any of them
received since the death of the said Duke Thomas , and which they or
any of them might have received without wilful default ; and that it
be referred to Sir Lacon William Child , Knight, one of the masters of
this court , to take the said account . * * *
[ This decree was reversed in the high court of chancery May 15 , 1683
by Lord Keeper North , on bill for review filed by defendants herein ;
and that decree of the high court of chancery was reversed and the
above decree of Lord Chancellor NOTTINGHAM affirmed by the House of
Lords, June 19th , 1685 , on appeal by Charles Howard .)
SCATTERWOOD V. EDGE , in Common Pleas , Trinity term , 9 Wm . III,
A . D . 1699 – 1 Salk . 229 .
In ejectment a special verdict was found , vi
z
. : Robert Edge devised
to trustees for eleven years , and then to the first son of A and the heirs
o
f
his body , and so on to the second , third , & c . , sons in tail male , provided
they the said sons shall take on them my surname ; and in case they
o
r their heirs refuse to take my surname , or die without issue , then I
devise my land to the first son of B in tail male , provided he take my
surname ; and if he refuse o
r
die without issue , then to the right heirs
o
f




the devise , and died without
issue ; and B had a son who was living at the time of the devise , who
took the surname of the devisor .
The whole court agreed : 1 . That the devise to the first son of A
was not a contingent remainder , but by way o
f
executory devise , be
cause the precedent estate is for years , which cannot support a remainder ;





the freehold ; nor can it be limited after a fee ,
because after such a disposal nothing remains in the owner to limit .
Et per POWELL , a devise to the first son of A , having none at that time ,
is void , because it is by way of a present devise , and the devisee is not
in esse ; but a devise to the first son of A , when he have one is good , for
that is only a future devise , and no inconvenience , for the inheritance
descends in the meantime . 2 . They held that an executory estate , to
arise within the compass o
f
a reasonable time , is good ; that 20 , nav 30
years , has been thought a reasonable time . So is the compass of a life
o
r lives ; for let the lives be never so many , there must be a survivor ,
and so it is but the length of that life ( for Twisden used to say the
candles are all lighted at once ) ; but they were not for going one step
farther , because these limitations make estates unalienable , every execui
tory devise being a perpetuity as far as it goes , that is to say , an estate
unalienable though all mankind join in the conveyance . And as to the
principal case BLENCOW , J . , held the devise to the first son of A to be
future ; for he supposed the testator knew A had no son , and that the
rather because he does not name him . POWELL , J . : There are three
sorts o
f executory estates : One where the devisor parts with his whole
fee -simple , but upon some contingency qualifies that disposition , and
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limits another fee upon that contingency ; which is altogether new , as
appears by 1 Inst. 18 a fee cannot be limited upon a fee. Vide 1 Ro .
825 , 826 ; 1 Cro., Pells v . Brown . The second sort is where he gives a
future estate to arise upon a contingency , and does not part with the
fee at present , but retains it ; these are not against law , for by common
law one might devise that his executor should sell his land , and in such
case the vendee is in by the will , and the fe
e
descends to the heir in
the meantime . For this sort , vide : 2 Leon . 11 ; 3 Leon . 64 ; Cro . Eliz .
833 ; Moor 644 ; 2 Rolle 793 ; Raym . 82 . A third sort of executory
devises is o
f
terms , which are well settled in Matthew Manning ' s Case .
It is dangerous to extend the boundary of these executory devises , which
at present is a life or lives . A devise to an infant in ventre sa mere . by
the better opinions , though various , is not good : Vide : 11 Hen . VI , 13 ;
Brooke [ Abr . ] Devises 32 ; 1 Rolle 609 , 610 ; Dyer 303 , 304 , 342 ; Moor
127 , 177 , 634 ; 2 Bulst , 272 ; 1 Rolle Rep . 110 ; Litt . 255 . But I am o
f
opinion that it is good , for he taking notice that the devisee is in ventre ,
must intend a future devise ; but a devise to A ' s first son does not import
notice in the devisor that A has no son ; it may as well be said a devise
to the heirs o
f J . S . , a person living , is good , because the testator knew
he was alive , and therefore meant a future devise . The question here
is whether the precedent term for eleven years makes a difference . I
hold not , because it is an original devise per verba de presenti , and so
differs from 1 Raym . 12 ; 2 Mod . 292 . But had it been to the first son
to b
e begotten it had been otherwise . Lastly he held that the devise
to the first son o
f
B , who was born and in esse at the time , was good ;
and a
s
to the objection that the devise to the first son of A was a condi
tion precedent , and so , that failing , all fails (Vide 1 Inst . 218 ) , he held
it was not a precedent condition , but part of the limitation . TREBY ,
C . J . : If the devise to the first son of A be good , then the devise to the
first son o
f
B is not good ; but if that to the first son of A be bad , then
this to the first son o
f
B is good . Had the first son of A been before
the court , the judgment must have been against him , because as a re
mainder it was void , and as an executory devise it was void ; for these are
either present or future : If present , the party must be in esse & capax
a
t
the time , o
r all is void - like a devise to the right heirs of J . S . , who is




infant in ventre sa mere ; where future , they must arise within the com
pass o
f
a life , no longer time has yet been allowed , and h
e
was not
for prolonging the time in favor o
f
these inconvenient estates . 2 . He
held the devise to the first son o
f
A was not a precedent condition , but
a precedent estate attended with these limitations . Judgment was given
for the defendant and afterwards affirmed b
y
the king ' s bench .
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GORE v. GORE , in Chancery , referred to the judges of the King's Bench , in
1722 and 1733 — 2 P . Wms. 28 , 2 Strange 958, 10 Mod . 501, 2 Kel. 254 , 3
Barnard K . B . 209, 229, 355 , 5 Gray 's P. C. 166 . Abridged from P . Wms.
and Strange .
This case came on before Lord Chancellor Macclesfield , who referred
it to the judges of the king 's bench for their opinion . William Gore ,
being seised in fee , devised to trustees and their heirs to the use of the
trustees for 500 years , to raise younger childrens ' fortunes and pay
debts , and after the determination of that estate, then to the first and
every other son of Thomas Gore (devisor 's eldest son ) , in tail male , re
mainder to Edward Gore (devisor's second son ) in tail male, remainders
over. At the death of the devisor , Thomas was a bachelor, but afterwards
married and had a son ; and upon this two questions arose : 1, whether
this son of Thomas could take; and, 2 , in whom the freehold vested at
the death of the devisor .
The judges certified their opinion as follows : " We have heard counsel
on both sides on the question above specified , and having considered
the same , are of opinion , that the devise of the manors above mentioned
to the first son of Thomas Gore is void , because he cannot take by way
of remainder , for that there is no freehold to support it ; nor can he take
by way of executory devise , because it is not to take place within that
compass of time which the law allows : and we are also of opinion , that
the freehold of the same manors , on the death of the devisor , were vested
in Edward , the second son . John PRATT [ C . J . ], LITTLETON Powls , R.
EYER , J . FORTESQUE ALAND [ JJ . 1 – 1722 .”
LORD MACCLESFIELD expressed some dissatisfaction with the opinion of
the judges , saying that though the law might be so , yet the term of 500
years being but a trust term , and so to be considered in equity as a
security only for money, was not to be so regarded , at least in equity ,
as to make the devise over void . After which the son of Thomas came
to agreement with his uncle Edward , which was confirmed by the
court .
Afterwards Thomas had a second son , and died , and this second so
n
brought the matter u
p
again in the chancery ; and LORD KING , now being
Lord Chancellor , sent it a second time to the court o
f king ' s bench , and
the justices this time certified against the opinion of their predecessors ,
a
s follows : “Upon hearing counsel on both sides , and consideration of
this case , we are of opinion , that the devise of the manors of Barrow
and Southley to the first son of Thomas Gore is good by way of ex
ecutory devise , and that the freehold of the said manors , on the death
o
f
the devisor , vested in his heir at law . HARDWICKE [ C . J . ] , F . Page ,
E . PROBYN , W . LEE [JJ . ) , Jan . 26 , 1733 . ”
This being certified , the cause was set down before LORD TALBOT , after
Trinity term , 1734 , who declared his agreement in opinion with the
last certificate , and made his decree accordingly . LORD RAYMOND was
also o
f
the same opinion .
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LONG V. BLACKALL , in King 's Bench , Hilary term , 37 Geo . III, A . D .
1797 — 7 Term 100 .
A case was sent from the court of chancery to this court for the
opinion of the judges , stated that George Blackall made his will April
23 , 1709, and died June 1, 1709 , leaving two sons , Thomas and George ,
and his wife Martha surviving ; and she was then enceinte with a son
afterwards born and named John . By his will he devised his mansion
house to his widow till her death or marriage or till a son of his should
attain 21 ; then to Thomas for life and on his death to his male issue
then living , who should be his heir , if any ; if none , then to George for
life , and on his death to his male issue then living , who should be his
heir , if any ; if none, then to the child , if a son , with which the wife
was then enceinte for life , and on his death to his male issue then living ,
if any ; and if such child should leave no male issue him surviving , or
should not be a son , then to Philippa Long, & c. The son George died
without issue April 14 , 1753 ; John died without issue March 5 , 1754 ;
the widow died Sept. 16 , 1768 ; and Thomas died without issue March
2 , 1786 . The question submitted for the opinion of the court was
whether the limitation to Philippa Long were good in the events that
have happened . Chambre contended for the plaintiff that the ultimate
limitation to her was not too remote ; and the only difference between
this and the common case is that the period of gestation occurs at the
beginning instead of at the end of the first estate for life ; but that can
not vary the question as far as it respects the tendency of such limita
tion to create a perpetuity . Wood was proceeding to argue for the de
fendants ; but the court expressed themselves so clearly satisfied that
the ultimate limitation to the plaintiff was good , that he declined argu
ing the point ; saying that he had no reason , from the view he had taken
of the subject , to expect that he should be able to alter their opinion .
LORD KENYON , C. J. The rules respecting executory devises have
conformed to the rules laid down in the construction of legal limitations ,
and the courts have said that the estate shall not be unalienable by execu
tory devises fo
r





law conveyance . In marriage settlements the estate may be limited to
the first and other sons o
f
the marriage in tail , and until the person
to whom the last remainder is limited is o
f
age the estate is unalienable .
In conformity to that rule the courts have said , so far we will allow exe
cutory devises to b
e good . To support this position I could refer to
many decisions ; but it is sufficient to refer to the Duke of Norfolk ' s Case ,
in which all the learning on this head was gone into ; and from that time
to the present , every judge has acquiesced in that decision . It is an estab
lished rule that an executory devise is good if it must necessarily happen
within a life or lives in being and twenty -one years , and the fraction o
f
another year , allowing for the time o
f
gestation .
[ * 103 ] LAWRENCE , J . The devise over in this case must take effect
if at al
l
after a life which must be in being within nine months after the
devisor ' s death .
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THELLUSSON v. WOODFORD , in the House of Lords , 1805 . — 1 Bos. & Pal.
N . R . 357 , 11 Ves. 212 , Cruise Dig . ti
t
. Devise 524 , 5 Gray ' s P . C . 530 .




the complainants in a
bill in chancery , and seeking a reversal of the decree (reported in 4
Ves . Jr . 227 ) of the chancellor dismissing the bill . Decree affirmed .
The complainants are the sons , widow , daughters , and husbands of the
daughters o
f
Peter Thellusson ; and the defendants are the trustees under
his will ; and the bill seeks a construction of the will and an adjudica
tion that the trusts are in violation of the rule against perpetuities , and
therefore void . The testator being seised of vast estates , real and per
sonal , and having three sons ( Peter , George , and Charles ) a wife , and
several daughters , made his will , dated April 2 , 1796 ; b
y
which he
gave to each o
f
his children , besides small annuities , sufficient to make
the portion for each son £23 ,000 , and each daughter £12 ,000 , previous
advances being reckoned a
s part of such portions ; gave £22 ,000 o
f
bank
stock and £600 per annum long annuities , to his children , subject to
a life interest to his wife ; and gave all the residue of his estate real and
personal to the defendants herein , the survivors and survivor of then
and the heirs of the survivor , in trust to permit his wife to use and
occupy the capital mansion and grounds and the furniture , horses ,




the widow the trustees should sell such premises and





his personal estate . The residue of his personal estate he
gave to the same trustees in trust to invest the same in freehold estates





him and the lands so directed to be purchased should be
regularly collected b
y





the children and grandchildren of the testator
in being at his death or born in due time afterwards ; and he directed
his trustees , on the death o
f
such survivor , to divide the residue of
the estate real and personal and the accumulations into three lots o
f
equal value , and give the first choice of the three to the then eldest
surviving male issue o
f
the testator ' s son Peter , in tail , with divers
remainders over ; the second choice in like manner to the eldest male
descendant o
f
testator ' s son George then surviving , in tail , with like
remainders over ; the remaining lot to the eldest male descendant of











The property subject to the trust consisted o
f
land in England o
f
the
annual value of £4 ,500 , and o
f
land in the West Indies and personal
property estimated at above £600 ,000 value .
The trustees filed a cross -bill praying that the trusts be established
and carried into execution . Both the original and cross -bills coming
o
n before Lord Loughborough , assisted by Richard P . Arden (master
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of the rolls ) , Buller and Lawrence , JJ., at Lincoln 's Inn Hall , Dec.
5th , 1798 , were heard on that and several subsequent days. On Feb .
19th , 1802 , the chancellor pronounced his decree dismissing the original
bill and establishing the trusts as prayed in the cross -bill . On appeal
to the House of Lords, the case was argued at the bar of the house
on several days by Mansfield and Romilly for the appellants , and by
Att . Gen . Percival, Sol. Gen . Sutton , and Pigott, Richards , Alexander ,
and Cox, for the respondents . After the argument the following ques
tions were submitted to the judges on motion of Lord Chancellor Elden :
1. A testator by his will , being seised in fee of the real estate therein
mentioned , made the following devise : - I give and devise al
l my manors ,
messuages , tenements , and hereditaments , at Brodsworth in the county
o
f
York , after the death of my sons , Peter Isaac Thellusson , George
Woodford Thellusson , and Charles Thellusson , and of my grandson
John Thellusson , son of my son Peter Isaac Thellusson , and o
f
such other
sons as my son Peter Isaac Thellusson may have , and of such sons
a
s my said sons George Woodford Thellusson and Charles Thellusson




f my decease , or born in due time afterwards ,
and after the deaths o
f
the survivors and survivor of the several







survivor of the said several persons , shall then be the eldest male lineal
descendant o
f my son Peter Isaac Thellusson and his heirs forever . - At
the time o
f
the testator ' s death , there were seven persons actually born
answering the description mentioned in the testator ' s will , and there
were two in ventre sa mere answering the description , if children in
ventre sa mere do answer that description ; a
ll
the said several persons ,
so described in the testator ' s will , being dead , and , at the death of the
survivor o
f
such several persons , there being living one male lineal
descendant o
f
the testator ' s son Peter Isaac Thellusson , and one only ;
Is such person entitled b
y
law , under the legal effect of the devise
above stated , and the legal construction o
f
the several words in which




2 . If at the death of the survivor of such several persons as afore
said , such only male lineal descendant was not actually born , but was
in ventre sa mere . Would such lineal descendant when actually born be
so entitled ?
The unanimous opinion of the judges was pronounced as follows b
y
[ * 385 ) LORD MACDONALD , C . B . The first objection to the will is , that
the testator has exceeded that portion o
f
time within which the contin





law , for three reasons . First , because so great a
number o
f
lives cannot be taken as in the present instance to protract the
time during which the vesting is suspended , and consequently the power
o
f
alienation suspended . Secondly , that the testator has added to the lives
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of persons who should be born at the time of his death the lives of persons
who might not be born . Thirdly , that , after enumerating different classes
of lives during the continuance of which the vesting is suspended , the
testator has concluded with these restrictive words , “ as shall be living
at my decease, or born in due time afterwards,” and that as these words
appertain only to the last class in the enumeration , the words which are
used in the preceding classes being unrestricted , they will extend to
grandchildren and great - grand children , and their issue , and so make
this executory devise void in it
s
creation , as being to
o
remote .
With respect to the first ground , vi
z
. the number of lives taken , which
in the present instance is nine , I apprehend that no case or dictum has
drawn any line as to this point , which a testator is forbidden to pass .
On the contrary , in the cases in which this subject has been considered
by the ablest judges , they have for a great length of time expressed them
selves a
s
to the number o
f
lives , not merely without any qualification or




o moment ; the ground o
f
that opinion being , that no public
inconvenience can arise from a suspension o
f
the vesting , and thereby




f many persons named or described is but the life
o
f
some one . This was held without dissent b
y
Twisden , J . , in Love v .









e for twenty lives , one after another , if all be in existence at once .




e proved without difficulty . When this
subject o
f
executory trusts came to be examined b
y




to the time within which the contingency must
happen , he thus expresses himself : " If a term be devised , or the trust
o
f
a term limited , to one for life with twenty remainders for life , suc






their estates , these , though they look like a possibility
upon a possibility , are al
l
good , because they produce no inconvenience ;
they wear out in a little time . ” With an easy interpretation , we find
from Lord Nottingham what that tendency to a perpetuity is , which
the policy of the law has considered as a public inconvenience , namely ,
where an executory devise would have the effect o
f making lands unalien
able beyond the time which is allowed in legal limitations , that is , beyond
the time a
t
which one in remainder would attain his age o
f twenty -one ,
if he were not born when the limitations were executed . When he de
clares that he will stop where he finds an inconvenience , he cannot con
sistently with sound construction of the context , be understood to mean ,
where judges arbitrarily imagine they perceive an inconvenience , for
h




tempt to supersede the vesting longer than can be done b
y legal limita
tions . I understand him to mean , that wherever courts perceive that
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such would be the effect, whatever may be the mode attempted , that
effect must be prevented ; and he gives the same but no greater latitude
to executory devises and executory trusts as to estates tail . This has
been ever since adopted . In Scatterwood v. Edge , 1 Salk 229 , ſante
p . ] the court held , that an [* 387 ] executory estate, to arise within
the compass of a reasonable time is good as twenty or thirty years so is
the compass of a life or lives , for let the lives be never so many , there
must be a survivor , and so it is but the length of that life . In Hum
berston v . Humberston , 1 P . Wms. 332 [ante p . ] where an at
tempt was made to create a vast number of estates fo
r
life in succession ,
a
s well to persons unborn as to persons in existence , Lord Cowper re
strained that devise within the limits assigned to common law convey
ances , by giving estates for life to all those who were living ( at the
death o
f
the testator , ) and estates to those who were unborn considering
all the co -existing lives ( a vast many in number ) as amounting in the
end to n
o
more than one life . His lordship was in the situation alluded
to b
y
Lord Nottingham , where a visible inconvenience appeared . The
bounds prescribed to limitations in common law conveyances were ex
ceeded , the excess was cut off , and the devise confirmed within those
limits . Lord Hardwicke repeats the same doctrine in Sheffield v .
Lord Orrery , 3 Atk . 282 , using the words life or lives without any
restriction as to number . Many other cases might be cited to the
like effect , but I shall only add what is laid down in two very modern
cases . In Gurnall v . Wood , Willes , 211 Lord Chief Justice Willes
speaks o
f
a life or lives without any qualification ; and Lord Thur
low , in Robinson v . Hardcastle , 2 Brown Ch . Cas . 30 , says that
a man may appoint 100 or 1000 trustees , and that the survivor o
f
them shall appoint a life estate . It appears then , that the coexisting
lives , at the expiration o
f
which the contingency must happen , are
not confined to any definite number . But it is asked shall lands be
rendered unalienable during the lives o
f all the individuals , who com




where other very ex
tensive descriptions are made use of ? It may be answered that when such
cases occur , they will , according to their respective circumstances ,
[ * 388 ] b
e put to the usual test , whether they will or will not tend to
à perpetuity , by rendering it almost , if not quite , impracticable to as
certain the extinction o
f
the lives described , and will be supported or
avoided accordingly .
But it is contended , that in these and other cases the persons , during
whose lives the suspension was to continue , were persons immediately con
nected with or immediately leading to , the person in whom the property




end . I am unable to
find any authority for considering this as a sine qua non in the creation
o
f
a good executory trust . It is true that this will almost always be the
case and mode of disposing o
f property , introduced and encouraged
u
p
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testator and it
s
connections . But when the true reason for circum
scribing the period , during which alienation may be suspended , is
adverted to , there seems to be no ground or principle that renders
such a









commerce . The length of time will not be greater or less , whether
the lives taken have any interest , vested o
r contingent , o
r
have
not ; nor , whether the lives are those of persons immediately connected
with o
r immediately leading to that person in whom the property is
first to vest , terms to which it is difficult to annex any precise meaning .
The policy o
f






which I apprehend looks merely to duration o
f
time . This could not
b
e the opinion o
f
Lord Thurlow in Robinson V . Hardcastle , nor
is any such opinion to be found in any case o
r
book upon this subject .
The result of al
l




Lord Chief Justice Willes (Willes 215 ) with his usual accuracy and
perspicuity : “ Executory devises have not been considered as mere pos
sibilities , but as certain interests and estates , and have been resembled
to contingent remainders [ * 389 ] in a
ll
other respects ; only they have
been put under some restraints to prevent perpetuities . As a
t
first
it was held that the contingency must happen within the compass of
a life , or lives in being , o
r
a reasonable number o
f
years ; at length it





the father ' s death ; because , as that contingency must
necessarily happen within less than nine months after the death o
f
a person in being , that construction would introduce no inconvenience ,
and the rule has in many instances been extended to 21 years after
the death o
f
a person in being , as in that case likewise there is no
danger o
f
a perpetuity . ” Comparing what the testator has done in the
present case with what is above cited , it will appear that he has not
postponed the vesting even so long as he might have done .
The second objection which has been made in this case is , that the
testator has added to the lives o
f persons in being at the time of his
decease , those of persons not then born . It becomes , therefore , nec
essary to discover in what sense the testator meant to use the words
“ born in due time afterwards . ” Such words , in the case o
f
a man ' s
own children , mean the time o
f gestation ; what is to be intended b
y
these words in this will must b
e
collected from the will itself . It
may be collected from the will itself , that by those words the testator
meant to describe the period of time within which issue might be
born during whose lives the trust might legally continue , o
r , in other













s their respective mothers were enceinte with a
t the time o
f
his death ; o




time which would b
e the necessary period for effecting
his purpose . This is probable from his using the same word , a
s a
p
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plied to the time during which the presentation to the advowson of
Marr might be suspended [ * 390 ] without incurring a lapse . That a
child in ventre sa mere was considered as in existence , so as to be capable
of taking by executory devise , was maintained by Powell , J ., in the case
of Loddington v. Kime , 1 Ld . Raym . 207 [ante - ] , upon this ground ,
that the space of time between the death of the father and birth of the
posthumous son was so short that no inconvenience could ensue . So
in Northy v. Strange, 1 P . Wms. 340 , Sir J . Trevor held , that by a
devise to children and grandchildren an unborn grandchild should
take. Two years after Lord Macclesfield in Burdett V. Hopegood ,
1 P . Wms. 486 . held that where a devise was to a cousin , if the testator
should leave no son at the time of his death , a posthumous son should
take as being left at the testator 's death . In Wallis v. Hodgson , 2
Atk . 117 , Lord Hardwicke held that a posthumous child was entitled
under the statute of distributions and hi
s
reason deserves notice .
“ The principal reason (says he ) that I g
o
upon is , that the plaintiff
was in ventre sa mere a
t
the time of her brother ' s death , and conse
quently a person in rerum natura ; so that b
y
the rules of the common
and civil law she was , to all intents and purposes , a child as much
a
s if born in the father ' s lifetime . ” Such a child , in charging for
the portions o
f
other children living at the death of the father , is
included a
s
then living , Beal v . Beal , 1 P . Wms . 244 , and so in a
variety of other reports . In Bassett v . Bassett , 3 Atk . 203 . Lord
Hardwicke decreed rents and profits which had accrued at a rent -day






W . 3 , c . 16 , such children seem to be considered in all cases
o
f
devise , and marriage or other settlement , to be living at the death
o
f
their father , although not born till after his decease . It is other
wise considered in the case o
f
descent . In Roe v . Quarterly , 1
Term 630 , the devise was to Hester Read for life (daughter o
f
Walter
Read ) and to the heirs o
f
her body ; and for default of such issue ,




Walter Read is now [ * 391 ] enceinte with ,




such child , then to the right heirs o
f
Walter Read and Mary his wife . It was contended that the last
limitation was too remote , as coming after a devise to one not in be
ing , and his issue . But the court said , that since the stat . of King
William , which puts posthumous children on the same footing with
children born in the life -time of their ancestor , this objection seemed
to b
e
removed , whatever was the case before . In Gulliver V .
Wickett , 1 Wils . 105 , the devise was to the wife for life , then to the
child , with which she was supposed to be enceinte , in fee , provided
that if such child should die before 21 leaving no issue , the reversion
should g
o
to other persons named . The court said , if there had
been n
o
devise to the wife for life , which made the ulterior estate
a contingent remainder , the devise to the child in ventre sa mere
being in futuro , would have been a good executory devise . In Doe v .
Lancashire , 5 Term 49 , the court o
f king ' s bench has held that
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marriage and the birth of a posthumous child revoke a will , in like
manner as if the child had been born in the lifetime of the father .
In Doe v . Clarke , 2 H . Bl. 399 , Ld . Chief Justice Eyre holds, that
independent of intention an infant in ventre sa mere , by the course
and order of nature, is then living , and comes clearly within the
description of children living at the parent 's decease ; and he pro
fesses not to accede to the distinction between the cases in which a
provision has been made for children generally , and where the testator
has been supposed to mark a personal affection for children who hap
pened to have been actually born at the time of his death . The most
recent case is that of Long v . Blackall ; there the court of king 's
bench had no doubt that a devise to a child in ventre sa mere in the
first instance was good , and a limitation over was good also , on the
contingency of there being no issue male , or descendant of issue male ,
living at the death of such posthumous child . It seems then , that if
estates [ * 392 ] for life had been given to the several cestuis qui vie
in this will , and after their deaths to their children , either born or
in ventre sa mere at the testator ' s death , they would have been good .
No tendency to perpetuity then can arise in the case of such lives
being taken , not to confer on them a measure of the beneficial in
terest , but to fix the time during which the vesting of the property
which is the subject o
f
this devise , shall be protracted ; inasmuch
a
s
the circulation of real property is no more fettered in the one case
than in the other . It is , however , observable that this question may
never arise , if it shall so happen that the children in ventre matris at
the death o
f
the testator shall not survive those who were then born .
The third ground o
f objection depends upon the application o
f
the





persons during whose lives the restriction is suspended . This
objection I conceive will be removed by the application o
f
the usual
rules in construing wills , to the present case . First , where the in
tention o
f
the testator is clear , and is consistent with the rules o
f
law ,
that shall prevail . His intention evidently was to prevent alienation
a




could ; if then it is to be supposed that the re
strictive words are to b
e
confined to the last o
f
seven different descrip
tions of persons , and that the testator intended to leave the four
descriptions o
f
persons which immediately preceded this 7th class ,
without the benefit o
f
such restriction , although they equally stand
in need o
f
it , we must do the utmost violence to all established rules
o
n this head . That construction is to b
e adopted which will support
the general intent . The grammatical rule o
f referring qualifying
words to the last o
f
the several antecedents , is not even supposed b
y








such a confined application o
f
them .
Reason and common sense revolt a
t the idea [ * 393 ] o
f overlooking
the plain intent which is disclosed in the context , namely , that they
should b
e applicable to such classes a
s require them , and as to the
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others to consider them as surplusage ; if words admit of more con
structions than one, that which will support the legal intention of the
testator is in a
ll
cases to be adopted . I do not trouble your lordships
with any observation upon the objections arising from the magnitude
o
f
the property in question , either as it now stands , or may hereafter
stand , or as to the motives which may have influenced this testator ,




which I or any other in
dividual may or ought to have been moved ; that would be to suppose
that such topics can in any way affect the judicial mind . For these
imperfect reasons , I concur with the rest of th
e
judges in offering this
answer to your lordships ' first question .
With respect to your lordships ' second question , the objection to
such child being entitled must arise from an allowance having been made
for the time of gestation at the end o
f
the executory trusts . It seems
to b
e
settled that an estate may be limited in the first instance to a
child unborn , and I apprehend to the first and other sons in fee as
purchasers . The case o
f Long V . Blackall , Term 100 , seems , to
have decided that an infant in ventre matris is a life in being . The es
tablished length o
f
time during which the vesting may be suspended
is during a life or lives in being , the period o
f
gestation , and the
infancy o
f
such posthumous child . If then this time has been al
lowed in some cases a
t
















W . 3 , c . 16 , as being born to such
purposes , what should prevent the period of gestation being allowed both
a
t
the commencement and termination o
f
the suspension , if it should
be called for ? In those cases where it has been allowed at the com
mencement , and particularly in Long v . Blackall , [ * 394 ] it must
have been obvious to the court that it might be wanting at the ter
mination , yet that was never made an objection . In Gulliver V .
Wickett , the child which was supposed to be in ventre sa mere might
have married and died before 21 , and have left his wife enceinte ; in
that case a double allowance would have been required , yet that pos
sibility was never made an objection , although it was obvious . In
Long v . Blackall , according to the printed report , the precise point
was not gone into . But it is plain that the attention of the court
must have been drawn to it for the learned judge who argued
that case in support o
f
the devise , expressly stated " that every
common case o
f
a limitation over , after a devise for a life in being ,
with remainder in trust to his unborn issue , includes the same con
tingency as was then in question ; for the heir for life may die leav
ing his wife enceinte , and the only difference is that the period o
f
gestation occurs a
t the beginning instead of the end o
f
the first legal
estate . It must have been palpable that it might possibly occur at
both ends . Every reason then for allowing the period o
f
gestation
in the one case seems to apply with equal force to the other , and
leads the mind to this conclusion , that it ought to be allowed in
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both cases, or in either case but natural justice in several cases having
considered children in ventre sa mere as living at the death of the father ,
it should seem that no distinction can properly be made , but that in the
singular event of both periods being required , they should be allowed ,
as there can be no tendency to a perpetuity .
Judgment affirmed .
Statute of New York , Michigan , & c.
" Every future estate shall be void in its creation , which shall suspend
the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed
by this article . Such power of alienation is suspended , when there are
no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be con
veyed .” N . Y . R . S . ( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c. 1, t. 2 , Art. 1, $ 14 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) ,
c. 62, $14 , C . L . ( 1897 ) , 88796 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $14 , R . L . ( 1905 ) ,
$3203 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56 , $ 14 , St. ( 1898 ) , 82038.
" The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any lim
itation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continu
ance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate ,
except in the single case mentioned in the next section . ” N . Y . R . S. ( 1828 ) ,
pt . 2, c. 1, t. 2, Art. 1, 815 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62 , 815 , C . L . ( 1897 ) ,
$8797 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $ 15 , R . L . (1905 ) , 83204 ; Wis. R . S. ( 1849 ) ,
c . 56 , $ 15 , St. ( 1898 ) , 82039.
" A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder
in fee , to take effect in the event that the person to whom the first re
mainder is limited , shall die under the age of 21 years , or upon any other
contingency , by which the estate of such persons may be determined before
they attain their full age .” N . Y . R . S. ( 1828 ) , pt . 2, c. 1, t . 2, Art . 1,
$ 16 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62, 816 , C . L . ( 1897 ) , 98798 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) ,
c. 45 , $16 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , 83205 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56 , $ 16 , St. ( 1898 ) ,
82040 .
" Successive estates for life shall not be limited , unless to persons in
being at the creation thereof; and where a remainder shall be limited on
more than two successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent
to those of two persons first entitled thereto , shall be void , and upon the
death of these persons , the remainder shall take effect in the same manner
as if no other life estates han been created .” N . Y . R . S. ( 1828 ) , pt. 2,
c . 1, t . 2, Art. 1, $17 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c . 62, 817 , C . L . (1897 ) , 88799 ;
Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $ 17 , R . L . (1905 ) , 83206 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56,
817 , St. ( 1898 ) , $2041 .
" No remainder shall be created upon an estate for the life of any other
person or persons than the grantee or devisee of such estate ; unless such
remainder be in fee ; nor shall a remainder be created upon such an estate
in a term of years , unless it be for the whole residue of such term . ” N . Y .
R . S. (1828 ) , pt . 2, c. 1, t. 2, Art . 1, § 18 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62, $ 18 ,
C . L . ( 1897 ) , 88800 ; Minn . St . (1866 ) , c . 45 , $18, R . L . (1905 ) , 83207; Wis .
R . S. (1849 ) , c. 56 , $18 , St . (1898 ) , $ 2042 .
“When a remainder shall be created upon any such life estates , and
more than two persons shall be named as the persons during whose lives
the life estate shall continue , the remainder shall take effect upon the
death of the two persons first named , in the same manner as if no other
lives had been introduced .” N . Y . R . S. ( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c. 1, t. 2 , Art . 1,
§ 19 ; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62, $ 19, C. L . ( 1897 ) , § 8801 ; Minn . St . ( 1866 ) ,
c . 45, $19, R . L . ( 1905 ) , 83208 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56, $ 19, St. ( 1898 ) ,
$2043.
" A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term of years , unless
the nature of the contingency on which it is limited be such that the re
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mainder must vest in interest , during the continuance of not more than
two lives in being at the creation of such remainder , or upon the termina
tion thereof. " N . Y , R . S. ( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c . 1, t . 2, Art . 1, 820 ; Mich . R . S.
( 1846 ) , c . 62, 820 , C. L . ( 1897 ) , 88802 ; Minn . St. ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , $20 , R . L .
(1905 ) , 93209 ; Wis . R . S. ( 1849 ) , c. 56 , 820 , St. ( 1898 ) , 82044 .
“ No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a term of years ,
except to a person in being , at the creation of such estate . ” N . Y . R . S.
( 1828 ) , pt. 2, c. 1, t . 2, Art. 1, § 21; Mich . R . S. ( 1846 ) , c. 62, $ 21, C. L .
( 1897 ) , 88803; Minn . St . ( 1866 ) , c. 45 , 821 , R . L . ( 1905 ) , 83210 ; Wis . R . S .
( 1849 ) , c. 56 , 821, St. (1898 ) , 82045.
LAWRENCE ' S APPEAL , in Pa . Sup . Ct., Oct . 6 , 1890 - 136 Pa . St . 354 ,
20 Atl . 521, 20 Am . St. Rep . 925 , 11 L . R . A . 85 .
CLARK , J . - John Lawrence died domiciled in the city of Philadelphia ,
in the month of March , 1847 . By his last will and testament he devised
all his real and personal estate to certain persons therein named in trust ,
to pay over the net income, during her life - time, to his daughter , Ann
Appleton ; to assign the real estate upon her decease in fee to the ap
pointees of her last will ; or , failing such appointment , to pay over the
same to and among her then living children , and the issue of children
then deceased . The trustees named in the will were removed by the
orphans ' court of Philadelphia county , during the life-time of Ann Ap
pleton , and George W . Appleton and Henry Pomerene were duly ap
pointed trustees in their place . All the property , except certain real
estate in Philadelphia , was lost by the devastavit of the original trustees ;
the remaining property being known as " No. 43 South Second Street,"
“ No. 221 Arch Street," and " Nos . 1127 and 1129 Pine Street.” Ann
Appleton , the donee of the power , died in March , 1883 , domiciled in
the state of New Jersey , leaving to survive her certain children , all of
whom , it is conceded , were born during the life -time of John Lawrence .
By her last will and testament in writing , which was afterwards duly
probated she devised to George W . Appleton , and , in the event of his
renunciation or decease , to the Philadelphia Trust, etc., Company , certain
property of her own , in Haddonfield , N . J ., and also all that remained
of the property over which she held the power of appointment , under the
will of John Lawrence , specifically referring thereto , in trust to care for
the same , and collect the income thereof , during the joint lives of her
children , all of whom , as we have said , were living at the death of John
Lawrence ; to pay out of such income and the proceeds of sale of the
Haddonfield property , if sold under the authority given , certain annuities
mentioned , during that period ; and , after the expiration of said joint
lives, to transfer the corpus of the property to the New York Baptist
Union , for ministerial education , which is the corporate name of what
is known as the “ Rochester Theological Seminary .” George W . Apple
ton died December 1, 1886 , and , the Philadelphia Trust , etc ., Company
having renounced the trust , the office of trustee under the appointment
in the will of Ann Appleton became vacant ; whereupon Ann Eliza Griffin ,
one of the annuitants for life, presented her petition for the appointment
of a successor to the trust created by the donee of the power . The ap
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pellants resisted this application , alleging that the execution of the power
by Ann Appleton was invalid , and that Mrs . Griffin had , therefore , no
standing in court to ask for the appointment of a trustee , the estate
having passed to those entitled in remainder , under the will of John
Lawrence , deceased , as if Ann Appleton had died intestate. Their con
tention is — First , that the appointment violates the rule against per
petuities , and is therefore wholly void ; and , second , that, while the
donee of the power by its terms could make a direct , immediate , and
absolute appointment o
f
the fee , she was not authorized to declare uses
and trusts as contained in her will .
The rule , as stated in Gray on Perpetuities , is as follows : “ No inter
est , subject to a condition precedent , is good unless the condition must
be fulfilled , if a
t










where the principles of the common law prevail , excepting as it may have
been modified b
y





it is modified b
y
the acts of 18th April , 1853 , § 9 , and 26th
April , 1855 , § 12 , which were suggested b
y
the Thellusen Act , and
operate only in restraint of accumulations . It seems to be conceded ,
and rightly too , we think , that , although Ann Appleton was domiciled
a
t her death in New Jersey , the validity o
f
the appointment , if there




which is the lex rei sitae . Any inquiry as to the law o
f
New Jersey is
therefore rendered unnecessary . The rule , as stated , applies to interests
in realty o
r
in personalty , whether legal o
r
equitable , but has no a
p




nature cannot be subject to a condition precedent . So , also , where a
power of appointment is given , either b
y
deed o
r will , the rule applies
a
s well to the power as ' to the appointment . If a power can be exercised
a
t
a time beyond the limits o
f
the rule it is bad . As , in the case at bar ,
however , the power must be exercised , if at all , in the life - time o
f
Ann




creation , it cannot be im
peached upon that ground ; and , although the power to be exercised by
will only is in the most general terms , it is not rendered bad b
y
the fact
that , within its terms , an appointment might possibly have been made
which would be too remote . Gray , Perp . § 510 . The direct and specific
object o
f
the power , according to its terms , is not to create a perpetuity ;
and , as the exercise o
f




choice in the donee , the security which the law provides
against the violation of the law o
f
remoteness is in the failure of any
disposition which results from the abuse of that discretion . Lewis , Perp .
487 . The question , therefore , is upon the validity o
f
the appointment
which was in fact made . As a general rule , whether an appointment
made in execution o
f
a power is too remote depends upon its distance
from the creation o
f
the power , and not from it
s
execution . Gray , Perp .
§ 514 ; Lewis , Perp . 481 . The exception is when the power is general





will . In such case the donee has absolute control as if he had the
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fee, since he can appoint as well to himself as to any other person . He
is practically the owner . In such case the degree of remoteness is meas
ured from the time of the exercise of the power, and not from the time
of its creation . Bray v . Bree , 2 Clark & F . 453 ; Sugd . Powers , 394 , 683 ;
Lewis , Perp . 483 ; Gray , Perp . $ $ 477 -524 ; Mifflin ' s Appeal , 121 Pa .
S
t
. 205 , 15 Atl . 525 . But it will be seen that the power given to Ann
Appleton is a power to be exercised b
y
will only . Her authority is not
commensurate with the entire ownership . She could not appoint to her
self , nor to any other person , to take in her life -time . She had not the
absolute control , and , although the decisions are somewhat conflicting ,
and the question not free from doubt , the better opinion seems to be that
the power must be regarded as special ; and therefore the remoteness of
the estate created b
y









See In re Powell ' s Trusts , 39 Law J . Ch . 188 ; Gray , Perp . § 526 ; and
cases there cited . No estate o
r
interest can be limited under a particular
power , which would have been too remote if limited in the deed o
r
will
creating the power . Lewis , Perp . 488 . But , assuming that the remote
ness o
f
the appointment depends upon it
s
distance from the creation o
f
the power , it is plain that the several bequests and annuities made in
the last will and testament of Ann Appleton , deceased , were to persons








r annuity , out of the proceeds of her own and the income of
the original trust estate .
The manifest purpose of the trust was to preserve the estate for the
legatees and annuitants for the life o
f
her children and the survivor o
f
them . At the death of the last child her surviving , their object would
be fully attained ; the annuities , whether to children , grandchildren , o
r
to others , were then to terminate , and the entire trust - estate then re




e , to be applied as b
y
the will is directed . We have then a devise to
the trustees , in trust for the annuitants , for the life of the children of
the donee , and the survivor of them , with a remainder over in fee to the
Baptist Union . Ann Appleton , as the donee of the power , had the right
b
y
her will to appoint to whom she chose . She certainly had a right to
appoint to her children for life , or to trustees for their use for life ,
whether they were born before or after the decease o
f
John Lawrence ;
and that , although the estate in remainder might be too remote , the
annuitants would take a
t




f particular estate and remainder , ( including anal
ogous gifts o
f personal estate , ) and the particular estate is limited to a
valid object o
f
the power , but the remainder is too remote , the appoint
ment will not be wholly void , but only the gift in remainder . In such
case , the interests , in respect of which there is an excess of the power ,
being distinct and separable from the valid portion of the appointment ,
there is n
o
reason for involving the primary limitation in the remoteness
o
f
the remainder . ” Lewis , Perp . 496 ; citing Adams v . Adams , Cowp .
651 ; Bristow v . Warde , 2 Ves . Jr . 336 ; Routledge v . Dorril , Id . 357 ;
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Brudenell v. Elwes , 1 East, 442 , y Ves. 382 ; Butcher v. Butcher , 9 Ves.
382 ; Gray , Perp . S $ 232 , 239 , 242 , citing Read v . Gooding , 21 Beav . 478 ,
4 De Gex , M . & G . 510, and other cases . See, also , Davenport v. Harris ,
3 Grant Cas . 168 . In this respect we think the ruling in Smith 's Ap
peal, 88 Pa. St. 492 , was wrong; for , although Ryan 's daughter , Mrs.
Smith , might have had children born after his decease , her children ,
whether born before or after Rvan 's death , would have taken at her
death , and the life-estates were therefore good ; whereas , it was held that
her appointment was wholly bad .
This statement of the law would seem to be decisive of the case at bar,
for the proceeding is not by the party entitled in remainder for a con
veyance , but by one of the annuitants for the appointment of a trustee ,
for the purposes of the trust subsisting under the will of Ann Appleton ,
for the benefit of the annuitants , during the life of her children . But
the estate of the Baptist Union also vested at the death of Ann Apple
ton . The beneficiaries under her will are described by name ; to each
is given a separate and distinct sum by way of legacy or annuity ; to each
one eo nomine ; and , as we have said , their rights vested at their mother 's
death . The remainder was ready, at any time after the death of Ann
Appleton , to come into the possession of the Baptist Union whenever
and however the life -estate might determine . It was subject to no con
dition precedent, save the determination of the preceding estate . The
contingency was not annexed to the gift, or to the person entitled , but
to the time of enjoyment merely ; and , according to all the cases , the
remainder must be treated , not as a contingent , but as a vested , estate .
If this be so the rule against remoteness is satisfied , for not only the
particular estate , but the remainder supported by it , took effect within
lives in being at the creation of the power. “ The particular feature ,”
says Mr. Lewis , in his treatise on Perpetuities , “ in limitations of future
interests, with which the rule against perpetuities is connected , is the
time of their vesting , or , in other words , of their becoming transmissible
to the representative of the grantee , devisee , or legatee , and disposable
by him . When they are so limited as necessarily to allow this quality ,
within the legal period of remoteness , they are free from objection in
reference to the perpetuity rule .” Upon this question we may also refer
to Mifflin 's Appeal , 121 Pa. St. 205 , 15 Atl . 525 . “ If a remainder is
vested , that is , if it is ready to take effect whenever and however the
particular estate determines , it is immaterial that the particular estate
is determinable by a contingency which may fall beyond a life or lives
in being.” Gray , Perp . $ 209. Perpetuities are grants of property
wherein the vesting of an estate is unlawfully postponed . Philadelphia
v . Girard 's II eirs , 45 Pa. St. 26 ; Barclay v. Lewis , 67 Pa. St. 316 . The
main question decided in Smith 's Appeal is therefore not involved in
this case. The accuracy of that decision has been somewhat doubted by
the learned judge who wrote it , (Coggins ' Appeal , 124 Pa. St. 10 , 16
Atl. 579 ,) but the subject can only be further considered when a proper
case is presented .
Nor do we think the appointment is invalid , because in the exercise
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of the power the donee, without special direction of John Lawrence, the
testator, to that effect , in appointing the fee, declared certain uses and
trusts for life, with remainder over . The power conferred upon Mrs .
Appleton by her father 's will was “ to grant and convey the real estate
in fee ," " in such parts or shares ” as she by her last will should direct .
The power is wholly unrestricted . The entire discretion is committed
to the donee of the power to grant the fee in such form and to such
persons as she chose . In the exercise of that power she did appoint the
fee, and we think she was authorized , observing the rule against remote
ness, to declare such uses and trusts for life as would best carry out her
wishes with respect to the ultimate disposal of the property . No au
thorities have been cited to any different effect. On the contrary , ap
pointments in trust , even under restricted powers, would seem to have
been sustained , and , as illustrations of this , we have been referred to
Alexander V. Alexander , 2 Ves . Sr. 642 ; Trollope v . Linton , 1 Sim . &
S . 477 ; Crompe v . Barrow , 4 Ves. 681 ; Willis v . Kymer , ì Ch . Div.
181 ; 2 Sugd . Powers, 273 , 274 . The decree of the orphans ' court is
affirmed , and the appeal dismissed at the cost of the appellants .
Ev.64
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